

HÉGÉMONIE ET AUTONOMIE: LES PETITES *POLEIS* DANS LES *HELLÉNIQUES* DE XÉNOPHON*

Abstract: Le programme de se souvenir des petites *poleis* si elles ont accompli des actions dignes de mémoire (*Helléniques* VII 2. 1) exerce une double fonction de césure historique et idéologique dans la vision de Xénophon de l'histoire de son temps. L'autonomie égalitaire entre les *poleis megalai* et *mikrai* envisagée dans le cadre d'un ordre international inspiré par la Paix du Roi est remplacée par une autonomie consensuelle et volontairement autolimitée de la part des petites puissances en faveur de l'hégémonie partagée entre Sparte et Athènes. Après Leuctres le nouveau ordre international qui remet en cause la primauté politique, militaire et morale d'Athènes et de Sparte, introduit un scénario qui sort de l'horizon intellectuel et existentiel de Xénophon. L'adhésion des petites *poleis* aux grandes est indispensable au maintien de l'équilibre traditionnel. Xénophon, en revanche, ne renonce pas à croire en une Grèce authentiquement polycentrique, où la présence d'un réseau de petites puissances est complémentaire à l'existence des grandes *poleis*.

L'historiographie contemporaine a bien souligné la structure complexe des *Helléniques* de Xénophon malgré l'apparente simplicité de son exposé événementiel. Personne ne nie plus le projet unitaire de l'œuvre, mais cela n'empêche pas de reconnaître dans cette unité la somme de trois sections narratives, où les sujets sont, en ordre consécutif, la fin de la guerre du Péloponnèse (la *Suite* de Thucydide), l'hégémonie de Sparte dans la partie centrale de l'ouvrage et, pour terminer, un ensemble de fragments d'histoire du Péloponnèse dans les deux derniers livres. C'est une succession dans laquelle on a voulu voir comment Xénophon s'écarte peu à peu d'une histoire générale pour aboutir à une histoire régionale tout en transformant le projet d'écrire des *hellenika* en un projet qui se concentre davantage sur des *peloponnesiaka*¹. La narration de Xénophon décrit d'abord, dans la première section — et encore selon une méthode historiographique 'thucydidéenne' — les grandes puissances, le bipolarisme qui s'est créé autour de Sparte et d'Athènes, ensuite l'hégémonie

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¹ C'est la thèse de RIEDINGER 1991, p. 38-40, 80-96; cf. DAVERIO 2002, p. 28-40; DAVERIO 2004, p. 41-56.

absolue de Sparte qui fait son début en 403 et qui a atteint son apogée, selon les *Helléniques*, en 379 avant J.-C². Enfin le récit passe à considérer l'histoire régionale dans le cadre d'un ordre international polycentrique, où les petites puissances deviennent les protagonistes. Il traite surtout l'histoire des centres du Péloponnèse, qui jusqu'à ce moment, sont restés dans l'ombre de Sparte.

Les petites puissances ou *mikrai poleis*, si nous voulons employer la terminologie des sources grecques, font leur apparition sur la scène politique en tant que protagonistes du système international au début du IV^e siècle et cette présence va croître pendant les années suivantes. Ce changement est la conséquence de la crise et de la dissolution des hégémonies, c'est-à-dire d'Athènes d'abord, et de Sparte, par la suite, se montrant incapable d'assumer son rôle de grande puissance en Grèce. Cela se mêle avec une instabilité de plus en plus évidente, causée par les ambitions de nouveaux protagonistes — des *poleis* aussi bien que des individus — désireux de remplir le vide laissé par Sparte et Athènes. Ailleurs j'ai essayé d'expliquer qu'il faut attribuer à Xénophon le mérite de percevoir cette fragmentation, d'en souligner les traits spécifiques dans le cadre du système international de la première moitié du IV^e siècle et d'en avoir fait à la fois le sujet d'une narration historique³.

Les réflexions sur lesquelles je voudrais retenir mon attention dans les pages suivantes ont leur point de départ dans la présence des petites puissances dans les *Helléniques*. L'intérêt que prend Xénophon à ce sujet ne découle pas seulement de l'exigence nouvelle de devoir traiter de 'morceaux' d'histoire événementielle, mais s'inscrit aussi dans sa vision de l'histoire de son temps. L'historien se propose de définir le rôle des puissances mineures selon deux perspectives: du point de vue de leur condition en tant que *poleis* autonomes et souveraines et du point de vue de leurs rapports avec les grandes puissances. Par ailleurs, en examinant la fonction que les petites *poleis* exercent dans le récit événementiel des derniers livres des *Helléniques*, il nous sera possible de suivre l'itinéraire intellectuel que l'historien a parcouru pour parvenir à son interprétation du rapport entre autonomie et hégémonie.

² Xén., *Hell.* V 3.27.

³ DAVERIO 2004, p. 41-56. Cf. Daverio 2007, p. 391-404.

*Le programme historiographique de Xénophon d'après la paix du Roi:
un ordre international polycentrique et le système égalitaire entre
puissances grandes et petites*

Peu avant la conclusion des *Helléniques*, Xénophon introduit dans son récit une importante affirmation par laquelle il demande d'assigner aux petites *poleis* une dignité à la mémoire pareille à celle que les historiens réservent aux grandes *poleis*⁴:

Au fait, pour les grandes cités, quand elles ont fait quelque belle action, tous les historiens les mentionnent; mais il me semble que si une ville, si petite soit-elle, a accompli beaucoup de belles actions, il n'est que plus digne encore de les exposer.

Cette phrase doit retenir notre attention pour trois raisons. Premièrement, parce qu'il s'agit d'une déclaration programmatique par laquelle Xénophon entend organiser son exposé événementiel; cette déclaration se rattache au propos de l'historien de narrer ce qui est digne d'être rappelé, *to axiologon*; tel propos représente, comme on le sait, l'une des catégories les plus importantes d'interprétation dans les *Helléniques*⁵; deuxièmement, parce qu'elle semble adresser une critique aux prédécesseurs de Xénophon, à Hérodote et à Thucydide en particulier, tout en présentant des réminiscences littéraires, qui renvoient à ces historiens. Hérodote nous renseigne sur le programme de son œuvre, où il déclare de vouloir «parcourir indistinctement les grandes cités des hommes et les petites»⁶. Suivant la conception hérodotéenne de l'histoire, toute *polis* au cours de son existence trace une courbe qui, après avoir atteint son apogée, commence son déclin: en fait, l'historien précise que

celles qui jadis étaient grandes, la plupart des cas, sont devenues petites;
et celles qui étaient grandes de mon temps, étaient petites autrefois.

Ce passage rappelle un autre bien connu des *Helléniques* de Xénophon, où celui reprend le même concept en prêtant à Jason les mots suivants:

... les dieux, à ce qu'il semble, prennent souvent plaisir à grandir les
petits et à rapetisser les grands⁷.

⁴ Xen., *Hell.* VII 2.1.

⁵ Cf. DAVERIO 2002, p. 33-40.

⁶ Hdt. I 5.3-4 (traduction Ph.-E. Legrand).

⁷ *Hell.* VI 4.23. On peut comparer aussi ce passage avec Plat., *Leg.* III 676c: «au cours des époques les *poleis* ont été régies par des différentes *politeiai* et elles ont changées de petites cités en grandes ou bien de grandes en petites (καὶ τότε μὲν ἐξ ἐλαττόνων μείζους, τότε ἐξ μείζονων ἐλάττους)». Il faudrait pourtant s'interroger sur le rôle que l'expérience socratique partagée par Xénophon et Platon a exercé dans cette réflexion sur le développement cyclique de la *polis*, en reprenant toutefois la pensée d'Hérodote.

Thucydide, à son tour, dans un passage fameux du début de son ouvrage, invite son lecteur à évaluer l'importance des *poleis* selon des rapports de puissance plutôt que selon l'évidence des structures matérielles :

... Sans doute, s'il est vrai que Mycènes était petite, ou si telle ou telle place d'alors nous paraît aujourd'hui peu importante, on ne saurait en tirer un indice sûr pour mettre en doute que l'expédition ait eu l'ampleur que lui donnent les poètes et dont la tradition s'est maintenue⁸.

L'historien fait alors la comparaison entre Sparte et Athènes pour en arriver à conclure que le critère de la grandeur se fonde sur la puissance : c'est à la *dynamis* de décider si une *polis* est *mikra* ou *megale*. Le rapport entre *poleis* petites et grandes n'est donc pas un thème nouveau dans la tradition historiographique, mais ce qu'il y a d'original chez Xénophon est la méthode pour l'analyser. L'historien des *Helléniques* s'écarte du relativisme historique d'Hérodote et de Thucydide et s'applique, en revanche, à mettre les *mikrai poleis* au centre du discours historiographique, et cela pour nul autre motif qu'en raison de leur propre micro-dimension. Il nous faut considérer en troisième lieu, la place remarquable qu'occupe cette déclaration programmatique dans la structure des *Helléniques*. Hérodote et Thucydide avaient présenté le projet et le but de leurs ouvrages au début de l'exposé pour indiquer au lecteur la correcte interprétation du récit qui va suivre. Xénophon, par contre, explique sa méthode de traiter l'histoire à la fin de son ouvrage, comme s'il s'agissait d'un épilogue. Mais cet épilogue est en même temps un prologue, car il introduit un long *excursus* sur l'histoire d'une petite *polis*, notamment la cité de Phlionte. Il faut, donc, ne pas ignorer la réciprocité qui est établie entre l'affirmation de caractère général et son développement particulier.

Je crois qu'on peut dater de manière précise le moment où Xénophon commence à prêter une attention particulière aux petites puissances : c'est à partir de la Paix du Roi de 386, la première des paix générales (*koinai eirenai*) qui marquèrent l'histoire de la première moitié du IV^e siècle. La Paix du Roi représente une nouveauté essentielle en ce qui concerne le rôle attribué aux petites puissances dans les relations entre les *poleis* : c'est la première fois qu'un document officiel reconnaît un ordre international constitué de plusieurs interlocuteurs exerçant tous les mêmes droits. Le système polycentrique de la Grèce reçoit sa formalisation institutionnelle selon le principe clef de l'égalité juridique de toutes les

⁸ Thuc. I 10.1-3 (traduction J. de Romilly).

poleis: qu'elles soient grandes ou petites, les cités jouissent toutes dans la même mesure du droit à l'autonomie: «Le Roi Artaxersès estime juste que [...] on laisse aux autres villes grecques, grandes et petites, leur autonomie [...]»⁹.

Il importe, par conséquent, de relever que dans le cadre historique évoqué par Xénophon l'autonomie des *poleis* constitue la précondition de la paix¹⁰. L'abolition des différences juridiques entre grandes et petites puissances marque un changement fondamental dans les relations internationales. On ne peut pas oublier qu'en 386 la Grèce sortait d'un système international qui s'était développé dans une direction tout à fait contraire. À partir de la fin des guerres médiques les *poleis* grecques s'étaient rangées dans deux systèmes hégémoniques qui s'appuyaient respectivement sur Athènes et sur Sparte, la Ligue de Délos et la Ligue du Péloponnèse. La guerre du Péloponnèse n'avait fait que renforcer ce bipolarisme. Il s'ensuit que la *koine eirene* introduit une révolution radicale à deux niveaux: (1) au niveau de la culture politique, par le fait qu'elle dessinait un ordre international qui ne prévoyait plus d'hégémonies; (2) au niveau des relations entre *poleis*, par le fait qu'elle entraînait la déstructuration des systèmes d'alliance. En plus

⁹ Xen. *Hell.* V 1.31. Pour l'analyse historique, politique et juridique du texte je me borne à mentionner, parmi les nombreuses ouvrages, les plus spécifiques, telles que les monographies de Ryder, Urban et de Jehne auxquelles j'ajoute l'étude récente de Alonso Troncoso. Cf. RYDER 1965; URBAN 1991, JEHNE 1994; ALONSO TRONCOSO 2003. Pour des données bibliographiques plus complètes cfr. DAVERIO 2002, p. 92-96.

¹⁰ L'autonomie rentre parmi les catégories qui constituent les piliers de la pensée politique des Grecs, le fil rouge de l'histoire de la *polis* comme écrit D. Musti: MUSTI 2000, p. 170-181. Mais il serait vain d'en chercher un traitement régulier dans la littérature politique, théorique ou philosophique, et autant moins dans l'historiographie. Il faut la reconstruire d'une série de témoignages, soit littéraires soit épigraphiques, qui sont hétérogènes sur la base du contenu aussi bien que du but et de la fonction du document ou du texte d'où elles sont tirées. À la moitié du XX^e siècle on peut reconduire les premières études fondamentales modernes de Ténékidès et Bikerman, qui ont fixé le cadre juridique du problème: TÉNÉKIDES 1954; BIKERMAN 1958, p. 99-127. Parmi les études il faut distinguer celles qui traitent l'autonomie à l'intérieur de la *polis* par rapport aux formes de gouvernement ou qui abordent le binôme *ἐλευθερία καὶ αὐτονομία* pour essayer de fixer les différents degrés de la notion d'indépendance, et celles qui considèrent l'autonomie par rapport aux relations internationales. Dans la première catégorie on va ranger OSTWALD 1982; KARAVITES 1982, p. 145-162 e 1984, p. 67-191; LÉVY 1983, p. 249-270; BOSWORTH 1992, p. 131-136; HANSEN 1995, p. 91-48 e 1998; RAAFLAUB 2004; dans la deuxième: PISTORIUS 1985; FIGUEIRA 1990, p. 63-88. Toutefois il s'agit d'une distinction assez rude selon les critères qui semblent inspirer l'intérêt de l'auteur: en fait, il n'est ni possible, ni raisonnable de séparer l'autonomie politique de la *polis* à l'intérieur de celle qui est à la base des relations à l'extérieur. De la sorte on rencontre dans une certaine mesure le traitement des mêmes questions dans les études que j'ai classé dans des catégories différentes.

elle déstabilisait l'équilibre qui avait régi la Grèce jusqu'à la défaite d'Athènes.

Xénophon fait preuve de croire en cet ordre nouveau, qui, dans sa vision laconocentrique de l'histoire de son temps, avait l'avantage d'assurer la primauté à Sparte grâce à son rôle de *prostatès* de la paix et de l'autonomie¹¹. Le fait qu'il signale ponctuellement tous les renouvellements de la paix du 386 au 369 peut être considéré comme un indice narratif très significatif témoignant de l'importance que l'historien accorde à la *koine eirene* dans le cadre de l'histoire des relations interhelléniques¹². Par les nombreuses violations de l'autonomie des *poleis* les plus faibles durant la guerre du Péloponnèse et les conflits qui suivirent dans les premières quinze années du IV^e siècle, le système polycentrique avait été remise en cause. Face à une telle crise, la *koine eirene* dans les *Helléniques* exprime toutes les attentes de Xénophon par rapport à un système fondé sur l'égalité de chaque *polis*, *megale* et *mikra*¹³, et où l'équilibre ainsi constitué se présente en même temps — il ne faut pas l'oublier — comme condition nécessaire de la paix. Afin de mieux cerner le rôle de petites cités dans le programme historique de Xénophon il nous faudra aussi esquisser le cadre plus large des développements politiques et des expériences juridiques qui ont contribué à créer tel ordre international égalitaire fondé sur l'autonomie de chaque *polis*.

Le binôme 'megalai' et 'mikrai' poleis

À partir de la Paix du Roi le binôme *megalai kai mikrai poleis* commença à fonctionner pour indiquer la condition nécessaire en vue d'assurer un

¹¹ Xen., *Hell.* V 1.36.

¹² Pour les renouvellements de la *koine eirene* entre 369 et 371 av. J.-C. et leur rôle dans le cadre des institutions du droit international grec dans le IV^e siècle voir ALONSO TRONCOSO 2003a.

¹³ Il faut préciser que la pensée philosophique et politique autant que l'historiographie ont envisagé la distinction entre cités *megalai* et *mikrai* selon d'autres critères qui touchent à la géographie, à la démographie et à l'économie. Selon Ph. Gauthier nous avons à faire avec un des exemples de classification binaire qui a rencontrée la faveur des intellectuels grecs de l'antiquité. Cf. GAUTHIER 1986-1987, p. 187-202. Amit considère des exemples historiques qui mettent en lumière le conflit entre les grandes puissances et les petites *poleis*: Égine/Athènes, Platée/Thèbes, Mantinée/Sparte. Cf. AMIT 1973. J'ai étudié ailleurs le binôme *megale/mikra polis* au sein de la tradition historiographique et par rapport aux conditions qui définissent une distinction d'ordre social et légal. Cfr. DAVERIO 1991, p. 53-71.

ordre égalitaire sur le plan international¹⁴. L'autonomie devenait incompatible avec chaque alliance dominée par une hégémonie. Les data procurés par d'autres sources permettent de constater, en effet, que l'application de l'autonomie dans les relations internationales donna lieu à une série des conséquences dans les années qui succédèrent à la *koine eirene*. Le témoignage le plus significatif est donné par le décret athénien où sont stipulés les critères selon lesquels on avait établi la Seconde Ligue Maritime (378/77), c'est-à-dire le décret d'Aristote (d'après le nom du proposant) ou de Nausinicos (d'après le nom de l'archonte)¹⁵. Au vrai centre des attentes des alliés athéniens en matière d'autonomie — attentes que le décret d'Aristote s'efforçait d'honorer —, se trouvent les mesures qui visent à garantir l'intégrité territoriale et juridique¹⁶: des clauses interdisant d'instaurer des cléruchies, d'envoyer des commandants militaires, de se soumettre aux ordres imposés par le magistrat de la cité hégémonique. Il s'agit de précautions visant à protéger non seulement les membres contre la réintroduction des mesures appliquées jadis par l'administration d'Athènes au sein de la Ligue de Délos (le droit au gouvernement autonome et les cléruchies), mais aussi de celles qui avaient été mises en pratique par Sparte (au moins à partir de 403) dans les *poleis* de l'Egée. Pensons à l'interdiction des *phourai* et du magistrat étranger, ce qui rappelle les harmostes et les garnisons lacédémoniennes dans les cités des ex-alliés athéniens. Mais le résultat le plus important pour les cités concerne le droit de se gouverner avec la *politeia* qu'elles choisissent de se donner, stipulation qui réalise au plus haut degré l'idée de l'autonomie. Certes, il est évident que les *symmachoi* de 378/77 voulaient

¹⁴ Il faut remarquer que au V^e siècle le binôme appartenait au vocabulaire de la Ligue du Péloponnèse. Dans l'Assemblée des *symmachoi* qui décida de la guerre contre Athènes, tous les alliés, grands et petits, votèrent. Cf. Thuc. I 125.1: ψῆφον ἐπήγαγον τοῖς ξυμμάχοις ἅπασιν ... καὶ μεῖζονι καὶ ἐλάσσονι πόλει. En 418/17 Sparte dans le traité avec Argos entend garantir l'autonomie des cités grandes et petites. Cf. Thuc. V 77.5: τὰς δὲ πόλιας τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ, καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας, αὐτονόμως εἶμεν πάσας κατὰ πάτρια. Selon Lévy cette clause annonce, dans une certaine mesure, la Paix du Roi. Cf. LÉVY 1983, p. 252. Le binôme est employé aussi dans le décret du Congrès convoqué par Périclès selon le texte du Plutarque qui en fournit le témoignage. Cf. Plut., *Per.* 17.1.

¹⁵ *SGHI* II 123. Cf. Diod. XV 29. Pour l'étude complète de toutes les questions posées par la Seconde Ligue Maritime, voir CARGILL 1981; DREHER 1995. K. Raaflaub reconnaît dans le décret d'Aristote la source la plus importante pour examiner de façon concrète l'application de l'autonomie. Cf. RAAFLAUB 2004, p. 146 ss.

¹⁶ *SGHI* II 123, ll. 9-12, 25-46: interdiction de la propriété, publique et privée, pour les Athéniens sur le sol des *poleis* alliées. Pour une analyse des caractéristiques et des fonctions de cléruchies par rapport à l'hégémonie athénienne, voir SALOMON 1997 (avec une très riche bibliographie).

prévenir de possibles projets d'hégémonie de la part d'Athènes, mais je crois pouvoir y découvrir aussi une volonté de se conformer aux conditions imposées par la Paix du Roi qui visaient à réaliser l'autonomie au niveau international, dans le domaine beaucoup plus large des rapports entre cités.

On sait que Xénophon ne fait pas mention de la fondation de la Seconde Ligue Maritime: son silence est unanimement considéré par l'historiographie moderne comme l'une des omissions les plus surprenantes des *Helléniques*¹⁷. Il est inévitable qu'un silence pareil ne cesse de nous étonner autant par son caractère tendancieux philolaconien et anti-athénien que parce qu'il ignore tout simplement le témoignage le plus remarquable qui nous renseigne sur l'application de l'autonomie au niveau des relations internationales durant les années qui suivirent à la Paix du Roi. Il reste, cependant, que le récit xénophontéen des événements postérieurs à la paix fait preuve des grands espoirs que l'historien a eus au sujet des effets de la *koine eirene* pour l'équilibre de la Grèce. Nous apercevons la maturation d'une conscience politique qui reconnaît dans les droits à l'autonomie et à la liberté des *poleis* les piliers sur lesquels repose la coexistence pacifique entre les Grecs. Il est vrai que Xénophon est moins direct que Diodore quand il s'agit de dénoncer les attentats que Sparte, oubliant son rôle de *prostatès* de la paix, a portés à l'autonomie des petites puissances¹⁸. Toutefois il ne néglige pas de signaler les épisodes qui en attestent la violation, et cela selon une attitude qui restera constante jusqu'à la fin de l'œuvre et qui poussera l'historien à exprimer un jugement moral très sévère à l'égard de l'occupation de la Cadmée:

On pourrait, d'une manière générale, citer bien d'autre faits, chez les Grecs et chez les Barbares, pour prouver que les dieux n'oublient pas ceux qui violent les lois divines et humaines; mais je me contenterai du récit qui va suivre. Les Lacédémoniens, qui, après avoir juré de laisser toutes les villes autonomes, s'étaient emparés de l'Acropole de Thèbes, reçurent leur première punition de ceux-là seuls qu'ils avaient lésés, eux que personne n'avait jamais vaincus¹⁹.

¹⁷ Cf. LÉVY 1990, p. 125-127; RIEDINGER 1991, p. 41-60; DAVERIO 2002, p. 33-40; JEHNE 2004, p. 463-480.

¹⁸ Ou sa source Éphore. Cf. Diod. XV 5.1-3, 19.1.

¹⁹ Xen., *Hell.* V 4.1 (traduction J. Hatzfeld). La dénonciation de l'affaire de la Cadmée n'est que le début de la condamnation globale de l'*arché* de Sparte dans le récit après la *koine eirene* du 386. Cf. TUPLIN 1993, p. 99 ss.; DILLERY 1995, p. 221 ss.; GILLONE 2004, p. 116 ss.

Plus tranchante encore est l'accusation que Xénophon met dans la bouche de l'Athénien Autoclès dans le discours qu'il prononce à la Conférence de Sparte, discours que l'on pourrait, à vrai dire, qualifier de «Mani-feste» de l'autonomie:

Citoyens de Lacédémone [...] vous, vous ne cessez de répéter: 'Il faut que les cités soient autonomes', et c'est vous qui êtes le plus grand obstacle à l'autonomie²⁰.

Résumons brièvement les deux principales violations selon le notable athénien: l'imposition aux alliés des ordres militaires de Sparte et de gouvernements oligarchiques qui tiennent les villes par la force²¹. Après les discours Xénophon énumère les conditions de la paix que les Lacédémoniens acceptèrent²²:

[...] les Lacédémoniens à leur tour votèrent qu'ils acceptaient la paix aux conditions suivantes: ils retireraient les harmostes des villes; les troupes en campagne, sur terre comme sur mer, étaient licenciées; on laissait aux cités leur autonomie; si quelqu'un agissait contre ces conditions, ceux qui le voudraient pourraient venir au secours des villes mal-traitées, mais ceux qui ne le voudraient pas ne seraient pas tenus par serment de combattre pour les États lésés²³.

²⁰ Xen., *Hell.* VI 3.7-9 (traduction J. Hatzfeld). Ce discours a été analysé d'une façon magistrale par G. Schepens et c'est à ses conclusions que j'entends me rallier. Cf. SCHEPENS 2001a, p. 81-96.

²¹ Xen., *Hell.* VI 3.7. À propos des *symmachoi* de la Ligue du Péloponnèse, notamment sur la question de deux niveaux d'alliés, les anciennes alliés du territoire du Péloponnèse, et les nouveaux dans l'Égée parmi les ex-*symmachoi* d'Athènes après la dissolution de la Ligue délienne je me borne à mentionner les titres les plus récents: RHODES 2000, col. 500-501; BIRGALIAS 2003, p. 19-26; CARTLEDGE 2003, p. 223-230; FUNKE 2004, p. 427-435; GILLONE 2004, p. 115-141 et GILLONE 2007, p. 3-34 (avec une exhaustive bibliographie). Pour le concept de *symmachie* à propos de la Ligue du Péloponnèse cf. CHRISTIEN 2007, p. 77-93. Voir aussi SCHEPENS 1993, p. 169-203 e 2001b, p. 81-96. Le discours d'Autoclès rentre dans la trilogie à laquelle appartiennent les discours de Callistrate et de Callias aussi: Xen., *Hell.* VI 3.4-17. En général les idées développées dans les trois discours forment une réflexions homogène. Tuplin y reconnaît six thèmes abordant l'explorations de sujets comme la paix, le rapprochement entre Athènes et Sparte, la co-opération politique. Cf. TUPLIN 1993, p. 103-104. Pour les études de la trilogie du point de vue de l'analyse structurelle et de sa fonction dans le contexte narratif je renvoie à la riche bibliographie de SCHEPENS 2001a, p. 81-96.

²² Xen., *Hell.* VI 3.18.

²³ À cet engagement on ajoute la motion proposée par le lacédémonien Prothoos après la Conférence dans le but de raffermir l'autonomie. Cf. Xen., *Hell.* VI 4.3: «si quelqu'un violait l'autonomie des *poleis*, il fallait convoquer de nouveau une Conférence de tous les États favorables à l'autonomie et décider la mobilisation contre l'agresseur». Les Lacédémoniens ne votèrent pas en faveur de sa proposition. Sur Prothoos et son programme politique en opposition à Agésilas, cf. BEARZOT 2004, p. 109-118.

Je partage le jugement de G. Schepens que dans ce programme nous avons sous les yeux le modèle de la Seconde Ligue Maritime, et qu'en général l'accord conclu et juré en cette occasion réaffirme les clauses que nous connaissons grâce au décret d'Aristote²⁴. D'ailleurs, je voudrais ajouter que ces accords avaient été conclus dans le but de remédier à la crainte qu'inspirait la politique lacédémonienne aux *poleis* de la mer Egée. Les devoirs que les Lacédémoniens acceptent d'accomplir conformément aux clauses de la Paix du Roi sont tout à fait comparables aux prescriptions du décret d'Aristote pour régler les relations entre Athènes et ses alliés. Dans un cas et dans l'autre c'est aux principes établis par la *koine eirene* qu'on a recours pour faire respecter l'autonomie²⁵. Autoclès nous le rappelle d'ailleurs de manière explicite:

Et lorsque le Roi ordonnait que les cités fussent autonomes, vous saviez très bien — et on le voyait — que, si les Thébains ne laissaient pas à chaque ville le droit de disposer d'elle-même et d'avoir les lois qu'elle voudrait, ils n'agiraient pas d'accord avec le rescrit royal.

Ce que nous avons vu jusqu'ici, nous permet, je crois, de formuler les conclusions suivantes. Xénophon introduit dans son récit le texte du traité de la Paix du Roi. Il nous montre que la *koine eirene* visait à réaliser un régime global de l'autonomie aussi bien dans la politique intérieure que dans la gestion des affaires étrangères. Dans la suite du récit il donne pour sûr que les lecteurs connaissent les critères et les conditions qui assuraient son application. Il ne cite pas la Seconde Ligue Maritime dont nous connaissons la charte constitutionnelle grâce au décret d'Aristote, qui fait le point sur la façon dont Athènes et ses alliées ont essayé d'implémenter l'autonomie. Toutefois, nous apercevons que Xénophon se tient à ces mêmes critères pour juger la violation de l'autonomie et que ce sont encore ces mêmes critères que les Lacédémoniens s'engagent à respecter lors de la conclusion de paix à la Conférence de Sparte du 371. Dans son récit Xénophon met en évidence en quoi réside, selon lui, l'ordre international nouveau que la Paix du Roi a instauré en Grèce: il s'agit de l'égalité des *poleis megalai* et *mikrai* dans l'autonomie, dont ressortissent toutes les mesures au niveau de la conduite politique de chaque *polis*. De son poste d'observation lacédémonien il a choisi d'ignorer le programme 'particulier' athénien parce qu'il s'est engagé à souligner la primauté de Sparte en tant que responsable pour l'application du traité de *koine eirene* au niveau

²⁴ Cf. SCHEPENS, 2001a, p. 81-96.

²⁵ Xén., *Hell.* VI 3.9.

général et à indiquer les normes principales auxquelles les autres doivent se conformer. On peut avancer l'hypothèse que toutes les garanties d'autonomie qu'on retrouve formulées dans la charte de la Seconde Ligue Maritime et dont la violation semble se celer dans le discours d'Autoclès, ne relèvent que de l'application de la Paix du Roi²⁶. Les Athéniens y répondirent avec la Seconde Ligue Maritime: ils s'engageaient à fournir des garanties concrètes au sujet de l'autonomie juridictionnelle, de la propriété du sol et du paiement du tribut. Les Spartiates furent obligés à rappeler les harmostes et les garnisons, tandis que toutes les *poleis*, grandes et petites, renonçaient aux forces militaires sur terre et sur mer.

Un cas exemplaire: Phlionte

Pour ce qui est du récit des événements dans les deux derniers livres des *Helléniques*, on y retrouve, comme je viens de le signaler plus haut, une inclination progressive à privilégier les petites puissances, de sorte que nous ayons à faire à des 'morceaux' d'histoire du Péloponnèse. Du point de vue de la méthode, on notera l'emploi des discours auxquels l'historien confie le traitement de ses idées²⁷. En fait, l'une des caractéristiques des deux derniers livres des *Helléniques*, comparés aux livres précédents, est que nous y saisissons d'une façon très forte, notamment dans les discours, la présence de l'auteur. À travers les paroles de ses protagonistes Xénophon introduit sa propre interprétation des événements, communique son jugement moral. Quant à sa réflexion, une partie des sections discursives aborde le thème de l'autonomie dans son rapport dialectique avec l'hégémonie en termes d'opposition ou de complémentarité.

²⁶ Voir aussi P. Cartledge selon lequel la Seconde Ligue Maritime représente un effort remarquable pour réinterpréter les rapports de la symmachie hégémoniale selon les principes de la Paix du Roi. Cf. CARTLEDGE 1987, p. 30. Selon C. Bearzot, l'autonomie cessait, en vertu du décret d'Aristote, de fonctionner comme un slogan de propagande pour devenir la clé des relations internationales, parce que ses contenus étaient fixés avec clarté. Cf. BEARZOT, 2004, p. 117. On peut partager ce jugement si on accepte que l'apparat normatif du décret est enraciné dans les principes de la Paix du Roi et que ceux-ci ne sont pas des moyens de propagande, mais le résultat d'un traité pour la première fois authentiquement international dans la mesure où il était soussigné par toutes les cités de la Grèce.

²⁷ Sur la place clef qu'occupent les discours dans les *Helléniques*, voir RIEDINGER 1991, p. 86-94. Ils ont retenu également l'attention de V. Gray, qui les a étudiés en tant que véhicules d'informations historiques et de messages moraux de l'auteur: GRAY 1981, p. 321-328; 1989, p. 49-63; 2003, p. 111-123. Je m'en suis occupée à propos de l'usage de la parole par Xénophon dans sa représentation de Sparte. Cf. Daverio 2007, p. 391-402 (= Actes du Colloque international organisé à l'École Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines à Lyon, 15-17 juillet 2006, *Xénophon et Sparte*).

Cependant, alors que l'idée de l'autonomie, comme nous venons de voir dans les pages précédentes, est présentée par l'auteur dans le cadre de l'histoire événementielle, le thème de l'hégémonie fait l'objet d'une réflexion plutôt théorique. Le rapport entre autonomie et hégémonie est examiné dans les discours prononcés par les représentants de petites puissances: Polydamas de Pharsale, Stasippos de Tégée et Proclès de Phlionte; leurs réflexions ont été entamées précédemment par le discours de Cleigénès d'Acanthe au livre V²⁸. Ce rapport se traduit dans l'opposition entre les droits des petites *poleis* et le pouvoir des cités les plus grandes. Par les discours de Polydamas et de Stasippos Xénophon affirme que les *megalai poleis* empêchent l'autonomie des petites cités. Le discours de Cleigénès attire l'attention sur la dispute entre Olynthe — *megiste polis* de la Thrace, selon la définition du notable d'Acanthe — et les petites cités de la région. La grande cité empêche les petites puissances de se gouverner elles-mêmes, tout en les obligeant à partager la citoyenneté d'Olynthe²⁹. On observera aussi que Stasippos de Tégée accorde, dans ses revendications de l'autonomie, une place importante à l'intégrité du territoire et que Cleigénès dénonce l'occupation de Potidée par Olynthe. En général, on ne manquera pas de noter les analogies entre les critères invoqués par les représentants des petites *poleis* et les clauses du décret d'Aristote en faveur de l'autonomie des *symmachoi* athéniens, d'une part, et la propension de l'auteur à se ranger du côté des *mikrai poleis*, de l'autre.

Par les discours de Proclès Xénophon aborde le sujet de la nature de l'hégémonie. Σκέψις τῆς ἡγεμονίας est le but déclaré de l'auteur³⁰. J'ai déjà eu l'occasion d'interpréter ces discours comme le point d'arrivée de sa réflexion par rapport à ce sujet³¹. Après avoir montré par les paroles

²⁸ Polydamas de Pharsale: Xen., *Hell.* VI 1.4-16; Stasippos de Tégée: *Hell.* VI 5.6; Proclès de Phlionte: *Hell.* VI 5.38-48; VII 1.2-11. Il faut ajouter l'anticipation du discours de Cleigénès d'Acanthe: *Hell.* V 2.12-19. Dans les discours des délégués d'Acanthe et de Tégée C. Bearzot croit reconnaître l'opposition entre le programme de l'autonomie et celui du fédéralisme. Voir BEARZOT 2004, p. 45-56, 119-126.

²⁹ Selon Xén. *Hell.* V 2.15, Olynthe inspire une violente crainte aux autres cités de la région, de sorte qu'elles n'osent pas participer à l'ambassade demandant le secours de Sparte. Pareille attitude illustre, d'après K. Raaflaub, les conséquences de l'intrusion dans l'autonomie en matière de politique étrangère. Cf. RAAFLAUB 2004, p. 190.

³⁰ Xen., *Hell.* VII 1.2.

³¹ DAVERIO 2004, p. 41-56. En général ces discours s'inscrivent dans la pensée du IV^e siècle par rapport à ce thème et en illustrent quelques unes des réflexions les plus importantes. Cf. WICKERSHAM 1994, p. 109 ss. Ils ont été différemment expliqués comme une pièce rhétorique ayant pour but d'exalter l'histoire d'une grande puissance (Athènes) par

de Cleigénès et de Polydamas le côté négatif de l'hégémonie, Xénophon, par les mots de Proclès, s'attache à trouver la formule d'une hégémonie soutenable, c.-à-d. une hégémonie qui, dans sa vision de l'ordre international, doit s'avérer compatible avec l'autonomie des petites puissances. Pourquoi le choix de confier ses idées à ce notable phliasien? Xénophon lui accorde une place importante dans l'exposé des *Helléniques*. Il est le seul auquel l'historien fait prononcer deux discours directs, qui sont, en plus, d'une longueur supérieure à toute autre *oratio recta* figurant dans le texte. C'est que les discours de Proclès attirent l'attention du lecteur sur Phlionte et se lient, par-là, aux segments narratifs des livres IV et V, où Xénophon avait donné une attention toute particulière au rôle joué par cette petite ville du Péloponnèse dans les événements de l'époque et où il nous avait présenté Proclès comme le chef des oligarques phliasien et l'ami personnel du roi Agésilas³². Si ses discours représentent le point d'arrivée de sa réflexion sur l'hégémonie, ils introduisent en même temps une série de considérations qui visent à mettre en relief la loyauté comme trait essentiel d'un système hégémonique positif fondé sur la fidélité des petites cités alliées à la puissance dominante. C'est cette valeur morale qui, dans l'ordre international esquissé par Proclès, doit régler les rapports entre *hegemon* et *symmachoi*. J.-C. Riedinger explique l'introduction d'une catégorie d'ordre moral dans le discours politique par le désir de Xénophon de mettre en lumière, dans une période si sombre pour Sparte, des événements consolateurs³³. Après le renversement de la démocratie Phlionte est rentrée, grâce à l'intervention de Proclès, dans la *symmachia* avec Sparte. Selon J.-C. Riedinger, Xénophon se laisserait guider ici par une vision affective, que son laconisme lui aurait inspiré.

Je crois que le programme de l'historien est plus complexe. En effet, après avoir proposé la charte de la loyauté, le discours de Proclès fait,

la reconnaissance qu'on lui accorde de la part d'une petite puissance, qui, de surcroît, est amie et alliée de Sparte: voir GRAY 1989, p. 112 ss. D'après DILLERY 1995, p. 161 ss. ils offriraient une réflexion philosophique et politique sur la nature du pouvoir hégémonique. BUCKLER 1982, p. 180-204 y décèle davantage le témoignage du rapprochement entre Athènes et Sparte, l'éloge d'Athènes étant balancé par celui de Sparte (cfr. BREITENBACH 1950, p. 125-126). G. Schepens est de l'opinion qu'il faut lire les discours de Proclès à la lumière de la trilogie athénienne où l'adhésion aux programmes en faveur de la paix s'inscrivent dans un horizon athénien; SCHEPENS 2001a, p. 81-96.

³² Xen., *Hell.* IV 2.15-16; V 2.8-9. Le récit expose la longue *stasis* des années 381-379, le renversement du régime oligarchique par les démocrates, l'intervention des Lacédémoniens qui, après un siège de 20 mois, rétablirent l'oligarchie. Cf. aussi Diod. XV 19-23; Xen., *Agés.* 11.22; Plut., *Pelop.* 5-6; Isocr., *Paneg.* 126.

³³ RIEDINGER 1991, p. 155, 198-206, 240-241.

dans le livre VII, fonction de prologue au long *excursus* sur Phlionte, qui commence au chapitre 2³⁴. Cette digression n'est pas vouée à l'histoire de la cité, mais on y lit plutôt un catalogue des vertus phliasiennes telles que l'amitié, le courage, la tempérance. D'un côté ces vertus ont le but de rassurer Sparte à propos du retour de Phlionte dans son alliance, de l'autre elles renforcent l'image de la loyauté de sorte que la cité péloponnésienne figure comme paradigme de l'allié fidèle³⁵. On n'est donc plus étonné de rencontrer à cet endroit le jugement programmatique, qui élève les petits *poleis* à la dignité à la mémoire³⁶. Ce jugement s'inscrit dans une évaluation générale, mais du point de vue de la structure logique et narrative il apparaît intimement cohérent avec le fragment phliasien du livre VII. Xénophon suit un parcours intellectuel qui fait sortir Phlionte de la chronique événementielle du Péloponnèse pour nous proposer le prototype de la petite puissance qui assume pleinement son rôle dans le cadre des rapports nouveaux entre 'hégémon' et 'symmachos'. En tant qu'orateur Proclès abandonne, à partir de la fin du livre VI, son rôle de leader local que nous avons connu auparavant. Dans sa personne Xénophon trace le portrait du représentant des petites puissances, qui prend la parole pour sauvegarder leurs droits³⁷.

Arrivés à ce point, nous pouvons apercevoir que l'historien a été déçu dans ses attentes par rapport aux perspectives qu'offrait la Paix du Roi: le système international où toutes les puissances, grandes et petites, jouaient du même poids, va s'effacer. À l'échec de la *koine eirene* s'ajoute encore la pression des nouvelles puissances, soit qu'il s'agisse de *poleis* comme Thèbes ou Olynthe ou bien d'individus comme Jason de Phères. Un nouveau ordre international va s'imposer en Grèce où la primauté de Sparte et d'Athènes est remise en cause pour faire place à un scénario qui sortait de l'horizon intellectuel et existentiel de Xénophon.

³⁴ Xen., *Hell.* VII 2.1-23. Cf. DAVERIO 2004, p. 41-56.

³⁵ Xénophon y ajoute le *pathos* de la cité-martyre en dressant l'image des souffrances de la *polis* au cours de guerres qui ont troublé le Péloponnèse dans les premières années du IV^e siècle. J'ai cru pouvoir reconnaître dans telle représentation l'écho de réminiscences thucydidiennes, où le destin des habitants de Mélos fournit le modèle. Cf. DAVERIO 2004, p. 50-55.

³⁶ Voir *supra* p. 00.

³⁷ Selon WICKERSHAM 1994, p. 109 il est «the spokesman for the few small states who stay with Sparta». RIEDINGER 1991 p. 202 ss. définit Proclès comme le 'sauveur'. Ses discours, notamment celui du livre VII, exercent la fonction de faire connaître la voix d'une sagesse politique supérieure.

L'énonciation programmatique du livre VII remplit donc aussi la fonction, plus significative encore, de césure historique et idéologique dans la vision de Xénophon de l'histoire de son temps. Cette césure permet d'introduire le segment phliasien qui, à mon avis, n'est pas seulement un 'fragment' d'histoire régionale. Par les discours de Proclès Xénophon quitte la voie, très difficile à suivre, de l'autonomie égalitaire pour s'engager dans un parcours qui essaie de repenser les rôles traditionnels attribués aux hégémons tout en respectant en même temps les droits des *mikrai poleis*. L'historien se prononce en faveur d'une hégémonie partagée entre Sparte et Athènes³⁸. Ceci n'est pas le lieu pour aborder toutes les questions que pose la formule de l'hégémonie duale, soit au niveau de sa réalisation historique soit à celui de la pensée politique et de la rhétorique du IV^e siècle³⁹. L'idée d'une hégémonie partagée circulait, bien sûr, depuis longtemps dans la réflexion politique⁴⁰.

L'hégémonie demande le contrôle absolu de la terre et de la mer. Cependant, le programme de Proclès/Xénophon esquissé dans le discours de la deuxième Conférence d'Athènes constitue l'exposé le plus complet et le plaidoyer le plus passionné d'un nouveau modèle d'hégémonie partagée entre les deux puissances les plus qualifiées à la recouvrir: Sparte par terre et Athènes sur mer. Il énonce les conditions et les mérites qui légitiment l'une et l'autre cité à exercer l'hégémonie respectivement sur mer et sur terre. Il s'agit d'abord de caractéristiques géographiques, et, ensuite, de la possession des moyens militaires et des connaissances technologiques dans le domaine de la guerre maritime et terrestre, pour en finir avec les modes de vie conditionnés par l'exploitation des ressources maritimes et terrestres. Je remarque que les conditions requises sont les

³⁸ Xen., *Hell.* VII 1.2-11.

³⁹ Cf. TUPLIN 1993, p. 114 ss: le projet confié à Proclès était séduisant sur le plan politique; malheureusement on manque des données pour envisager un co-commandement sortant de la coopération. Au contraire J. WICKERSHAM 1994, p. 109, pense que Proclès «showed himself to be a theorist of hegemony»; selon lui le programme sera transformé en réalité dans l'alliance conclue entre Athènes et Sparte à l'occasion de la bataille de Mantinée. Selon ALONSO TRONCOSO 2003b, p. 347-348 la co-hégémonie était une possibilité envisagée par la diplomatie grecque à partir de la fin de l'âge archaïque.

⁴⁰ Les premiers témoignages concernant le projet d'une hégémonie à deux proviennent du *Panégérique* d'Isocrate. Cfr. Isocr., *Paneg.* 100-185, avec les considérations de BUCHNER 1958, p. 108 ss.; DOBESCH 1968, p. 95 ss.; PORCIANI 1996, p. 31-39; WICKERSHAM 1994, p. 136 ss.; ASHERI 2000, p. 193-199. Pour une analyse institutionnelle de l'hégémonie duale voir Alonso TRONCOSO 2003, p. 347-348. R. Brock établit des analogies entre l'hégémonie telle qu'elle est envisagée par Xénophon et la pensée de Platon; ces deux auteurs seraient redevables à leur commun maître, Socrate. Cf. BROCK 2004, p. 247-257.

mêmes que Xénophon a passées en revue dans les cas d'Olynthe et de Jason de Phères. Toutefois, tandis que dans ces occasions-là elles constituaient une menace potentielle à l'autonomie des petites *poleis*, elles offrent maintenant le point de départ pour une hégémonie 'vertueuse' qui trouve l'adhésion des petites cités.

D'où vient cette différence? Je crois qu'elle trouve son origine dans le libre consentement des *poleis* mineures, capable, selon Xénophon, de donner de la force et de la crédibilité à la *symmachia*⁴¹. Dans son important ouvrage sur l'hégémonie de l'Antiquité à nos jours le savant allemand Heinrich Triepel affirme que c'est en raison du caractère libre de l'adhésion ou mieux, en raison de l'adhésion volontaire, que les Grecs pouvaient justifier l'alliance hégémonique⁴². Les alliés donnaient leur appui, puisqu'ils reconnaissaient les vertus de la puissance hégémonique. Dans une telle optique, comme le souligne H. Triepel, même les devoirs imposés aux alliés, qu'ils soient militaires ou financiers, ne sont pas à considérer comme des exigences injustes, puisqu'ils résultent d'engagements pris volontairement. On choisit donc comme chef l'état ou l'individu capable de se prodiguer pour le bien de tous. En raison du différent poids des deux puissances hégémoniques et des autres partenaires, le projet de Proclès/Xénophon met sur pied une alliance asymétrique bien qu'homogène dans la mesure où il y ait convergence d'intérêts entre *mikrai* et *megalai poleis*⁴³.

C'est dans cette perspective qu'il faut envisager l'originalité de Xénophon. Par son programme de confier la *σκέψις τῆς ἡγεμονίας* au représentant d'une puissance mineure il a choisi de décrire le rapport entre grandes et petites *poleis* 'du bas', tout en valorisant le rôle des petites puissances dans les *symmachiai* hégémoniales. Par ailleurs nous ne pouvons pas ignorer que dans cette alliance on va re-proposer le dualisme inégal entre petites et grandes puissances. L'image d'une hégémonie 'vertueuse' dans le programme de Xénophon s'accorde avec un système où

⁴¹ Dans son premier discours Proclès dit que grâce à l'appui de la cité qui exerce l'hégémonie, les petites *poleis* peuvent, elles aussi, accroître leur puissance. Cf. Xen., *Hell.* VI 5.44.

⁴² Cf. TRIEPEL 1949, p. 380-387. Selon Triepel l'hégémonie est le produit de la convergence de deux ordres d'intérêts: la nécessité du partenaire faible de recevoir un appui, et l'ambition de la grande puissance à maintenir sa primauté.

⁴³ Une alliance est définie asymétrique par les théoriciens contemporains des relations internationales si elle embrasse des sujets qui ne sont pas égaux par leurs capacités stratégiques. Pareille alliance peut être qualifiée d'homogène ou d'hétérogène en fonction des programmes ou des objectifs qui s'avèrent compatibles ou non avec les intérêts de tous les participants. Cf. CESA 2007, p. 96-113.

les puissances mineures acceptent une souveraineté limitée en matière de politique étrangère; en échange elles demandent des garanties dans les domaines de la sécurité et de l'autonomie intérieure.

Pour conclure, les discours de Proclès prononcés aux Conférences d'Athènes nous amènent à reconnaître un changement de direction dans la pensée de Xénophon: les paroles du notable phliasien esquissent un ordre international tout à fait différent de celui qui sortait de la paix du Roi. L'autonomie égalitaire est remplacée par une autonomie consensuelle et volontairement autolimitée de la part des petites *poleis*. On peut, en toute vraisemblance, assigner une date à ce changement de direction. C'est la bataille de Leuctres qui a décidé de la fin des équilibres traditionnels en Grèce et qui a assigné la suprématie à Thèbes, c'est-à-dire, à la puissance qui dès 386 s'était acharnée contre les *koinai eirenai* et s'opposait à l'autonomie des *poleis* de la Béotie. Proclès/Xénophon est d'avis que la rupture des équilibres traditionnels à la suite de l'hégémonie de Thèbes ne resterait pas sans conséquences pour les petites villes comme d'ailleurs aussi pour les grandes puissances. Du côté des *mikrai poleis* ce serait l'autonomie à être menacée, du côté de Sparte et Athènes il y aurait la perte de leur primauté politique et militaire ainsi que du rôle moral et spirituel qu'ils exerçaient dans la Grèce entière et que tout le monde leur reconnaissait. Pour maintenir l'ordre traditionnel il importait qu'on retrouve l'unité, ce qui est possible par le partage du commandement. Dans le récit des *Helléniques* le discours de Proclès tient lieu d'assurer l'adhésion des petites puissances par le recours aux valeurs morales de la loyauté et de la fidélité. L'histoire de Phlionte offre le témoignage par excellence de la conduite exemplaire d'une petite ville, qui se laisse inspirer par ces valeurs.

En somme, si Xénophon s'est sans doute rallié à la tradition historiographique d'Hérodote et de Thucydide par son programme de se souvenir des petites cités, si elles ont accompli de belles actions, il convient de souligner, avant toute autre chose, qu'il se présente comme l'historien de son temps. La conscience d'une Grèce authentiquement polycentrique lui est toujours restée présente à l'esprit et il s'est interrogé sur les voies à parcourir et sur les moyens à mettre en œuvre pour en assurer la survie.

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ORGANIZZAZIONE DEGLI SPAZI URBANI E POLITICA: IL POSTO DELLA *SCHOLÉ* NELLA CITTÀ IDEALE DI ARISTOTELE*

Abstract: La progettazione di una doppia *agora* nella città ideale di cui si parla nel settimo libro della *Politica* sembra riprendere il modello urbanistico della capitale persiana, quale ci è tramandato da Senofonte nella *Ciropedia*. Di fatto, però, non risulta chiara la funzione assegnata da Aristotele all'*agora* alta, destinata specificamente alla *scholé*, quasi a voler colmare la mancata attenzione alle attività e funzioni «superflue» nella *polis* ideale in *Pol.* 1328b19ss.

Cosa intende qui Aristotele con il termine *scholé* e come mai riserva questo spazio esclusivamente ai *presbyteroi*?

Nel cercare delle risposte a questi interrogativi, l'A. individua nella prefigurazione dell'*agora* alta un nuovo modello educativo basato fondamentalmente sull'interazione e lo scambio fra uomini maturi e magistrati, che intende garantire la formazione permanente del gruppo politico destinato al naturale avvicendamento nelle cariche.

Nel settimo libro della *Politica* Aristotele, per condurre la sua ricerca sulla «costituzione migliore», si pone preliminarmente tre obiettivi: determinare quale sia il miglior tipo di vita (1323a14 ss.); individuare, se è possibile, quello che è il migliore «per tutti» (*ibid.* a20) e, infine, stabilire se il genere di vita che può esser definito il migliore per un singolo individuo possa risultare tale anche per tutti i cittadini (*ibid.* a21). Dopo aver ribadito la corrispondenza fra la felicità del singolo cittadino e quella dell'intera comunità civica¹, basata fondamentalmente sulla rappresentazione di quest'ultima quale risultante dalla somma dei singoli individui e delle loro qualità personali², il filosofo si sofferma sugli elementi

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¹ Cf. 1324a5 ss.: «rimane da indagare se siano identiche la felicità del singolo e quella della città. Ma questo è evidente: tutti saranno d'accordo nel riconoscere che è la stessa»; 1325b30 ss. «è quindi evidente che lo stesso genere di vita è il migliore per un individuo, come per le città e per tutti gli uomini». Su questa tematica negli ultimi due libri della *Politica* cf. E. SCHÜTRUMPF, *Die Analyse der Polis durch Aristoteles*, Amsterdam 1980, p. 1 ss.

² 1332a38: «se ciascun individuo è virtuoso, anche i cittadini nella loro totalità sono virtuosi». Sulle rappresentazione della massa e sulle qualità attribuitele da Aristotele cf. J. WALDRON, *The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book III, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's Politics*, in *Aristotle's Politics. Critical Essays*, ed. by R. Kraut – S. Shultety, Lanham (MD) 2005, p. 145 ss.; cf. pure il mio *Giudizio artistico e maturità politica: una tematica aristotelica*, *Athenaeum* 64 (1986), p. 127-137.

fondamentali per costruire la città ideale, cioè sui cittadini e sul territorio, che dovranno avere entrambi determinate qualità³.

Così come i cittadini non dovranno essere né troppi né troppo pochi⁴, ma in numero tale da essere abbracciati con un solo sguardo⁵, perché il politico e il legislatore possano compiere nel modo migliore la loro opera (1326a4 s.), lo stesso criterio vale per il territorio (1326b26), che dovrà presentare determinate qualità, in relazione alla necessaria autosufficienza della *polis* (*ibid.* b27 ss.), e una certa estensione (*ibid.* b30 ss.).

Il filosofo affronta poi il problema della scelta della posizione migliore della città, sia rispetto al mare per facilitare i commerci con l'esterno (1327a18-20), sia rispetto al retroterra (1327a3 ss.) per un adeguato sviluppo del trasporto e della distribuzione interna dei prodotti (1327a7 ss.). A questo proposito, riprende in esame la questione, già discussa da Platone nelle *Leggi*⁶, se la vicinanza al mare sia utile o dannosa al buon ordinamento delle città, concludendo che, se si riesce ad evitare il danno che potrebbe venire dalla frequentazione di uomini vissuti sotto leggi diverse, la vicinanza è sicuramente la posizione più vantaggiosa, innanzitutto per lo scambio agevolato dei prodotti, ma anche per la sicurezza stessa dei cittadini (1327a11 ss.).

Fra le condizioni che garantiscono una posizione favorevole della città, egli assegna il primo posto alla salubrità del luogo in cui sorge (1330a38 ss.)⁷; quindi sottolinea che le caratteristiche del territorio dovranno essere funzionali al buon svolgimento sia dell'attività politica sia di quella bellica (1330a41 ss.), e, privilegiando di fatto le esigenze di sicurezza della *polis*, conclude che la conformazione del luogo dovrà essere tale da garantire l'evacuazione degli abitanti in caso di pericolo e la sua difendibilità da attacchi dei nemici (1330b2 s.).

Infine, dopo aver indicato senza alcuna pretesa di precisione⁸ il numero e le qualità dei cittadini e la misura e le caratteristiche del territorio, prende in considerazione le «parti» della città, chiarendo che bisogna intendere per parti tutto ciò che è necessario alla sua sussistenza (1328a23

³ 1325b37 ss.

⁴ Cf. 1326b2 ss.

⁵ 1327a1.

⁶ Cf. Plat., *Leg.* 705A.

⁷ Sull'influenza del trattato ippocratico *Sulle acque, le arie e i luoghi* vedi le osservazioni di R. KRAUT, *Aristotle. Politics Books VII and VIII*, Oxford 1997, p. 118.

⁸ 1328a19-21: «non bisogna ricercare la stessa precisione nei ragionamenti e in quanto si percepisce con i sensi». Sul valore di questa notazione metodologica cf. R. KRAUT, *op. cit.*, p. 96 s.

ss.), vale a dire le funzioni e le attività dei cittadini, grazie alle quali la città può costituirsi come una «comunità autonoma» (1328b15-19).

Prima di indicare tali parti, il filosofo fornisce una definizione della città come *κοινωνία τῶν ὁμοίων*⁹, ἔνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης (1328a35-37), specificando che «la miglior vita» si identifica con la felicità, che consiste nel praticare la virtù (*ibid.* 37 s.) nei modi e con i mezzi più disparati che gli uomini scelgono, dando così vita alle diverse costituzioni (*ibid.* 41 ss.).

A questo punto enumera le esigenze dei cittadini a cui la *polis* deve provvedere: il cibo, i prodotti delle attività artigianali, la difesa e in generale le attività belliche, la disponibilità di ricchezze, il culto divino e, infine, l'esercizio della giustizia (1328b2 ss.). A queste esigenze fa corrispondere altrettante categorie di cittadini: contadini, artigiani, guerrieri, commercianti, sacerdoti e giudici (*ibid.* 19 ss.)¹⁰.

Come si vede, il filosofo parla qui esclusivamente di compiti necessari, senza fare alcun accenno ad altri incarichi da conferire ai cittadini della città ideale, come quelli menzionati nel sesto libro della *Politica*, dove, in aggiunta alle magistrature cosiddette necessarie, sono ricordati anche i sorveglianti delle donne, i guardiani delle leggi, i sovrintendenti ai ragazzi, i capi dei ginnasi, e infine i sovrintendenti agli agoni ginnici e dionisiaci e ad altre rappresentazioni (*Pol.* VI 1322b29-1323a3): magistrature, queste ultime, che sono dette proprie delle città che vivono nel benessere (εὐημεροῦσαι)¹¹, concedono più spazio alla σχολή e si preoccupano dell'εὐκοσμία¹² (1322b37 ss.).

Ora, la limitazione del discorso sulle attività nella città ideale nel VII libro della *Politica* ai compiti strettamente necessari suscita non poche perplessità, in quanto risulta difficilmente spiegabile alla luce della

⁹ Sul principio di uguaglianza e parità fra i cittadini cf. S. GASTALDI, *BIOS HAIRE-TOTATOS. Generi di vita e felicità in Aristotele*, Napoli 2003, p. 61 s.

¹⁰ Sui compiti necessari nel III libro della *Politica* cf. P. ACCATTINO, *L'anatomia della città nella 'Politica' di Aristotele*, Torino 1986, p. 1 ss.

¹¹ Il benessere, secondo Aristotele, è una delle componenti della felicità dell'uomo (cf. *E.N.* 1099b6 s., 1178b33 ss.). Nella *Politica* si parla di questa condizione in riferimento alla sfera personale e privata del cittadino (1313b24; 1339b4), ma anche a quella pubblica, in cui τὸ εὐημεροῦν τῆς πόλεως, che sembra esprimere uno stato di tranquillità per mancanza di conflitti e anche di benessere economico, deve essere garantito dall'equilibrio fra i diversi gruppi sociali: i nobili e il popolo, i poveri e i ricchi (1308b24 ss.).

¹² Questo termine indica nella *Politica* il corretto svolgimento delle attività del mercato (1299b16; 1321b14), ma anche il decoro in senso globale dell'ambiente cittadino (1321b20), e, infine, il retto comportamento dei cittadini, in particolare delle donne e dei fanciulli (1299b19).

polemica condotta nel IV libro contro il modello di città presentato da Platone nella *Repubblica*, che nel suo progetto primario si presenta come ἀναγκαιοτάτη πόλις, tutta indirizzata a soddisfare esclusivamente i bisogni primari dei suoi cittadini, garantendo così nel modo più semplice la giustizia e la «sanità» dell'intero corpo civico¹³, in contrapposizione al modello degenerato della πόλις τρυφῶσα segnata dalla malattia, in cui il semplice consumo del cibo richiede complessi rituali collocati in scenari sfarzosi e dove le esigenze sempre nuove di vesti, calzature preziose e prodotti artistici rendono la città sfavillante di mille colori¹⁴ ed echeggiante melodia lidia¹⁵. Di fatto Aristotele contesta proprio la scelta di Socrate di costituire il nucleo originario della città esclusivamente con quegli elementi che sono riconosciuti come necessari, e, per esplicitare il suo pensiero, aggiunge: «quasi che ogni città si costituisse soltanto per soddisfare i bisogni necessari e non soprattutto in funzione del bello» (1291a17 s.).

Nella visione aristotelica non solo il bello non è collegato necessariamente alla τρυφή, ma viene anche considerato come un segno positivo di progresso, giacché, secondo un principio enunciato nel VII libro, l'attenzione al «bello» è destinata a crescere in rapporto all'evoluzione naturale dei costumi e delle istituzioni politiche: gli uomini *in una fase primitiva* sono spinti dal bisogno a procurarsi ciò che è strettamente necessario, mentre poi, superata questa fase, possono sviluppare un modo di vita elegante e possono persino avere il superfluo (1329b27 ss.).

Dunque, sulla base di quest'ultima assunzione, ci si aspetterebbe che, nel rappresentare la sua *polis* ideale, il filosofo inserisse anche quegli elementi che indica come tipici di una società progredita, se è vero che — come afferma nel VI libro — «senza le magistrature indispensabili la città non può sussistere, ma senza quelle che vigilano sul buon ordine e sul decoro la città non può vivere bene» (1321b6 ss.).

¹³ Plat., *Resp.* 369D ss.

¹⁴ Sul motivo della ποικιλία che caratterizza questa città e che richiama il modello democratico cf. le osservazioni di S. CAMPESE – L.L. CANINO, *La genesi della 'polis'*, in *Platone. La Repubblica*, a cura di M. Vegetti, vol. II, Napoli 1998, p. 322. Di fatto, l'uomo democratico in *Resp.* 561D s. viene definito, con una significativa *variatio* rispetto alla formula tradizionale καλᾶγαθός, καλός τε καὶ ποικίλος, così come la costituzione democratica è «la più bella, simile ad un mantello variopinto e ricamato a fiori d'ogni genere», un vero e proprio mosaico di caratteri, che potrà apparire bellissima, anzi, sarà effettivamente giudicata così da molti «simili ai bambini e alle donne che contemplano ammirati gli oggetti di vario colore» (*ibid.* 557C).

¹⁵ *Ibid.* 373A ss.

Invece, dalla menzione dei soli compiti necessari in 1328b19 ss., sembra che quella stessa città che dovrà creare le condizioni perché i suoi cittadini possano essere felici, si accontenti di ciò che è strettamente necessario alla sussistenza e non dia spazio a quel «bello» che è riconosciuto come lo scopo dell'educazione, «perché si deve sì attendere al lavoro e condurre la guerra, ma ancor di più godere della pace e dell'ozio, così come bisogna fare le cose necessarie e utili, ma ancor di più quelle belle» (1333a41 s.)¹⁶.

Bisogna riconoscere questa come una delle tante aporie¹⁷ della teoria politica aristotelica?

Invero il filosofo non sembra affatto prefigurare una situazione di eccessivo rigore e di limitazione per la sua città ideale quando, pur affermando che la nobiltà di una *polis* non è certo opera della sorte, ma piuttosto delle scelte consapevoli dei suoi cittadini (1332a32 s.), si augura che, in vista della felicità, essa possa godere già al momento della sua fondazione di tutti quei doni di cui la sorte è signora (*ibid.* 29 ss.)¹⁸. Inoltre nelle indicazioni che fornisce per l'organizzazione degli spazi urbani, utilizza ripetutamente la categoria estetica del «bello» (κόσμον), che sembra proiettare nelle strutture esterne quella tensione da parte dei cittadini ad attuare nel modo perfetto la virtù (1332a7 ss.): al decoro, oltre che alla sicurezza, dovrà puntare la disposizione delle case (1330b31), come la costruzione e la cura delle mura (1331a12), secondo un criterio che viene attribuito ad Ippodamo di Mileto: «la disposizione delle case private riesce più gradevole e più utile anche ad altri fini, se la città è ben suddivisa»¹⁹ (1330b21 ss.).

In questo discorso sull'organizzazione interna della città ideale, l'ordine secondo il quale vengono citati i singoli elementi viene a disegnare una particolare forma a pianta centrale da cui si ripartono dei raggi, che sembra richiamare quella planimetria a stella che Metone negli *Uccelli* di

¹⁶ Cf. pure *Pol.* 1338b1-4.

¹⁷ Su queste cf. in particolare O. MURRAY, 'Polis' and 'Politeia' in Aristotle, in *The Ancient Greek City-State*, ed. by M.H. Hansen, Copenhagen 1993, p. 197 ss.

¹⁸ Questo enunciato va comunque letto alla luce del principio espresso in 1323b1 ss., secondo cui la felicità può essere raggiunta più facilmente da coloro che hanno comportamenti e intelligenza superiori al normale, ma possiedono ricchezze in misura moderata, che da coloro che invece mancano di quelle qualità e invece sovrabbondano di ricchezze.

¹⁹ Sul significato tecnico di *eutomos* vedi P. BENVENUTI FALCIAI, *Ippodamo di Mileto architetto e filosofo. Una ricostruzione filologica della personalità*, Firenze 1982, p. 60, 62, 168. Sul valore della testimonianza aristotelica su Ippodamo cf. E. GRECO, *Definizione dello spazio urbano: architettura e spazio pubblico*, in *I Greci. Storia, Cultura, Arte, Società*, 2. *Una storia greca*, II. *Definizione*, a cura di S. Settis, Torino 1997, p. 642 ss.

Aristofane vuole proporre per la nuova *polis*²⁰: il fuoco del discorso infatti è posto prima sulla periferia (le fortificazioni) poi sul centro (le case private), per puntare di nuovo verso la periferia (le mura), e tornare definitivamente sul centro, dove vengono collocate le mense comuni (1331a22), i templi (*ibid.* 24) e i sissizi degli arconti (*ibid.* 25).

Nella descrizione dello spazio centrale, vero cuore della *polis*, prende invece il sopravvento un'altra simbologia, basata sulla contrapposizione fra alto e basso²¹. Il filosofo precisa infatti che tutte le strutture menzionate saranno collocate bene in vista nel centro, per simboleggiare il ruolo eminente della virtù, ma anche per motivi di sicurezza (1331a28-30); più in basso sarà costruita una piazza «come quella che in Tessaglia chiamano piazza libera» (*ibid.* 32), che viene denominata «piazza alta» (1331b12), del tutto distinta dalla piazza del mercato, che invece deve essere collocata in un luogo diverso, evidentemente ancora più in basso, perché in essa possano giungere più facilmente sia le merci provenienti dal mare, sia quelle provenienti da tutto il territorio (*ibid.* 1-4).

La progettazione di una doppia *agora*²², sembra riprendere il modello urbanistico della capitale persiana, quale ci è tramandato da Senofonte nel

²⁰ Cf. Aristoph., *Av.* 1005 ss. Per il probabile richiamo alle nuove teorie di pianificazione urbanistica, cf. G. ZANETTO, *Aristofane. Gli Uccelli*, Milano 1987, comm. *ad loc.*; G. DAVERIO ROCCHI, *Forme urbane e rappresentazioni geografiche della politeia*, in *Poleis e Politeiai* [Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Storia Greca (Torino, 29-31 maggio 2002)], a cura di S. Cataldi, Torino 2004, p. 298 s.

²¹ Questa stessa simbologia è usata nel *Crizia* platonico per la descrizione urbanistica dell'antica Atene, in cui gli operai e gli agricoltori abitano nella parte bassa, sui fianchi dell'Acropoli, mentre la classe militare (ad eccezione del periodo estivo) occupa la parte più alta (112A-C). Del tutto differente la capitale di Atlantide, che, oltre allo sfarzo dei metalli preziosi, degli ornamenti e dei colori degli edifici che la contraddistinguono (cf. 116A-C; 116D-117A, che si contrappone agli edifici dei guerrieri e dei sacerdoti dell'antica Atene «senza oro né argento, perché in nessun luogo adoperavano questi metalli, ma costruivano abitazioni modeste, cercando una via di mezzo tra il fasto e la sordidezza»: 112C), presenta un impianto urbanistico a pianta marcatamente concentrica (115C-117E).

²² Naturalmente su questo modello aristotelico si è concentrata l'attenzione dagli archeologi, che in alcuni casi hanno postulato un riscontro effettivo nelle strutture urbane studiate (cf., ad esempio, il caso di una doppia *agora*, segnalato da Carlo Zoppi e Maria Clara Conti, individuato a Camarina e databile al sec. V, secondo le notizie fornite da G. DI STEFANO, *I recenti scavi di Camarina*, in *Un ponte fra l'Italia e la Grecia* [Atti del Simposio in onore di Antonino Di Vita (Ragusa, 13-15 febbraio 1998)], Padova 2000, p. 198 s.). Su questo tema cf. specialmente C. MORGAN – J. COULTON, *The Polis as a Physical Entity*, in *The Polis as an Urban Centre and as a Political Community* (Acts of the Copenhagen Polis Centre, 4), Copenhagen 1997, ed. by M.H. Hansen, p. 107 ss. Sul valore ideologico della separazione di questa *agora* dall'area destinata al mercato cf. le considerazioni di P. MILLETT, *Encounters in the Agora*, in *Kosmos. Essays in Order, Conflict and Community in Classical Athens*, ed. by P. Cartledge – P. Millett – S. von Reden, Cambridge 1998, p. 218 ss.

primo libro della *Ciropedia*: anche lì esiste una ἐλευθέρα ἀγορά, ove sono ubicati il palazzo reale e gli altri edifici di governo, il cui accesso è negato alle mercanzie e ad ogni attività che possa turbare con schiamazzi (φωναί) e volgarità (ἀπειροκαλίαι) l'armonia (εὐκοσμία) del luogo riservato ai cittadini ben educati (παιδευμένοι) (I 2.3-4)²³. Lo storico chiarisce che questa piazza, «cosiddetta libera», veniva destinata dai Persiani ad accogliere tutti i cittadini, distinti in quattro classi di età (fanciulli, giovani, uomini maturi e più anziani), a ciascuna delle quali veniva riservato uno specifico settore e venivano assegnate particolari attività, al fine di rendere i cittadini incapaci di compiere azioni cattive o disonorevoli (I 2.2, 5). Secondo Senofonte, a tale spazio urbano la costituzione persiana assegnava una funzione educativa per tutto il corpo civico, separando preventivamente i cittadini da quanti potevano fornire esempi negativi, e imponendo loro dei compiti specifici: tali compiti per i fanciulli erano finalizzati al solo apprendimento di principi etici e regole di vita, mentre per i giovani e per gli adulti dovevano avere anche una specifica funzione di servizio per l'intera comunità²⁴.

Al contrario, nel modello aristotelico non risulta chiara la funzione assegnata all'*agora* alta.

Per fissare le caratteristiche di questa piazza il filosofo parte con due prescrizioni negative: essa dovrà essere tenuta sgombra da merci di ogni tipo e il suo accesso sarà proibito ad operai, contadini e gente di questo genere, se non sono convocati lì dai magistrati (1331a32-35). Segue un'indicazione positiva introdotta da un ottativo: «il luogo sarebbe piacevole (εὐχαρῖς) se fossero lì i ginnasi²⁵ degli adulti maturi (τῶν πρεσβυτέρων)» (*ibid.* a35-37). A motivare questa opzione, Aristotele dichiara opportuno rispettare anche nell'organizzazione degli spazi urbani la distinzione fra classi di età: solo *alcuni* magistrati si dedicheranno ai giovani, mentre i *presbyteroi* potranno godere (evidentemente senza alcuna limitazione) della presenza dei magistrati²⁶ (37-40).

²³ Per la distanza culturale dei Persiani nei confronti del modello greco dell'*agora* commerciale cf. la testimonianza di Herod. I 153.1, in cui Ciro, per disprezzare i Greci, evoca proprio l'immagine della loro *agora*, collocata al centro dell'abitato, come luogo in cui gli uomini si incontrano per ingannarsi vicendevolmente, utilizzando per questo persino i giuramenti.

²⁴ Su questo sistema educativo e sulla centralità della «Free Square» cf. C. TUPLIN, *Xenophon's 'Cyropaedia': Education and Fiction*, in *Education in Greek Fiction*, ed. by A.H. Sommerstein – C. Atherton, Bari 1996, p. 65-162, partic. 71 ss. e 138 s.

²⁵ Sulla funzione ideologica attribuita alla presenza dei ginnasi cf. N. FISHER, *Gymnasia and the Democratic Values of Leisure*, in *Kosmos*, cit., p. 84 ss.

²⁶ Sull'uso aristotelico del termine *archon*, cf. P. CARLIER, *La nozione di ἀρχή nella Politica di Aristotele in Poleis e Politeiai*, cit., p. 393 ss.; D. FREDE, *Citizenship in Aristotle's Politics*, in *Aristotle's Politics. Critical Essays*, cit., p. 170 ss.

Analogamente al modello fornito da Senofonte dell'*agora* persiana, lo Stagirita propone qui una netta limitazione alla frequentazione dell'*agora* alta, mirante in primo luogo ad evitare quei rischi che possono derivare dai contatti con chi frequenta l'*agora* tradizionale, rischi di cui si dimostra consapevole anche Platone, in particolare nel *Teeteto*, dove afferma che i veri filosofi fin da giovinetti non conoscono la via che porta all'*agora*, non sanno dov'è il tribunale, né il consiglio, né alcun altro luogo di adunanze pubbliche della città; non leggono né ascoltano leggi o decreti (173D). Invece colui che sin dalla giovane età frequenta tali luoghi, non solo impara a parlare controllando sempre il tempo, perché incalzato dalla clessidra, ma non ha neanche la libertà di argomentare come vorrebbe, perché si sente strettamente controllato dall'avversario (172D). Le caratteristiche negative del frequentatore dell'*agora* sono dipinte qui con molta efficacia e riguardano sia le modalità, sia i contenuti della sua comunicazione: secondo Platone, questi è sempre in tensione, è sottile e accorto, conosce l'arte della lusinga, opera obliquamente ed è aduso alla menzogna e alle ingiurie (173A-B). È chiaro perciò che i filosofi non dovranno frequentare l'*agora* per non essere addestrati a diventare essi stessi «servi dei discorsi» (173C)²⁷.

Del pericolo che può costituire in ambito politico un'intensa frequentazione dell'*agora* si dimostra consapevole lo stesso Aristotele nel VI libro della *Politica*, quando, affrontando il tema delle differenti specie di democrazia e dei vari tipi di popolazioni, indica come prima e migliore di tutte quella democrazia in cui la popolazione vive di agricoltura e di pastorizia, proprio perché la scarsa disponibilità di beni impedisce di impiegare troppo tempo nelle assemblee (1318b9 ss.), mentre tutte le altre sono giudicate peggiori di questa, anzitutto in quanto il genere di vita degli operai, dei mercanti e dei salariati non può essere virtuoso (1319a24 ss.), in secondo luogo perché, frequentando la piazza e il centro della città, «la gentaglia si riunisce facilmente in assemblea, a differenza dei contadini che, sparsi per la campagna, non sentono il bisogno allo stesso modo di tali raduni» (ibid. a28-32).

Ora, mentre il discorso del IV libro della *Politica* riguarda l'intero corpo civico senza alcuna distinzione d'età, la progettazione della città ideale nel VII libro sembra proporre invece l'allontanamento dalla piazza

²⁷ Cf. le considerazioni su questo passo di A.M. MILLER, *N. 4.33-43 and the Defense of Digressive Leisure*, *CJ* 78.1 (1983), p. 214 s.

del mercato²⁸ di alcune categorie di individui, come misura precauzionale mirante a garantire i frequentatori dell'agorà alta, che, tenuto conto dell'auspicata separazione fra uomini maturi e giovani, nonostante le riserve avanzate da Kraut²⁹ e da Schuttrumpf³⁰, saranno da identificare con i soli adulti, ai quali è riservata la libera e continua frequentazione dei magistrati (1331a40ss.), mentre i giovani vengono di fatto affidati a soltanto ad «alcuni» magistrati (ibid. a38-39).

Questa distinzione fra giovani e adulti, come anche fra le due *agorai*, ripropone il criterio di distinzione binaria che si presenta costantemente nel VII libro della *Politica*, ad iniziare dalla famosa divisione dell'anima in due parti, una che possiede la ragione, l'altra no (1333a16 ss.). Anche la vita dell'uomo viene distinta in due sfere: come nell'ambito privato l'ozio si contrappone alle occupazioni, così nell'ambito pubblico la pace si contrappone alla guerra (30 ss.). Di fatto tutte le azioni umane vengono distinte in due categorie: quelle necessarie e utili da una parte e quelle belle dall'altra (a32 ss.). Fra queste due categorie il filosofo riconosce una precisa gerarchia, giacché, riguardo alle scelte da operare, prescrive che si seguano le stesse preferenze che valgono per le parti dell'anima e per le loro attività: bisognerà cioè scegliere la guerra in vista della pace, l'occupazione in vista dell'ozio, le cose necessarie in vista di quelle belle (1333a33 ss.).

Applicando questa distinzione binaria, Aristotele assegna all'*agora* del mercato l'utilità come sua funzione specifica, mentre all'*agora* alta l'ἐνσχολάζειν (1331b12), quasi a voler colmare, destinando questo spazio specificamente ed esclusivamente alla σχολή³¹, la mancata attenzione alle attività e funzioni «superflue» rivelata dalla menzione delle sole attività e magistrature necessarie nella *polis* ideale di 1328b19 ss.

Ma cosa intende qui Aristotele con il termine σχολή, e come mai riserva questo spazio esclusivamente ai *presbyteroi*?

²⁸ Sul significato giuridico dell'esclusione di un cittadino dall'*agora* tradizionale cf. G.E.M. DE STE. CROIX, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, London 1972, p. 271 s., 279 s., 397 s.; P. MILLETT, *art. cit.*, p. 224 ss.

²⁹ Cf. R. KRAUT, *Aristotle. Politics, cit.*, p. 122, in cui lo studioso osserva che, benché Aristotele stabilisca mense e ginnasi separati, la sua opzione di far beneficiare sia giovani che anziani dei contatti con i magistrati dimostra che non è previsto un isolamento totale dell'*agora* alta.

³⁰ Cf. E. SCHÜTRUMPF, *Aristoteles. Politik. Buch VII/VIII*, Berlin 2005, p. 435.

³¹ Su questa nozione cf. in particolare L. BERTELLI, *La scholè aristotelica tra norma e prassi empirica*, in *Poetica e Politica. Fra Platone e Aristotele*, AION (filol.) 6 (1984), p. 97 ss.

In assenza di indicazioni nel testo, gli studiosi hanno risposto alla prima domanda ipotizzando varie soluzioni. Ad esempio, il Newman, nel suo classico commento alla *Politica*³², immagina che nell'*agora* alta dovessero svolgersi l'elezione dei magistrati e l'adunanza dell'ecclesia, benché debba poi ammettere che il filosofo non parla di ciò, e che la stessa esistenza dell'ecclesia nello stato ideale aristotelico è incerta. La sua conclusione è che «the main function of this *agora* seems to be to serve as a place for the enjoyment of leisure».

Da parte sua, B. Kraut³³ ipotizza che nell'*agora* superiore dovesse trovare collocazione il teatro, i dibattiti filosofici e politici, nonché l'educazione dei fanciulli, attività che dovevano essere separate dall'*agora* commerciale onde evitare ai cittadini ogni contatto con i *banausoi*, che potevano costituire un elemento di disturbo.

Invero, nei brevi tratti della descrizione aristotelica, questa *agora* alta appare come uno spazio quasi del tutto vuoto, giacché l'unico edificio di cui Aristotele fa esplicita menzione è il ginnasio degli adulti³⁴, la cui collocazione pone di per sé un problema, innanzitutto in considerazione del fatto che non vi sono i templi e non sono menzionati neanche gli edifici pubblici che invece sono normalmente presenti in un'*agora* tradizionale³⁵.

Per spiegare questa «presenza anomala» del ginnasio, il Newman avanza due ipotesi: che tale edificio dovesse avere una funzione primariamente (se non esclusivamente) estetica, in quanto poteva servire a dare «una fresca eleganza» all'*agora*; oppure che fosse posto lì per incoraggiare gli anziani a fare attività fisica, evitando loro di andare

³² *The Politics of Aristotle*, ed. by W.L. NEWMAN, vol. III, Oxford 1902, pp. 413 ss.

³³ *Aristotle. Politics*, cit., p. 121-123.

³⁴ Di diverso avviso E. SCHÜTRUMPF, *Aristoteles. Politik*, cit., p. 435, il quale, sottolineando la presenza di καί, che nel testo precede τὰ γυμνάσια, ritiene che ci siano altri edifici in quell'area e, volendo colmare il silenzio aristotelico sulla collocazione del ginnasio dei giovani, ipotizza che anche quello dovesse essere situato nell'*agora* alta: «Wo sollen sich die Gymnasien der Jüngerer befinden? Ar. scheint als selbstverständlich vorauszusetzen, dass auch die Jüngerer in diesem Quartier ihre Gymnasium hatten, da sie ja unter der Aufsicht der dort tätige Beamten stehen sollen». Invero nel testo aristotelico alla menzione del ginnasio degli adulti segue immediatamente, introdotta da γὰρ, la nota-zione riguardante l'opportunità di operare una distinzione sulla base dell'età dei cittadini, il che, a mio avviso, non permette di adottare un criterio genericamente inclusivo (anziché distintivo), quale è quello utilizzato da Schütrumpf.

³⁵ Nonostante il silenzio aristotelico, credo non si possa però escludere la presenza in quest'area di alcuni edifici pubblici: la menzione in 1331b6 ss. di alcuni altri magistrati, come quelli che sovrintendono ai contratti, destinati ad avere la loro sede (ἀρχεῖον) vicino all'*agora* del mercato, può far pensare infatti che i magistrati presenti nell'*agora* alta abbiano lì anche la loro sede.

fuori città «per i loro piaceri»³⁶. Anche B. Kraut — ripercorrendo in qualche modo la linea interpretativa proposta dal Newman — suggerisce che il porre tale struttura in un luogo così importante della città doveva incoraggiare gli anziani a praticare quell'attività fisica che quelli altrimenti avrebbero trascurato.

In realtà, se la prima ipotetica spiegazione del Newman non è certo soddisfacente, anche la seconda, ripresa dal Kraut, non è condivisibile, giacché sembra nascere da un fraintendimento in cui entrambi gli studiosi cadono nel determinare l'età dei *presbyteroi*, termine che in Aristotele identifica propriamente non gli uomini «anziani» (nell'accezione odierna del termine), bensì gli adulti avanti negli anni, che hanno raggiunto l'età della piena maturità politica³⁷, per i quali quindi non possono valere le preoccupazioni formulate circa la loro mancanza di forze.

L'unico dato sicuro è che Aristotele colloca in questo spazio la presenza costante dei *presbyteroi* e dei magistrati: per comprendere la funzione di questa *agora* risulta essenziale quindi interrogarsi sulla funzione assegnata ai magistrati, che sembrano essere in generale tutti i magistrati della *polis*, benché di alcuni di essi (ad esempio i magistrati che sovrintendono ai contratti, o alle funzioni giudiziarie, oppure alla sorveglianza del mercato o della città) sia detto esplicitamente che troveranno la loro collocazione appropriata nei pressi dell'*agora* inferiore, o, comunque, in uno dei luoghi più frequentati (1331b6-11).

Invero Aristotele, pur non specificando quale sia il compito dei magistrati che frequentano l'*agora* alta, fornisce però alcuni indizi significativi sia sulle modalità attraverso le quali si esplica l'azione di tali magistrati, sia sugli effetti della loro presenza. Egli dice infatti: ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρουσία μάλιστα ἐμποίει τὴν ἀληθινὸν αἰδῶ καὶ τὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων φόβον (1331a41-b1).

³⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 414.

³⁷ Nel I libro della *Politica* Aristotele osserva che ogni casa, come ogni villaggio, è governata dal *presbyteros* (1252b20 ss.) e più avanti afferma che il *presbyteros*, essendo maturo (*teleios*), è più adatto al governo di chi è più giovane (*neoteros*), e immaturo (*ateles*) (1259b3-4). Per una determinazione più precisa, può valere quanto il filosofo argomenta nel VII libro a proposito dell'età giusta per la procreazione: qui, dopo aver dichiarato che i *presbyteroi* come i *neoteroi* possono generare figli imperfetti nella mente e nel corpo, parla di un'altra classe d'età, assolutamente distinta, quella dei genitori vecchi (τῶν γεγηρακώτων) che generano figli *astheneis* (1335b29 ss.); infine conclude indicando con precisione l'età dell'uomo a partire dalla quale possono insorgere i suddetti rischi, e che quindi deve essere identificata con l'età dei *presbyteroi*: «4 o 5 anni dopo i cinquanta» (*ibid.* 35 ss.).

Gli effetti che la presenza dei magistrati produce nell'animo dei *presbyteroi* sono αἰδώς e φόβος, termini a cui viene aggiunta un'ulteriore specificazione (rispettivamente: ἀληθινόν e τῶν ἐλευθέρων), che determina pure un'espansione significativa di questi concetti all'interno del discorso.

Dell'αἰδώς Aristotele parla, in particolare, nell'*Etica Nicomachea*, affermando che da questa virtù unita al desiderio del bello, definito come desiderio di ricevere onori e di evitare il biasimo, nasce il coraggio politico (1116a28 s). In un altro luogo della stessa opera il filosofo formula una netta distinzione fra i giovani che sono di carattere liberale (τῶν νέων τοὺς ἐλευθερίους) e la massa (τοὺς πολλούς) che invece non riuscirà mai a raggiungere la vera nobiltà d'animo, giacché per sua natura essa non obbedisce all'αἰδώς, bensì alla paura e si astiene dal commettere il male solo perché teme le punizioni (1179b7 ss.).

È evidente che la contrapposizione presente in quest'ultimo passo fra i due termini, αἰδώς e φόβος, non ha alcuna corrispondenza nel passo della *Politica* di cui ci stiamo occupando, ma costituisce un termine di confronto molto utile. Se nell'*Etica Nicomachea* solo αἰδώς è virtù civica, mentre φόβος è l'atteggiamento dell'animo di coloro che non hanno alcuna formazione liberale, nella *Politica*, invece, i due concetti, arricchiti dalle loro determinazioni, hanno entrambi un valore altamente positivo: ed è proprio la presenza dei magistrati che, secondo il filosofo, compie quest'opera educativa che trasforma l'αἰδώς in «virtù autentica»³⁸ e il φόβος, da emozione fredda e dolorosa, contraria per natura al coraggio richiesto al cittadino, in virtù liberale.

Di particolare interesse è la notazione del testo aristotelico riguardante le modalità dell'azione dei magistrati. Si osserva infatti che essi non agiscono attraverso la parola, ma proponendo un modello di comportamento, evidentemente virtuoso, *davanti agli occhi dei cittadini*, nei quali si ingenerano così gli effetti indicati. Si direbbe quindi che Aristotele intenda applicare quel principio educativo enunciato da Platone nelle *Leggi*, secondo cui «la migliore educazione dei giovani e anche degli adulti non è nell'ammonirli, ma nel mostrare che si mette in pratica nella vita ciò che si potrebbe dire ammonendo un altro» (729c3 ss.).

³⁸ Non credo quindi che si possa condividere la lettura di E. BARKER, *The Politics of Aristotle*, Oxford 1946, p. 310, secondo il quale «Aristotle has here in mind, as in other passages of the *Politics*, the tendency to homosexual passion, which might be encouraged by unregulated games and recreations». Anche E. SCHÜTRUMPF, *Aristoteles. Politik, cit.*, p. 436 vede nella menzione di αἰδώς un riferimento alle «sexuellen Versuchungen in Gymnasien».

L'espressione che abbiamo evidenziato (*davanti agli occhi...*) viene riproposta nella *Retorica* nella sezione dedicata all'*αἰσχύνη*, definita come «una prefigurazione di disistima» (1384a22 ss.). Aristotele osserva che gli individui rivaleggiano in onore soprattutto con i pari-grado e si preoccupano in primo luogo dell'opinione delle persone assennate (τῶν φρονίμων), perché la ritengono giusta; specifica poi che tali persone sono sia gli uomini anziani (πρεσβύτεροι), sia le persone bene istruite (πεπαιδευμένοι), e conclude che ci si vergogna di più delle azioni compiute davanti ai loro occhi (1384a31-b1).

Come si vede, il filosofo mira qui innanzitutto a definire gli attori della situazione che determina l'*αἰσχύνη* e la loro relazione, mettendo in luce il valore dei rapporti paritetici, che, grazie ad una sorta di emulazione reciproca, determina una più forte aspirazione alla stima e, per questo, al comportamento virtuoso. Un elemento per noi significativo è il ruolo riconosciuto ai *presbyteroi*, che qui incarnano il modello delle persone assennate (φρόνιμοι), rispetto ai quali chi ritiene di essere osservato prova più facilmente un sentimento di vergogna, giacché quanto maggiore è la stima nell'osservatore tanto più profonda è l'ansia che si determina nell'osservato, che ne teme il giudizio negativo.

Ma i *presbyteroi* rappresentano pure per Aristotele i cittadini più adatti a rivestire incarichi politici³⁹, fra i quali verranno quindi scelti i magistrati, secondo quel criterio di avvicendamento nel servizio politico che rappresenta un'importante novità rispetto alla fissità dei ruoli postulata da Platone⁴⁰.

Sembra allora legittimo intendere che le relazioni fra uomini maturi e magistrati, a cui viene riservato un apposito spazio nella *polis* ideale, siano improntate essenzialmente sul principio della reciprocità⁴¹ e dell'emulazione fra pari-grado⁴².

³⁹ Cf. *Pol.* 1259b3-4, citato alla n. 31.

⁴⁰ Sull'importante ruolo che riveste nella filosofia politica aristotelica il criterio dell'avvicendamento dei cittadini nel servizio politico, cf. *Pol.* 1332b12 ss. e ved. in particolare G. BIEN, *La filosofia politica di Aristotele*, trad. it., Bologna 1985 (Freiburg/München 1973), p. 326 s.

⁴¹ Sul fondamentale ruolo della reciprocità nell'etica e nella politica aristotelica cf. in particolare P. MILLETT, *Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens*, Cambridge 1991, p. 109 ss.; per la testimonianza dell'*Etica Eudemia* cf. M. SCHOFIELD, *Political Friendship and the Ideology of Reciprocity*, in *Kosmos*, cit., p. 37 ss.

⁴² Diversamente R. KRAUT, *Aristotle. Politics*, cit., p. 122, il quale, pur riconoscendo che Aristotele generalmente (ad esempio in *E.N.* 1143b11 s.) attribuisce agli anziani una caratteristica saggezza, osserva che altrove lo stesso filosofo sottolinea però i limiti di quella età (*Rhet.* 13) e conclude «The present passage none the less suggests that even in the ideal circumstances one is not at one's best when one is young or old».

Invero, la reciproca conoscenza è, secondo Aristotele, uno dei requisiti basilari per garantire la buona conduzione dello stato, come dimostra la rappresentazione dei rapporti ideali fra i componenti dell'intero corpo civico in un altro passo della *Politica*, dove, discutendo della grandezza della città ideale, fra gli altri criteri per determinare il limite numerico della popolazione, il filosofo ne introduce uno riguardante la giusta distribuzione delle magistrature: «per assegnare le cariche secondo il merito è necessario che i cittadini conoscano gli uni le qualità degli altri, perché in caso contrario giudizi e distribuzioni di cariche non riusciranno bene» (1326b14-18).

Come è noto, l'importanza della «conoscenza» fra i cittadini è esaltata anche da Platone, che in un passo delle *Leggi* auspica che il legislatore assegni a ciascuna regione dello stato luoghi appositi con tutto il necessario per il culto, dove gli abitanti si possano riunire nei giorni stabiliti: il fine principale di queste riunioni è provvedere ai bisogni di ognuno e, soprattutto, consolidare il rapporto di conoscenza reciproca, fino al punto che tutti possano sentirsi membri della stessa famiglia:

non c'è fortuna migliore per uno stato che il rapporto di conoscenza (γνῶρίμους εἶναι) fra tutti i cittadini. Dove invece non la luce, ma l'ombra regna fra gli uni e gli altri, non ci sono le condizioni perché ognuno ottenga rettamente l'onore di cui è degno e gli siano attribuite giustamente le cariche e gli sia resa giustizia (*Leg.* 738d-e).

Nella scelta di destinare l'*agora* alta all'interazione diretta e continua fra i cittadini più maturi e i magistrati — con l'esclusione di tutte le altre categorie civiche che questo comporta — Aristotele sembra quindi voler garantire innanzitutto quello stretto rapporto fra i cittadini eccellenti, che, alla luce di quanto si è letto nella *Retorica*, può creare un'emulazione positiva fra di loro.

Con l'istituzione di questa *agora* il filosofo intende anche prefigurare il sommo grado della *scholè*, nel quale, ovviamente, non possono essere ammessi quanti non sono riconosciuti da lui adatti, per natura o per occupazioni lavorative, ma anche quei cittadini non ancora maturi per fare una tale esperienza, in particolare i giovani.

Il suo obiettivo non è quindi l'esclusione permanente di quanti non appartengono al gruppo dirigente, ma la salvaguardia del clima di «fraternità» fra i responsabili della *polis*, che già Platone auspicava, senza però accettare il sistema di comunanza di donne e di figli, che solo, per il Maestro, poteva garantire l'effettiva fraternità fra i guardiani, e che

viene aspramente criticato nel II libro della *Politica*, proprio perché incapace di creare rapporti improntati ad un'autentica *philia*⁴³.

Di fatto, soltanto in un clima di amicizia si possono determinare quei complessi meccanismi psicologici di autoimmedesimazione che rendono possibili gli effetti positivi dell'emulazione determinata dalla contemplazione dell'altro⁴⁴, resa nel testo di cui ci stiamo occupando dall'espressione ἡ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς παρουσία (*Pol.* 1331a40 s.).

Solo la virtù, vissuta in un clima di *philia* sul modello spartano⁴⁵, potrà favorire, senza dover accogliere il comunismo dei beni platonico, il superamento del problema costituito dalla proprietà privata, uno dei problemi principali che può minare l'unità della *polis* (correttamente intesa), giacché, come Aristotele prefigura nel libro della *Politica*, «la virtù farà sì che nell'uso le proprietà degli amici siano comuni» (1263a29 s.)⁴⁶.

Non credo quindi che Aristotele miri a prefigurare una sorta di gestione gerontocratica del suo stato ideale; credo piuttosto che intenda proporre un nuovo modello educativo basato fondamentalmente sull'interazione e lo scambio fra soggetti di pari livello, che possa garantire in un clima di reciprocità la formazione permanente del gruppo politico destinato al naturale avvicinamento nell'impegno attivo. Così i frequentatori dell'*agora* alta insieme ai magistrati, vengono a rappresentare a pieno titolo il gruppo di «coloro che posseggono la virtù politica, che è necessario siano presenti in una città» (*Pol.* IV 1291b1 s.)⁴⁷.

⁴³ Cf. 1262b15 ss. Sul ruolo riconosciuto all'amicizia da Aristotele in ambito privato e politico, cf. in particolare D. KONSTAN, *Friendship in the Classical World*, Cambridge 1997, p. 67 ss.

⁴⁴ Cf. *E.N.* 1169b33 ss. e ved. R. KRAUT, *Aristotle on the Human Good*, Princeton 1989, p. 142.

⁴⁵ Sugli elogi e le critiche della costituzione spartana in Aristotele, cf. P. CLOCHÉ, *Aristote et les institutions de Sparte*, in *Schriften zu den Politika des Aristoteles*, herausg. von P. Steinmetz, Hildesheim/New York 1973, p. 336 ss.

⁴⁶ Aristotele pone qui in primo piano l'uso dei beni, mentre riconosce l'effettivo possesso come condizione necessaria per vivere la liberalità (τὸ χαρίσασθαι) nei confronti di chi si ama, che rappresenta come una delle principali fonti di piacere (1263b5 s.). Sull'importanza riconosciuta da Aristotele alla *charis* nelle relazioni sociali cf. A. LO SCHIAVO, *Charites. Il segno della distinzione*, Napoli 1993, p. 162 ss., il quale ipotizza che l'estraneità di questo valore al mondo del commercio e delle transazioni affermata in *Rhet.* 1385b1 ss. sia il motivo principale della distinzione fra le due *agorai* operata dal filosofo nella sua città ideale (p. 163 n. 52); cf. pure P. MILLETT, *art. cit.*, p. 220 s.

⁴⁷ Per la condizione straordinaria che Aristotele postula nella sua costituzione ideale, in cui l'areté del cittadino coincide con quella dell'uomo buono, cf. S. GASTALDI, *L'uomo buono e il buon cittadino in Aristotele*, *Elenchos* 16 (1995), p. 253 ss.

L'*agora* alta però non può essere vista come un'isola felice all'interno dello stato ideale, giacché questo sarebbe in aperta contraddizione con quanto Aristotele sostiene in polemica con le posizioni platoniche: non è importante garantire la felicità di un ceto particolare (i guardiani), ma bisogna rendere felice tutto lo stato⁴⁸.

In realtà, alla luce di quanto viene affermato nell'*Etica Nicomachea*, proprio questo gruppo di cittadini eccellenti può, anzi deve avere un ruolo propulsivo per l'intera *polis*: chi persegue personalmente il bene, infatti, non solo è lodato e ammirato da tutti, ma, oltre a giovare a se stesso, sarà di utilità anche a tutti gli altri, che vorranno emulare la sua virtù, e «se tutti gareggiassero per il bello e si sforzassero di compiere le azioni migliori, alla comunità deriverebbe tutto ciò di cui ha bisogno e anche nel privato a ciascuno verrebbero i beni più grandi» (1169a9 ss.).

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⁴⁸ *Pol.* 1264b16 ss.

THE POWER STRUGGLE OF THE DIADOCHOI IN BABYLON, 323 BC*

Abstract: Immediately after the death of Alexander the Great a fierce struggle for power ensued among the Diadochoi. It took more than a month before the final settlement was agreed on because the generals, all of them striving to get as much personal power as possible, did not easily reach a compromise. Moreover, the infantrymen were not prepared to accept just any decision the generals made. This paper analyses the decisions taken in the various stages leading to the Babylon settlement, including the complex problem of the distribution of offices, as well as the decision-making process. It shows how Perdikkas eventually achieved a very unstable supremacy after making many concessions, while some of the other Successors seem to have preferred a territorial power base in one of the satrapies.

The source material on the first month after the death of Alexander the Great is relatively abundant. Nonetheless, much is unclear and there has been a lot of scholarly debate. The last decades important progress has been made, especially thanks to the works of Errington¹, Anson², and Bosworth³. Bosworth's thorough analysis will definitely set the standard for many years to come. Thus, I do not need to deal with every aspect, and I shall concentrate on a few problems which centre around the power struggle of Alexander's generals who all tried to get the most advantageous position possible in the new political set-up.

* I would like to thank professors Hans Hauben, Leon Mooren, Willy Clarysse, Guido Schepens, and Hubert Meeus for their many useful remarks on earlier versions of this paper. They do not, however, agree with everything stated here, and any remaining flaws and errors are of course entirely my own.

Journal abbreviations are those of *L'année philologique*. The translations of Curtius and Justin are Yardley's (*Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander* [Penguin Classics], Middlesex 1984; *Justin, Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus* [Classical Resources, 3], Atlanta 1994); all other translations are from the Loeb Classical Library, unless stated otherwise.

¹ R.M. ERRINGTON, *From Babylon to Tripuradeisos: 323-320 B.C.*, *JHS* 90 (1970), p. 49-77.

² E.M. ANSON, *Craterus and the Prostaia*, *CPh* 87 (1992), p. 38-43.

³ A.B. BOSWORTH, *The Legacy of Alexander. Politics, Warfare, and Propaganda under the Successors*, Oxford 2002, p. 29-63.

1. THE THREE STAGES OF THE BABYLON SETTLEMENT

R.M. Errington has shown the need for distinguishing three stages in the Babylon settlement⁴: the meeting immediately after Alexander's death and the *στάσις* of the phalanx (1.1); the compromise between nobles and cavalry on the one side and infantry on the other (1.2); and the final settlement (1.3)⁵. Many scholars have neglected his conclusions and confusion continues⁶. Bosworth does take the different stages into account, and consequently, his study is to my mind the first one to give a satisfactory solution for the distribution of the offices.

1.1. The first meeting and the *στάσις*

Alexander died on the 11th of June⁷. The next day the main officers and friends of the king met in the palace to discuss the succession. Our most detailed sources on the episode, Curtius and Justin, contradict each other on several important issues (cf. *infra*). Curtius is often reproached to have adapted his account to reflect Roman history of his own time⁸, but scholars do not agree on which time this exactly was. This inconclusiveness

⁴ According to A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 32-34, 'settlement' is a misnomer. He is right in stressing the instability of it, but instable as it was, it still was a settlement.

⁵ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 54. Cf. F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Alexander in Babylon und die Reichsordnung nach seinem Tode* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 268), Wien 1970, p. 144-146, who, however, did not yet fully realise the extent of the reorganisation in the final settlement.

⁶ E.g. M. RATHMANN, *Perdikkas zwischen 323 und 320. Nachlassverwalter des Alexanderreiches oder Autokrat?* (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 724), Wien 2005, p. 27-28, who sees contradictions concerning Krateros' position in Photius epitome of Arrian, but actually fails to distinguish between the second and the third stage.

⁷ L. DEPUYDT, *The Time of Death of Alexander the Great: 11 June 323 B.C. (-322), ca. 4:00-5:00 PM, Die Welt des Orients* 28 (1997), p. 117-135; T. BOIV, *Late Achaemenid and Hellenistic Babylon* (Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta, 136), Leuven 2004, p. 116-117.

⁸ See the overview of J.E. ATKINSON, *Q. Curtius Rufus' 'Historiae Alexandri Magni'*, in ANRW II 34.4, p. 3471-3472; *id.*, *Originality and its Limits in the Alexander Sources of the Early Empire*, in A.B. BOSWORTH & E.J. BAYNHAM (edd.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, Oxford 2000, p. 319-324, who exaggerates Curtius' 'originality' concerning the events at Babylon: the account of the lustration is not implausible and if it contains details not found elsewhere, it is because Curtius' account is the most detailed one, cf. *infra*, n. 35. See also E.J. BAYNHAM, *Alexander the Great. The Unique History of Quintus Curtius Rufus*, Ann Arbor 1998, *passim*; D. SPENCER, *The Roman Alexander. Reading a Cultural Myth*, Exeter 2002, *passim*.

would seem to suggest that Curtius' adaptation was not substantial and rather subtle, and thus probably did not affect his account to a high extent. His narrative of events in Babylon does contain one set of considerations on Roman history, but this is clearly marked out as a digression⁹. The only problem seems to be in X 8.15-22 where Arrhidaios plays an implausibly active role and gives a very apt and well-considered speech. All other actions attributed to the king, such as the hearing of ambassadors¹⁰, might well have been executed by his counsellors in Arrhidaios' presence¹¹. Sharples' view that Curtius is reticent on Arrhidaios' condition is unwarranted: he does not indicate the problem explicitly, but it is clear enough from his account that Arrhidaios was incapable of acting independently¹². Martin's argument that the *ignotus* in X 7.1-2 must be an invention is not convincing either¹³. The easiest solution seems the most attractive to me: Arrhidaios was for Curtius the ideal compromise figure to give the reconciliatory speech in X 8.15-22 in which the historian could show his rhetorical talents. Given that the rest of his account is the most plausible

⁹ Curt. X 9.3-6; at 9.7 he writes: *Ceterum, ut at ordinem, a quo me contemplatio publicae felicitatis averterat, redeam* («But let me return to the narrative from which my reflections on our national prosperity diverted me»).

¹⁰ Curt. X 8.8.

¹¹ As was the case during later embassies at the court of Arrhidaios: Plut., *Phoc.* 33.7-12. T.R. MARTIN, *Quintus Curtius' Presentation of Philip Arrhidaeus and Josephus' Accounts of the Accession of Claudius*, *AJAH* 8 (1983), p. 167-168, argues that Arrhidaios' silence in answer to Meleagros' suggestion to kill Perdikkas (X 8.2) is a deliberate and highly appropriate attitude, but this need not be the case. I. SHARPLES, *Curtius' Treatment of Arrhidaeus*, in P.J. CONNOR (ed.), *Ancient Macedonia: An Australian Symposium*. Papers of the Second International Congress of Macedonian Studies, the University of Melbourne, 8-13 July 1991 [*Mediterranean Archaeology*, 7 (1994)], Sydney 1995, p. 53 n. 4, also considers X 8.6 as an instance of serious action on Arrhidaios' behalf, but it is not impossible for a mentally deficient or retarded person to answer a rather simple question. The image of an Arrhidaios leaving the meeting because he is frightened by the authority of the generals (*principum auctoritate contreritus* X 7.13) does not seem to suggest a king in full possession of his mental powers.

¹² I. SHARPLES, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 54: «The impression given by Curtius' account is one of reticence rather than ignorance». At p. 53 n. 4, he writes: «Note also that Curtius makes no mention of a regency for Arrhidaeus». It is clear, however, from X 10.1, where Perdikkas leads the meeting, that Arrhidaeus was incapable of doing so, and at X 10.4, Curtius does mention the regency: *Perdicca ut cum rege esset copiisque praeset, quae regem sequebantur*. If Arrhidaios did not suffer any deficiency, he could have commanded the royal army himself; now Perdikkas has to do so.

¹³ T.R. MARTIN, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 161-190. See the refutation by I. SHARPLES, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 56-58; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 35-38; E.M. ANSON, *Eumenes of Cardia. A Greek among Macedonians (Ancient Mediterranean and Medieval Texts and Contexts. Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity, 3)*, Boston 2004, p. 54 n. 17.

and cogent one¹⁴, there is no reason to conclude that the insertion of this invented speech has greatly affected the narrative of the events themselves.

The contents of the debates in the first meeting after Alexander's death preserved in Curtius (X 6-7.15) and Justin (XIII 2.4-14) are also regarded as largely fictitious by some scholars¹⁵. According to Hammond Curtius and Justin added «typically Roman race prejudice» to the speeches¹⁶. This need not be the case as it is clear to what extent most Macedonians disliked Alexander's orientalising policy¹⁷. Political tensions among the Macedonians themselves also played a part here: it had been Perdikkas' proposal to await the birth of Rhoxane's child and make it king if it should prove to be a boy. Perdikkas' opponents rejected the proposal not only because they objected to a half-Asian king, but also to thwart his plans, and the argument of the Asian descent of the child was a convenient pretext for doing so. McKenchie even argued that Curtius' account of the debates is simply a rhetorical elaboration of the traditional debate on the three constitutions (monarchy, oligarchy and democracy)¹⁸. His argument is far-fetched and has been convincingly rejected by others¹⁹.

¹⁴ Cf. R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 75: «we should be grateful that his intelligent and coherent account has survived».

¹⁵ R.N.H. BOERMA, *Justinus' boeken over de diadochen, een historisch commentaar. Boek 13-15 cap. 2 met een inleiding op de bronnen voor de periode 323-302 v.C.*, Amsterdam 1979, p. 276; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *A History of Macedonia III, 336-167 B.C.*, Oxford 1988, p. 101 n. 1.

¹⁶ N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 102 n. 1; cf. R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 107.

¹⁷ Cf. G. WIRTH, *Zur Politik des Perdikkas 323*, *Helikon* 7 (1967), p. 297 n. 56; A.B. BOSWORTH, *Alexander and the Iranians*, *JHS* 100 (1980), p. 7; W.S. GREENWALT, *Polygamy and Succession in Argead Macedonia*, *Arethusa* 22 (1989), p. 39-42, especially 39 n. 80; J. ROISMAN, *Honor in Alexander's campaign*, in ID. (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden 2003, p. 293: «We cannot ascertain the authenticity of words put by later historians into the mouth of Alexander or others, but it can be safely assumed that the resentment toward what was seen as blurring the lines between conquered and conqueror was authentic and that it was used in people's rhetoric against the king or anyone else». Cf. K. GEUS, *Eratosthenes von Kyrene. Studien zur hellenistischen Kultur- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte* (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 92), München 2002, p. 85: «Die Frage, welche Stellung die Barbaren im Weltreich Alexanders einnehmen sollten, bewegte zur Zeit der Diadochen und Epigonen die Gemüter».

¹⁸ P. MCKENCHIE, *Manipulation of Themes in Quintus Curtius Rufus Book 10*, *Historia* 48 (1999), p. 44-60.

¹⁹ E.D. CARNEY, *The Trouble with Philip Arrhidaeus*, *AHB* 15 (2001), p. 68-69; A.B. BOSWORTH, *Plus ça change... Ancient Historians and their Sources*, *CIAnt* 22 (2003), especially p. 175-186.

Saying that Curtius and Justin do not hand down the precise words spoken at the meeting is to state the obvious, but the contents of the speeches they relate accord very well with the political set-up at the time of Alexander's death, and are completely consistent with both earlier and later events. Consequently, most scholars assume that both ancient authors provide a quite reliable account of the debates²⁰.

Curtius (X 6.1) says that those invited were the *corporis custodes*, the *principes amicorum* and the *duces copiarum*. The σωματοφύλακες, then, were certainly present, as were the highest commanders and the closest friends of the king. It is impossible, however, to determine exactly who belonged to the latter two groups. Whether the rank and file were also present at the meeting is disputed, since the sources present two different traditions on this matter. According to Justin (XIII 2.4-3.1), the leaders held a separate council in which they decided that Alexander was to be succeeded by his unborn child; afterwards they exacted an oath from the cavalrymen to make them accept this ordering. Subsequently, the infantry – incensed about not being heard – held a gathering where they acclaimed Arrhidaïos king. In Diodorus' version (XVIII 2.2) there were also two separate councils, but he mentions the meeting of the infantrymen first. Diodorus must have switched the order of the assemblies: it is unthinkable that the leaders would have awaited the initiative of the common soldiers. Curtius (X 6.1) on the other hand, says that the king's companions summoned a private meeting where the common soldiers forced an entry, anxious to know what was going to happen. Scholarly opinion is

²⁰ W. SCHUR, *Das Alexanderreich nach Alexanders Tode*, *RhM* N.F. 83 (1934), p. 132; G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 293-294; J. SEIBERT, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios' I.* (*Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, 56), München 1969, p. 32-33; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 72-75; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 122 (especially for Justin; Curtius he deems less reliable); P. GOUKOWSKY, *Essai sur les origines du mythe d'Alexandre (336-270 av. J.-C.) I, Les origines politiques*, Nancy 1978, p. 193; L. MOOREN, *The Nature of the Hellenistic Monarchy*, in E. VAN 'T DACK et al. (edd.), *Egypt and the Hellenistic World*. Proceedings of the International Colloquium, Leuven 24-26 May 1982 (*Studia Hellenistica*, 27), Leuven 1983, p. 206 n. 2; W. HECKEL, *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*, London 1992, p. 145-147; W.M. ELLIS, *Ptolemy of Egypt*, London 1994, p. 25; W.L. ADAMS, *The Successors of Alexander*, in L.A. TRITLE (ed.), *The Greek World in the Fourth Century: from the Fall of the Athenian Empire to the Successors of Alexander*, London 1997, p. 229; W. HUSS, *Ägypten in hellenistischer Zeit. 332-30 v.Chr.*, München 2001, p. 82; C. SCHÄFER, *Eumenes von Kardia und der Kampf um die Macht im Alexanderreich* (*Frankfurter Althistorische Beiträge*, 9), Frankfurt am Main 2002, p. 57; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 34-45 and *id.*, *art. cit.* (n. 19), p. 178-180.

divided on this issue: some prefer Justin and Diodorus, others Curtius²¹. Mooren has adduced strong arguments in support of Curtius' version²². The king's death must have caused great disturbance with the troops and it is not unlikely that they went to the palace in their distress. In Justin's account, the nobles arrived at a compromise quite easily, despite their very differing views and mutual distrust, while Curtius shows that they only closed ranks when they felt threatened by the resistance of the rank and file. The latter development is by far the most likely. Moreover, the version of Justin and Diodorus contains an inconsistency which makes it very implausible. After Meleagros had opposed to Perdikkas' proposal in the meeting of the nobles and — like the infantry — championed the cause of Arrhidaïos, the commanders would have chosen precisely him out of all possible candidates as ambassador who had to convince the soldiers to accept Alexander's unborn child as king. It is very unlikely that they lacked discernment to such an extent; consequently, the stories Justin and Diodorus give have to be rejected²³.

²¹ Justin and Diodorus: J.G. DROYSSEN *Geschichte des Hellenismus II, Geschichte der Diadochen*, 1877 (= München 1980), p. 5-7; P. JOUGUET, *L'impérialisme macédonien et l'hellénisation de l'orient (L'Évolution de l'Humanité)*, Paris 1926, p. 132; W. SCHWAN, *Die Nachfolge Alexanders des Großen II, Einzelfragen*, *Klio* 24 (1931), p. 309-310; P. CLOCHÉ, *La dislocation d'un empire. Les premiers successeurs d'Alexandre le Grand (323-281/280 avant J.-C.)*, Paris 1959, p. 11-12; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 78-79; R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 277; H. BENGTON, *Die Diadochen: die Nachfolger Alexanders des Großen*, München 1987, p. 16-17; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 101-102; A. SIMONETTI AGOSTINETTI, *Flavio Arriano: gli eventi dopo Alessandro (Centro Ricerche e Documentazione sull'Antichità Classica, Monografie 15)*, Roma 1993, p. 34; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 44-45.

Curtius: R. SCHUBERT, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Leipzig 1914, p. 110; M.J. FONTANA, *Le lotte per la successione di Alessandro Magno dal 323 al 315*, Palermo 1960, p. 16 n. 10; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 50-51; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 233-236; W.S. GREENWALT, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 20-21; E.M. ANSON, *The Evolution of the Macedonian Army Assembly (330-315 B.C.)*, *Historia* 40 (1991), p. 236; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 146-147; W. HUSS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 82. According to F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 136, the army attended the meeting of the nobles, but they only proclaimed Arrhidaïos king at a later separate assembly. This view is certainly impossible: Diodorus/Justin and Curtius provide two distinct traditions here, only one of which can be correct: mixing both stories is unwarranted. P. BRIANT, *Antigone le Borgne. Les débuts de sa carrière et les problèmes de l'assemblée macédonienne (Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon, 152 – Centre de recherches d'histoire ancienne, 10)*, Paris 1973, p. 243, assumes that the soldiers stayed outside at the doors, because Curt. X 6.2 does not explicitly state that they entered. The following events, however, clearly imply that they were inside: see L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 234.

²² L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 233-236.

²³ Cf. M.J. FONTANA, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 16 n. 10: «Non è possibile infatti che i duci, che sapevano Meleagro contrario alle loro decisioni, inviassero proprio lui come ambasciatore

Heckel argues that Perdikkas had chosen Meleagros because of the influence the latter could exercise on the foot soldiers as their commander. This does not seem to be a sufficient reason, as Perdikkas' brother Alketas was also an infantry commander, and he would have been the obvious choice if being an infantry commander were the criterion by which the nobles chose their envoy. Heckel's counter-argument that the uprising of the troops against Perdikkas shows that Alketas did not have enough influence²⁴, is not convincing. Once Meleagros had whipped up the soldiers by encouraging them to appropriate a part of the booty, it probably became almost impossible to restrain them, no matter how big Alketas' influence might have been. Consequently, the conclusion that there was only one meeting, at which the soldiers were present, is the most plausible one. Curtius does not, however, provide any information on the number and nature of the troops present at the meeting.

It does not seem possible to identify Curtius' sources for his account of events at Babylon. Concluding that Curtius was the best source for many elements in the episode following Alexander's death, Errington suggested that he had based his narrative on Hieronymus of Cardia, but there is no tangible evidence²⁵. Hornblower, in her book on Hieronymus, contended that the Cardian did not deal with the events at Babylon in much detail²⁶. If Hieronymus was anything like the serious Thucydidean historian he is usually taken to be²⁷, he must have spent considerable

presso la falange»; G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 291: «Er wäre der einzige gewesen, der nicht hätte geschickt werden dürfen». According to W. SCHWAN, *art. cit.* (n. 21), p. 309-310, and R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 112, the fact that Meleagros was sent, proves that he did not champion Arrhidaïos' cause in the assembly of the commanders. This is less likely, however: see below, n. 38. I. SHARPLES, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 55 also thinks that Meleagros did not say anything in the first meeting, but while a simple error of name might account for the attribution of Nearchos' proposal to Meleagros, Nearchos will not have spoken for Arrhidaïos as he would thus undermine his own argument: Justin must have blended two speeches together.

²⁴ W. HECKEL, *On Attalos and Atalante*, CQ n.s. 28 (1978), p. 380.

²⁵ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 72-75.

²⁶ J. HORNBLOWER, *Hieronymus of Cardia (Oxford Classical & Philosophical Monographs)*, Oxford 1981, p. 88-89. For a partial refutation of her argument: see E. BADIAN, 'The Ring and the Book', in W. WILL & J. HEINRICHS (edd.), *Zu Alexander d.Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*, vol. I, Amsterdam 1987, p. 605-606.

²⁷ For recent reiterations of this view see e.g. S. HORNBLOWER, in ID. (ed.), *Greek Historiography*, Oxford 1994, p. 43; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 169; B. BLECKMANN, *Fiktion als Geschichte. Neue Studien zum Autor der Hellenika Oxyrhynchia und zur Historiographie des vierten vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Philologisch-historische Klasse III, 277)*, Göttingen 2006, p. 132. See, however, D. ASHERI, *Hieronymus of Cardia c. 364-?260 BC*, in N. WILSON

attention on events at Babylon as they were vital for a proper understanding of the early Successor history. Given that in the general outline of their narratives on Babylon Diodorus and Justin are much closer to each other than to Curtius, and that the correspondence between Diodorus and Justin is usually traced back to Hieronymus²⁸, he might not be the most likely candidate for being Curtius' source. All of this, however, should not be pressed too far.

From the outset Perdikkas tried to show off his close ties with Alexander²⁹. He had placed the king's throne clearly in view, with the royal diadem, robes and weapons displayed on it. Then, he also added the signet ring³⁰. After that, he took the floor and proposed to await the birth of

(ed.), *Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece*, New York 2006, p. 359-360, who relievingly points out how uncertain our knowledge about Hieronymus actually is. Unfortunately, the recently published *P. Oxy.* LXXI 4808, a text on Hellenistic historians, hardly adds any certainty to our knowledge due to its lacunary state. Note, moreover, that the extant part of the papyrus has only the last part of the author's name: []μοσ[]. The word Diadochoi seems certain, however, and the probable mention of Antigonos and Demetrios in the second column does suggest that the text indeed concerns Hieronymus. One would especially like to know the context of the words πρὸς χάριν (I 27), as this most likely was a statement concerning Hieronymus' objectivity. If the reading συνγρα[φεὺς καὶ ἀνήρ] σ[π]ουδαῖος[...] is correct, it might provide some justification for the view of Hieronymus as a Thucydidean author.

²⁸ Most extensively: F. REUSS, *Hieronymus von Kardia. Studien zur Geschichte der Diadochenzeit*, Berlin 1876 (= Aalen 1985), p. 23-35; J. HORNBLLOWER, *op. cit.* (n. 26), p. 65-67.

²⁹ R.M. ERRINGTON, *Alexander in the Hellenistic World*, in E. BADIAN (ed.), *Alexandre le Grand. Image et réalité (Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique, 22)*, Genève 1976, p. 138-139; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 81.

³⁰ For the most recent discussion of the problems concerning the signet ring, see M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 9-26. A further argument for the historicity of Alexander's giving of the ring to Perdikkas is provided by the *Liber de Morte* now that Bosworth's excellent analysis has shown it to be Ptolemaic propaganda: A.B. BOSWORTH, *Ptolemy and the Will of Alexander*, in ID. & E.J. BAYNHAM (edd.), *Alexander the Great in Fact and Fiction*, Oxford 2000, p. 207-241; see also E.J. BAYNHAM, *A Baleful Birth in Babylon. The Significance of the Prodigy in the Liber de Morte – An Investigation of Genre*, *ibid.*, p. 242-262. Since in a propaganda document Ptolemaios had no reason whatsoever to make up events which were of no significance to him, and on the contrary will have tried to embed his propagandistic inventions in as many facts as possible, the mention of the giving of the ring at *LDM* 112 would now seem to be a conclusive argument for its historicity. If the omission of the ring story in Arrian and Plutarch is indeed the consequence of Ptolemaios' silence on the matter in his Alexander History (thus most recently M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* [n. 6], p. 9-10) and not of the selection Arrian and Plutarch made, this also constitutes a further argument for the early date of Ptolemaios' History. As Bosworth's study of the *LDM* shows that it was written about 309/8, we have a *terminus ante quem* for determining when Ptolemaios thought it useful to conceal that Perdikkas had received the signet ring. There was indeed no reason to suppress the fact in or after 309 as Perdikkas had long been dead by that time, and we may well assume, then, that Ptolemaios wrote his history at the time of the struggle against Perdikkas.

Alexander's child and to make it king if it would prove to be a boy. Undoubtedly, he hoped to assume power as regent³¹.

Nearchos, however, argued that there was no point in awaiting an unborn child while Alexander already had a son by Barsine, namely Herakles, as we learn from Curtius³². According to Justin (XIII 2.6-7) this was Meleagros' idea, but it is clear that Curtius is correct. On the occasion of the mass marriage at Susa, Nearchos had married a daughter of Barsine³³. If his proposal were to be accepted, he would be married to a half sister of the king. Mehl considers Nearchos' intervention as part of the «Bestrebungen der makedonischen Großen, den Reichsverband zu lockern», because he interprets it as an attempt to undermine the possibility of a strong monarchy with Perdikkas as king³⁴. At that time, however, that possibility had not yet been considered. Nearchos simply wanted to develop a personal power base: as son-in-law of the queen mother he could be very influential at court³⁵. Although he vehemently defended his cause, he did not get any support³⁶. Boerma doubts that the Greek Nearchos attended the meeting, and deems it impossible that this proposal was uttered immediately after Perdikkas³⁷. Given Nearchos'

³¹ Curt. X 6.8-9 and Just. XIII 2.5; W. SCHUR, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 132. M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 31, is too enthusiastic about Perdikkas' good intentions when he interprets the nomination of Alexander IV as a proof of loyalty without even considering that Perdikkas might just have aimed at a long period of regency.

³² Curt. X 6.10-11.

³³ Arr., *Anab* VII 4.6.

³⁴ A. MEHL, *Seleukos Nikator und sein Reich*. I. Teil, *Seleukos' Leben und die Entwicklung seiner Machtposition* (*Studia Hellenistica*, 28), Lovanii 1986, p. 25.

³⁵ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 50 and 74; P.A. BRUNT, *Alexander, Barsine and Heracles*, *RFIC* 103 (1975), p. 31-32; D. OGDEN, *Polygamy, Prostitutes and Death. The Hellenistic Dynasties*, London 1999, p. 47; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 38. According to P. MCKENCHIE, *art. cit.* (n. 18) p. 60, one should have no faith in Curtius unless another source confirms his statements. J.L. O'NEIL, *Political Trials under Alexander the Great and his Successors*, *Antichthon* 33 (1999), p. 29, endorses this view, but in a slightly more balanced way; cf. also J.E. ATKINSON, review of Bosworth, *op. cit.* (n. 3), *CR* n.s. 54 (2004), p. 158. Since Curtius' account is the only correct one on this particular matter, McKenzie's view is untenable; cf. n. 19. Moreover, it is *a priori* clear that such a method cannot be applied here. As Curtius provides the most elaborate account on the Babylon settlement we have, he must by definition have written things not to be found in any of the other preserved sources, but which certainly featured in some of the accounts which have not been handed down.

³⁶ Curt. X 6.12: *Nulli placebat oratio. (...) iamque prope ad seditionem pervenerant, Nearchos pervicacius tuente sententiam* [*«Nobody liked Nearchus' suggestion (...) and, as Nearchus pressed his idea with greater insistence, they came close to rioting»*].

³⁷ R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 106.

position under Alexander there is no reason to deny that he participated in the debates. To propose making a son — albeit a bastard — of Alexander king immediately after the idea to appoint an unborn son was brought forward, is logic itself.

These proposals provoked a fierce reaction from Meleagros. He rejected the possibility of having a half Asian (sc. Alexander's unborn child or Herakles) rule over Macedonians, and therefore suggested that Alexander's half-brother be chosen instead³⁸. His suggestion was probably inspired by personal ambition as well since the feeble-minded Arrhidaios would never have been able to exercise power: Meleagros could then claim the regency as he had supported the king from the very beginning³⁹.

Deeming neither of the aforementioned candidates suited to rule the Macedonian empire, Ptolemaios proposed that a council of those who were closest to the deceased king should take up the government, meeting at Alexander's throne⁴⁰. Justin (XIII 2.11-12) probably misrepresents

³⁸ Just. XIII 2.6-10. Determining Meleagros' attitude is difficult because the contradictions in the sources do not allow a clear conclusion. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 38-40, has shown that he was most likely the first one to recommend Arrhidaios. It is almost inconceivable that the army commanders would have discussed the candidacy of Herakles and Rhoxane's unborn child, while failing to consider Arrhidaios. Meleagros, then, was the one to push Alexander's half-brother forward, and he was followed by the infantrymen. According to P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 330-331, Arrhidaios was «le successeur déjà désigné»; this is endorsed by F.J. FERNANDEZ NIETO, *La designación del sucesor en el antiguo reino de Macedonia*, in V. ALONSO TRONCOSO (ed.), *ΔΙΑΔΟΧΟΣ ΤΗΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΑΣ. La figura del sucesor en la realeza helenística (Gerión Anejos, 9)*, Madrid 2005, p. 39. There is, however, no trace of a designated successor in the sources, and their arguments fail to convince. The situation under the Antigonids is no proof for Argead practices. Curtius X 7.15 shows most of all that it was important to be of Argead descent, not that there was any additional designation of a successor among the Argead candidates. Even if the religious functions of the king are as important as Briant supposes, the military tasks were at least as important, and it is quite unlikely that Alexander would have appointed a successor who would never be able to command the army. Arrhidaios was to only Argead to survive Alexander's accession to the throne, and this might well have been because Alexander thought he would never be able to rule (A.B. BOSWORTH, *Conquest and Empire. The Reign of Alexander the Great*, Cambridge 1988, p. 27-28; E.D. CARNEY, *art. cit.* [n. 19], p. 65-66; S. MÜLLER, *Maßnahmen der Herrschaftssicherung gegenüber der makedonische Opposition bei Alexander dem Großen [Europäische Hochschulschriften III, 974]*, Frankfurt am Main 2003, p. 34-43). That Arrhidaios did in fact come to the throne was the result of a crisis no one could have foreseen; he would never have become king under normal circumstances.

³⁹ R.A. BILLOWS, *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State (Hellenistic Culture and Society, 4)*, Berkeley 1990, p. 53: «Meleagros, naturally, expected to wield actual power in Arrhidaios's name».

⁴⁰ Curt. X 6.13-15. According to P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 193, Ptolemaios only proposed this at a later time, namely the moment the nobles had to present a united front to

Ptolemaios' words here, making him suggest choosing one of Alexander's friends as king⁴¹. It is highly unlikely that Ptolemaios would have made such a proposal: he must have realized that they were not going to choose him, in which case it would become very difficult to develop a personal position of power. Whatever his ambition was, the appointment of a strong king could not have served it, unless he himself had been that king. Contrary to what some scholars think⁴², Ptolemaios' proposal was

Meleagros and the infantrymen (see below). Since both Justin and Curtius relate Ptolemaios' speech at this point, and it fits the logical course of the debate very well, his view seems unwarranted. W.L. ADAMS, *The Hellenistic Kingdoms*, in G.R. BUGH (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Cambridge 2006, p. 29, interprets Ptolemaios' proposal as a temporary solution, postponing the definite settlement until Rhoxane's child was born. Both in Justin and in Curtius, however, it is clear that he did not want to appoint a king and intended his solution to be — in theory — permanent. In practice, of course, he hoped to gain as much personal power as possible, as soon as possible in this way.

⁴¹ Some have held that Justin means that Ptolemaios wanted the satrapies to be distributed among Alexander's friends who would then also jointly rule the empire: thus G. WIRTH, review of Seibert, *op. cit.* (n. 20), *BO* 30 (1973), p. 411; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 193. A more likely interpretation is offered in the translations of Seel and Yardley: O. SEEL, *Pompeius Trogus. Weltgeschichte von den Anfängen bis Augustus im Auszug des Justin. Eingeleitet, übersetzt und erläutert*, Zürich 1972, p. 242; J.C. YARDLEY, *Justin. Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus* (APA. *Classical Resources*, 3), Atlanta, GA 1994, p. 124; cf. W. HECKEL, *The Politics of Distrust: Alexander and his Successors*, in D. OGDEN (ed.), *The Hellenistic World. New Perspectives*, London 2002, p. 82. They interpret the words *qui provincias regant, quibus bella mandentur* as being on the same level as *qui prae virtute regi suo proximi fuerint*. Justin, then, says that Ptolemaios claimed that it is better «to choose from those who stood close to their late king in personal qualities, who are the governors of provinces, who are entrusted with military campaigns» (trans. Yardley, adapted). The change of tense is to be explained by the fact that the king was dead, while the generals still held the government of the satrapies and the military commands. Justin does not mention any council, and it would have been impracticable to meet regularly for satraps who were scattered throughout the entire empire; Wirth's argument on the matter is unconvincing. R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 321, holds that Curtius has adapted his account to his own view on the events, but he does not say what this view would have been. It is much more likely that Trogus/Justin could not conceive the empire being governed by a council and therefore made Ptolemaios propose choosing a king from among Alexander's closest friends. I would like to thank dr. Gert Partoens for discussing this passage with me. Professor Mooren pointed out to me that since Justin does not expressly say that one man had to be chosen, he might well mean that the members of a council had to be elected. If this is what Justin wanted to say, his wording is extremely clumsy. To my mind the context does seem to suggest that the choice of a king is what he was talking about.

⁴² A. BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, *Histoire des Lagides I, Les cinq premiers Ptolémées (323-181 avant J.-C.)*, Paris 1903, p. 9; W. SCHUR, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 132; M.J. FONTANA *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 206; K. ROSEN, *Politische Ziele in der frühen hellenistischen Geschichtsschreibung*, *Hermes* 107 (1979), p. 465; A. MEHL, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 25; G. WIRTH, *Alexander, Kassander und andere Zeitgenossen. Erwägungen zum Problem ihrer Selbstdarstellung*, *Tyche* 4 (1989), p. 202.

not meant to weaken the unity of the empire⁴³; disbanding the territory Alexander had conquered, was unthinkable at that time⁴⁴. He might really have thought that it was possible to administer the empire in this way, but more likely the proposal was simply aimed at preventing anyone else from obtaining more power than he did — the best he could hope for in the given circumstances — or at least undermining Perdikkas' authority⁴⁵. If so, he was apparently successful, because more nobles approved of his suggestion than of Perdikkas', probably because most of them deemed it the best way to obtain a position of power since they could not all hope to become regent⁴⁶. The difference of opinion should not be interpreted as the manifestation of an ideological opposition between advocates and opponents of collegiate government: it was mere expediency with everyone adopting the point of view that was most suited to serve his personal ambition. Schäfer assumes that Ptolemaios might have acted «im Sinn des Perdikkas» because he suggested that the council should meet at Alexander's throne, the very throne on which Perdikkas had put the ring⁴⁷. This seems to be a shallow connection. Both men referred to Alexander in order to grant some legitimacy to their proposals, but Ptolemaios' proposition was almost diametrically opposed to Perdikkas': while the latter wanted to appoint a king, the former explicitly suggested not doing so. If Ptolemaios wanted to support Perdikkas, he would have agreed with him instead of making a counterproposal.

⁴³ Cf. P. JOUGUET, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 132; J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 32; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 74: «an implication which it is difficult to see»; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 232: «In Ptolemy's opinion Macedon and its empire could survive without a king»; M.B. HATZOPOULOS, *Macedonian Institutions under the Kings I, A Historical and Epigraphic Study (Meletemata, 22)*, Athens 1996, p. 343-344.

⁴⁴ P. JOUGUET, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 131: «La pensée de partager l'Empire ne pouvait venir à l'esprit d'aucuns des grands chefs qui délibérèrent à Babylone, après la mort d'Alexandre. Si vives que fussent les ambitions de chacun, ces Macédoniens ne pouvaient songer à détruire l'œuvre de la Macédoine»; M.J. FONTANA *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 15 n. 5: «Era troppo presto ancora perchè il concetto dell'unità dell'impero potesse far nascere dubbi o tendenze separatistiche»; W.M. ELLIS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 24: «From our perspective, the division of the empire seems inevitable. It cannot be overstressed that this solution was unthinkable to the leaders who gathered in Babylon around the corpse of Alexander the Great».

⁴⁵ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 50-51 and 74-75: «Ptolemy's proposal was subtly aimed at undermining Perdikkas' pre-eminence» (p. 51).

⁴⁶ Curt. X 6.16: *Ptolomaeo quidam, pauciores Perdikkae adsentiebantur* («Some agreed with Ptolemy, fewer with Perdikkas»). Cf. L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 233: «For them, as for Ptolemy, it was above all a matter of getting as much as possible out of the actual political situation, and preventing others from getting more».

⁴⁷ C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 57.

Next, Aristonous proposed that Perdikkas should be appointed king⁴⁸. Despite the backing of the common soldiers, Perdikkas doubted whether to accept or not⁴⁹. Some scholars have argued that Curtius wanted to suggest a parallel with Tiberius' accession, as the latter also pretended to hesitate in order to be asked more pressingly; like Tiberius, Perdikkas was, in their view, unchallenged and had no reason to doubt⁵⁰. Perdikkas' position, however, was far from secure, and his wavering was well-advised. Curtius only mentions the resistance of Meleagros — who even tried to kill Perdikkas a little later (cf. *infra*) — and Ptolemaios, but there certainly were others who did not support Perdikkas, among whom were those who backed Ptolemaios' proposal⁵¹. Being a threat to their own power, it is not surprising that Perdikkas' kingship was opposed to by other nobles⁵². Furthermore, other important generals not present at Babylon, such as Antipatros, Antigonos and Krateros, were potential opponents⁵³. Thus, Perdikkas had to refuse the kingship to save both his position and his life⁵⁴. Meleagros then started stirring up the soldiers and

⁴⁸ Curt. X 6.16-17. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 43, doubts whether Aristonous actually made this proposal and he argues that «Curtius' account might reflect negative propaganda» here. It is clear, however, that Aristonous was one of Perdikkas' supporters, as Bosworth himself indicates; cf. R.M. ERRINGTON, *Bias in Ptolemy's History of Alexander*, *CQ* N.S. 19 (1969), p. 235-236 and W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 275-276. That Justin does not mention Aristonous' proposal is merely a matter of abbreviation; he leaves out some of the other speakers as well: see R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 278. Consequently, I see no reason to reject Curtius' account on this matter. *Pace* G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 288, *summa imperii* should rather be taken to mean supreme power than the highest office, and consequently we need not assume that Aristonous has changed his proposal during his speech.

⁴⁹ Curt. X 6.18: *Haerebat inter cupiditatem pudoremque et, quo modestius quod expectabat adpeteret, pervicacius oblaturus esse credebat* («Perdikkas wavered, wishing to do it but bashful, and he thought that the more diffident he was in seeking what he expected to be his the more insistently they would press it upon him»).

⁵⁰ E. BADIAN, *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford p. 263; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 51; J.E. ATKINSON, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni Books 3 and 4* (*London Studies in Classical Philology*, 4), Amsterdam 1980, p. 36; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 237 n. 144. That the opposition to Perdikkas is less clear in the other sources is, again, a consequence of the difference in extensiveness between Curtius and the other authors: cf. above, n. 35. The question whether Tiberius' position actually was that stable need not detain us here, but see D. SHOTTER, *Tiberius Caesar* (*Lancaster Pamphlets in Ancient History*), London 2004², p. 18-19.

⁵¹ Cf. R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 50-51.

⁵² Curt. X 6.18-22; cf. L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 236.

⁵³ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 49; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 31-32.

⁵⁴ Cf. R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 50-51; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 236-237; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 145; D. BRAUND, *After Alexander: the Emergence of the Hellenistic World, 323-281*, in A. ERSKINE (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*

prompted them to seize the booty⁵⁵. Apparently he was successful, because he found wide support with them⁵⁶.

The opposition of the soldiers eventually led to a compromise among the nobles⁵⁷. According to Curtius (X 7.8), they agreed that Perdikkas and Leonnatos would be 'tutor' for the unborn child, while Antipatros and Krateros would hold joint responsibility for the government of Europe. Justin (XIII 2.14) on the other hand, says that Perdikkas, Leonnatos, Antipatros and Krateros were all appointed 'tutor'. The first problem is to determine the meaning of 'tutor': it could either be regent or guardian, or both. This question need not detain us here. For the present purpose it is enough to know that it certainly meant regent, and that it might have included guardianship as well⁵⁸. Determining whether there were two or four 'tutores' is difficult, but the more detailed information given by Curtius seems more likely because Justin often makes mistakes in abbreviating, and this might be another instance of simplification in his account, changing two 'tutores' and two governors of Europe into four 'tutores'⁵⁹. Apparently the opposition among the nobles was strong enough to prevent that Perdikkas became the sole regent, despite the precarious situation. Another possibility is that the joint regency was a way to try to appease Meleagros and his supporters somewhat because having a colleague made it more difficult for Perdikkas to usurp the kingship, as he was planning to do according to Meleagros' claims⁶⁰. In any case, it is

(*Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World*), Oxford 2003, p. 22: «His whole stance as the guardian of Alexander's interests required hesitation, for Alexander's widow was pregnant and might produce a son and heir. As Alexander's champion Perdikkas could hardly seize the throne from the king's son: much better to be regent, if there were to be a son».

⁵⁵ Curt. X 6.20-24.

⁵⁶ Curt. X 7.1.

⁵⁷ W. SCHUR, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 132-133; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 52; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 236. Contra: I. SHARPLES, *art. cit.* (n. 11), p. 59-60.

⁵⁸ On this and related problems, see A. MEEUS, *Some Institutional Problems concerning the Succession to Alexander the Great*, forthcoming.

⁵⁹ F. GRANIER, *Die makedonische Heeresversammlung. Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht* (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 13), München 1931, p. 59; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 101; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 44, prefer Justin's account. J.G. DROYSEN, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 6; W. ENSSLIN, *Die Gewaltenteilung im Reichsregiment nach Alexanders Tod*, *RhM* N.F. 74 (1925), p. 303; P. CLOCHÉ, *op. cit.* (n. 21) p. 11; M.J. FONTANA, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 18-19; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 49 n. 1 and 52-53; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 136; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 78; R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 110; L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 234-235 follow Curtius.

⁶⁰ Curt. X 7.21. Cf. G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 288. W. ENSSLIN, *art. cit.* (n. 59), p. 303, explains the joint regency by the «Besorgnis vor einer straffen Zentralgewalt (...),

clear that Leonnatos was included into the regency in order to limit Perdikkas' powers. Why Antipatros and Krateros, both absent from Babylon, were included in the compromise is unclear⁶¹. The appointment of the governor of Europe does not seem a pressing concern at a time when a civil war is about to arise over the question of the succession to the throne.

The infantry, under Meleagros' direction, refused to recognise the settlement of the generals and revolted. Most nobles fled the city, along with the cavalry, but Perdikkas and a small circle of collaborators stayed within the walls and tried to come to terms with the soldiery⁶². His opponents sent a hit squad to kill Perdikkas, but he managed to escape⁶³.

1.2. The compromise

By means of diplomatic machinations, Perdikkas succeeded in reaching an agreement with the infantrymen, but it is unclear how much time it took⁶⁴. Arrhidaios (under the dynastic name of Philippos) and Alexander's unborn child — if it proved to be a boy — would be joint kings⁶⁵. The organisation of the government is highly debated as most scholars fail to distinguish this compromise from the final settlement⁶⁶. The nobles did not really reconcile themselves to the agreement reached with the infantry for the purpose of avoiding civil war, and reorganised the government again at a later stage (see 1.3). Most scholars, however, have neglected this, and assume that the final stage only consisted of a distribution of the

die in den Kreisen der Grossen alsbald sich zeigte», but it is highly unlikely that most nobles wanted a strong central government: cf *supra*, p. 50-51. Furthermore, a dual regency is no guarantee for a strong government because internal dissension might cause impairment.

⁶¹ According to R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 53, the nobles hoped to win Antipatros and Krateros over to their side by means of their appointment and also to get the support of the phalanx: especially Krateros was very popular with the infantrymen. P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 294 n. 34, assumes that they hoped to avoid a struggle for power in Europe by including this regulation in the compromise, but it is very doubtful whether that belonged to the concerns of the generals in Babylon at the time and whether it was a suitable means of doing so.

⁶² Curt. X 7.16-21; Diod. XVIII 2.4; Just. XIII 3.4-5.

⁶³ Curt. X 8.1-4; Just. XIII 3.7.

⁶⁴ See A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 46-49, who solves the contradictions in the sources very plausibly.

⁶⁵ Arr., *Succ.* Fl1a1; Curt. X 8.22-23; Diod. XVIII 2.4; Just. XIII 4.1-4.

⁶⁶ See R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 54 n. 42.

satrapies⁶⁷. Unfortunately no source gives each stage in its entirety and there are a few contradictions. The following table might bring some clarification: it lists all decisions at the point when they are mentioned in the sources, i.e. at the moment of the reconciliation with the phalanx on the one hand (1.2), and at the time of the satrapy distribution on the other hand (1.3)⁶⁸:

	compromise (1.2)	final settlement (1.3)
Perdikkas	A.3: χιλιαρχεῖν χιλιαρχίας ἧς ἦρχεν Ἡφαιστίων J.4.5: castrorum et exercitus et rerum cura	C.10.4: cum rege esse copiisque praesese D.2.4: ἐπιμελητῆς τῆς βασιλείας De.1: ἐπετρόπευον ⁶⁹ αὐτοῖς (=the kings) τὴν ἀρχήν De.4: ἡ Ἡφαιστίωνος χιλιαρχία H.: ἐπίτροπος καὶ ἐπιμελητῆς τῶν βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων
Krateros	A.3: προστάτης τῆς Ἀρριδαίου βασιλείας J.4.5: regiae pecuniae custodia	A.7: the administration of Europe, except for Thrace and the adjacent areas (*) De.4: ἡ κηδεμονία καὶ ὅση προστασία τῆς βασιλείας
Antipatros	A.3: στρατηγὸς τῶν κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην J.4.5: Macedoniae et Graeciae Antipater praepositur	A.7: the administration of Europe, except for Thrace and the adjacent areas (*) D.3.2(*) and De.3 (*): idem
Meleagros	A.3: ὑπαρχος Περδίκκου C.8.22: tertius dux J.4.5: castrorum et exercitus et rerum cura	

⁶⁷ The first scholars to recognize that there was a later reorganisation of the central government were R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 54, and F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 144-146: see above, n. 5.

⁶⁸ A. = Arr., *Succ.* F1a; Ap. = App., *Syr.* 57; C. = Curt. X; D. = Diod. XVIII; De. = Dexippus (*FGrH* 100) F8; H. = *Heidelberger Epitome* (*FGrH* 155) F1.2; J. = Just. XIII; L. = Libanius, *Or.* XI 79. The data of Diodorus, Dexippus and the *Heidelberger Epitome* clearly belong to the third stage as these authors only mention the final decisions: see below, 1.3.

⁶⁹ The verb takes the plural form because the subject is οἱ ἀμφὶ Περδίκκων, which should here be taken to mean simply 'Perdikkas', however.

compromise (1.2)	final settlement (1.3)
Seleukos	Ap.: ἡγεμὼν τῆς ἵππου τῆς ἐταιρικῆς D.3.4: ἔταξεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἵππαρχίαν τῶν ἐταίρων J.4.17: summus castrorum tribunatus L.: ἵππαρχος ὑπὸ Περδίκκου

(*) quoted in n. 112.

Apparently Leonnatos no longer held an office in the second settlement while in the earlier compromise of the nobles during the first meeting (1.1) he had been appointed ‘tutor’. The reason for this sudden setback seems to be beyond retrieval due to our summary sources.

Antipatros was confirmed in the office he already held under Alexander: στρατηγός of Europe⁷⁰. The respective positions of Perdikkas, Krateros and Meleagros are less clear, as is the interrelation between their offices. Arrian calls Perdikkas χιλίαρχος and Krateros προστάτης. These terms have been much debated, but no consensus has been reached⁷¹. As I shall argue elsewhere, Anson’s conclusion that προστασία means regency and possibly also guardianship seems the most probable solution⁷²; again, the question of the guardianship need not detain us here. The chiliarchy is the highest cavalry command, one of the most important military positions⁷³. The question to be dealt with

⁷⁰ H. BENGTON, *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit. Ein Beitrag zum antiken Staatsrecht I* (Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, 26), München 1964², p. 15-56.

⁷¹ J. SEIBERT, *Das Zeitalter der Diadochen* (Erträge der Forschung, 185), Darmstadt 1983, p. 84-89, provides an excellent *status quaestionis* up to 1978. More recent literature includes: N.G.L. HAMMOND, *Some Macedonian Offices: 336-309 BC*, *JHS* 105 (1985), p. 156-160; W. HECKEL, *The Last Days and Testament of Alexander the Great. A Prosopographic Study* (*Historia Einzelschriften*, 56), Stuttgart 1988, p. 19-21 and ID., *The Marshals of Alexander’s Empire*, London 1992, p. 366-370; E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 2); P. BRIANT, *Sources gréco-hellénistiques, institutions perses et institutions macédoniennes: continuités, changements et bricolages*, in H. SANCISI-WEERDENBURG e.a. (edd.), *Continuity and Change*. Proceedings of the Last Achaemenid History Workshop, April 6-8, 1990 – Ann Arbor, Michigan (*Achaemenid History*, 8), Leiden 1994, p. 291-298; E.D. CARNEY, *Women and Basileia: Legitimacy and Female Political Action in Macedonia*, *CJ* 90 (1995), p. 372-375; G. SINATTI, *Epimeletes ed epimeleia in Diodoro Siculo XVIII-XX*, in B. VIRGILIO (ed.), *Studi Ellenistici 8* (*Bibliotheca di Studi Antichi*, 78), Pisa 1996, p. 97-122; A.W. COLLINS, *The Office of Chiliarch under Alexander and the Successors*, *Phoenix* 55 (2001), p. 259-283; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 51-53.

here is whether Justin's description of the offices of Perdikkas, Krateros, and Meleagros accords with the titles Arrian gives. Schachermeyr has pointed out that *regiae pecuniae custodia* does not exactly equal προστασία⁷⁴. I can see two possible explanations for Justin's wording. Either Trogus' source gave a list of the duties of the προστατής which was poorly summarised by Trogus/Justin or it might — more likely — have been a specification of the division of tasks between Perdikkas, Krateros, and Meleagros. Justin says that Perdikkas and Meleagros were also entrusted with the charge of the camp and the army. Arrian, too, ascribes a military function to Perdikkas: the chiliarchy. Justin calls Seleukos' chiliarchy in the final settlement (1.3) *summus castrorum tribunatus*⁷⁵, the supreme command of the camp, which accords — albeit not literally — with the common equation χιλιαρχία = *tribunatus militum*⁷⁶. The resemblance of this description to the *castrorum et exercitus cura* of Perdikkas, suggests that the latter paraphrase also refers to the chiliarchy in his case, and to a comparable military position for Meleagros (see below)⁷⁷. Besides the military function, Justin also mentions the *rerum cura*, as the manuscripts have it. Some, however, have emended this to *regum cura*⁷⁸, but most scholars reject the emendation for various reasons⁷⁹. The emendation is indeed unnecessary: since the Macedonians surely appointed regents the text is sound as it stands⁸⁰. Perdikkas and

⁷² E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 2); A. MEEUS, *art. cit.* (n. 58).

⁷³ A. MEEUS, *art. cit.* (n. 58); similar views have already been argued by E.R. BEVAN, *Note on the Command held by Seleukos, 323-321 B.C.*, *CR* 14 (1900), p. 396-398, and W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 366-370.

⁷⁴ F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 126; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 52. Attempts to explain the discrepancy between Arrian and Justin away, such as that of R. LAQUEUR, *Zur Geschichte des Krateros*, *Hermes* 54 (1919), p. 295-300, have proven unsuccessful.

⁷⁵ See below, p. 61-62, for Seleukos' appointment as χιλιαρχος.

⁷⁶ H.J. MASON, *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions. A Lexicon and Analysis* (*American Studies in Papyrology*, 13), Toronto 1974, s.v. χιλιαρχία 1.

⁷⁷ Cf. F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 140.

⁷⁸ The emendation originated with J.N. MADVIG, *Adversaria critica ad scriptores Graecos et Latinos II*, *Adversaria critica ad scriptores Latinos*, Copenhagen 1873 (= Hildesheim 1967), p. 623-625; O. Seel adopted it in the Teubner edition.

⁷⁹ R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 124 (taking care of Arrhidaios was not Perdikkas' task); W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 369 n. 4 (there was only one king, i.e. Arrhidaios); A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 51 (it is unlikely that Perdikkas would have included Meleagros in the guardianship).

⁸⁰ A. MEEUS, *art. cit.* (n. 58). J.N. MADVIG, *loc. cit.*, deemed XIII 4.5 (*castrorum et exercitus et rerum cura Meleagro et Perdiccae adsignatur*) and XIII 6.10 ([...] *Arridaeum et Alexandri Magni filium, quorum cura illi [= Perdikkas] mandata fuerat* [...]) contradictory. Maybe, then, the passages actually show that there was no distinction between

Meleagros, then, were regent together with Krateros, as Perdikkas and Leonnatos were supposed to share the regency in the very first compromise (1.1)⁸¹.

That Perdikkas was also a regent, explains why Arrian (*Succ.*, Fl1a 3) — or Photius — wrongly described the chiliarchy as ἐπιτροπή τῆς ξυμπάσης βασιλείας; this can only refer to the regency, while the chiliarchy merely was the supreme cavalry-command. The original text probably stated that Perdikkas held the ἐπιτροπή τῆς ξυμπάσης βασιλείας and was chiliarch at the same time, but Arrian/Photius misunderstood this and interpreted it as if Perdikkas held the ἐπιτροπή because he was chiliarch⁸². According to Curtius, Meleagros was *tertius dux*, while Arrian calls him ὑπαρχος Περδίκκου. The most likely solution in this reconstruction seems to be that his infantry command was inferior to Perdikkas' cavalry command⁸³. This would explain why Justin (XIII 4.17) labels the chiliarchy *summus castrorum tribunatus*. Errington argues that Meleagros merely was Perdikkas' deputy and that this was the most he could expect⁸⁴. It seems unlikely, however, that Perdikkas would have risked not reaching a compromise by refusing to acknowledge Meleagros as his peer — the phalanx might not have accepted that Perdikkas became regent

rerum cura and *regum cura*, although it should be noted — again — that both passages cannot be compared directly as XIII 4.5 belongs to the second stage while XIII 6.10 gives the result of the third stage. At XIII 6.10 the manuscript readings should be maintained: see R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 176-178. The wording *rerum cura* possibly originates from the same source as ἐπίτροπος καὶ ἐπιμελητὴς τῶν βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων and τὴν ἐπιτροπὴν καὶ ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων in the *Heidelberger Epitome* (FGrH 155) F1.2 and 1.5: cf. K. ROSEN, *Die Reichsordnung von Babylon (323 v. Chr.)*, *AClass* 10 (1967), p. 109 n. 107. See also Nepos, *Eum.*, 2.1-2 (*summa rerum tradita esset (...) Perdiccae (...) [et] liberi [Alexandri] in suam tutelam pervenissent*), 5.1 (*rerumque summa ad Antipatrum defertur*), and *Phoc.*, 3.4 (*regiis rebus praeerat*).

⁸¹ According to P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 80, Perdikkas and Leonnatos renounced the regency as a concession from their part, and Krateros would from now on be the sole regent. This view does not account for Justin's *rerum cura*.

⁸² E.R. BEVAN, *art. cit.* (n. 73), p. 398 also concluded, rightly, I think, that Photius blundered in his *epitome* of Arrian, although I cannot agree with his reconstruction of the original text, since he fails to distinguish the second and the third stage of the Babylon settlement. Cf. F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5) p. 140-141; A.W. COLLINS, *art. cit.* (n. 71), p. 276: «(...) There is a strong possibility that the gloss [scil. τὸ δὲ ἦν ἐπιτροπή τῆς ξυμπάσης βασιλείας] may be a confused description by Photius of the functions of Perdikkas' ἐπιμέλεια rather than those of his chiliarchy».

⁸³ Cf. W. SCHWAN, *art. cit.* (n. 21), p. 310; F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 139 n. 80 and 140-141; G. SINATTI, *art. cit.* (n. 71), p. 108 n. 34: «Associato al potere di Perdicca, ma già in posizione subordinata sul piano militare (ὑπαρχος Περδίκκου, secondo Arriano, *FGrHist* 156, F1,3), come comandante della fanteria macedone».

⁸⁴ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 56; cf. E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 57-58.

and Meleagros did not — and probably he had already decided to dispose of Meleagros as soon as he had the opportunity⁸⁵. It seems, then, that there were three regents among whom the tasks were divided: Perdikkas was to command the cavalry and Meleagros the infantry, while Krateros would be responsible for the treasury. However, given the confusion in the sources and the lack of information on the period between this stage and the final settlement (1.3), a definite and complete answer is impossible.

Yet Perdikkas had made these concessions only in order to reach a compromise. Undoubtedly, he did not plan this settlement to be permanent⁸⁶, so he immediately sought a way to get rid of Meleagros⁸⁷. After he had won the latter's confidence, they jointly organised a ritual purification of the army⁸⁸. This turned out to be a plot of Perdikkas and he had 30 — or 300 — soldiers who had supported Meleagros executed⁸⁹. Meleagros himself tried to escape in vain⁹⁰. Some scholars assume that Perdikkas killed Meleagros only after the final settlement (1.3) because Diodorus (XVIII 4.7) narrates his death then⁹¹. All sources, however, have the execution of Meleagros together with that of the soldiers and Diodorus is the only one to insert the distribution of the satrapies and the cancellation of the *Hypomnemata* before this event. It seems unlikely that Meleagros did not flee immediately when his supporters were executed and Perdikkas' scheming became evident. This suggests that the interval between the execution of the soldiers and the death of Meleagros indicated in the sources⁹² must have been very small and only means that they were not killed at the very same moment, as both events were separated by the duration of Meleagros' flight and subsequent capture. The

⁸⁵ Cf. n. 86.

⁸⁶ Cf. E. BADIAN, *A King's Notebooks*, *HSCPh* 72 (1967), p. 202: «Meleager's challenge had forced the marshals to patch up a compromise which they probably all knew would not last long»; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 52 and 55-56; E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 42-43.

⁸⁷ Curt. X 9.7.

⁸⁸ Justin (XIII 4.7) says that this was necessary *propter mortem regis*, while Curtius (X 9.11) links it to the civil strife: *probabilis causa videbatur praeterita discordia*.

⁸⁹ Arr., *Succ.* Fl44; Curt. X 9.7-19; Diod. XVIII 4.7; Just. XIII 4.7-8; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 54 with n. 95.

⁹⁰ Arr., *Succ.* Fl44; Curt. X 9.20-21; Diod. XVIII 4.7.

⁹¹ F. SCHACHERMEYER, *Die letzten Pläne Alexanders des Großen*, *JÖAI* 41 (1954), p. 121-122 and *id.*, p. 142; E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 202 n. 62; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 55 n. 96.

⁹² Arr., *Succ.* Fl44 (οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον); Curt. X 9.21 (mox); Diod. XVIII 4.7 (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα).

reason why Diodorus has changed the order is that he only gives the essentials of the different stages: a reconciliation between the phalanx on the one hand and the cavalry and the generals on the other hand came about and Perdikkas eventually became regent⁹³. He does not deem the regulations of the second stage (1.2) important as they did not exist very long — it is not clear how long exactly⁹⁴ — and he only narrates the actual outcome. He does not mention the prospective kingship of Rhoxane's child because it was as yet unborn and this regulation consequently did not affect reality at that time. Together with the final appointment of a regent, the satrapies were distributed and after that Perdikkas had the *Hypomnemata* cancelled. That is why Diodorus mentions these events together with Perdikkas' appointment and postponed his account of executions of the soldiers and the death of Meleagros⁹⁵. The problem is that this procedure has imperceptibly connected the second and third stages of the settlement in Diodorus' account.

1.3. The final settlement

After the mutineers had been executed, the generals reorganised the administration, calling an assembly to discuss the future. Again, it is impossible to determine who exactly attended this meeting, and the way in which the decisions were made is equally unclear. An analysis of the

⁹³ F. SCHACHERMEYR, *Zu Geschichte und Staatsrecht der frühen Diadochenzeit*, *Klio* 19 (1925), p. 443, and *id.*, p. 163, already noticed that this was the principle behind Diodorus' summary, albeit not entirely for the right reasons. See below, 1.3, for Perdikkas' appointment as sole regent.

⁹⁴ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 54 and A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 55, have aptly remarked that it might have been a matter of weeks: Perdikkas had to gain Meleagros' confidence, prepare his plot, and then organise the ritual purification which probably could not be performed on any given day. Aelian (XII 64), says that Alexander was left unburied for thirty days while the Diadochoi argued about the succession. That the king really was left unburied for such a long time in the Babylonian summer heath is rather unlikely, but the duration of the negotiations Aelian mentions might well be a round number close to the actual time period.

⁹⁵ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 57 n. 59; P. GOUKOWSKY, *ad* Diod. XVIII 3.1 (*Collection des Universités de France*); A. MEHL, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 20 with n. 55; E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 59, also prefer the chronology of Arrian and Curtius and situate the death of Meleagros before the final settlement. R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 54 n. 42 and A.W. COLLINS, *art. cit.* (n. 71), p. 277 n. 93 assume that the explanation for the divergence in Diodorus simply is confusion.

decisions is necessary to reconstruct the decision-making process and the struggle for power that influenced it.

1.3.1 *The decisions*

1.3.1.1 The satrapy distribution

The distribution of satrapies does not pose major problems⁹⁶. Most of the satraps from Alexander's time were confirmed, probably largely for the sake of convenience⁹⁷. There were a few new appointments, however. Ptolemaios replaced Kleomenes of Naukratis as satrap of Egypt while the latter became his ὑπαρχος, and Laomedon was appointed governor of Syria⁹⁸. Leonnatos obtained Hellespontine Phrygia, but Paphlagonia (which had belonged to the same province under Alexander) was given to Eumenes, together with Cappadocia. Peithon received the larger part of Media while Atropates, the former satrap and father-in-law of Perdikkas, retained the other part⁹⁹. Caria was given to Asandros and Thrace to Lysimachos. It is not quite certain whether Philotas' appointment over Cilicia was decided only now: the former satrap, Balakros, had died in 324 and it is not impossible that Philotas had already taken over the satrapy at that time¹⁰⁰. Two of the confirmed satraps also need

⁹⁶ For the most recent discussion: see W. HUSS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 86-89.

⁹⁷ Cf. J. KAERST, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* II, *Das Wesen des Hellenismus*, Leipzig 1926², p. 11; R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 55.

⁹⁸ According to W. SCHWAN, *art. cit.* (n. 21), p. 332, Laomedon had already been appointed satrap of Syria by Alexander because he was not present at Babylon in 323 and was not important enough to be awarded a satrapy if absent. However, we do not know whether Laomedon was at Babylon. In 326 he was still with the king, but after that nothing is known about his career under Alexander: W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 211. The satrap of Syria during Alexander's last years is also unknown. Schwan's argument about Laomedon's relative lack of importance is equally unconvincing: see below, 1.3.2. Most scholars assume that Laomedon was newly appointed in the Babylon settlement: see A.B. BOSWORTH, *The Government of Syria under Alexander the Great*, *CQ* n.s. 24 (1974), p. 63-64; W. HECKEL, *loc. cit.*; M. SARTRE, *D'Alexandre à Zenobie. Histoire du Levant antique. IV^e siècle avant J.-C. – III^e siècle après J.-C.*, Paris 2001, p. 92-93.

⁹⁹ H. BERVE, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, München 1926, II, p. 92.

¹⁰⁰ According to H. BERVE, *op. cit.* (n. 99), II p. 398, he was already appointed under Alexander and W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 329 and *id.*, *King and "Companions": Observations on the Nature of Power in the Reign of Alexander*, in J. ROISMAN (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden 2003, p. 201 n. 17, and M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 42, also consider this to be a possibility. A.B. BOSWORTH, *loc. cit.*, on the other hand, does assume that he was newly appointed in the Babylon settlement.

to be mentioned here: Antigonos in Greater Phrygia and Menandros in Lydia. The others are not relevant for an analysis of the power relations which determined the decision-making at Babylon.

1.3.1.2 The regency

Perdikkas' position does not really constitute a problem either¹⁰¹: he was confirmed as regent, as is clearly stated by Curtius (albeit in a somewhat clumsy phrasing), Diodorus, the *Heidelberger Epitome*, and the first paragraph of Photius' summary of Dexippus¹⁰². However, in the fourth paragraph the latter, whose account seems based on Arrian's¹⁰³, says Perdikkas still held the chiliarchy, but all other sources have Seleukos as chiliarch in this stage of the settlement. The contradiction, both internal and with an otherwise unanimous tradition, is already suspicious in itself. In his summary of Arrian Photius did not mention Perdikkas' position in the final stage, but that Dexippus differs from Arrian concerning the position of Krateros, to whom the Athenian still attributes the *προστασία*, proves that he has moved the offices of Perdikkas and Krateros from the second (1.2) to the third stage (1.3)¹⁰⁴. This is also apparent from the

¹⁰¹ See the table in 1.2.

¹⁰² The same conclusion is reached by E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 43; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 56-57; M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 26-29. The latter's argument, however, is flawed by his failure to distinguish between the three stages, resulting in the unwarranted use of elements from the first stage as evidence for the last stage. Cf. also W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 370: «In the almost three years that Perdikkas exercised power in Asia he did so as *prostates* or *epimeletes*, not as Chiliarch». He is indeed never called *chiliarch* after the Babylon settlement: see below, n. 106. Consequently, the view that Perdikkas at some point usurped the *προστασία* or part of it (thus most recently W. HECKEL, *art. cit.* [n. 41], p. 93 n. 26) should be abandoned.

¹⁰³ Although it seems to be generally accepted that Dexippus relied on Arrian alone for his history of the Successors, G. MARTIN, *Dexipp von Athen. Edition, Übersetzung und Begleitende Studien (Classica Monacensia, 32)*, Tübingen 2006, p. 154, remarks: «Über die Nähe zu Arrians Werk können wir also nichts Genaues sagen sagen». Photius' phrase καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διέξεσιν ἐν πολλοῖς, ὥς κἀν τούτοις, Ἀρριανῶ κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον σύμφωνα γράφων (Dex. F1.8) actually shows that there were differences. These need not have been limited to matters of style and emphasis by Dexippos. He might well have used other sources too.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 2), p. 42; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 49-50. The view of J.D. GRAINGER, *Seleukos Nikator. Constructing a Hellenistic Kingdom*, London 1990, p. 18-20, that Seleukos was «the chiliarch's chiliarch», cannot stand because there was no other chiliarch. Similarly, A.W. COLLINS, *art. cit.* (n. 71), p. 278, claims that Perdikkas maintained the court chiliarchy and gave Seleukos the equestrian chiliarchy, but I will argue elsewhere that there was no such distinction: A. MEEUS, *art. cit.* (n. 58). Thus

structure of Dexippus' text as it stands in Photius' *Bibliotheca*. First, he deals with the organisation of the central government (F8.1), and there he is accurate: Arrhidaios and Alexander become king, with Perdikkas as regent. Then he discusses the distribution of satrapies (F8.2-7), and in the middle of that account he mentions the *προστασία* and the *χιλίαρχία*, two offices which belong to the central government. They are inserted where Krateros' position next to Antipatros should have been mentioned. Given this confused structure and the internal contradiction, Dexippus must be wrong here¹⁰⁵. Moreover, after Babylon Perdikkas' office is always referred to as *προστασία*, *ἐπιτροπή* or some description of it, and never as chiliarchy¹⁰⁶, and it is clear that he held more responsibility than commanding the cavalry: he was the highest official concerning all matters of state. Consequently, the other sources must be correct in stating that Seleukos now became chiliarch while Perdikkas held the regency.

1.3.1.3 The administration of Europe

Arrian is the only one to mention Krateros' new position: apparently the nobles reverted to their original plan (see 1.1) to appoint him governor of Europe together with Antipatros¹⁰⁷. Kanatsulis disputes this conclusion¹⁰⁸, but his arguments fail to convince. First of all, it is clear that

also A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 56: «There is, however, no suggestion that Seleucus held anything other than the position previously occupied by Hephaestion and Perdikkas, that is, the chiliarchy itself». According to F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 145-146, Dexippus is correct. He argues that the *προστασία* was modified in the final settlement, but now the nature of the office is clear thanks to the demonstration of Anson (*art. cit.* [n. 2]), this view is untenable.

¹⁰⁵ It is not the only blatant mistake in Dexippus' account: at 8.6 Seleukos is given Babylon, an appointment which actually belongs to the Triparadeisos settlement.

¹⁰⁶ App., *Syr.* 52: *προστατεύσαντος τῶν βασιλέων*; App., *Mithr.* 8: *τῆς ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ γενομένης γῆς ἐπιτροπεύων*; Arr., *Succ.* F1.30: *ἄρχων τῆς πάσης δυνάμεως*; Diod. XVIII 23.2: *παρέλαβε (...) τὴν τῶν βασιλέων προστασίαν*. Arrian's rather general description of military command can not refer to the chiliarchy, because he states it is the office Peithon and Arrhidaios held after Perdikkas, and they held the regency, but not the chiliarchy.

¹⁰⁷ Thus also R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 55: «(...) in the final settlement after Meleager's death they reverted to their original arrangement of making him share Europe with Antipater (...). Cf. Arr., *Succ.*, F19 on Antipatros and Krateros: (...) ἐν ἰσῃ μοίρᾳ ἄμφω τετάχθαι [«(...) they were appointed to the same province»].

¹⁰⁸ D. KANATSULIS, *Antipatros als Feldherr und Staatsmann nach dem Tode Alexanders des Großen, Makedonika* 8 (1968), p. 124-127.

Krateros no longer held the *προστασία*: Dexippus is wrong in stating the opposite, as argued above. Arrian (*Succ.* F1a7) is indeed the only source to mention Krateros' appointment, but — *pace* Kanatsulis — one cannot use Justin (XIII 4.5) to contradict him, because it refers to the second stage. That leaves Diodorus (XVIII 3.2) and Dexippus (F8.3), where Krateros is not mentioned alongside Antipatros as governor of Europe. It is more likely that Krateros was left out in Photius' summary of Dexippus than that he was added in the epitome of Arrian, as one rather expects elements to disappear in a summary than to be added¹⁰⁹. The displacement of Krateros' office from the second to the third stage might have caused the oversight or could be a consequence of it. Diodorus too, then, must have skipped Krateros' appointment in the third stage. If not, Krateros would have had no office in the final settlement, and it is unlikely that Perdikkas would not have tried to affect Krateros' actions by an official decision. There was, evidently, no guarantee that Krateros would obey, but it was at least worth trying to send him to Europe, in order to prevent him from coming to Babylon to contest Perdikkas' position. Probably, this was also what Perdikkas tried to achieve by cancelling the *Hypomnemata* (see below, 2) and that would be substantially easier if Krateros had already been appointed governor of Europe. That Krateros did not immediately leave for Europe after the Babylon settlement came about, does not provide any indication on his office; it simply means that he did not recognize the legitimacy of the decisions, if there was no other reason we are unaware of.

Under Alexander Antipatros had been in command of the entire European part of the Empire, including Thrace, as *στρατηγός*¹¹⁰. In his influential study on *strategia* in the Hellenistic age, Bengtson has argued that this situation remained unchanged in the Babylon settlement. Most scholars agree with him and assume therefore that Lysimachos' territory was part of Antipatros' province¹¹¹. This view does not find support in the

¹⁰⁹ Cf. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 58-59: Photius is generally reliable when copying lists, although sometimes an element is left out.

¹¹⁰ H. BENGTSON, *op. cit.* (n. 70), p. 26-29.

¹¹¹ H. BENGTSON, *op. cit.* (n. 70), p. 27-29 and 44-45; K. ROSEN, *art. cit.* (n. 80), p. 100-101; D. KANATSULIS, *art. cit.* (n. 108) p. 122-123; O. MÜLLER, *Antigonos Monophthalmos und "Das Jahr der Könige"* (Saarbrücker Beiträge zur Altertumskunde, 11), Bonn 1973, p. 18; P. GOUKOWSKY, *ad* Diod. XVIII 18.4 (*Collection des Universités de France*); R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 55; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 43; F. LANDUCCI GATTINONI, *Lisimaco di Tracia. Un sovrano nella prospettiva del primo ellenismo*, Milano 1992, p. 102; H.S. LUND, *Lysimachos. A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*, London 1992, p. 54; O. SCHMITT, *Der Lamische Krieg* (Habelts Dissertationsdrucke. Reihe Alte

sources and Bengtson's arguments are not very convincing. All sources mentioning Antipatros (and Krateros) in the distribution of satrapies explicitly contrast the territory of Lysimachos and that of Antipatros and Krateros¹¹². As the lists of Arrian and Dexippus are very elaborate, it is reasonable to assume that they aim to be complete and precise. That Lysimachos' satrapy is always described as a separate province suggests that Lysimachos was not subordinate to Antipatros and Krateros. That Dexippus (F8.3) still calls Antipatros στρατηγός in the final settlement is not a very strong argument either. Dexippus is the only author to do so while Arrian (*Succ.*, F1a3) only mentions the title στρατηγός in the second stage of the settlement (1.2). Since Dexippus has moved the offices of Perdikkas and Krateros from the second to the third stage (see above) it is not unlikely that he did the same with Antipatros'. Furthermore, the question of the title might not be very relevant here: even with the same title his territory might have been reduced. Bengtson, however, argues against the sources that it would be impossible that Lysimachos had no superior while the satraps in Asia had to obey Perdikkas¹¹³. This view is based on the wrong premises that the chiliarch was grand vizier of Asia and that Perdikkas was appointed chiliarch in the final settlement. Actually there were two kings and one regent holding sway over one entire

Geschichte, 33), Bonn 1992, p. 52 n. 20; C. FRANCO, *Il regno di Lisimaco. Strutture amministrative e rapporti con le città* (*Studi Ellenistici*, 6 – *Bibliotheca di Studi antichi*, 71), Pisa 1993, p. 15; W. ORTH, *Die Diadochenzeit im Spiegel der historischen Geographie. Kommentar zu TAVO-Karte BV2 "Diadochenreiche (um 303 v.Chr.)"* (*Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients*, Reihe B, 80), Wiesbaden 1993, p. 20. Contra: A. SCHÄFER, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit* III, Leipzig 1887², p. 352; J. KAERST, *op. cit.* (n. 97), p. 11; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 144-145; É. WILL, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique (323-30 av. J.C.)* I, Nancy 1979², p. 25; A. SIMONETTI AGOSTINETTI, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 48.

¹¹² Arr., *Succ.* F1a7: Τῶν δὲ κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην, Θράκης μὲν καὶ Χερρονήσου καὶ ὅσα Θράξι σύνορα ἔθνη ἔστε ἐπὶ θάλασσαν τὴν ἐπὶ Σαλμυδησσὸν τοῦ Εὐξείνου Πόντου καθήκοντα, Λυσιμάχῳ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐπετράπη· τὰ δὲ ἐπέκεινα τῆς Θράκης ὡς ἐπὶ Ἰλλυριοῦς καὶ Τριβαλλοῦς καὶ Ἀγριαῖνας καὶ αὐτὴ Μακεδονία καὶ ἡ Ἥπειρος ὡς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη τὰ Κεραῦνια ἀνήκουσα καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες σύμπαντες Κρατερῷ καὶ Ἀντίπατρῳ ἐνεμήθη. Dexip. (*FGrH* 100) F8.3: Θράκης μὲν καὶ Χερρονήσου Λυσίμαχος· Ἀντίπατρος δὲ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Μακεδόσι καὶ Ἑλλήσι καὶ Ἰλλυριοῖς καὶ Τριβαλλοῖς καὶ Ἀγριαῖσι καὶ ὅσα τῆς Ἥπειρου ἔξέτι Ἀλεξάνδρου στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ ἐκτέτακτο. Diod. XVIII 3.2: Κατὰ δὲ τὴν Εὐρώπην Λυσιμάχῳ μὲν ἐδόθη Θράκη καὶ τὰ συνορίζοντα τῶν ἐθνῶν παρὰ τὴν Ποντικὴν θάλασσαν, ἡ δὲ Μακεδονία καὶ τὰ πλησιόχωρα τῶν ἐθνῶν Ἀντίπατρῳ προσωρίσθη.

¹¹³ H. BENGTSON, *op. cit.* (n. 70), p. 44.

empire, and everyone – including Lysimachos, Antipatros and Krateros – was subordinate to them¹¹⁴.

After the peace treaty with Athens in 322 Antipatros indeed offered land in Thrace to the disenfranchised Athenians¹¹⁵, but this does not necessarily mean that he held sway over that territory. It was important for Antipatros and Lysimachos to entertain good mutual relations and according to Pausanias (I 10.1) they did; Lund has provided convincing arguments that the Periegete is right¹¹⁶. Lysimachos had to confront an uprising of the local king Seuthes who tried to preserve his autonomous position¹¹⁷, while Antipatros and Krateros had to concentrate entirely on Aitolia after the capitulation of the Athenians¹¹⁸. Consequently, they could not provide Lysimachos with direct military support, but they could aid him by sending colonists¹¹⁹. The presence of an Athenian settlement would help the governor in gaining control of his province as the settlers were, like Lysimachos, in hostile territory and thus shared the same fate¹²⁰. As this measure, then, might simply have been an attempt to help Lysimachos, it does not prove that Antipatros had any authority over Thrace. Since Bengtson's arguments are so inconclusive, it seems better to follow the sources in contrasting the territories of Antipatros and

¹¹⁴ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 56 n. 57. Diod. XVIII 3.1 describes Perdikkas' regency as ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονία: leadership of the whole.

¹¹⁵ Diod. XVIII 18.4-5; Plut., *Phoc.*, 28.7.

¹¹⁶ H.S. LUND, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 54-55; cf. F. LANDUCCI GATTINONI, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 102.

¹¹⁷ See J. KABAKČIEV, *Thrakien in den Plänen Philipp II. und Alexander III. (341-323 v.u.Z.)*, *Bulgarian Historical Review* 28 (2000), p. 18-19, for Seuthes' *de facto* autonomy during Alexander's last years. Cf. P. DELEV, *Lysimachus, the Getae, and Archaeology*, *CQ* N.S. 50 (2000), p. 384-386; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 269. H.S. LUND, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 22-28, discusses Lysimachos' troubles with Seuthes.

¹¹⁸ Diod. XVIII 24.

¹¹⁹ Cf. H.S. LUND, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 54.

¹²⁰ E.J. BAYNHAM, *Antipater and Athens*, in O. PALAGIA & S.V. TRACY (edd.), *The Macedonians in Athens 322-229 B.C.* Proceedings of an International Conference held at the University of Athens, May 24-26, 2001, Oxford 2003, especially p. 27-28. See also E. Poddighe, *Nel segno di Antipatro. L'eclissi della democrazia ateniese dal 323/2 al 319/8 a.C. (Collana del Dipartimento di Storia dell'Università degli Studi di Sassari, N.S. 2)*, Roma 2002, p. 71 n. 50: «Si deve ancora una volta ricordare che Antipatro dovette intervenire ripetutamente per mantenere il controllo della regione». Admittedly, the interpretation is hindered by the fact that there is no indication as to where and how the Athenian colonists were settled: see J. CARGILL, *Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century B.C. (Mnemosyne, Supplement 145)*, Leiden 1995, p. 37-38 and E.J. BAYNHAM, *loc. cit.* Cf. the colonisation policy of Philippos II in Thrace: Diod. XVI 71.2; J.R. ELLIS, *Population-Transplants by Philip II, Makedonika* 9 (1969), p. 9-17; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *A History of Macedonia II*, Oxford 1979, p. 660-662.

Krateros on the one hand and those of Lysimachos on the other. Perdikkas probably detached Thrace from Antipatros' province to create a buffer zone separating Antipatros and Krateros from Asia, as Schäfer already pointed out¹²¹. The respective titles of Antipatros, Krateros, and Lysimachos are unknown, but it is in any case clear that they all were subordinate to Perdikkas, the regent of the empire.

1.3.1.4 Alexander's funeral

After the organisation of the administration, Alexander's funeral remained to be dealt with. The exact decision the Successors made on this matter is disputed because, again, most scholars fail to distinguish the different moments. First, there is Alexander's wish, allegedly uttered on his deathbed, to be buried at the sanctuary of Ammon at Siwa¹²². Some scholars assume that this was not Alexander's desire and that the sources are influenced by Ptolemaic propaganda, aimed at legitimising Ptolemaios' possession of Alexander's body¹²³. Alexander probably was unable to speak during his last days¹²⁴, but he might well have indicated where he was to be entombed on an earlier occasion¹²⁵. It is not unlikely that this would have been in Siwa as Alexander's reverence for Ammon at the end of his life is very clear and he even considered the god to be his father¹²⁶. Moreover, Ptolemaios did not have the least interest in assert-

¹²¹ A. SCHÄFER, *loc. cit.* (n. 111). Cf. É. WILL, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 25; A. SIMONETTI AGOSTINETTI, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 48.

¹²² Curt. X 5.4; Just. XII 15.7. Diod. XVIII 3.5 and Just. XIII 4.6, only mention the decision of the Successors, and cannot be used as evidence for Alexander's wish.

¹²³ W.W. TARN, *Alexander the Great II, Sources and Studies*, Cambridge 1949, p. 355; cf. J. HORNBLOWER, *op. cit.* (n. 26), p. 41-42, N.G.L. HAMMOND, *The Macedonian State. Origins, Institutions, and History*, Oxford 1989, p. 25 n. 45 and R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 61 n. 19.

¹²⁴ Arr., *Anab.*, VII 26.1.

¹²⁵ Cf. E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 187: «We need not doubt the last wish of the dying King. Even if not uttered with his last breath, it would be well known from previous conversation».

¹²⁶ E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 186; A.B. BOSWORTH, *Alexander and Ammon*, in K. KINZL (ed.), *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory. Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr on the Occasion of his Eightieth Birthday*, Berlin-New York 1977, p. 55-67; E.A. FREDRICKSMEYER, *Alexander's Religion and Divinity*, in J. ROISMAN (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden 2003, p. 270-278, especially 273. D. KIENAST, *Alexander, Zeus und Ammon*, in W. WILL & J. HEINRICHs (edd.), *Zu Alexander d.Gr. Festschrift G. Wirth zum 60. Geburtstag am 9.12.86*, vol. I,

ing that Alexander wanted Ammon's sanctuary to be his last resting-place because eventually he did not bury Alexander there either¹²⁷. He entombed Alexander in Egypt, so we would expect him to say in his propaganda that that is what Alexander wanted. And indeed, he did just that: the *Liber de Morte* (108 and 119), a propaganda document of Ptolemaios maintaining that he was the only Successor to observe Alexander's will, states that Alexander wanted to be buried in Egypt¹²⁸. Diodorus (XVIII 28.3) says the following about Ptolemaios after the body snatch of 321:

Ἐκρίνε γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἰς μὲν Ἀμμῶνα μὴ παρακομίζειν,
κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκτισμένην ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πόλιν (...) ἀποθέσθαι.
«He decided for the present not to send it to Ammon, but to entomb it
in the city that had been founded by Alexander himself (...).»

This passage seems to confirm that the original destination was Siwa, if it does not just refer to a change of Ptolemaios' plans¹²⁹. The embalming of the body by Egyptian and Babylonian priests is also a possible indication that Alexander wished to be buried at Siwa and not at Aigai¹³⁰. There is, then, no reason to deny that the Diadochoi decided to entomb Alexander at Siwa, complying with the king's last wish¹³¹. Some scholars, however, argue that Pausanias (I 6.3) disproves this view because he says that those who had to take the body to Aigai were persuaded by Ptolemaios to bring it to Egypt¹³². The decision to take it to Macedon,

Amsterdam 1987, p. 330-331, doubts that Alexander thought that Ammon was his father, but he does acknowledge the king's high reverence for the god and the resulting wish to be buried at Siwa.

¹²⁷ D. KIENAST, *art. cit.* (n. 126), p. 331: «Es wäre aber politisch nicht unbedenklich gewesen, erst zu propagieren, Alexander wolle beim Ammon bestattet werden, und sich dann über diesen letzten Wunsch des Königs einfach hinwegzusetzen (...)».

¹²⁸ A.B. BOSWORTH, *art. cit.* (n. 30), p. 219. Cf. the oracular response ordering to bury Alexander in Memphis in the Alexander Romance (III 34.1-5, ed. H. VAN THIEL, *Leben und Taten Alexanders von Makedonien. Der griechische Alexanderroman nach der Handschrift L [Texte zur Forschung, 13]*, Darmstadt 1974).

¹²⁹ According to J. HORNBLOWER, *op. cit.* (n. 26), p. 41: «Diodorus implies that the funeral cortège was destined for Alexandria in Egypt (...)». However, Diodorus clearly states that the original destination was Siwa, but that Ptolemaios decided not to bring the body there.

¹³⁰ Curt. X 10.13; M. PFROMMER, *Alexander der Große. Auf den Spuren eines Mythos (Zaberns Bildbände zur Archäologie. Sonderbände der Antiken Welt)*, Mainz am Rhein 2001, p. 92.

¹³¹ Diod. XVIII 3.5; Just. XIII 4.6; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 160 n. 516; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 13 n. 30.

¹³² M. CARY, *A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.C.*, London 1978 (=1951²), p. 13 n. 2; J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 98 and 111; P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 318; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 123), p. 25 n. 45; R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39),

however, was not taken in 323, but was a later order by Perdikkas, given well after the final settlement at Babylon had been reached¹³³.

Justin (XIII 4.6) has erroneously moved the decision concerning the burial at Siwa to the second stage, when Perdikkas made the compromise with the infantry (1.2). It is highly unlikely that the decision not to bury Alexander at Aigai was part of that agreement as the patriotically minded phalanx would never have accepted such a breach with tradition. Moreover, if there was a previous decision concerning Alexander's burial, the generals certainly would have rediscussed it for the final settlement, as they reconsidered all important issues at this stage, and the royal burial clearly was a matter of the highest interest: the one who controlled the body, could present himself as the true successor¹³⁴.

1.3.2 *The decision-making process*

The decision-making process leading to the final settlement should now be analysed as it is unclear whether we are facing a compromise or whether Perdikkas was able to impose his own will. Curtius (X 10.1), Diodorus (XVIII 3.1) and the *Heidelberger Epitome* ([FGrH 155] F1.2) state that Perdikkas held a council with the other leaders, but they are silent on the way the decisions came about. Plutarch (*Eum.*, 3.3) does not mention Perdikkas: he simply has the generals meeting in a council to distribute the satrapies. Justin (XIII 4.9) and Dexippus (F8.7), on the other

p. 61 n. 19; W.M. ELLIS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 35; A. BERNAND, *Alexandrie la Grande*, Paris 1998², p. 250.

¹³³ R. SCHUBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 182; E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 187; R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 64-65; R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 125; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 160 n. 516; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 13 n. 30. Contra: N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 106 and *id.*, *op. cit.* (n. 123), p. 25; W.M. ELLIS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 35.

¹³⁴ R. SCHUBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 180-181: «Wer die Leiche besaß, hatte damit vor den andern Diadochen in dem Kampfe um die Herrschaft einen gewissen Vorsprung»; E. BADIAN, *op. cit.* (n. 50), p. 258; P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 130 and 318; W.S. GREENWALT, *Argaeus, Ptolemy II and Alexander's Corpse*, *AHB* 2 (1988), especially p. 41; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *Arms and the King. The Insignia of Alexander the Great*, *Phoenix* 43 (1989), p. 219-220; A. STEWART, *Faces of Power. Alexander's Image and Hellenistic Politics* (*Hellenistic Culture and Society*, 11), Berkeley 1993, p. 222 and *id.*, *Alexander in Greek and Roman Art*, in J. ROISMAN (ed.), *Brill's Companion to Alexander the Great*, Leiden 2003, p. 44; J. WHITEHORNE, *Cleopatras*, London 1994, p. 64-65; A. ERSKINE, *Life after Death: Alexandria and the Body of Alexander*, *G&R* 49 (2002), p. 171; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), pp. 59-60; O.B. RADER, *Grab und Herrschaft. Politischer Totenkult von Alexander dem Großen bis Lenin*, München 2003, p. 150-153.

hand, explicitly say that Perdikkas distributed the provinces. According to Arrian (*Succ.*, F1a 5) Perdikkas was in charge, acting ὡς Ἀρριδαίου κελεύοντος, which Appian (*Syr.* 52) phrases as ὑπὸ τῷ βασιλεῖ Φιλίππῳ; this is clearly a legalistic fiction. It does not seem to make sense to consider these differences between the ancient authors as meaningful¹³⁵; probably they simply are the result of the abbreviating activities of the writers. The only conclusion that can be reached on this basis is that there was a meeting and that Perdikkas, from that time onwards the only regent — evidently — made the appointments *de iure*.

Some scholars argue on the basis of Diodorus' text (XVIII 2.4) that the army assembly made or confirmed the decisions¹³⁶. There seems to be some misapprehension here. As I have tried to show above (p. 58-59), Diodorus (XVIII 2.4) has imperceptibly connected the second and third stages of the settlement. His account goes as follows:

(...) οἱ χαριέστατοι τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπεισαν αὐτοὺς ὁμονοῆσαι. Εὐθὺ δὲ βασιλέα κατέστησαν τὸν Φιλίππου υἱὸν Ἀρριδαῖον καὶ μετωνόμασαν Φίλιππον, ἐπιμελητὴν δὲ τῆς βασιλείας Περδίκκαν, ᾧ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸν δακτύλιον τελευτῶν ἐδεδώκει, τοὺς δὲ ἀξιολογωτάτους τῶν φίλων καὶ σωματοφυλάκων παραλαβεῖν τὰς σατραπείας καὶ ὑπακοῦειν τῷ τε βασιλεῖ καὶ τῷ Περδίκκᾳ.

«(...) The men most inclined toward conciliation persuaded the parties to come to an agreement. Straightaway they made Arrhidaeus, son of Philip, their king and changed his name to Philip; Perdikkas, to whom the king had given his ring as he died, they made regent of the kingdom; and they decided that the most important of the Friends and of the Bodyguard should take over the satrapies and obey the king and Perdikkas».

¹³⁵ Cf. R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 313. Contra: J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 29-35. Justin's use of words like *sortiri*, is — *pace* SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 30 — not to be taken literally: it was the term the Romans used for appointing someone to an office or province, which they happened to do by lot, and Trogus/Justin simply used it for the sake of variation, without caring for accuracy. If one were to take it literally, a contradiction would arise with his statement that Perdikkas attributed the satrapies: see R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 129. Cf. P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 137-138.

¹³⁶ J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 31-32; F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 142-143, 159 and 184; M.B. HATZOPOULOS, *op. cit.* (n. 43), p. 283-284. According to F. GRANIER, *op. cit.* (n. 59), p. 65-66, it is difficult to believe that the army assembly alone decided on the redistribution of satrapies, but on the basis of Diodorus (XVIII 2.4) he concludes that they must have had some part in it. Even if Diodorus' use of the plural ἔταξαν (Diod. XVIII 3.5) has any evidential value, it only proves that the decisions were taken by more than one person, but this might just as well have been the council of nobles as the army assembly.

At first sight this does indeed seem to be a single set of decisions, connected to the compromise between the phalanx and the cavalry and nobles where the army assembly evidently had its say (1.2). Other authors, however, do not mention a redistribution of satrapies before the final settlement. Moreover, Perdikkas' appointment as sole regent clearly belongs to the third stage. The imperceptible splice, then, has to be situated after Arrhidaios' appointment as king¹³⁷. Consequently, I see no reason to assume that the army assembly decided that the satrapies had to be distributed anew and that Perdikkas was to be the only regent¹³⁸.

While we can thus conclude that the distribution of satrapies was arranged in the council of nobles after the execution of Meleagros and his supporters, it remains to be seen whether it was a compromise or a unilateral decision of Perdikkas. It is hard to determine whether the distribution of territories was in Perdikkas' advantage. Justin (XIII 4.9) states that the measure allowed the regent to remove his rivals from court and present the appointments as favours on his part¹³⁹, but at the same time he provided his opponents with a territorial power base. Furthermore, after Meleagros' death many of the generals might have wanted to leave the court, looking for a safer place to try fulfilling their ambitions. On the other hand, Perdikkas' appointment as sole regent clearly constitutes a significant improvement in comparison to the two previous compromises (1.1 and 1.2), the more so since his two main rivals were cut off from direct access to Asia by the creation of the Thracian buffer. The decision to bury Alexander at Siwa, however, was less convenient for Perdikkas because Ptolemaios, as satrap of Egypt, would control that area and thus also the body¹⁴⁰. The fact that Perdikkas had to *de facto* degrade his

¹³⁷ Dexippus (*FGrH* 100) F8.1-2, and the *Heidelberger Epitome* (*FGrH* 155) F1.1-2, show a similar structure.

¹³⁸ Thus also P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 137-138 and 255-256; E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 61 n. 47.

¹³⁹ (...) *inter principes provincias dividit, simul ut et aemulos removeret et munus imperii beneficii sui faceret*. For the first element: see also Arrian (*Succ.*, F1a5). W.L. ADAMS, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 230; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 57, assume that removing rivals was indeed Perdikkas' aim.

¹⁴⁰ R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 29), p. 142. R. SCHUBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 181-182, assumes that Siwa was considered neutral ground, but it is clear that in practice Ptolemaios would be the first to seize control of the tomb if it were located there. According to Aelian XII 64, there was a fierce debate because all the generals wanted that Alexander would be buried in their territory. That they all demanded this is certainly exaggerated, but we need not doubt that there actually was a debate. The Alexander Romance (III 34.1, ed. H. VAN THIEL, *op. cit.* [n. 128]) also mentions a debate concerning the place of

father-in-law Atropates by giving the larger part of his satrapy to Peithon, is also a possible indication that the regent was unable to impose his will on all matters.

The execution of the ringleaders responsible for the insurrection of the troops had certainly deterred the phalanx from further opposition to Perdikkas, but it is not sure whether the nobles were equally impressed. Possibly some even left his camp precisely because of this cruel and ruthless action, as Arrian says that from then on mutual suspicion reigned among the Diadochoi¹⁴¹. If all the nobles had united against Perdikkas, he could not have remained regent. However, he certainly had the support of the *somatophylax* Aristonous as well as of his brother Alketas and possibly also of Attalos¹⁴². Eumenes, who had remained neutral at first¹⁴³, might also have joined sides with Perdikkas now as he certainly showed himself a loyal partisan of Perdikkas later¹⁴⁴. The case of the bodyguard Peithon is less clear: he was the one who had taken the initiative to execute Perdikkas' proposal in the first meeting (1.1)¹⁴⁵, but possibly he had only done so in order to reach a compromise, without really belonging to the Perdikkas camp¹⁴⁶. Given the personal ambition he showed later on¹⁴⁷, it is less likely that he unconditionally sided with Perdikkas. Ptolemaios, another bodyguard, had manifestly been an opponent of Perdikkas from

burial, albeit between Persians and Macedonians, where Ptolemaios came up with the solution. W.M. ELLIS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 35, stresses that the other Diadochoi would not have wanted the king to be buried in a remote area only accessible to Ptolemaios, but it is clear that they did decide it nonetheless and Alexander's own wish definitely was a good reason to do so: see above. E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 187 argues that they had to make this decision because the governor of Macedon was an enemy in 323 while Ptolemaios was not. It is clear, however, that Ptolemaios was no friend of Perdikkas either: see above, p. 49-50, and below n. 148.

¹⁴¹ Arr., *Succ.*, F1a5: ἐξ ὧν Περδίκκας ὑποπτος ἐς πάντας ἦν καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπόπτευεν («For this he was suspected by all and was himself suspicious». Trans. Goralski).

¹⁴² See above, n. 48, for Aristonous; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 172, for Alketas; W. HECKEL, *art. cit.* (n. 24), p. 381, for Attalos. See also the detailed discussion by M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 32-50 on «die 'Großen' in Babylon und ihre 'Parteiung'». His list of Perdikkas' [ibid., p. 48] certainly includes too many names, however.

¹⁴³ Plut., *Eum.* 3.1-2; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 19 and 54. It cannot be ruled out that Eumenes' neutrality was just pretence in order to be able to promote Perdikkas' interests more efficiently.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 53, but I do not see why Seleukos' appointment as chiliarch should necessarily mean that he was part of the Perdikkas party.

¹⁴⁵ Curt. X 7.8.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. R.A. BILLOWS, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴⁷ See W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 277-279.

the beginning¹⁴⁸. Leonnatos, yet another bodyguard, will not have discarded his own ambitions in favour of Perdikkas¹⁴⁹. He and Ptolemaios certainly were not Perdikkas' only opponents, but how numerous the opposition was cannot be determined. In any case, it would not have been wise for Perdikkas not to make any concessions at all when he became sole regent¹⁵⁰. It is, then, rather unlikely that Perdikkas decided everything unilaterally.

Nevertheless, J. Seibert argues that Perdikkas acted omnipotently when distributing the satrapies¹⁵¹. Two of the new satraps were Greeks and according to him, these men could never have pressed their personal claims in a *synedrion* of Macedonians. Ptolemaios was the only satrap with the check of a ὑπαρχος, sc. Kleomenes, and Seibert assumes he would never have accepted this if he had had any input in the decision-making. Furthermore, Seibert argues that the satrapies were distributed according to a well-considered system. Given their Greek origin Laomedon, appointed over Syria, and Eumenes, satrap of Cappadocia, would never have been able to rise against the central government. The old satraps Antigonos (in Phrygia) and Menandros (in Lydia) were deliberately surrounded by new and unimportant men: Philotas (in Cilicia) and Asandros (in Caria). In Seibert's view the new appointment of Leonnatos (in Hellespontine Phrygia) also fits this scheme designed to exclude coalitions of the satraps against the central government. According to him the alternating ordering cannot have come about by mere coincidence.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. B. NIESE, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schlacht bei Chaeroneia I, Geschichte Alexanders des Großen und seiner Nachfolger und der Westhellenen bis zum Jahre 281 v. Chr. (Handbücher der alten Geschichte, II 2)*, Gotha 1893, p. 195; G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17) p. 317; R.A. BILLOWS, *loc. cit.*; A. STEWART, *op. cit.* (n. 134), p. 214; W. HUSS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 83; D. BRAUND, *art. cit.* (n. 54), p. 23. Contra: A. BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, *op. cit.* (n. 42) p. 10; M.J. FONTANA, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 15 and 20; E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 187; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 57. J. ROISMAN, *Ptolemy and his Rivals in his History of Alexander, CQ N.S. 34* (1984), p. 380, argues that even if there was a rift between Ptolemaios and Perdikkas, it ended very soon in any case because Ptolemaios supported Perdikkas in the confrontation with Meleagros. It is clear, however, that there was a grave opposition between both men: see above, p. 49-50. They had indeed buried the hatchet in order to close ranks against Meleagros' party, but as soon as the rebels were eliminated they no longer had any reason to be friends.

¹⁴⁹ P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 164.

¹⁵⁰ G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 317; P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 138; R.M. ERRINGTON, *Geschichte Makedoniens. Von den Anfängen bis zum Untergang des Königreiches*, München 1986, p. 111; A. MEHL, *op. cit.* (n. 34), p. 21-22; E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 61; M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 27.

¹⁵¹ J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 27-38.

Furthermore, Seibert deems it a significant indication that not all the new satraps were important men who could press their claims to a satrapy and that not all were men distrusted by Perdikkas. Thus, he rejects these two interpretations of the ancient authors.

Seibert's arguments fail to convince. It is indeed unlikely that Greeks were able to successfully claim a satrapy on their own, but they might have been backed by one or more of the leading Macedonians. Thus, Ptolemaios might have stipulated for Laomedon's province: they were good friends, and a man like Ptolemaios will already have understood the strategical importance of Syria in the defence of Egypt before he resided there.

It is remarkable that Ptolemaios was the only satrap who had a ὑπαρχος, but it is not unlikely that he had to make some concessions in exchange for all the decisions to his advantage: the allotment of Egypt, according to Diodorus the best satrapy¹⁵², Laomedon's appointment in Syria — if he had procured it — and Alexander's burial at Siwa. Moreover, Perdikkas might have insisted on retaining Kleomenes in office for his competence in financial matters and his experience in the development of Alexandria — at least as a pretext¹⁵³. Furthermore, there were drawbacks for the other new satraps as well: Lysimachos' satrapy had to a large extent to be (re)conquered and he risked conflict with Antipatros and Krateros; Leonnatos received Hellespontine Phrygia, but Paphlagonia, belonging to the same province under Alexander, was given to Eumenes; the latter, in turn, still had to conquer Cappadocia; Peithon only got a portion of Media as Atropates retained the other part of it; Antipatros and Krateros had to share command, which might cause a power struggle¹⁵⁴. Ptolemaios, then, was certainly not the only one who had to make concessions.

It might have been difficult for Greeks to take personal initiatives against the central government, but there is no reason why Laomedon could not have concluded an alliance with Ptolemaios, and Eumenes —

¹⁵² Diod. XVIII 6.3: σατραπεία πασῶν ἀρίστη καὶ προσόδους ἔχουσα μεγάλη.

¹⁵³ H. KLOFT, *Kleomenes von Naukratis. Probleme eines hellenistischen Wirtschaftsstils*, GB 15 (1988), p. 217, calls Kleomenes an «Organisation- und Finanzgenie»; cf. G. LE RIDER, *Alexandre le Grand. Monnaie, finances et politique (Histoires)*, Paris 2003, p. 253: «Cléomène fut l'un de ces serviteurs qui permirent au Conquérant, par leur dévouement et leur ingéniosité, de réaliser un certain nombre de grands desseins»; B. LEGRAS, *Καθάπερ ἐκ παλαιοῦ. Le Statut de l'Égypte sous Cléomène de Naukratis*, in ID. & J.-C. COUVENHES (edd.), *Transferts culturels et politique dans le monde hellénistique*, Paris 2006, p. 83-101.

¹⁵⁴ R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 55.

if he did not yet belong to the Perdikkas party at that time¹⁵⁵ — might have joined his friend Antigonos¹⁵⁶. The new Macedonian satraps could attach themselves to such coalitions as well. Furthermore, it is not even certain that Philotas was indeed appointed at this time, and if so, it was probably because the previous satrap had died and had not yet been replaced¹⁵⁷. Moreover, Arrian (*Succ.* F 24.2) says that Philotas was a friend of Krateros, and Perdikkas would rather have chosen his own friends if he wanted to be sure they would not rise against him. It is also striking that most satraps simply remained in office: this does not suggest that Perdikkas had developed the kind of system Seibert assumes. For most newly appointed satraps it is possible that Perdikkas indeed nominated them in order to remove his most important rivals: Krateros, Eumenes, Leonnatos, Lysimachos, Peithon, Ptolemaios and maybe even Asandros. Though the conclusion that the new satraps were mainly rivals of Perdikkas cuts across Seibert's argument¹⁵⁸, it does seem to suggest at least some initiative on Perdikkas' behalf. However, it is also possible that — but for some exceptions — only the most important men were able to obtain a satrapal appointment, and these very men were of course also those whom Perdikkas distrusted.

Bosworth has also argued for Perdikkas' omnipotence in distributing the satrapies. In his view, Perdikkas had by the time of the final settlement strengthened his position to such an extent that no-one could oppose him¹⁵⁹. However, his argument seems to be based too much on Perdikkas' relationship with the phalanx which had indeed been gravely intimidated by the executions; the nobles might have been less impressed, and now that the rank and file had been placated, there was no more reason for them to concord with Perdikkas in all respects. There is no reason, then, to assume that they would not have pursued their own ambitions, and — as argued above — Perdikkas could not take the risk of becoming opposed to a large coalition of officers. The only way to avoid this was to make concessions.

Another important argument against Perdikkas' omnipotence is Pausanias' statement (I 6.2) that Ptolemaios was responsible for the partition of

¹⁵⁵ Thus e.g. K. ROSEN, *art. cit.* (n. 80), p. 98: «Erst im Verlauf der weiteren Entwicklung wurde er zum treuesten Anhänger des Perdikkas».

¹⁵⁶ R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 35 n. 60, for the friendship between Eumenes and Antigonos.

¹⁵⁷ See above, n. 100.

¹⁵⁸ J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 38.

¹⁵⁹ A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 56-58.

the empire in 'kingdoms', when opposing to those who wanted to make Arrhidaios king¹⁶⁰. Some scholars have taken Pausanias at face value, and conclude that Ptolemaios wanted to disband Alexander's empire¹⁶¹. The context of the passage, however, shows that Pausanias is misrepresenting the facts and that the passage is actually a garbled reference the events leading to the Babylon settlement. Τοῖς ἐξ Ἀριδαῖον τὸν Φιλίππου τὴν πᾶσαν ἄγουσιν ἀρχὴν situates the action before Arrhidaios was definitively recognised king. Furthermore, it happened before Ptolemaios went to Egypt. The statement cannot refer to Ptolemaios' proposal in the first meeting (1.1) as that was in no way related to any division of the territory¹⁶². Consequently, we are just facing the interpretation of Pausanias who concluded from hindsight that the distribution of satrapies actually meant the eventual break-up of Alexander's empire. The wording ἐς τὰς βασιλείας (...) τὰ ἔθνη νεμηθῆναι accords so well with Appian's (*Syr.*, 52) description of the satrapal division, ἐς σατραπείας ἐνεῖμαντο τὰ ἔθνη, that they must be talking about the same event and clearly share a single source¹⁶³. The only difference between both phrases is the word βασιλεῖαι in Pausanias, but this anachronistic use of the word is not uncommon in our sources on the age of the Successors¹⁶⁴; that Pausanias also says in I 6.3 that Perdikkas wanted to remove Ptolemaios from ἡ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλεία proves that he is making this mistake here because in 320 Ptolemaios was merely satrap of Egypt and not king. Thus, it would seem that according to Pausanias' source Ptolemaios, and not Perdikkas, was the main initiator of the distribution of satrapies. Unless Pausanias has

¹⁶⁰ I 6.2-3: Τελευτήσαντος δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῖς ἐξ Ἀριδαῖον τὸν Φιλίππου τὴν πᾶσαν ἄγουσιν ἀρχὴν ἀντιστὰς αὐτὸς μάλιστα ἐγένετο ἐς τὰς βασιλείας αἴτιος τὰ ἔθνη νεμηθῆναι. [3] Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐς Αἴγυπτον διαβάς (...) [«After the death of Alexander, by withstanding those who would have conferred all his empire upon Aridaeus, the son of Philip, he became chiefly responsible for the division of the various nations into the kingdoms. He crossed over to Egypt in person (...)»]. J. É. WILL, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 24; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 150 n. 466.

¹⁶¹ Thus recently e.g. N.G.L. HAMMOND, *The Nature of the Hellenistic States*, in *Ancient Macedonia VI. Papers Read at the Sixth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, October 15-19, 1996 (Institute for Balkan Studies, 272)*, Thessaloniki 1999, I, p. 483.

¹⁶² Contra: J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 32-33, who thinks that Pausanias simply misrepresents the proposal from the first meeting.

¹⁶³ This is all the more conspicuous as it is a strange phrasing which seems to suggest that the satrapies originated at this moment: see J. SEIBERT, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 31.

¹⁶⁴ F. BIZIERE, *Comment travaillait Diodore de Sicile*, *REG* 87 (1974), p. 373; N.L. COLLINS, *The Various Fathers of Ptolemy I*, *Mnemosyne* 50 (1997), 443 n. 24. For the satrapy distribution: Nepos, *Eum.* 2.1, who says that the *regna* were distributed among Alexander's friends.

conflated different moments mentioned in his source, this passage also provides another highly interesting insight in the debates for the final settlement, namely that even Arrhidaios' kingship was discussed again.

Some assume that his initiative for the distribution of satrapies is the reason why Ptolemaios is named first in all the lists¹⁶⁵. Probably he preferred having a territorial base of power to staying at court in order to have the best possible position to pursue his personal ambitions. This need not mean that he wanted to disband the empire, whether as an explicit objective or as predictable consequence of his action¹⁶⁶. If Ptolemaios was indeed the main instigator of the distribution, this supports the hypothesis that he stipulated for Laomedon's appointment.

All these elements together indicate that there probably were intense negotiations and that the final settlement with the satrapal division was the result of a compromise rather than of Perdikkas' omnipotence¹⁶⁷. Especially Ptolemaios tried to undermine Perdikkas' power; he obtained the burial of Alexander at Siwa and was the main instigator of the distribution of satrapies. Possibly he already planned to attack Perdikkas from his power base in Egypt, a country easy to defend¹⁶⁸. On the other hand, it is not unlikely that Perdikkas had already decided at this moment to remove Ptolemaios as soon as possible¹⁶⁹.

2. THE REJECTION OF ALEXANDER'S LAST PLANS

After the organisation of the administration comes an episode only known from Diodorus (XVIII 4.1-6): Perdikkas presented Alexander's last plans

¹⁶⁵ G. WIRTH, *art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 317.

¹⁶⁶ W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 150 n. 466, thinks such a policy of «a wide distribution of power (...) would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the empire».

¹⁶⁷ As argued also by R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 57; F. SCHACHERMEYER, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 143; P. BRIANT, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 132-141 and 255; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 81; R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 314-315; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 150; O. SCHMITT, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 52 n. 19; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 20.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. É. WILL, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 24: «Si ce renseignement (= Paus. I 6.2) est exact, il implique vraisemblablement que Ptolémée avait quelque idée derrière la tête, et l'on ne se trompera sans doute pas en pensant que ce fut sur sa demande, ou à la suite de ses intrigues, que l'Égypte lui fut attribuée»; W. HUSS, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 97: «Höchstwahrscheinlich hatte sich Ptolemaios in der Umgebung des Alexandros befunden, als dieser sich im J. 332/31 in Ägypten aufgehalten hatte. Und vermutlich wird ihm bereits damals klar geworden sein, welche Chancen der Besitz dieses Landes eröffnen konnte».

¹⁶⁹ E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 61-62. According to Diodorus XVIII 14.2 Ptolemaios already knew that Perdikkas was going to try to remove him at the time of his arrival in Egypt. I hope to deal with this in a forthcoming study.

to the army assembly asking whether they should be executed. According to Badian this happened before the final settlement (1.3) because it was not possible to know which commands had to be distributed as long as the plans were not cancelled¹⁷⁰. It is more likely, however, that Perdikkas could only perform such a significant act¹⁷¹ once he had gained the supreme command. Moreover, it was essential for him to have Krateros' mission to Europe confirmed before he cancelled Alexander's instructions on the return to the motherland: it was of prime importance to him that Krateros would leave Asia as soon as possible and not return to Babylon¹⁷².

We do not know the complete contents of the *Hypomnemata* as Diodorus only mentions τὰ μέγιστα καὶ μνήμης ἄξια: the construction of a thousand large warships for the conquest of the West, the building of a road along the African coast all the way to the pillars of Herakles, the building of ports and docks; the erection of six temples of 1500 talents each; *synoikismoι*, transpositions of people from Asia to Europe and from Europe to Asia, and intermarriage in order to promote the unity of the empire; the completion of Hephaistion's funeral monument; and the construction of a tomb for Philip comparable to the largest Egyptian pyramid. The authenticity of the *Hypomnemata* has long been disputed, but I see no reason to doubt that they were real¹⁷³, regardless of the question

¹⁷⁰ E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 202 n. 62; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 104. Badian's argument that Diodorus has the *Hypomnemata* episode out of place because it disconnects the so-called 'Gazetteer of Empire' from the division of commands, is obviated by Diodorus' own statement on the reasons for giving the description of the empire (XVIII 5.1): it did not serve as background for the distribution of commands but as a pre-
amble to αἱ μέλλουσαι πράξεις.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Diod. XVIII 4.3 for the significance of the matter; E.M. ANSON, *art. cit.* (n. 21), p. 238.

¹⁷² R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 57 n. 59, also prefers to place the reading of the last plans after the satrapy distribution. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 59 n. 113, argues that the rejection of the *Hypomnemata* did not mean the renunciation of Krateros' commission to return to Europe. "Ἐκρίναν μηδὲν τῶν εἰρημένων συντελεῖν (XVIII 4.6) indeed only refers to «the specific proposals put to them», but we cannot conclude from Diodorus what all of these were as he only gives a selection (τὰ μέγιστα καὶ μνήμης ἄξια: XVIII 4.4), and the explicit connection of the last plans with Krateros' commissions (XVIII 4.1) suggests that these were part of the proposals put to the soldiers. Since Krateros first had to supervise the ship-building activities in Cilicia (A.B. BOSWORTH, *From Arrian to Alexander. Studies in Historical Interpretation*, Oxford 1988, p. 209-210, it is not surprising that his mission was included in the last plans (cf. *infra*).

¹⁷³ See especially A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 172), p. 185-211. J. SEIBERT, *Alexander der Große (Erträge der Forschung, 10)*, Darmstadt 1972, p. 7-10 and *id.*, *op. cit.* (n. 71), p. 91, provides a good overview of the debates.

whether the document Perdikkas read to the assembly was written by Alexander as such. Tarn pointed out that the completion of the monument for Hephaistion is an odd element: as the works were already in process, it is quite out of place in a list of plans¹⁷⁴. This observation is the basis of Badian's argument that Perdikkas was responsible for the compilation of the list he presented, containing a well-considered selection from Alexander's plans¹⁷⁵; Hephaistion's monument was then added to the list to prove that it were the king's actual plans, one of which happened to be in process already. Badian assumes that Perdikkas must have adapted the contents of the rest of the list as well¹⁷⁶, but this does not seem necessary: Alexander's plans were megalomaniacal enough¹⁷⁷. Perdikkas wanted the plans to be rejected¹⁷⁸, which has determined the selection process: he tried to present as many projects unpopular with the soldiers as possible. While all of this is not implausible, there might even be a simpler solution as the document with the last plans need not necessarily stem from Alexander's very last months: he might well have made some sort of list before the construction of Hephaistion's monument had started.

Krateros, whom Alexander had sent to Europe with 10,000 veterans in 324, was still in Cilicia when the king died¹⁷⁹. Diodorus (XVIII 4.1) says that the plans Perdikkas had cancelled were those Alexander had entrusted Krateros with in 324¹⁸⁰. By rejecting the plans, Perdikkas wanted to renounce Krateros' mission in Cilicia, so that he would no longer have any reason to stay in Asia and could leave for Europe immediately. Krateros evidently was not absolutely obliged to abide by a decision of the army assembly in Babylon: he could dispute the legitimacy of it since

¹⁷⁴ W.W. TARN, *op. cit.* (n. 123) p. 382; cf. E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 201: «(...) this is the one item in the *Hypomnemata* that cannot be made plausible as such: the completion of a building that had been under construction for eight months could hardly be an item in Alexander's projects».

¹⁷⁵ E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 200-201.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ Cf. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 172), p. 207. Contra: P.A. STADTER, review of Bosworth, *op. cit.* (n. 172), *AJP* 110 (1989), p. 378, who deems the account of the *Hypomnemata* irreconcilable with «the logistical genius indicated by Alexander's previous conquests» because of the impracticability of the plans which he consigns to the realm of «rhetoric, propaganda and fantasy».

¹⁷⁸ Diodorus XVIII 4.2.

¹⁷⁹ A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 172), pp. 208-209; N.G. ASHTON, *Craterus from 324 to 321 B.C.*, in *Ancient Macedonia V. Papers Read at the Fifth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki, October 10-15, 1989 (Institute for Balkan Studies, 240)*, Thessaloniki 1993, I, p. 128-129.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 59.

a large part of the army was not in Babylon, but with him Cilicia. Nonetheless, the moral authority of the assembly at Babylon was high: an important part of the soldiers had rejected the plans, and his popularity with these very soldiers constituted Krateros' main asset¹⁸¹. Moreover Perdikkas wanted to avoid Antipatros' crossing to Asia after Krateros' arrival in Europe¹⁸². One of the instructions Alexander had given Krateros was to replace Antipatros as governor of Europe and send the latter to Asia with new recruits¹⁸³. Probably Perdikkas hoped that a struggle for the power in Europe would come about, which would possibly lead to the elimination of one of his rivals without him having to play an active part in it¹⁸⁴. Krateros, however, stayed in Asia until the summer of 322, when he set out to aid Antipatros in the Lamian War; crossing over to Europe immediately after the Babylon settlement would have implied recognition of Perdikkas' supremacy¹⁸⁵. Some scholars assume that Perdikkas also hoped to increase his popularity with the troops by cancelling the expensive plans and showing that he wanted to hear the army's opinion on important matters¹⁸⁶. This is certainly possible, but our ignorance concerning the context of the episode precludes any certitude on the matter.

3. THE OUTCOME OF THE BABYLON SETTLEMENT

The so-called balance of power — some even call it a triumvirate¹⁸⁷ — between Perdikkas, Krateros, and Antipatros seems to be absolutely out

¹⁸¹ A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 172), p. 209-210.

¹⁸² E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 202; F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 191; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 128-129; N.G. ASHTON, *art. cit.* (n. 176), p. 129.

¹⁸³ Arr., *Anab.*, VII 12.4. N.G. ASHTON, *art. cit.* (n. 179), p. 126, suggests that Alexander possibly wanted to appoint Antipatros «overall commander, governor and king's representative in Asia — an essential post once the King had left for his western campaign»; cf. M. ZAHRT, *Versöhnen oder Spalten? Überlegungen zu Alexanders Verbanntendekret*, *Hermes* 131 (2003), p. 408. The Alexander testament, a forgery emanating from Ptolemaic propaganda (see above n. 27), seems to offer strong confirmation for this view. According to the testament Antipatros was to be governor of Western-Anatolia after Alexander's death: *Liber de Morte* 117; W. HECKEL, *op. cit.* (n. 68), p. 28-29. It goes without saying that the testament would be all the more effective if it contained as many elements as possible corresponding to what Alexander actually wanted at the time of his death.

¹⁸⁴ E. BADIAN, *art. cit.* (n. 86), p. 202; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 56; E.M. ANSON, *op. cit.* (n. 13), p. 61.

¹⁸⁵ N.G. ASHTON, *art. cit.* (n. 179), p. 129-130.

¹⁸⁶ F. SCHACHERMEYR, *op. cit.* (n. 5), p. 192-193; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 60.

¹⁸⁷ W.W. TARN, *Alexander's πομπήματα and the 'World-Kingdom'*, *JHS* 41 (1921), p. 4; W. ENSSLIN, *art. cit.* (n. 59), especially p. 298; G. De SANCTIS, *Perdicca, Studi*

of the question. Perdikkas, who had the best position to begin with, being the king's closest companion present in Babylon, immediately tried to gain supremacy while setting his main rivals against each other¹⁸⁸. He succeeded to a large extent as he was appointed sole regent and made Krateros and Antipatros share command in Europe. Bosworth argued that Perdikkas «carefully refrained from a direct challenge to Craterus and Antipater» because he did not dare to confront them¹⁸⁹, but appointing them over the same province must have come across as an attack¹⁹⁰. Perdikkas, thus, had been able to establish his supremacy after the initial resistance of the phalanx had been overcome, but his position was far from secure as nobody could predict the reaction of Antipatros and Krateros and as men like Ptolemaios and Leonnatos were not likely to acquiesce in his supremacy.

There is no trace of the separatist tendencies some scholars have argued for, especially in Ptolemaios' actions. He fiercely opposed Perdikkas, but nothing indicates that he — or any other officer for that matter — thought of disbanding the state¹⁹¹.

italiani di Filologia Classica N.S. 9 (1931), now in A. FERRABINO & S. ACCAME (edd.), *Gaetano De Sanctis. Scritti Minori V, 1931-1947 (Storia e Letteratura, 124)*, Roma 1983, p. 109-112; F. GRANIER, *op. cit.* (n. 59), p. 61-63; P. ROUSSEL, *Le démembrement de l'empire d'Alexandre*, in G. GLOTZ et al., *Histoire Ancienne II, Histoire Grecque IV, Alexandre et l'hellénisation du monde antique 1, Alexandre et le démembrement de son empire*, Paris 1938, p. 262; M. CARY, *op. cit.* (n. 132), p. 2-3; M.J. FONTANA, *op. cit.* (n. 21), p. 50; H. BENGTSON, *op. cit.* (n. 70), p. 63-81; M. FORTINA, *Cassandro, re di Macedonia*, Torino 1965, p. 15; K. ROSEN, *art. cit.* (n. 80), p. 95-99; O. MÜLLER, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 18; P. GOUKOWSKY, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 195; R.N.H. BOERMA, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 75, 295 and 299; É. WILL, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 22-23; N.G.L. HAMMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 15), p. 103; R.A. BILLOWS, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 56; J. SEIBERT, *Zur Begründung von Herrschaftsanspruch und Herrschaftslegitimierung in der frühen Diadochenzeit*, in ID. (ed.), *Hellenistische Studien. Gedenkschrift für Hermann Bengtson (Münchener Arbeiten zur Alten Geschichte, 5)*, München 1991, p. 87; O. MØRKHOLM, *Early Hellenistic Coinage. From the Accession of Alexander to the Peace of Apamea (336-188 B.C.)*, Cambridge 1991, p. 55; W. HECKEL, *art. cit.* (n. 41), p. 89; C. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 20), p. 19.

¹⁸⁸ G. Wirth's conclusion [*art. cit.* (n. 17), p. 284; endorsed by M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 32 n. 99] «Perdikkas geht es darum, vorerst eine Instanz zu finden, Einzelpersonlichkeit oder Gremium, welche die Kräfte des Reiches zusammenzuhalten vermag», seems rather naïve. Rathmann (*ibid.*, p. 39) shows more sense of reality when writing on Lysimachos' position: «Da diese Satrapienzuweisung letztlich den politischen Spielraum des Antipatros und Krateros in Europa berührte (...), kann hierin eine bewusste Spitze des Perdikkas gegen Antipatros gesehen werden». This is, however, in contradiction to the views on the relationship between Perdikkas and Antipatros expressed *ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁸⁹ A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 58-60.

¹⁹⁰ A. SCHÄFER, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 353-354, already pointed this out; cf. R.M. ERRINGTON, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 59.

¹⁹¹ Although it does not seem to be supported by the sources, the view that there were separatists among the Diadochoi still finds wide acceptance, but it is finally being abandoned

The conclusion that only one regent, being in supreme command of the entire empire, was appointed also disproves the view that Europe and Asia were considered to be two separate βασιλεῖαι¹⁹². It should now be clear that both kings were considered to hold sway over the entire empire¹⁹³. The joint kingship only emerged as a compromise between the phalanx and the nobles: it has no constitutional significance¹⁹⁴. If Arrhidaios stayed in Asia, this was because he was king of the entire Macedonian empire; there was no such thing as the council of regents for Alexander IV which Miltner concocted, and even if it did exist, the feeble-minded Arrhidaios would not have been part of it. That documents were dated by the years of Arrhidaios in Asia too, can only mean that his kingship covered that area as well. Likewise, the fact that both kings always stayed together, either in Asia or in Europe, can only mean that they were both kings of the entire empire, in spite of Miltner's ingenious explanations.

by some scholars: E.S. GRUEN, *The Coronation of the Diadochoi*, in J.W. EADIE & J. OBER (edd.), *The Craft of the Ancient Historian. Essays in Honor of Chester G. Starr*, Lanham 1985, p. 253-271; E.D. CARNEY, *The Sisters of Alexander the Great: Royal Relicts*, *Historia* 37 (1988), p. 402; H.S. LUND, *op. cit.* (n. 111), p. 51-52; A.B. BOSWORTH, *op. cit.* (n. 3), p. 246-247; W.L. ADAMS, *art. cit.* (n. 40), p. 28-35; A. MEEUS, *De territoriale ambities van de diadochen in de eerste jaren na de dood van Alexander de Grote (323-320 v.C.)*, forthcoming in *Koninklijke Zuidnederlandse Maatschappij voor Taal- en Letterkunde en Geschiedenis: Handelingen* 61 (2007).

¹⁹² This view has been argued most elaborately by F. MILTNER, *Die staatsrechtliche Entwicklung des Alexanderreiches*, *Klio* 26 (1933), p. 47-51, and H. BENGTSON, *op. cit.* (n. 70), p. 63-81. It was endorsed most recently by W. HECKEL, *art. cit.* (n. 41), p. 89. M. RATHMANN, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 19-20 n. 53, provides good arguments against the view of a constitutionally defined 'Doppelkönigtum'. See also Diod. XVIII 41.5-7 and 50.2 where Antigonos, the στρατηγός of Asia, is clearly subordinate to the regents Antipatros and Polyperchon.

¹⁹³ On the status of the kings: see C. HABICHT, *Literarische und epigraphische Überlieferung zur Geschichte Alexanders und seiner ersten Nachfolger*, in *Akten des VI. Internationalen Kongresses für Griechische und Lateinische Epigraphik*. München 1972 (*Vestigia*, 17), München 1973, p. 370-377; W. HECKEL, *IG II² 561 and the Status of Alexander IV*, *ZPE* 40 (1980), p. 249-250; E. ARENA, *La titolatura regale nella macedonia ellenistica: i βασιλεῖς Filippo III e Alessandro IV nelle fonti letterarie ed epigrafiche (323-317 a.C.)*, in *Ancient Macedonia VI. Papers Read at the Sixth International Symposium held in Thessaloniki*, October 15-19, 1996 (*Institute for Balkan Studies*, 272), Thessaloniki 1999, I, p. 77-98; P. FUNKE, *Philippos III. Arrhidaios und Alexandros IV. "von Amun auserwählt"*, in V. ALONSO TRONCOSO (ed.), *op. cit.* (n. 38), p. 45-56. The possible adaptation of Persian elements at Arrhidaios' court would also indicate that he was considered king of both Europe and Asia: see S.A. PASPALAS, *Philip Arrhidaios at Court – An Ill-Advised Persianism? Macedonian Royal Display in the Wake of Alexander*, *Klio* 87 (2005), p. 72-101.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. L. MOOREN, *art. cit.* (n. 20), p. 238: «The compromise that was reached at Babylon (joint kingship of Philippos Arrhidaios and Rhoxane's son) was not so much a constitutional as a political one».

After more than a month of struggle between infantry and nobles, and among the nobles themselves, the Macedonian empire finally had a government it could move on with. However, it remained to be seen whether and how long everybody would be prepared to abide by the agreements.

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Onderzoekseenheid Oude Geschiedenis

APPENDIX

OVERVIEW OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN IN THE THREE STAGES¹⁹⁵

(1.1) The first compromise of the nobles (Curt. X 7.8; Just. XIII 2.14)

- Alexander's child king if it would be a son
- Perdikkas and Leonnatos regent
- Antipatros and Krateros governor of Europe

(1.2) The compromise between nobles and phalanx

- Philippos III joint king with Alexander's child if it would be a son (Just. XIII 4.2-3; Arr., *Succ.*, F1a1[?])
- Perdikkas, Krateros, and Meleagros regent (προστάτης), with Perdikkas commanding the cavalry (being χιλιάρχος), Meleagros the infantry, and Krateros administering the finances (Just. XIII 4.5; Arr., *Succ.*, F1a3; Curt. X 8.22) [Dex. F8.4]
- Antipatros governor of Europe (Just. XIII 4.5; Arr., *Succ.*, F1a3)

(1.3) The final settlement of the nobles

- Philippos III joint king with Alexander's child if it would be a son (Dex. F8.1)
- Perdikkas sole regent (Diod. XVIII 2.4; Curt. X 10.4; Dex. F8.1; *Heidelberg Epitome* F1.2)
- Seleukos χιλιάρχος (Diod. XVIII 3.4; Just. XIII 4.7; App., *Syr.*, 57; Libanius, *Or.* XI 79)
- Antipatros and Krateros governor of Europe (Diod. XVIII 3.2; Arr. F1a7; Dex. F8.3)
- satrapy distribution (Diod. XVIII 3.1-3; Just. XIII 4.10-25; Curt. X 10.1-4; Arr., *Succ.*, F1a5-7; Dex. F8.2-7)
- Alexander's burial at Siwa (Diod. XVIII 3.5) [Just. XIII 4.6]

¹⁹⁵ If, according to the present reconstruction, a source mentions a decision in the wrong place, the reference is given between square brackets.

LA 'STÈLE DE SAÏS' ET L'INSTAURATION DU CULTE D'ARSINOÉ II DANS LA *CHÔRA**

Abstract: A new translation of the so-called 'Saïs stela' shows that the entire document concerns the institution of the cult of Queen Arsinoë II in the *chôra* in the 20th year of Ptolemy II. This event can be linked with the assigning of part of the *apomoira* to the same cult in year 21 and with some economical measures taken in the same period. Since the cult of Arsinoë II had been first established in Alexandria some five years earlier, the initial reason for instituting it must be interpreted as a mere family matter. It would appear that the will to include the Egyptian population in her worship only arose at a later date.

Il est communément admis que la décision de Ptolémée Philadelphie d'instaurer un culte en l'honneur de sa défunte sœur Arsinoé II dans l'ensemble des temples d'Égypte fut prise presque immédiatement après la mort de cette dernière, survenue en l'an 15 (270 ou 268 av. J.-C¹). Cette assertion repose sur un passage de la stèle de Mendès, qui paraît en effet assez clair et précis:

(...) Alors, Sa Majesté s'unit avec sa sœur [...] (...). En l'an 15, premier mois de chemou (pakhons), cette déesse monta au ciel. Elle unit

* Je remercie M. Chauveau pour ses commentaires sur une première version de cet article, ainsi que W. Clarysse et les *referees* anonymes de la revue *Ancient Society* pour plusieurs corrections importantes.

¹ À la date de 270 av. J.-C. adoptée par la plupart des auteurs, E. GRZYBEK, *Du calendrier macédonien au calendrier ptolémaïque*, Basel 1990, p. 103-112, a opposé toute une série d'arguments qui lui font préférer la date de 268 av. J.-C. Il faut toutefois noter que certains arguments issus de la documentation égyptologique présentés par Grzybek sont difficilement acceptables. Ainsi, concernant notre propos, il me semble audacieux de supposer des computs différents dans les stèles de Mendès et de Pithom, sans que le fait ait été signalé par les rédacteurs alors qu'il est habituel de trouver utilisé des systèmes de double datation dans ce type de documents (voir encore les objections de M. MINAS, *Die Pithom-Stele. Chronologische Bemerkungen zur frühen Ptolemäerzeit*, in M. MINAS – J. ZEIDLER (ed.), *Aspekte spätägyptischer Kultur. Festschrift für Erich Winter zum 65. Geburtstag (Aegyptiaca Treverensia, 7)*, 1994, p. 207-209, et celles de Chr. THIERS, *Ptolémée Philadelphie et les prêtres d'Atoum de Tjékou. Nouvelle édition commentée de la stèle «de Pithom»* (OrMonsp, 17), Montpellier 2007, p. 83-90, concernant l'ensemble de l'argumentation de E. Grzybek). Par ailleurs, la soi-disant mention d'une «année sacrée», hapax qui désignerait le comput macédonien (E. GRZYBEK, *op. cit.*, p. 93), est une lecture erronée du texte (voir Chr. THIERS, *op. cit.*, p. 62-63, n. 147). Voir encore les arguments de H. CADELL, *A quelle date Arsinoé est-elle décédée?*, in H. MELAERTS (ed.), *Le culte du souverain dans l'Égypte ptolémaïque au III^e siècle avant notre ère*. Actes du colloque international, Bruxelles 10 mai 1995 (*StudHell*, 34), Leuven 1998, p. 1-3. Mais le débat ne semble pas clos, si l'on en croit Chr.J. BENNETT, http://www.geocities.com/christopherjbennett/ptolemies/arsinoe_ii.htm, qui préfère adopter la date de 268 proposée par E. Grzybek.

son corps à [Celui-qui-a-crée-sa-perfection (?)] [...]. Après qu'eut été pratiqué sur cette déesse le rite de «l'ouverture de la bouche» sur une période de quatre jours, elle partit comme un ba vivant; on festoya en son honneur à Anpet (= Mendès), en célébrant sa fête et en y rappelant son ba à la vie à côté des béliers vivants, comme on le fait pour les bas de tous les dieux et déesses depuis l'origine et jusqu'à ce jour. Car c'est le lieu d'exaltation de la royauté de tous les dieux, leur ville de rajeunissement, où ils respirent l'air; c'est [la place privilégiée (?)] de toutes les déesses, où elles renaissent et sont inondées de myrrhe et de lys consumé chaque décade.

Sa Majesté ordonna de dresser son effigie dans tous les temples (et cela plut à leurs prophètes, car on connaissait sa loyauté envers les dieux et ses actes de bienfaisance pour les gens. Sa statue fut érigée dans le nome mendésien auprès de Celui-dont-les-bas-sont-vivants² (...)

Cependant, la relecture d'une stèle érigée à Saïs en l'an 22 de Ptolémée Philadelphie me semble démontrer qu'il n'en fut rien. L'essentiel de ce texte était connu depuis longtemps par un grand fragment conservé au Louvre³; récemment, Christophe Thiers⁴ a pu rapprocher ce morceau d'un fragment aujourd'hui perdu mais connu par deux dessins du XVI^e siècle et d'un petit fragment conservé à Naples, complétant ainsi de manière significative le texte initial (voir la restitution de l'ensemble proposée par Christophe Thiers reproduite ici en fig. 1), et renouvelant du même coup l'approche que l'on pouvait tenter de cette stèle. Le texte ainsi reconstitué est encore loin d'être complet, mais il nous permet, me semble-t-il, de comprendre parfaitement tous les événements qui étaient rapportés sur la stèle et leur raison d'être.

Après la date de rédaction de la stèle (an 22, au mois d'Hathyr) et l'habituel éloge au roi, qui occupe environ six lignes et demi (plus de la moitié du texte), vient le passage narratif⁵:

(7) (...) En l'an 20, Sa Majesté dit aux dignitaires qui étaient à ses côtés: «Faites moi amener les gouverneurs, les responsables de domaine, les prophètes et les pères divins des temples de Haute et

² *Urk.* II 40.8-41.14. Traduction chez H. DE MEULENAERE – P. MAC KAY, *Mendes II*, 1976, p. 175-177; S. SAUNERON, *BIFAO* 60 (1960), p. 96; Chr. THIERS, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 185-195. Ma traduction s'inspire de cette dernière.

³ Stèle Louvre C 123, publiée dans les *Urk.* II 75-80.

⁴ *BIFAO* 99 (1999), p. 423-445; le texte est repris chez ID., *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 178-180, suivant l'interprétation présentée ici.

⁵ La traduction présentée ici s'appuie largement sur celle de Christophe Thiers. Voir son commentaire pour les détails de traduction non abordés ici.

Basse Égypte pour [...]. (8) Qu'on dresse (a) une statue de la Majesté de la reine, héritière [du Double Pays] Isis-Arsinoé [...] les dieux et les déesses, car c'est la fille du dieu. Je doterai vos villes (respectives) (b) bien plus que ce qui a été fait auparavant».

Ils dirent à Sa Majesté: «La parole du souverain notre maître sera accomplie conformément à tout ce qui a été dit [...]».

(9) En l'an 21, Sa Majesté vint pour rendre prospère l'Égypte (?), pour combler la population [...] s'enquérir de l'état de l'Égypte avec eux. Ils s'en retournèrent alors du lieu où se trouvait Sa Majesté vers la ville de Saïs afin de nourrir le pays après la pénurie. Il accomplit (toute) chose pour embellir [...]. (10) Il a rendu prospère la condition de tous les habitants afin que son nom soit proclamé [...] accompli à la perfection.

Puis les prophètes et les pères divins du temple de Neith s'en vinrent au lieu où se trouvait Sa Majesté; ils dirent à Sa Majesté: «Souverain, notre maître, la statue de la reine, héritière du Double Pays Isis-Arsinoé, [la déesse qui aime] son frère [...] a été érigée (c) [...]. (11) C'est la place où accostent (?) (d) tous les dieux [...]. Que Ta Majesté daigne venir la voir (e)! ». Au mois de Pharmouti [...] après lui, des quadriges et chevaux si nombreux qu'on ne pouvait les compter, des commandants et des soldats sans fin. Apparition royale au temple de (sa) mère, la maîtresse de [Saïs...]».

Éléments de commentaire textuel:

(a) L'expression *dj.t h'*, «faire apparaître» ne doit pas nécessairement être comprise comme une allusion à la «sortie (en procession)» d'une divinité, même si cette valeur est bien attestée pour le verbe *h'*⁶; ce terme désigne simplement de manière très générale tout type d'«apparition» du dieu. Compte tenu du contexte, il me paraît certain que le verbe fait ici référence à la fabrication et à l'érection d'une statue en faveur de la déesse nouvelle. Le fait que le rédacteur emploie dans notre passage la formule *dj.t h'*, «faire apparaître» au lieu du verbe *s'h'*, «dresser», qui est justement le terme utilisé dans la stèle de Mendès dans le passage relatif à l'érection d'une statue pour le culte d'Arsinoé⁷, ainsi que dans le décret de Canope, concernant cette fois-ci l'instauration du culte de Bérénice⁸, ne doit pas surprendre; l'explication est en fait très certainement d'ordre linguistique: dans le décret de Canope, le verbe *s'h'* est précisément la traduction en égyptien de tradition de *dj.t h'* employé dans la version démotique⁹. Le même *dj.t h'* employé dans la version démotique est rendu






⁶ Voir Chr. THIERS, *BIFAO* 99 (1999), p. 434, n. ah), avec références.

⁷ *Urk.* II 41.11.

⁸ *Urk.* II 147.5.

⁹ *mtw=w dj.t h' n=s w' shm (n) ntr (n) nwb*, «et l'on fera apparaître pour elle une statue divine en or»; voir R.S. SIMPSON, *Demotic Grammar in the Ptolemaic Sacerdotal*

par *ms*, «sculpter, fabriquer» en hiéroglyphes dans un passage du décret de Memphis¹⁰. L'emploi de *dj.t h'* dans la stèle de Saïs procède donc tout simplement d'une influence du vernaculaire sur la rédaction du texte¹¹. C'est d'ailleurs bien le même terme, sous la forme du causatif ancien *sh'*¹², qui revient un peu plus loin dans notre texte (l. 10) ainsi que dans la stèle de Mendès¹³, concernant la mise en place de la statue, et le passage a toujours été compris comme une allusion à l'érection de cette statue et a bien été traduit conformément (voir *supra*).

(b) Le groupe  peut être lu *njw.t tn*, «cette ville»¹⁴. Compte tenu du contexte, je préfère cependant lire *njw.t=tn*, «vos villes» ou, peut-être mieux étant donné l'absence de marque du pluriel derrière *njw.t*, «votre ville (à chacun)»¹⁵; comme il est précisé juste avant dans le texte, le roi s'adresse ici à des personnes venues de toute l'Égypte. Le fait que le pronom suffixe  = *tn* soit écrit sans la marque du pluriel n'a rien de surprenant; cette graphie sans  est d'ailleurs employée un peu plus loin pour le pronom suffixe = *n* (col. 8, dans , «notre maître»). Quoi qu'il en soit, comprendre ce  comme un démonstratif ne remettrait pas en cause le sens général du texte. «Cette ville» désignerait alors ici Saïs, lieu focal de l'ensemble du récit; il faudrait comprendre que les rédacteurs adaptent ici le propos royal au cas qui les concerne au premier chef: leur ville de Saïs¹⁶.

(c) La forme *sh' ssm* a été interprétée par tous les traducteurs comme un impératif: «Fais paraître une statue», et le passage dans son ensemble a été souvent invoqué pour illustrer la part active prise par les prêtres égyptiens dans le culte d'Arsinoé II, proposant au roi la sortie ou l'érection d'une statue de la reine¹⁷. Il me semble toutefois impossible de

Decrees, London 1996, p. 236-237. Même emploi de *s'h'* (hiéroglyphes) = *dj.t h'* (démotique) pour l'érection d'un naos dans le décret de Memphis en R 13 (= *Urk.* II 197.3).


¹⁰ R 7 = *Urk.* II 191.2. Sur toutes ces équivalences, voir Fr. DAUMAS, *Les moyens d'expression du grec et de l'égyptien comparés dans les décrets de Canope et de Memphis* (CASAÉ, 16), Le Caire 1952, p. 228.

¹¹ De même, le *r* du Futur III est rendu par un *j* tout à fait en adéquation avec la prononciation de l'époque à la col. 8 (*jw=j j (snfr) =eie*). Voir encore n. 18 sur une influence démotique probable dans la rédaction de la stèle de Saïs.

¹² Correspondant tout à fait au «nouveau causatif» démotique *dj.t h'*.

¹³ *Urk.* II 41.14.

¹⁴ Voir Chr. THIERS, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 429.

¹⁵ Voir par exemple *njw.t=sn*, «leur ville» en *Urk.* II 43.5 (Stèle de Mendès, graphie ).

¹⁶ Dans le même sens, mais pour un autre passage de la stèle, voir Chr. THIERS, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 440.

¹⁷ Voir *Urk.* II 80 («Die Priester von Sais bitten den König, das Bild der vergötterten Arsinoe Philadelphos in Prozession herumführen zu lassen»); W. HUSS, *Der makedonische*

comprendre ainsi le passage, compte tenu notamment des nouveaux éléments textuels. Tout d'abord, on n'attend pas des prêtres qu'ils emploient un impératif avec le roi. Par ailleurs, à chaque fois qu'un ordre, une injonction ou un souhait est émis dans ce texte, le rédacteur emploie la forme *jm + sdm=f*¹⁸ (col. 7 (discours royal): *jm jn=tw*, «Faites venir»; col. 11 (discours des prêtres); *jm spr hm=k*, «Que Ta Majesté daigne se déplacer»); or, la forme est justement attestée dans ce contexte précis dans les nouveaux fragments: *jm h' ssm*, «Qu'on dresse une statue» (col. 8 (discours royal)), qu'on attendrait donc aussi ici s'il s'agissait bien d'un souhait ou d'un ordre. Analyser la forme comme un *sdm=f* passif perfectif s'accorde en revanche beaucoup mieux tant avec la grammaire qu'avec le sens¹⁹. C'est d'ailleurs exactement la même forme grammaticale, et les mêmes termes de vocabulaire *sh'* et *ssm*, qui reviennent dans la stèle de Mendès, concernant le même événement, et le passage a toujours été bien traduit: «Sa statue fut dressée dans le nome de Mendès»²⁰.

(d) Je propose de comprendre l'étrange crochet $\overset{\text{I}}{\text{I}}^{\text{I}}_{\text{I}}^{\text{I}}$ ²¹ qui figure devant $\overset{\text{I}}{\text{I}}^{\text{I}}_{\text{I}}^{\text{I}}$ *ntr.w*, «dieux» comme une graphie abrégée de $\overset{\text{I}}{\text{I}}^{\text{I}}_{\text{I}}^{\text{I}}$ *mnj*, «accoster», écrite au moyen du seul signe $\overset{\text{I}}{\text{I}}^{\text{I}}_{\text{I}}^{\text{I}}$ ²². Une lecture $\overset{\text{I}}{\text{I}}^{\text{I}}_{\text{I}}^{\text{I}}$ *hqʒ*, «gouverner» me semble moins probable, compte tenu de l'emploi habituellement transitif de ce verbe.

(e) Le pronom suffixe =s renvoie nécessairement à la statue. Cette invitation à venir contempler la statue trouve encore un écho dans un passage de la stèle de Mendès, où les prêtres proposent au roi d'envoyer une équipe auprès du nouveau Bélier, dans une formulation exactement paral-

König und die ägyptischen Priester (*Historia Einzelschriften*, 85), 1994, p. 109; J. QUAE-
GEBEUR, *AncSoc* 20 (1989), p. 109; Chr. THIERS, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 440.

¹⁸ Sur cette forme dans l'égyptien de tradition ptolémaïque, voir A. ENGSHEDEN, *La reconstitution du verbe en égyptien de tradition, 400-30 avant J.-C.*, Uppsala 2002, p. 91-92. En égyptien de la seconde phase (néo-égyptien et démotique), la forme est utilisée comme impératif du verbe *rdj*, notamment dans sa fonction de verbe opérateur, mais aussi avec cette valeur de jussif, d'injonction, de recommandation, que l'on retrouve ici, notamment dans le discours des prêtres (A. ERMAN, *Neuägyptische Grammatik*, 1995³, §291 et 356; J.H. JOHNSON, *The Demotic Verbal System* (SAOC, 38), Chicago 2004², p. 139-142; R.S. SIMPSON, *Demotic Grammar in the Ptolemaic Sacerdotal Decrees*, London 1996, p. 123, §7.5.4).

¹⁹ Sur le *sdm=f* passif dans ces textes, voir A. ENGSHEDEN, *op. cit.* (n. 18), p. 341-357.

²⁰ *sh^c sšm=s m Jtn: Urk. II 41.14 (voir supra p. 84).*

²¹ Voir Chr. THIERS, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 443, fig. 2 et p. 444, fig. 3.

²² Sur les graphies abrégées de ce verbe et certaines variantes paléographiques, voir Ph. COLLOMBERT, *RdE* 49 (1998), p. 50; voir aussi un exemple particulièrement similaire chez J. LECLANT – H. DE MEULENAERE, *Kēmi* 14 (1957), p. 34-42 et pl. III, col. 3, qui date vraisemblablement de la même époque.

lèle: *jm jy t(.t) pr-ḥ r m33[=f]*, «Daigne envoyer une équipe de la Maison de Vie pour [le] voir»²³.

Résumons maintenant les faits présentés par la stèle, tous articulés autour de la défunte Arsinoé II selon mon interprétation: en l'an 20, le roi Ptolémée Philadelphie fait convoquer (très vraisemblablement à Alexandrie) les responsables de toutes les instances administratives et religieuses du pays, afin de leur demander de faire dresser une statue de sa sœur défunte Arsinoé II dans leur ville respective²⁴; en contrepartie, il s'engage à enrichir ces villes. La formulation est très proche de celle que l'on trouve dans la stèle de Mendès, dans le passage commémorant la même décision d'instaurer un culte en faveur d'Arsinoé II dans tous les temples de Haute et Basse Égypte (voir *supra*).

Peu de temps après, en l'an 21, le roi décide de prendre des mesures en faveur de la *chôra* et s'enquiert de l'état du pays, probablement à nouveau auprès d'instances venues de toute l'Égypte et nommées dans la lacune malencontreuse de la l. 9. Ces personnes s'en retournent ensuite vers Saïs (très probablement, le texte focalise-t-il ici sur la délégation saïte uniquement parce que la stèle y a été rédigée et dressée²⁵), pour mettre fin à une période de pénurie. On comprendra que l'amélioration est due aux mesures royales évoquées dans la phrase qui précède; le texte reste cependant très allusif.

Enfin, un peu plus tard, les prêtres de Saïs reviennent voir le roi, pour lui annoncer que la statue d'Arsinoé (c'est à dire celle que le roi avait demandé d'ériger en l'an 20) est désormais en place dans leur sanctuaire, et l'invitent à venir la voir. C'est ce que fait le roi, en grand équipage, au mois de Pharmouti, [jour perdu?]. La stèle commémorant ces événements est gravée et érigée quelques mois après, en l'an 22, au mois d'Hathyr.

Le but premier — et presque unique — de la stèle est donc, me semble-t-il, de commémorer l'installation du culte d'Arsinoé II dans la ville de Saïs, telle qu'elle avait été ordonnée par le roi²⁶. Par ailleurs, entre le

²³ *Urk.* II 48.10; le pronom est restitué d'après le parallèle en *Urk.* II 48.14.

²⁴ Si dans la col. 7, le roi s'adresse à ses conseillers, dans la col. 8, il semble bien s'adresser aux administrateurs territoriaux convoqués, comme l'indique le contexte. Le changement d'interlocuteur était soit explicité dans le passage en lacune, soit implicite. Que l'approbation de la fin de la col. 8 soit celle des hommes de cour ou celle des gouverneurs d'Égypte ne change rien à la teneur du message royal.

²⁵ Voir Chr. THIERS, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 440.

²⁶ En cela, cette stèle se distingue des stèles de Pithom ou de Mendès, qui commémorent quant à elles une série d'événements. Par sa composition (disposition en colonnes, texte plus court), elle s'en distingue aussi, et se rapproche plus de la stèle de Naucratis, bien antérieure, qui ne commémorait elle aussi qu'un seul fait.

décret royal et l'exécution de celui-ci vient s'intercaler — non sans raison — un épisode célébrant certaines largesses royales en faveur de tout le pays, et notamment de Saïs. Il semble probable que ces mesures prises par le roi en faveur de la *chôra* en l'an 21 sont plus ou moins directement liées à l'érection de la statue d'Arsinoé. Du moins est-ce l'impression que donne le texte en intercalant cet événement entre les deux épisodes relatifs à Arsinoé. On pourrait y voir une référence aux mesures fiscales prises par Philadelphie en faveur du culte nouveau (l'*apomoira*: voir *infra*, p. 91-92); elles semblent à tout le moins trouver un écho dans les stèles de Pithom et de Mendès (voir *infra*, p. 94-95).

Ainsi compris, le texte pose cependant un problème: il semble entrer en contradiction avec celui de la stèle de Mendès qui, comme on l'a vu initialement, placerait la date de l'instauration du culte d'Arsinoé II dans les temples d'Égypte immédiatement après la mort de la reine (an 15), et non pas près de cinq ans plus tard, comme l'indique donc la stèle de Saïs (an 20). La similitude des deux documents, tant dans la rédaction que dans les faits présentés, me semble rendre tout à fait certain qu'il s'agit bien de la description du même événement. Il paraît pourtant difficile de croire que l'instauration du culte d'Arsinoé ait pu se dérouler en plusieurs étapes, à des dates différentes. Le décret royal était manifestement destiné à tout le pays, comme il ressort de la formulation tant du texte de la stèle de Mendès que de celui de la stèle de Saïs, puisque, dans le premier, le roi décide de l'installation du culte «dans tous les temples» (stèle de Mendès, l. 13) et que dans le second, il est bien précisé que le roi convoque «les gouverneurs, les responsables de domaine, les prophètes et les pères divins des temples de Haute et Basse Égypte» (stèle de Saïs, col. 7).

Cette contradiction des deux textes n'est probablement qu'apparente. Car si la date du décès d'Arsinoé est explicitement notée dans la stèle de Mendès, rien ne dit que son culte ait été instauré immédiatement. Seul le fait que cette décision royale suit assez rapidement la mention de la date de la mort d'Arsinoé a fait adopter cette hypothèse, qui était du reste tout à fait plausible tant que d'autres documents ne venaient pas la contredire. Compte tenu de la mention explicite d'une date en l'an 20 de Philadelphie dans la stèle de Saïs, il est désormais nécessaire de préférer celle-ci.

Il n'est peut-être pas inutile à ce propos d'insister ici sur la prudence avec laquelle il convient d'utiliser les stèles du type de celle de Mendès ou de Pithom pour fixer la date de certains événements survenus sous le règne de Philadelphie²⁷. Lorsqu'une date est expressément citée en

²⁷ Dans le même sens, voir déjà M. MINAS, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 207-208.

relation avec un événement, comme c'est le cas, par exemple, de la mort d'Arsinoé, il n'y a aucune raison, *a priori*, de la mettre en doute. En revanche, les événements non datés explicitement mais intégrés dans le vague canevas chronologique que présentent les stèles ne me semblent pas devoir être nécessairement assujettis de manière aussi précise aux indications temporelles qui ponctuent le texte.

De fait, les stèles de Mendès, de Pithom, ou même celle de Saïs, ne sont pas des annales, même si la description des événements semble suivre un ordre chronologique. Le but premier des rédacteurs est de décrire une série d'événements où leur ville s'est trouvée en rapport direct avec le roi et, surtout, d'énumérer des bienfaits royaux qui sont le résultat de ces visites ou de décrets plus généraux, s'étendant à l'ensemble du pays; ces textes à but de propagande célèbrent par ailleurs le dieu local, dont la spécificité et les qualités uniques — reconnues par le roi — sont présentées comme la cause de ces royales largesses. L'ordre chronologique dans lequel semblent placés les événements reste donc très secondaire (voir encore *infra*, p. 94).

Ainsi, l'épisode Arsinoé II' est-il traité en une seule fois dans la stèle de Mendès et la mention de l'instauration de son culte, qui devrait peut-être figurer plus loin si l'ordre chronologique était strictement respecté, suit tout logiquement la mention de sa mort. D'ailleurs, il n'est pas tout à fait sûr que cet ordre chronologique ne soit pas véritablement respecté dans le cas d'Arsinoé. Car la date suivante mentionnée est l'an 21²⁸ et seule la mention, tout juste avant cette date, du creusement d'un canal, dont on sait par la stèle de Pithom qu'il eut lieu en l'an 16, a incité certains commentateurs à placer les événements décrit antérieurement entre l'an 15 (date de la mort d'Arsinoé II) et l'an 16 (date — non mentionnée ici — du creusement du canal). Mais on pourrait aussi tout simplement supposer que ce dernier événement, introduit par la formule: «autre action parfaite qu'a fait Sa Majesté», ne s'inscrit pas dans la toile chronologique et ne représente qu'un événement presque anecdotique par rapport au propos principal.

Ce raisonnement en entraîne un autre: la mention des faveurs royales décrites dans la stèle de Mendès²⁹ juste après la décision d'instaurer le culte d'Arsinoé, et juste avant les événements de l'an 21 survenus à Mendès (si l'on excepte donc l'épisode du creusement du canal) rappelle très fortement celles qui sont mentionnées dans la stèle de Saïs pour l'an 21 (voir *infra*, p. 95).

²⁸ *Urk.* II 46.3.

²⁹ *Urk.* II 42-45.

L'apomoira d'Arsinoé³⁰

Cette nouvelle datation de l'instauration du culte d'Arsinoé dans la *chôra* en l'an 20 de Ptolémée Philadelphie me semble trouver une pleine confirmation dans la décision prise par le roi vers la même date de redéployer une partie de l'*apomoira* en faveur du culte de la reine.

Un décret daté du 5 Daisios de l'an 23 de Ptolémée Philadelphie (comput macédonien, = 14 juin 263 av. J.-C.) stipule en effet que l'*apomoira*, taxe relative aux vignobles et vergers, devait désormais être prélevée sur les clérouchies ou les *doreai* (terres non cléricales) et reversée pour le culte d'Arsinoé II. Le décret entrait en vigueur immédiatement, puisqu'il prenait en compte les revenus de l'année précédente, c'est à dire ceux de l'an 22 (comput macédonien). Cette mesure excluait les terres appartenant en propre au clergé, qui continuait quant à lui à percevoir une *apomoira* dont il pouvait disposer comme bon lui semblait pour les cultes. Cette mesure nouvelle concernant les terres non cléricales est donc très clairement prise en faveur du clergé, puisque les lieux de culte d'Arsinoé II étaient situés dans l'enceinte des temples et participaient de la même essence. Si l'on considère que le culte de la reine dans la *chôra* a été décrété à partir de l'an 20 (comput égyptien) mais ne fut véritablement effectif qu'à partir de l'an 21 (comput égyptien), conformément à ce qui est énoncé sur la stèle de Saïs, on constate que l'*apomoira* d'Arsinoé II apparaît sensiblement au même moment, autour de l'an 264 (an 22 du comput macédonien = an 21 du comput égyptien)³¹. Le recoupement des

³⁰ Sur cette taxe voir L. KOENEN, in A. BULLOCH *et al.* (ed.), *Images and Ideologies. Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World*, 1994, p. 66-69 et W. CLARYSSE – K. VANDORPE, in H. MELAERTS (ed.), *Le culte du souverain dans l'Égypte ptolémaïque au III^e siècle avant notre ère*. Actes du colloque international, Bruxelles 10 mai 1995 (*StudHell*, 34), Leuven 1998, p. 5-37. Je suis ici leur nouvelle analyse de la taxe.

³¹ La datation absolue à l'époque de Ptolémée Philadelphie est un problème encore aigu, compte tenu notamment de l'existence simultanée de plusieurs computes parallèles (datation macédonienne, datation égyptienne, année financière) et de l'intégration en cours de règne de ses années de corégence avec Ptolémée Sôter, au moins dans le comput macédonien (voir R.A. HAZZARD, *The Regnal Years of Ptolemy Philadelphos*, *Phoenix* 41, 1987, p. 139-158, qui situe avec beaucoup de vraisemblance ce changement au tout début du règne autonome de Ptolémée Philadelphie, l'an 1 devenant l'an 4). Les dernières recherches concernant le comput égyptien semblent indiquer que toutes les années égyptiennes de l'époque de Philadelphie sont attestées, rendant improbable l'existence d'un quelconque saut d'années dans ce calendrier (voir B. MUHS, *The Chronology of the Reign of Ptolemy II Reconsidered: The Evidence of the Nhb and Nht Tax Receipts*, in A.M.F.W. VERHOOGT – S.P. VLEEMING [ed.], *The Two Faces of Graeco-Roman Egypt: Greek and Demotic and Greek-Demotic Texts and Studies presented to P.W. Pestman* [PLBat, 30], Leiden 1998, p. 71-85; ID., *Tax Receipts, Tax-payers, and Taxes in Early Ptolemaic Thebes* [OIP, 126], Chicago 2005, p. 29-40). Compte

dates est frappant et tout à fait explicite: il s'agit tout simplement pour Ptolémée II d'assurer au culte tout nouvellement mis en place les moyens de son fonctionnement, en le dotant de revenus propres, sans toutefois grever le budget des temples, qui sont chargés du culte. Le roi instaure le culte d'Arsinoé et assoit dans le même temps son autonomie économique³². Le fait qu'il y ait eu imposition rétrospective pour l'an 22 (comput macédonien) montre bien la volonté, une fois le culte mis en place, de doter assez rapidement celui-ci de ses moyens de fonctionnement³³. Ce nécessaire aspect économique du culte est d'ailleurs très vraisemblablement décelable dans la stèle de Saïs, où l'énumération des différentes instances convoquées par Ptolémée dans tout le pays débute par les *ḥꜣty-ꜣ* et les *ḥqꜣ-ḥw.t*, «les gouverneurs, les chefs de domaines», c'est à dire l'administration sous contrôle royal direct, avant même la mention des prêtres (voir *supra*).

tenu du décalage bien attesté à cette époque entre comput macédonien et comput égyptien, il faudrait alors supposer que la datation égyptienne sous Ptolémée II débute au moment de la corégence et n'a jamais varié ensuite, ne cherchant pas à s'adapter au calendrier macédonien qui changeait (ce phénomène s'était d'ailleurs déjà produit quelques années plus tôt, lorsque Ptolémée I^{er} inclut ses années comme satrape dans le calendrier macédonien sans que le calendrier égyptien s'en trouve modifié). Toutes ces incertitudes rendent les datations absolues sous le règne de Philadelphie encore parfois bien hasardeuses et il me paraît actuellement illusoire de chercher à donner une date absolue trop précise pour la série des événements qui nous concernent ici. Ces approximations sont cependant de peu d'importance pour notre propos; il suffit de constater que les dates se concentrent toutes autour de l'an 21 du comput égyptien. Tout au plus notera-t-on que le décret concernant l'*apomoira* d'Arsinoé II semble légèrement plus tardif que le décret relatif à l'instauration de son culte, ce qui semble tout à fait logique.

³² L. KOENEN, *The Ptolemaic King as a Religious Figure*, in A. BULLOCH *et al.* (ed.), *Images and Ideologies. Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, p. 66, n. 96 établit lui aussi un lien direct entre l'entrée en vigueur de l'*apomoira* d'Arsinoé et l'instauration du culte de la reine, tout en situant l'ensemble en l'an 15, en tenant compte de la mention d'un amendement au décret initial, qui mentionne «les années 18 à 21» (comput macédonien) dans le décret de l'an 23; selon lui, «the beginning of the eighteenth year was obviously the administrative starting point for the appropriation of the apomoira to the cult of Arsinoe». En fait, plus vraisemblablement, comme le supposait déjà B.P. Grenfell dans *P. Revenue Laws*, p. 118-119, cette demande d'information sur le total des récoltes effectuées entre l'an 18 et l'an 21 sert à établir une moyenne afin de fixer un taux d'imposition pour l'an 22; la mesure date d'ailleurs bien de l'an 23, comme l'atteste la date du décret (voir les remarques de D. KALTSAS, *Dokumentarische Papyri des 2. Jh. v.Chr. aus dem Herakleopolites* [P. Heid. VIII], 2001, p. 237, n. 2). Il n'est pas impossible que ce calcul de moyenne ait été décidé en raison d'une récolte particulièrement mauvaise, et donc non représentative, dans l'année qui précéda, si la «pénurie» mentionnée pour l'an 21 (comput égyptien) dans la stèle de Saïs n'est pas un simple lieu commun (voir *supra*, p. 88).

³³ Voir aussi J. BINGEN, *Le Papyrus Revenue Laws – Tradition grecque et adaptation hellénistique* (R-WAW Vorträge, G 231), 1978, p. 17.

La documentation de l'an 20 et après

Par ailleurs, il est frappant que toute une série d'autres documents égyptiens de l'époque de Ptolémée Philadelphie relatifs au culte d'Arsinoé II dans la *chôra*, lorsqu'ils sont datés, sont compris dans une fourchette chronologique extrêmement étroite, comprise entre l'an 20 et l'an 22 (comput égyptien). Il est difficile de croire que cela ne soit que pure coïncidence.

Le graffiti démotique du Ouadi Hammamat

Ainsi, un graffiti démotique des carrières du Ouadi Hammamat³⁴ garde le souvenir du passage d'un «artisan du dieu Psenamounis fils de Ih-yiou» (*ḥmw nṯr P3-šr-Jmn s3 Jhy-jw*) venu pour «faire exécuter la statue de pharaon (et) la statue d'Arsinoé» (*(r) dj.t jr=w p3 twt n Pr-3 t3 rpj(.t) n 3rsn*). Or, ce graffiti est daté de «l'an 20 du pharaon Ptolémée fils de Ptolémée», qui est assurément ici Ptolémée Philadelphie.

On ne connaît pas l'origine de ce Psenamounis, ni à quel usage étaient destinées ces statues du roi et de la reine. *A priori*, la mention conjointe de Ptolémée et d'Arsinoé plaiderait plutôt en faveur de statues destinées au culte des *Theoi Adelphoi*, qu'il convient très vraisemblablement de différencier de celui d'Arsinoé II seule à cette époque³⁵. Néanmoins, la coïncidence est remarquable: en l'an 20 (comput égyptien), au moment même où le roi décrète le culte national d'Arsinoé II, un artisan-du-dieu vient au Ouadi Hammamat chercher la matière première destinée à une statue de la reine.

La stèle de Saft el-Henneh

Une autre stèle de l'époque de Ptolémée Philadelphie, retrouvée cette fois-ci à Saft el-Henneh, date de l'an 22³⁶; il ne subsiste malheureusement plus qu'une partie des neuf premières lignes de la stèle, qui ne contenaient manifestement que l'éloge royal. Dans le cintre figure Ptolémée faisant offrande de l'encens aux dieux de la région, suivis d'Arsinoé II (voir fig. 2). La coïncidence des dates est troublante et il est loisible de supposer que le reste du texte contenait une allusion à la mise en place du culte d'Arsinoé ainsi qu'aux largesses du roi en faveur de la ville.

³⁴ H.-J. THISSEN, *Enchoria* 9 (1979), p. 83-84 et pl. 22 (b).

³⁵ Voir par exemple P.M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* I, Oxford 1972, p. 228-229.

³⁶ E. NAVILLE, *The Shrine of Saft el Henneh and the Land of Goshen* (EEF, 5), London 1888, p. 13, pl. 8, D. Son lieu de conservation actuel est inconnu.

Les stèles de Mendès et de Pithom

Les deux autres grandes stèles du même type du règne de Philadelphie présentent des faits échelonnés entre l'an 6 et l'an 21 pour la stèle de Pithom³⁷ — et celle-ci a donc très vraisemblablement été gravée autour de l'an 21 ou 22, à l'instar de la stèle de Saïs et de la stèle de Saft el-Henneh — et des événements s'étalant entre une année en lacune mais nécessairement antérieure à l'an 15 (la première date conservée sur le document) et une autre année en lacune, qui est très probablement l'an 28, pour la stèle de Mendès³⁸. Chacune des stèles décrit une série d'événements locaux, dont le seul intérêt semble résider dans le lien qu'ils établissent entre le roi et la ville où la stèle fut érigée. Ainsi, si la stèle de Saïs met en exergue le culte d'Arsinoé II, c'est très certainement parce que l'instauration de celui-ci avait valu à la ville l'honneur d'une visite royale; de même, dans la stèle de Mendès, la ville s'enorgueillit d'avoir reçu le roi pour l'intronisation du Bélier, premier animal sacré que Philadelphie avait honoré de sa dévotion particulière en participant en personne aux rites; enfin, la stèle de Pithom rappelle notamment les fréquentes visites royales sur les marches orientales du royaume et le passage à Pithom à cette occasion. Cependant, au-delà de ces divers faits purement locaux et presque anecdotiques, toutes ces stèles ont pour point commun de mentionner aussi une série de largesses royales, et cela me semble être précisément une de leur raison d'être première: pérenniser par la pierre les avantages que le roi avait octroyés à leur ville, tant de manière locale que dans le cadre plus large de décrets concernant le pays tout entier.

Ainsi, dans la stèle de Mendès, parmi tous les faits mentionnés, figure toute une série d'exemptions de taxes pour le nome mendésien, ainsi que la mention d'une réduction d'imposition générale: «Sa Majesté projeta de réduire les impôts de l'Égypte afin de réjouir les Deux Terres pour Celui-qui-a-crée-sa-perfection. Sa Majesté se dessaisit de [690.000] dében d'argent qui étaient perçus par le palais, chaque début d'année et pour toujours»³⁹. Cet événement est cité juste avant le rappel du creusement d'un canal dans la région, dont on sait grâce à la stèle de Pithom qu'il eut lieu en l'an 16, mais je ne pense pas que l'ordre chronologique soit ici respecté ou fondamental (voir *supra*, p. 90). La date qui est citée après ce passage est — encore une fois — l'an 21.

³⁷ Sur cette stèle, voir désormais Chr. THIERS, *op. cit.* (n. 1), *passim*.

³⁸ Voir W. CLARYSSE, *CdE* 82 (2007), p. 201-206.

³⁹ *Urk.* II 44.14-45.3.

De même, dans la stèle de Pithom⁴⁰, l'avant-dernier paragraphe du texte consiste en un «relevé de tous les biens que Sa Majesté a accordés comme bienfaits aux temples de Haute et Basse Égypte comme allocation au début de l'année», qui rappelle donc une mesure prise par Philadelphie en faveur de tous les temples d'Égypte. Cette mention est suivie d'un «relevé des biens que Sa Majesté a accordés comme bienfaits à Piquereh (le temple local)», qui concerne la seule région de Pithom. Vient ensuite, en clôture du texte, la mention d'une date: «21^e année, mois de Pharmouthi», suivie du «relevé des biens que Sa Majesté a accordés comme bienfaits aux temples de Haute et Basse Égypte: biens collectés dans les maisons d'Égypte: 90.000 deben d'argent; biens collectés chez les habitants comme impôt au début de l'année: 660.000 (deben) d'argent». Compte tenu de l'imprécision des termes ici employés, il est difficile de proposer une identification de ces virements en faveur des temples avec certaines taxes connues par la documentation grecque et démotique⁴¹; il est d'ailleurs probable qu'il est ici fait allusion à plusieurs mesures fiscales différentes, étalées dans le temps; pour le dernier exemple, il est évident qu'il s'agit d'une mesure fiscale nouvelle prise par le roi autour de l'an 21 en faveur du clergé et il serait notamment possible d'y voir une allusion à l'*apomoira*, et peut-être plus spécialement à celle qui devait être désormais versée par certains particuliers pour le culte d'Arsinoë II.

Ces mentions des stèles de Mendès et de Pithom rappellent en tout cas fortement les mesures décidées par le roi dans la stèle de Saïs en l'an 21. Au-delà des événements locaux divers, il semble donc qu'on puisse mettre en évidence toute une série d'exemptions et de dotations locales ou générales, concentrées autour de l'an 21⁴².

Une réforme fiscale de Ptolémée Philadelphie en l'an 21?

Ces indices convergents peuvent aussi être rapprochés de certaines données issues de la documentation démotique: constatant la disparition des

⁴⁰ *Urk.* II 103-104 = Chr. THIERS, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 79-80.

⁴¹ Voir les réflexions de Chr. THIERS, *op. cit.*, p. 121-122.

⁴² Il existe une autre stèle du règne de Philadelphie, provenant de Xoïs et datée de l'an 29 (Stèle BM EA 616, voir I. GUERMEUR – Chr. THIERS, *BIFAO* 101, 2001, p. 197-219). Il n'en reste plus que les sept premières lignes du texte, qui ne contiennent que l'éloge royal; le cintre n'a jamais été décoré. La date de cette stèle permet peut-être de la rapprocher de la stèle de Mendès et on peut supposer qu'elle faisait aussi référence à certains faits identiques.

reçus de la taxe-*nḥb* et leur remplacement probable par la taxe sur le sel (*ḥd ḥm3*) entre l'an 21 et l'an 22 de Philadelphie, Br. Muhs⁴³ a proposé de situer à cette date une réforme des taxes de l'administration lagide, qu'il a d'ailleurs mise en parallèle avec la réforme de l'*apomoira*. Toute une série de faits convergents semble donc désigner l'an 21 de Philadelphie comme une période de réformes économiques conséquentes et variées.

Nes-isout nommé prêtre du culte d'Arsinoé en l'an 23?

Plus ambiguë est l'hypothétique mention de l'an 23 de Philadelphie sur la stèle funéraire de Nes-isout surnommé Padibastet, Grand Prêtre de Ptah à Memphis sous Ptoléme I^{er} et Ptolémée II⁴⁴; il y décrit les charges qui lui ont été accordées par le roi en personne; or, si l'on suit l'interprétation habituelle, celles-ci lui auraient été confiées en l'an 23 (de Ptolémée II très certainement). Le passage n'est cependant pas tout à fait clair et le texte est susceptible de découpages et interprétations diverses⁴⁵:

Jamais on a trouvé de faute depuis que je commandais [le travail (?) dans le domaine de (?)] Ptah en 23 ans/l'an 23, par décision du roi lui-même et de sa cour. Mon maître a renouvelé mes récompenses; il m'a nommé [...] grand dans Memphis. Mon maître a renouvelé mes récompenses: [il m'a nom]mé prêtre de la sœur du roi et fille du roi Philotéra. Mon maître a renouvelé mes récompenses: il m'a inscrit à la grande fonction de prêtre [de la fille du roi, sœur du roi, fille d'Amon, la maîtresse des De]lux-Terres Arsinoé, la déesse Philadelphie aimée d'Isis.

On voit que le passage ne signifie pas forcément que notre homme ait été nommé prêtre d'Arsinoé en l'an 23, ni même qu'il faille nécessairement trouver ici une référence à un quelconque an 23. À l'encontre de cette interprétation, on notera d'ailleurs que l'on n'attend pas la graphie 𐤎 pour

⁴³ *Tax Receipts, Taxpayers, and Taxes in Early Ptolemaic Thebes* (OIP, 126), Chicago 2005, p. 29-30; ID., *The Chronology of the Reign of Ptolemy II Reconsidered: The Evidence of the Nḥb and Nḥt Tax Receipts*, in A.M.F.W. VERHOOGT – S.P. VLEEMING (ed.), *The Two Faces of Graeco-Roman Egypt: Greek and Demotic and Greek-Demotic Texts and Studies presented to P.W. Pestman* (PLBat, 30), Leiden 1998, p. 71-85 et plus particulièrement p. 82-83.

⁴⁴ Stèle BM 379, voir J. QUAGEBEUR, *JNES* 30 (1971), p. 246-248 et p. 266; E.A.E. REYMOND, *From the Records of a Priestly Family from Memphis* (ÄA, 38), Wiesbaden 1981, p. 61-70; D.J. CRAWFORD, in D.J. CRAWFORD – J. QUAGEBEUR – W. CLARYSSE, *Studies on Ptolemaic Memphis* (StudHell, 24), Leuven 1980, p. 26; pour le personnage, voir *ProsPtol* III 5361.

⁴⁵ Voir les hésitations de J. QUAGEBEUR, *art. cit.* (n. 44), p. 246.

une année de règne, même s'il est vrai que, à l'inverse, la graphie Ϝ° est employée dans une stèle du même groupe, pour écrire les années cette fois-ci⁴⁶. Quoi qu'il en soit, cette pièce ne me semble donc pouvoir être versée au dossier qu'avec de fortes réserves.

Le culte d'Arsinoë II à Alexandrie

Tout ce qui vient d'être dit concerne exclusivement le culte d'Arsinoë II dans la *chôra*. Car il semble en aller tout autrement de son culte à Alexandrie⁴⁷. La création d'un sacerdoce particulier à Alexandrie, la «canéphore d'Arsinoë», qu'on doit très vraisemblablement mettre en rapport avec la divinisation et le culte d'Arsinoë, date très probablement de 268/267 (an 18 du comput macédonien)⁴⁸. Elle eut donc lieu quelques temps après la mort de la reine si l'on s'en tient à la chronologie classique qui fixe la mort d'Arsinoë II à 270; certains tenants de la date plus récente de 268 supposent que le canéphorat fut institué du vivant de la reine ou alors immédiatement après sa mort⁴⁹. Quoi qu'il en soit de ces divergences, la mise en place de ce sacerdoce est donc pratiquement contemporaine de la mort de la reine et relève de conceptions grecques, perceptibles tant dans les emplois⁵⁰ que dans la forme⁵¹. Il en est de même pour les fêtes instituées en son honneur, les *Arsinoeia*, qui participent de rites grecs à Alexandrie⁵², même si elles semblent avoir été célébrées aussi dans la

⁴⁶ Stèle HMV 162, voir E.A.E. REYMOND, *op. cit.* (n. 44), p. 89, l. 11.

⁴⁷ Sur ce point, voir P.M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* I, Oxford 1972, p. 228-229.

⁴⁸ Voir H. CADELL, in H. MELAERTS (ed.), *Le culte du souverain dans l'Égypte ptolémaïque au III^e siècle avant notre ère*. Actes du colloque international, Bruxelles 10 mai 1995 (*StudHell*, 34), Leuven 1998, p. 3, qui émet même l'hypothèse d'une date encore légèrement antérieure.

⁴⁹ Voir L. KOENEN, *art. cit.* (n. 32), p. 56; H. HAUBEN, *CdE* 67 (1992), p. 161 (référence W. Clarysse).

⁵⁰ Voir par exemple l'emploi de la mention de la canéphore dans le système de datation (L. KOENEN, *art. cit.*, p. 46). Le fait que la canéphore soit nommée dans les documents démotiques dès l'an 18 (alors que le prêtre d'Alexandre ne l'est pas avant l'an 21) ne fait que refléter les directives de la chancellerie alexandrine et ne peut pas être considéré comme une preuve de l'existence de son culte dans la *chôra* (*contra* M. MINAS, in H. MELAERTS [ed.], *Le culte du souverain dans l'Égypte ptolémaïque au III^e siècle avant notre ère*. Actes du colloque international, Bruxelles 10 mai 1995 [*StudHell*, 34], Leuven 1998, p. 54-55).

⁵¹ Voir notamment les attributs de la prêtresse: D.M. BAILEY, *CdE* 74 (1999), p. 156-157; M. MINAS, *art. cit.* (n. 50), p. 43-46. Noter toutefois que ce n'est vraisemblablement pas la canéphore mais la statue particulière d'Arsinoë II à Mendès qui est représentée dans le cintre de la stèle de Mendès: voir Chr. THIERS, *BiOr* 57 (2000), p. 90-91.

⁵² Voir P.M. FRASER, *op. cit.* (n. 35), p. 229.

chôra (mais alors probablement plus tard), avec des adaptations égyptiennes⁵³.

Il est donc désormais nécessaire de bien distinguer le culte d'Arsinoé II à Alexandrie de celui qu'on lui rendra dans la *chôra*: la date de l'an 20 de la stèle de Saïs, quel que ce soit le comput retenu et la date exacte de l'instauration du culte d'Arsinoé à Alexandrie, est de plusieurs années postérieure à ce dernier. Le culte d'Arsinoé II apparaît donc initialement comme une affaire alexandrine, purement lagide. Ce n'est que dans un deuxième temps, quelques cinq années plus tard, que le roi va diffuser le culte de sa sœur dans le pays entier, peut-être guidé en cela par un conseiller égyptien qui aurait entrevu les rapprochements possibles avec la tradition indigène et trouvé là l'occasion d'un rapprochement culturel et culturel.

Une histoire de famille

Tels me semblent se présenter les faits; il appartiendra aux historiens de traiter des implications diverses de ce décalage chronologique. Cet intervalle temporel important dans la mise en place du culte d'Arsinoé II entre Alexandrie et la *chôra* invite notamment à reconsidérer les raisons qui poussèrent Ptolémée à diffuser le culte de sa sœur dans l'Égypte indigène. En effet, le culte d'Arsinoé II est souvent cité comme un exemple typique de la volonté de rassemblement des composantes grecque et égyptienne de son peuple par le souverain lagide; il me semble que cette allégation doit être désormais largement relativisée. Il ne s'agit pas de nier des rapports indéniables, mais bien d'identifier les priorités. Il est en effet certain que le culte d'Arsinoé II trouva dans la *chôra* égyptienne un terrain propice à un plein épanouissement et qu'il favorisa un rapprochement des Grecs et des Égyptiens autour de la figure commune de la souveraine. Néanmoins, le fait que ce culte ait été instauré dans l'ensemble de l'Égypte bien après son installation à Alexandrie montre que tel n'était pas le but premier, voulu par Philadelphie.

Le culte d'Arsinoé II doit être replacé dans le contexte plus large de la déification des membres de la famille royale lagide, dont il n'était qu'une des composantes, au même titre, par exemple, que le mariage incestueux de Ptolémée avec sa sœur. Les raisons qui ont présidé à cette divinisation de la dynastie lagide ont fait l'objet d'interprétations variées,

⁵³ Voir F. PERPILLOU-THOMAS, *Fêtes d'Égypte* (StudHell, 31), Leuven 1993, p. 155-158.

où les rapprochements avec le caractère divin du pharaon égyptien n'ont pas manqué d'être soulignés. Mais ces rapprochements ne sont probablement que superficiels ou, plus exactement, secondaires. Dans un ouvrage récent, R.A. Hazzard⁵⁴ insiste sur la dimension familiale et la volonté toute personnelle de Ptolémée II de mettre en place un système idéologique qui permet de renforcer le pouvoir de sa dynastie. Et les décisions prises en ce sens par Ptolémée prenaient leur source dans sa culture gréco-macédonienne. Le caractère secondaire de l'attention portée à la population égyptienne dans la mise en place du culte d'Arsinoé II, tel qu'on a pu l'établir ici, s'inscrit tout à fait dans la perspective développée par R.A. Hazzard. L'instauration du culte d'Arsinoé II semble bien être, initialement, une simple histoire de famille.

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⁵⁴ *Imagination of a Monarchy: Studies in Ptolemaic Propaganda* (Phoenix, Supplementary Volume 37), Toronto 2000 (référence Chr. Thiers).




Fig. 1 – La ‘stèle de Saïs’
(d’après Chr. THIERS, *BIFAO* 99, 1999, p. 442, fig. 1)




Fig. 2 – La stèle de Saft el-Henneh
(d'après E. NAVILLE, *The Shrine of Saft el Henneh*, pl. 8D)

THE EXPULSION OF CLEOPATRA VII: CONTEXT, CAUSES, AND CHRONOLOGY

Abstract: This article treats the removal of Cleopatra from her throne and from her country in the early part of her reign. Near the end of Cleopatra's life, when she had no remaining hope that she could withstand Octavian, we are told that Egypt offered to rise and fight the enemy on her behalf. This offer suggests that Cleopatra had achieved great popularity as the ruler of Egypt. But she had not always been so secure in her position—early in her career she had, in fact, been deposed and driven out of Egypt. This article attempts to answer several disputed questions about the details of this deposition. Who were Cleopatra's enemies? Why did they oppose her? When and how did they succeed in excluding a sitting queen from power? Existing analyses attempt to explicate some of these mysteries, but they fail, I believe, to account fully for the ancient evidence, and to describe the conclusions that must be drawn from that evidence. Taking documentary and literary evidence into consideration, I attempt to reconsider the matter. The ancient sources point to a more limited number of enemies than is sometimes believed, a much later date than is always asserted, and motives and methods that have largely been ignored.

Near the end of Cleopatra's reign, when she had no remaining hope that she could successfully withstand, or even continue to contend with, the Roman Octavian, Egypt, we are told, offered to rise up and fight the enemy on her behalf¹. In view of the fact that the enemy was Rome, the offer, if true, was a bold one and suggests that Cleopatra had achieved great popularity as queen. But her position within Egypt had not always been so secure; she enjoyed neither an undisputed nor an uninterrupted reign — early in her career Cleopatra was temporarily driven from her throne and her country².

By and large scholars agree on the reasons for the queen's removal, on the identity of her enemies, and on the timing of her expulsion. Cleopatra has been accused of showing excessive independence. The queen's ascendancy over her sibling co-ruler, Ptolemy XIII, which some believe to have been contrary to the expressed wishes of their father, Ptolemy XII Auletes, is said to have provoked growing hostility to her and led to her overthrow³. Grant claims that «people were afraid that

¹ Pseudo-Acro on Horace, *Odes* I 37.23.

² Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 103, cf. 107; App., *Bell. Civ.* II 84.

³ M. GRANT, *Cleopatra: a Biography*, London 1972, p. 47-50; P. GREEN, *Alexander to Actium: the Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age*, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1990,

Cleopatra intended to supplant her young half-brother» and that her independence outraged her subjects⁴. More recent writers have agreed on the stresses caused by the queen's independence from her brother, but have characterized those stresses as existing between Cleopatra and powerful court officials in Alexandria, who supported Ptolemy XIII, rather than between Cleopatra and the more nebulous 'people'⁵. In virtually every interpretation, Cleopatra met resistance to her supremacy over her brother and found herself under increasing pressure to admit him fully to his inherited kingship. According to several scholars that pressure reached such a pitch that Cleopatra was forced to flee Alexandria by October of 50 BCE and to flee Egypt itself before the end of the summer of 49⁶.

While existing analyses go some way toward explicating the queen's expulsion, several critical issues remain disputed. Was Cleopatra's dominant position contrary to Auletes' wishes? Was she trying to supplant her sibling co-ruler? Did she offend and frighten people generally by her actions, or were the tensions primarily between herself and select court officials, as more recent scholars suggest? If, in fact, Cleopatra's enemies consisted of a few figures at court, and not a broader band of the population, how did those individuals succeed in expelling a sitting and apparently popular queen from power? What support did those enemies enjoy? Finally, did the hostility to the queen reach such a pitch within the first year and a half of her reign that her position was already effectively undermined by the fall of 50 BCE and she forced to leave her country by

p. 664; M. CHAUVEAU, *Egypt in the Age of Cleopatra* (trans. D. Lorton), Cornell 2000, p. 22-23; G. HÖLBL, *A History of the Ptolemaic Empire*, New York 2001, p. 231; A. MEADOWS, *Sins of the Fathers: the Inheritance of Cleopatra, Last Queen of Egypt*, in *Cleopatra of Egypt: from History to Myth*, eds. P. Higgs – S. Walker, London 2001, p. 24; W. HUSS, *Ägypten in hellenistischer Zeit 323-30 v.Chr.*, Munich 2001, p. 707-709. Both M. Grant (p. 47) and M. Chauveau (p. 22), represent Cleopatra's preeminence as contrary to Auletes' wishes.

⁴ M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 47, p. 48-50.

⁵ See, among others, H. HEINEN, *Rom und Ägypten von 51 bis 47 v.Chr.*, diss. Tübingen 1966, p. 46-48; P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664; M. CHAUVEAU (n. 3), p. 23; G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 231; D.E.E. KLEINER, *Cleopatra and Rome*, Cambridge MA 2005, p. 77.

⁶ H. HEINEN (n. 5), p. 32; M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 51-52; L. CRISCUOLO, *La successione a Tolomeo Aulete ed i pretesi matrimoni di Cleopatra VII con i fratelli*, in *Egitto e Storia antica dall'ellenismo all'età araba: Bilancio di un confronto*. Atti del Colloquio Internazionale, Bologna, 1987, eds. L. Criscuolo – G. Geraci, Bologna 1989, p. 328; P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664; G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 232; M. CHAUVEAU, *Cleopatra: Beyond the Myth* (trans. D. Lorton), Cornell 2002, p. 18. A. MEADOWS (n. 3), p. 24, is an exception, asserting that Cleopatra had been driven into exile by the middle of 48 BCE, but giving no specific reason for assigning Cleopatra's exile to this time period.

the summer of 49? An accurate interpretation of the earliest years of Cleopatra's reign depends upon the answers to these questions, and a careful reading of the issues, individuals, methods, and dates involved in her temporary removal from power is in order.

First, let us consider the nature and timing of her accession. When her father, Ptolemy XII Auletes, died, Cleopatra and her young brother, Ptolemy XIII, were designated to rule in his stead. In his will Auletes named his eldest, surviving daughter and his eldest son joint-heirs of the kingdom, entreating Rome «by all the gods and by the treaties he had made with Rome» to see that the terms of his will were fulfilled⁷. Auletes died sometime between February and August of 51 BCE, but uncertainty persists about the date of his death. Since the differences of opinion with regard to the end of his life and the beginning of his daughter's reign lead to conflicting interpretations of Cleopatra's behavior in her earliest days as ruler, a more precise chronology would be helpful.

It seems clear that in mid-February of 51 BCE Ptolemy XII was still alive and ruling. A surviving papyrus from 15 February 51 refers to the thirtieth year of Auletes' reign⁸. Cleopatra, for her part, had certainly become queen by March of 51 BCE. An inscription on the shrine of the Buchis bull at Hermonthis dated to March 22 of that year commemorates the installation of a new Buchis bull and declares that «the Queen, the Lady of the Two Lands, the goddess Philopator, rowed [the Bull] in the barge of Amon to Hermonthis.»⁹ The 'queen' in 51 BCE, the 'goddess', who 'loves her father', can be none other than Cleopatra, and these are, indeed, cult titles that she adopted and used throughout her life¹⁰. Although this inscription includes a reference to an unnamed king, it makes no clear reference to Ptolemy XII Auletes, and it is widely

⁷ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 108.4-6; *Bell. Alex.* 33. One copy of the testament was sent to Rome and deposited with Pompey; another was under seal at Alexandria.

⁸ BGU 1826. This papyrus, which is a petition to a government official by the name of Seleucus, is specifically dated to year 30, Mecheir 14 (15 February 51 BCE). While disputing about the precise month, both Samuel and Bloedow agree that Ptolemy XII Auletes succeeded to the throne before 1 Thoth (11 September) of 80 BCE. Thus the thirtieth year of Auletes' reign would run from 11 September 52 to 11 September 51. Samuel regards BGU 1826, along with OGIS 190, as one of the latest dated documents of Auletes' reign. See A.E. SAMUEL, *Ptolemaic Chronology* (*Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, Heft 43), Munich 1962, p. 154-156, and E. BLOEDOW, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Ptolemaios XII*, diss. Würzburg 1963, p. 11-17.

⁹ R. MOND – O.H. MYERS, *The Bucheum*, 3 vols., London 1934, II, p. 12.

¹⁰ For Cleopatra's cult titles, see BGU 2376.

supposed that he was already dead by this time, and Cleopatra, perhaps with her young brother, ruling in his stead¹¹.

In papyri that postdate this inscription, however, Auletes' regnal year continues to be utilized, albeit in conjunction with another ruler's first year. A petition datable to May mentions the year thirty and the year one as two distinct royal calendars¹². This formula continues at least until July 51: a papyrus of that month from the Heracleopolite nome is likewise dated by the year thirty and the year one¹³. According to Samuel, this type of chronological marker is «used only when there are two people on the throne.»¹⁴ The papyrological evidence notwithstanding, the view prevails that Auletes certainly died by May, if not as early as March.

The dual dating formula has been variously explained. Some scholars assume that Auletes had died by March of 51 and that Cleopatra and Ptolemy XIII *ought* to have succeeded jointly to the throne by that time, but that Cleopatra had concealed the king's death in order to bar her brother from royal power and to guarantee her independent control of the government¹⁵. Grant cites the Bucheum inscription, which, in his view, makes no reference to Ptolemy XIII, and in which Cleopatra figures so prominently, as an example of Cleopatra's neglect of her brother's rightful position: she ought to have had her young co-ruler with her, doing his kingly duty at the installation of the sacred bull¹⁶. Chauveau maintains that any co-regency between Auletes and his daughter, which is implied by the dual-dating formula, was a fiction that allowed the succession to be manipulated, contrary to her father's wishes, in favor of Cleopatra¹⁷.

¹¹ T.C. SKEAT, *The Reigns of the Ptolemies* (*Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, Heft 39), Munich 1954, p. 41, believes the king was dead by 22 March 51, possibly earlier. H. DE MEULENAERE, *CE* 42 (1967), p. 304, also presumes that Auletes was dead before the end of March 51. *BGU* 1810, a papyrus from the Heracleopolite nome, may refer to year 1 of Cleopatra and has lead Skeat to suggest that Auletes may even have died as early as February 51, although he acknowledges that the date of the papyrus remains doubtful. See also A.E. SAMUEL (n. 8), p. 157, M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 30 and P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 661, all of whom assume Auletes died in the spring. The interpretation of the Bucheum stele is debatable, and its implications will be discussed in greater detail below.

¹² *BGU* 1829. The full date of receipt is Α λ καὶ α Παχ(ών) κβ, 24 May 51. Note also *BGU* 1832, Α λ καὶ α Πα(ῦνι) κ, although the restoration of the latter is doubtful. Both papyri are cited in A.E. SAMUEL (n. 8), p. 157 n. 53.

¹³ *BGU* 1827: Α λ τοῦ καὶ α Ἐπερίρ.

¹⁴ A.E. SAMUEL (n. 8), p. 158.

¹⁵ M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 30.

¹⁶ M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 47.

¹⁷ M. CHAUVEAU (n. 3), p. 22. Cf. A.E. SAMUEL, *CE* 40 (1965), p. 349.

Alternatively there are those who argue that Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy XIII together succeeded their father, but that Cleopatra expelled her brother from the kingship soon after their accession. Hölbl, for example, assumes that the unnamed king of the Bucheum inscription is, in fact, Ptolemy XIII and that the text constitutes proof of the joint accession of Cleopatra and her brother at Auletes' death, while those documents from the first half of 51 BCE that make use of a dual dating formula provide evidence of Cleopatra's exclusion of Ptolemy XIII from their joint kingship¹⁸. Green shares this view and refers for additional proof to a contract dated to 28 August 51 BCE, which includes the name of Cleopatra but not of her brother, and, on the assumption that Ptolemy XIII had succeeded to the throne, speaks of the queen having «already ... dropped her young brother's name from official documents.»¹⁹

There is, however, no convincing reason to adopt the most sinister interpretations of the ancient sources, concluding either that Cleopatra covered up her father's death, and thus tried to guarantee her sole control of the throne, or that she had succeeded to the throne with Ptolemy XIII by early spring of 51 but removed her brother from kingly power as soon as she was able. These arguments depend upon certain assumptions: that Ptolemy XII Auletes was dead by March of 51 BCE and that Ptolemy XIII had, in fact, succeeded to the throne, either as co-ruler in his father's lifetime, or upon his father's presumed death by March of 51. These assumptions, however, may not be correct.

Cleopatra's participation in the installation of a sacred Buchis bull in March 51 is not proof that her father, Auletes, was dead by that time. The only secure *terminus ante quem* for the death of Ptolemy XII is August 51. In a letter to Cicero from 1 August 51 Caelius Rufus writes: *praeterea nuntiatur enim nobis et pro certo iam habetur regem Alexandrinum mortuum, quid mihi suadeas, quo modo regnum illud se habeat, quis procuret, diligenter mihi prescribas*²⁰. The wording suggests that Auletes' death had been a matter of rumor. By the time this letter was sent to Cicero, however, the rumors had been sufficiently confirmed to satisfy

¹⁸ G. HÖBL (n. 3), p. 231. Cf. A.E. SAMUEL (n. 8), p.157-158, 169, who suggests that both siblings shared in a joint-reign with their father from as early as September 52 BCE. See also H. VOLKMANN, *Cleopatra: a Study in Politics and Propaganda*, New York 1958, p. 60, who accepts that Ptolemy XIII was present at the installation ceremony.

¹⁹ P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664. For the inscription: *PSI* X 1098b. Cf. M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 47.

²⁰ Cic., *Ad Fam.* VIII 4.5. T.C. SKEAT (n. 11), p. 41, surprisingly and exclusively dates this letter to June 51.

Caelius. And, as noted above, papyri from within Egypt bear this out, with references to two regnal calendars appearing into July of that year²¹. Not until early August was Ptolemy XII's thirtieth regnal year definitively dropped from the dating formula of surviving papyri and 'year one' employed alone²². Perhaps the papyri merely represent the political reality: that Auletes still reigned, but had adopted Cleopatra as his co-ruler by March of 51²³. He may well have been alive until July but unwilling, or possibly unable, due to failing health, to perform royal duties unassisted.

Furthermore, the surviving documentary evidence predating August of 51 provides no proof that Cleopatra's brother, Ptolemy XIII, had succeeded to the throne. Cleopatra was certainly performing royal offices and being called 'queen' in March of 51, but the stele documenting her involvement in the installation of the Buchis bull makes no clear mention of her brother. The reference in the stele to an unnamed king is ambiguous at best: «[The bull] was installed by the king himself in year 1 Phamenoth 19; the Queen, the Lady of the two lands, the goddess Philopator, rowed him in the barque of Amon.»²⁴ It may be, as Tarn asserted, that the reference to the king is a traditional formula and no proof that any king was present²⁵, or as Grant suggests, that the king denotes Cleopatra herself²⁶. If a particular male ruler is, in fact, meant, it remains unclear who that was. While the queen is called 'lady of the two lands' and 'the goddess Philopator', the unnamed king is without the full nomenclature that might clarify his identity. Hölbl assumes that 'year 1' identifies the king as Ptolemy XIII, since it clearly would not be year 1 of Auletes' reign²⁷. But the use and placement of the chronological

²¹ BGU 1827, 1829, 1832. See A.E. SAMUEL (n. 8), p. 157-158.

²² See, for example, BGU 1830.

²³ BGU 1755 has been dated year 1 Thoth 29, which could locate year one of Cleopatra's reign as early as October 52, but its date is very uncertain. See A.E. SAMUEL (n. 8), p. 157. BGU 1810, noted above, which could place her appointment as co-ruler in February 51, is likewise too insecure to be relied upon. We can only confidently say that Cleopatra was performing queenly functions by March 51. A.E. SAMUEL (n. 8), p. 158, thinks it probable that Auletes placed both his eldest son and Cleopatra on the throne with himself, but the occasional later use of distinct dating formulas for brother and sister suggest that Cleopatra's own reign predated that of her younger brother.

²⁴ R. MOND – O.H. MYERS (n. 9), II, p.12.

²⁵ W.W. TARN, *The Bucheum Stele: a Note*, JRS 26 (1936), p. 187-189.

²⁶ M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 47, observes that «the conventions of Egyptian terminology are hard to understand and sometimes surprising.»

²⁷ G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 231.

marker fail to guarantee this. It is not the traditional royal dating formula by the year of the king: 'year x of King Ptolemy', and it may be intended to indicate year one of the queen's reign and relate, therefore, to Cleopatra exclusively. This latter view is certainly possible in light of other evidence, which securely attests the rule of Cleopatra in the first half of 51 BCE, but not that of Ptolemy XIII²⁸.

As for the contract dated to 28 August 51, from which the name of Cleopatra's brother, Ptolemy XIII, is notably absent and by which time Auletes was unquestionably dead: if Auletes survived until July, it might be more accurate to assume that the boy's name had never yet been included rather than to suggest, with Green, that Cleopatra had by this time discontinued the inclusion of her sibling's name²⁹. This contract is, moreover, not a court document and does not prove that Cleopatra had 'dropped' or even omitted her brother's name from official records³⁰.

The possible absence of Ptolemy XIII from the installation of the Buchis bull and from the inscription commemorating it, as well as the omission of his name from other surviving documents through August of 51 are perfectly sensible if one assumes that Cleopatra's father was still alive until July, and only Cleopatra acting as co-ruler. As queen, Cleopatra acted her part; her brother, who as yet had no official position, was not represented. It may, on the basis of surviving documents, be argued neither that she had dethroned him, nor that she planned to ignore him altogether.

However, it is not until September of 50 BCE, more than a year after Auletes was certainly dead, that unambiguous references to Ptolemy XIII begin to appear in the papyrological sources. In some of the surviving papyri of the period the king and queen are both named and the regnal year is three, no distinction being made between the beginning of Cleopatra's reign and that of her brother³¹. In other documents there occurs a dating formula like the one she shared with her father, with reference to both

²⁸ One may, for example, point to the crypt of the temple of Hathor in Dendera, which houses a representation of Cleopatra behind her father, but with no sign of her brother. For a discussion of this scene in the temple of Hathor, see J. QUAEGBEUR, *Une scène historique méconnue au grand temple d'Edfou*, in *Egitto e Storia antica dall'ellenismo all'età araba: Bilancio di un Confronto*. Atti del Colloquio Internazionale, Bologna, 1987, eds. L. Crisculo – G. Geraci, Bologna 1989, p. 605. Cf. G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 230.

²⁹ P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664.

³⁰ PSI X 1098b.

³¹ BGU 1730.

the first year (that of Ptolemy XIII) and the third year (Cleopatra's)³². The continued omission of Ptolemy XIII's name beyond the certain demise of Ptolemy Auletes in summer of 51 does appear to be proof of Cleopatra's exclusion of her brother from the position specified for him in their father's will and must be accounted for.

The question of Cleopatra's relationship to the court functionaries who became the young Ptolemy's advisors is perhaps more relevant in this regard than the question of the queen's relationship to her brother. Several men, whom the ancient sources identify as the eunuch Pothinus, the general Achillas, and a certain Theodotus, came to enjoy powerful positions around the young king. Caesar describes these men as those *qui propter aetatem eius in procuratione erant regni*³³. Ptolemy's age explains their presence: he was too young to rule unassisted. Cleopatra's own age may in turn help to explain the omission of her brother's name from court documents. If, as Thompson claims, Cleopatra was seventeen at the time of her accession, and her birthday fell in late December or early January, she would have entered upon the first year of her reign when still a mere teen³⁴. In view of her youth, Cleopatra may have asserted her own position with added force in order to avoid contending with those who might argue that *she*, as well as her brother, required adult supervision. After establishing herself as an independent queen, she could acknowledge her brother with some hope of asserting a claim to act as the primary royal authority, which she clearly intended to be, as well as caretaker of Ptolemy XIII. Other Ptolemaic queens had certainly performed this function³⁵. It is probable that Cleopatra was trying to ensure family control independent of her brother's advisors, lest she be overshadowed, or, worse, eliminated. Her shows of autonomy suggest a desire to achieve ascendancy over ambitious counselors as much as over her adolescent brother.

As to the claim that Cleopatra's dominance was contrary to Auletes' expressed wishes, it is clear from the terms of his will that Ptolemy

³² *P. Berol.* 16277, *P. London* 827.

³³ *Caes., Bell. Civ.* III.104. App., *Bell. Civ.* II.84, referring to a time after Cleopatra's expulsion, likewise names these men: Achillas is said to have been overseeing the army for the king; Pothinus the finances; Theodotus to have been the boy's διδάσκαλος.

³⁴ D. THOMPSON in *CAH* IX², 1994, p. 320.

³⁵ Cleopatra I, for example, outlived her consort, Ptolemy V, and controlled Egypt for several years of her son's adolescence. See *P. Freib.* 12-33; *P. Tebt.* 828; T.C. SKEAT (n. 11), p. 33; P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 425; W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 536, 538-541.

Auletes gave careful thought to the transition of power at his death³⁶. To have included his daughter so conspicuously in the settlement proposed by the will is unusual. Ptolemies had occasionally named co-regents before, associating the heir, and occasionally a sibling or wife, with the sitting monarch, but never a daughter of the king³⁷. It was, furthermore, common practice for reigning Ptolemaic kings to marry their sisters and thus make them queens³⁸. Auletes might have assumed that his son, Ptolemy XIII, would continue this tradition and leave the father, who evidently wished to have Cleopatra reign with her brother, no need for *naming* her one of his heirs. One can, however, conceive of several dangers that would have suggested themselves to the mind of Auletes when contemplating the bequest of the kingdom to the male child alone.

In view of the fact that the youthful Ptolemy XIII could not be expected to rule unassisted, considerable influence would naturally have fallen to an adult advisor (or advisors)³⁹. An untried boy ruler on the throne after the death of a king whose own legitimacy had been challenged would present a strong temptation — *coup d'état* sponsored by ambitious and enterprising court functionaries was not without precedent in Ptolemaic Egypt⁴⁰. Indeed, as Ptolemy XII neared the end of his career, he had no

³⁶ See M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 47, and M. CHAUVEAU (n. 3), p. 22, for the view that Cleopatra overshadowed her brother against her father's wishes. On the arrangements of Ptolemy Auletes' will, see Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 108.4-6; *Bell. Alex.* 33.

³⁷ Most famously Ptolemy I Soter named his son, Ptolemy II Philadelphus, his co-ruler in 285/4 BCE, two years before his own death, thereby rejecting the advice of Demetrius of Phaleron and favoring his eldest son by his second wife, Berenice, rather than his eldest son by Eurydice. See Diog. Laert. V 78-79. For a survey of Ptolemaic coregencies and the associated evidence, see W.J. MURNANE, *Ancient Egyptian Coregencies (Studies in Ancient Oriental Civilization, no. 40)*, Chicago 1977. Cf. A. BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ, *Histoire des Lagides*, 4 vols., Paris 1903-1937, p. 99 with n. 2, for references, and P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 87-88, 131.

³⁸ The practice was initiated with the marriage of Ptolemy II Philadelphus to his sister Arsinoë and repeated by Ptolemy IV Philopator, Ptolemy VI Philometor, Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II, Ptolemy IX Philometor Soter II, and Ptolemy XII, Cleopatra's own father.

³⁹ If, as App., *Bell. Civ.* II 84 suggests, Ptolemy XIII was thirteen years old — ὁ δὲ ἦν μὲν περὶ τρισκαίδεκα ἔτη μάλιστα γεγινώς — when Pompey was murdered, he must have been born in 61 BCE, making him just ten at the time of his father's death. Cf. Dio XLII 3; Plut., *Pomp.* 77.2; H. VOLKMANN, *RE* XXIII (1959), *Ptolemaios XIII*, cols. 1756-1757.

⁴⁰ Famously, when Ptolemy IV Philopator died in 204 BCE, his advisors, Sosibius and Agathocles, put themselves forward as guardians of the boy successor, Ptolemy V Epiphanes. For their attempt and its bloody end at the hands of an Alexandrian mob, see Polyb. XV 25-33; Cf. Just. XXX 2.7-8. On the role of the Alexandrian populace, see P.M. FRASER, *Ptolemaic Alexandria*, 3 vols., Oxford 1972, I, p. 80-82; H. HEINEN, *Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Rom und dem Ptolemäerreich von ihrem Anfang bis zum Tag*

reason to expect sympathy from the citizens of Alexandria, or to hope that they would take up the cause of his son, should the boy's throne be threatened. He had had his own experience of those volatile citizens, who had driven him out in 58 BCE and kept him out until Roman troops restored him in 55. The rage of the Alexandrians at Ptolemy XII (and their potential hostility toward his offspring) is part of the larger framework of his reign and comprehends what was perhaps the greatest source of concern to Auletes at his death — the question of the Roman stance toward Egypt and its rulers and the increasing threat of Roman appropriation of Ptolemaic resources or territory. This larger framework requires consideration.

While the history of exchange between Egypt and Rome goes back at least to the time of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, the first critical instances of Roman incursions into Ptolemaic territory and affairs occurred during Auletes' own reign, and one need not investigate very much beyond the insecure and embattled history of his career to explain the terms of his will⁴¹.

Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II had supposedly willed his kingdom to Rome in 155 BCE, entrusting to them the protection of his dominions. The will, however, provided this only in the case that Ptolemy should die without a successor, which he did not, and on his death in the year 116 Physcon, in fact, left his kingdom to his wife Cleopatra III and whichever of her two sons she should choose as co-ruler, with a special allotment of Cyrene for his bastard son Ptolemy Apion⁴². Rome does not enter into the testamentary disposition. In 96 BCE Ptolemy Apion, the bastard son of Ptolemy VIII, bequeathed Cyrene to Rome⁴³, but it is not until 63 that we can, with

von Eleusis (273-168 v.Chr.), *ANRW* I 1 (1972), p. 633-659, esp. 634-637; A. JAEHNE, *Politische Aktivität der Bevölkerung Alexandrias am Ende des 3. Jahrhunderts v.u.Z. (nach Polybios)*, *Klio* 58 (1976) p. 405-423; and W.D. BARRY, *The Crowd of Ptolemaic Alexandria and the Riot of 203 BC*, *Echos du Monde Classique* 12 (1993), p. 415-431.

⁴¹ For the embassy sent to Rome by Ptolemy II Philadelphus and the results thereof, see Dio fr. 41 = Zon. VIII 6.11; Dion. Hal. XX 14.1-2; Val. Max. IV 3.9; Justin XVIII 2.9; App., *Sic.* 1; Eutrop. II 15; Livy *Per.* 14. See E.S. GRUEN, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, Berkeley – Los Angeles 1984, p. 673-674, and W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 294. A detailed review of the long history of the relationship between Rome and Ptolemaic Egypt can be found in Gruen (p. 672-719) and in A. LAMPELA, *Rome and the Ptolemies of Egypt. The Development of their Political Relations 273-80 B.C.* (*Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum*, III), Helsinki 1998, throughout.

⁴² *SEG* IX 7.11-23, especially ll. 11-15; Just., *Epit.* XXXIX 3.1-2; V 2. See G. OLIVERSIO, *La stele di Tolomeo Neoteros re di Cirene*, Bergamo 1932; W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 573; J. WHITEHORNE, *Cleopatras*, London – New York 2001, p. 119. Physcon's testament is the first known instance of a Ptolemaic will making reference to Rome.

⁴³ Cic., *De leg. agr.* II 19.51; Just., *Epit.* XXXIX 5.2-4; Livy, *Per.* 70; Tac., *Ann.* XIV 18; App., *Bell. Civ.* I 111. See G.I. LUZZATTO, *Epigrafica giuridica greca e romana*, Milan

confidence, refer to Cyrene as a magisterial province⁴⁴. When, in 87, Ptolemy X Alexander I was expelled from Egypt, after almost thirty years of civil conflict with his brother, Ptolemy IX Soter II, he followed his father's example and willed his kingdom to Rome. He presumably hoped thereby to attract that country's attention and encourage its support for his personal political struggle⁴⁵. The gesture apparently struck some Roman moneylenders as promising collateral, for Ptolemy X managed to obtain enough money to raise a fleet, albeit to no avail. He died without regaining the throne, and Rome did not implement the bequest⁴⁶.

On his death in 81 BCE, Ptolemy IX Soter II (Lathyrus) left no legitimate male heir. Two (presumably bastard) sons, by an unnamed concubine, were in the care of Mithridates VI of Pontus⁴⁷. Cleopatra Berenice, the one-time wife of Ptolemy X and nominal joint ruler with Lathyrus, ruled alone briefly, when Ptolemy X's son, who had escaped to the proconsul Sulla in 86, was installed on the throne of Egypt as Ptolemy XI Alexander II⁴⁸. Ptolemy XI murdered his stepmother/consort, but in response to this deed was himself rejected and killed by the Alexandrians after only nineteen days as king⁴⁹.

The only possible heir to the Ptolemaic throne was the eldest of Lathyrus' sons in Pontus, and thus Ptolemy XII, commonly called Auletes, came to inherit Egypt⁵⁰. He was not secure in his role. Early and

1942, p. 165-189; H. VOLKMANN, *RE* XXIII (1959), *Ptolemaios Apion*, col. 1738; E. BADIAN, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*, 2nd ed., Ithaca 1968, p. 29-30, 35-37; E.S. GRUEN (n. 41), p. 716; W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 655.

⁴⁴ In that year M. Laterensis served there *pro quaestore*. See Cic., *Planc.* XIII 63.

⁴⁵ Cic., *De leg. agr.* I 1; II 41. On the will and its consequences, see most importantly E. BADIAN, *The Testament of Ptolemy Alexander*, *RhM* 110 (1967), p. 178-192, where he argues convincingly for the attribution of the will to Ptolemy Alexander I, rather than Alexander II, as had long been assumed. Badian's view is supported by W.V. HARRIS, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B.C.*, Oxford 1979, p. 155-158, and by E.S. GRUEN (n. 41), p. 716 n. 213. D.J. Braund reverts to the earlier stance, claiming Alexander II as the testator: D.J. BRAUND, *Royal Wills and Rome*, *PBSR* 51 (1983) p. 24-27. See also G.I. LUZZATTO (n. 43), p. 197-221; E. OLSHAUSEN, *Rom und Ägypten von 116 bis 51 v.Chr.*, Erlangen – Nuremberg 1963, p. 22-37, and W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 659-660.

⁴⁶ Porph., *FGH* 260 F 2.8; G.I. LUZZATTO (n. 43), p. 197-221; E. BADIAN (n. 45), p. 178-192; E.S. GRUEN (n. 41), p. 716; P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 553.

⁴⁷ App., *Mithr.* 23 ad fin. Cf. E. BEVAN, *The House of Ptolemy*, Chicago 1968 (repr.), p. 344-345. One of these sons was the future Ptolemy XII Auletes.

⁴⁸ App., *Bell. Civ.* I 102; Euseb., *Chron.* I 165f.; E. BADIAN (n. 45), p. 182; E. BEVAN (n. 47), p. 342; P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 554; J. WHITEHORNE (n. 42), p. 143, 175; W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 669-670.

⁴⁹ Porph., *FGH* 260 F 2.11; App., *Bell. Civ.* I 102; Cic., *De Reg. Alex.* fr. 9; J. WHITEHORNE (n. 42), p. 177; W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 670.

⁵⁰ For a treatment of Auletes' career, see W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 672-697.

energetically he sought official Roman recognition, but he was not called 'friend and ally of the Roman people' until 59 BCE, and in his lifetime the Roman interest in Egypt became dangerously intrusive⁵¹. Up until his reign Rome had shown no anxiety to take over the administration of Egypt⁵². Nevertheless, the will of Ptolemy X Alexander I was there and could be produced to justify intervention should the need arise. This potential danger was realized by Auletes. The first effective instances of Roman attention to Egyptian affairs, touching both Auletes' possession of the Ptolemaic throne and Ptolemaic possession of extra-Egyptian territories, occurred during his reign.

As noted above, the enduring Roman presence in Cyrene is first securely attested in 63 BCE, when Auletes was king. There is no evidence that the king was actively blamed for this; nominal control of the region had departed the Ptolemies at the death of Ptolemy Apion in 96. Still, the first official dispatch of someone with *imperium* and the eventual formalization of Roman administration of the region both belong to the career of Ptolemy XII⁵³. However the Ptolemaic subjects had felt about the earlier bequest of Cyrene to Rome, those feelings may have been recalled in these years and linked to Auletes.

In the same period two sons of King Antiochus X went to Rome in pursuit of the throne of Egypt. According to Cicero, they asserted a right to the Ptolemaic kingdom on their own and their mother's behalf. Their mother, Cleopatra Selene, was a daughter of Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II, sister and one-time wife of Ptolemy IX Philometor, and wife of three successive claimants to the Seleucid throne. The princes had, it seems, as much Ptolemaic blood to justify their pretensions as had Auletes. They were, however, unable to obtain a hearing of their case before the senate and went away disappointed. Their failure to obtain Roman support for a Seleucid claim on Egypt was apparently owing to the grave state of the republic more than to any inherent flaw in their argument⁵⁴. Auletes will have known of these rivals and presumably perceived them as a threat.

⁵¹ For a recent and thorough discussion of Auletes' relationship to the Romans, see M. SIANI-DAVIS, *Ptolemy XII and the Romans*, in *Cicero's Speech Pro Rabirio Postumo* (trans. M. Siani-Davis), Oxford 2001, p. 1-38.

⁵² Cf. E.S. GRUEN (n. 41), p. 672.

⁵³ E. BADIEN (n. 43), p. 34. *Imperium* first appeared in the person of Publius Lentulus Marcellinus in 75/4 BCE. Evidence of formal Roman control is attested by 63 BCE, when M. Laterensis was serving *pro quaestore*.

⁵⁴ Cic., *In Verr.* IV 27. See J. WHITEHORNE (n. 42), p. 117, 179.

Here were royal alternatives, of Ptolemaic descent, ready to hand, asserting their rights, should influential Romans desire a change of leadership in Egypt.

And there were influential Romans who did take an interest in Egypt. In 65 BCE the status of Egypt was debated in Rome. On what precisely the discussion centered is unclear. On the basis of Ptolemy X's will, Crassus, as censor, apparently sponsored a measure to seize substantial Ptolemaic resources, perhaps to make Egypt tributary to Rome. Caesar probably supported him in this. Crassus' fellow censor, Catulus, opposed and thwarted the effort, and Cicero likewise gave a speech, *De Rege Alexandrino*, against Crassus' proposal⁵⁵. A *lex agraria* of 63 may be interpreted as another attempt to effectively, if not technically, annex the resources of Egypt, and here too the will of Alexander I was to be the justification for Roman intervention⁵⁶.

In 64/3 BCE Pompey the Great, who was campaigning in the east and had marched over Coele-Syria, brought the Roman sway to the very border of Egypt⁵⁷. He did not enter the Ptolemaic realm, but that realm was now virtually surrounded by land under Roman rule.

Ptolemy Auletes will have been mindful of the will of Ptolemy X and the increasing pressures of Roman interest in his kingdom. His perception of the series of events just outlined will account for his efforts to obtain official recognition from Rome. After years of largely unsuccessful negotiation, finally, in return for the sum of six thousand talents, the consul Caesar oversaw the acknowledgement of Ptolemy XII as friend and ally of the Roman people in 59 BCE: *Ptolomaeo et lege et senatus consulto societas erat facta*⁵⁸.

⁵⁵ Cic., *leg. agr.* I 1; II 44; *De Reg. Alex.* fr. 1-2, 6-7; Plut., *Crass.* 13.1-2; Suet., *Iul.* 11. See T.R.S. BROUGHTON, *MRR* II, p. 157; B.A. MARSHALL, *Crassus: a Political Biography*, Amsterdam 1976, p. 65-67; A.M. WARD, *Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic*, Columbia – London 1977, p. 129-135; A.N. SHERWIN-WHITE, *CAH* IX², p. 271; and D. THOMPSON, *CAH* IX², p. 319; T.P. WISEMAN, *CAH* IX², p. 345-346. Interpretations of Crassus' proposal range from the view that he was, as noted above, attempting to get control of Ptolemaic treasures and make Egypt tributary to the view that he wanted to convert Egypt to a province, ruled directly by Rome.

⁵⁶ Cic., *leg. agr.* II 41-44; H. VOLKMANN (n. 18), p. 46-47; M. GELZER, *Caesar: Politician and Statesman*, Cambridge MA 1968, p. 43-44.

⁵⁷ App., *Mith.* XVII 114; Joseph., *AJ* XIV 34-35; D. THOMPSON, *CAH* IX², p. 319.

⁵⁸ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 107; App., *Mithr.* 114; Cic., *Ad Att.* II 16.2, *Pro Rab. Post.* 6; Suet., *Iul.* 54.3; Dio XXXIX 12.1; Pliny, *NH* XXXIII 136. For the amount of money spent and its sources, see Cic., *Pro Rab. Post.* 4.

Even with this battle finally won, Auletes could not rest easy. In 58, the year following his recognition, the tribune Clodius introduced a law ordering the annexation of Cyprus; a second measure appointed M. Porcius Cato to effect the seizure. Auletes' brother, who had been ruling Cyprus since 80 BCE, committed suicide rather than retire. Cato scrupulously confiscated and auctioned off the Cypriot king's property. When he finished and departed the region, Cyprus joined the jurisdiction of the governor of Cilicia⁵⁹.

What justification Clodius gave for such legislation is not known, but possibly the will of Ptolemy Alexander was applied to in order to defend Roman interest in traditionally Ptolemaic territory. Unlike Auletes, the Ptolemy ruling Cyprus had not formally been called 'a friend and ally of the Roman people', and his land was not protected by that hard-won title⁶⁰. Cicero makes a point of this. He admits that King Ptolemy of Cyprus had not been styled an ally by the Roman state, but that he still deserved better treatment, being the brother of a king who *had* received that honor from the senate, being a descendant of an ancient alliance, and being always, the absence of a senatorial decree notwithstanding, a true ally and friend of Rome⁶¹.

The loss of Cyprus was a far more serious blow to the Ptolemies than the loss of Cyrene or Crassus' threat of exacting treasures. In 295/4 BCE, Ptolemy I Soter had acquired the island in the wars of Alexander's successors. It had remained a prize of the Ptolemaic kingdom ever since, and was a more lasting part of the territorial legacy of the Ptolemies than any land save Egypt⁶². Inasmuch as Ptolemy XII did not so much as blink at the Roman seizure of the island, one cannot help but wonder if Cyprus was not part of the price the king had agreed to pay, in addition to the six thousand talents, for official acknowledgement.

⁵⁹ App., *Bell. Civ.* II 23; Dio XXXVIII 30.5, XXXIX 22.2-4; Cic., *Pro Sest.* 57, 59; Strabo XIV 6.6; Plut., *Cato Min.* 34-38; Vell. Pat. II 38.6, II.45.4; Livy, *Per.* 104. Cf. S.I. OOST, *Cato Unticensis and the Annexation of Cyprus*, *CPh* 50 (1955), p. 99. While Cato announced the annexation of Cyprus, the organization of the province seems to have been the work of P. Lentulus Spinther, who was proconsul of Cilicia in 56 BCE. See E. BADIEN, *M. Porcius Cato and the Annexation and Early Administration of Cyprus*, *JRS* 55 (1965), p. 112-113.

⁶⁰ See S.I. OOST (n. 59), p. 100.

⁶¹ Cic., *Pro Sest.* 57.

⁶² Plut., *Dem.* 35; cf. 38; *SEG* III 368.1-9; E. WILL, *HP*² 1, p. 192; *CAH* VII², p. 108; R.S. BAGNALL, *The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions Outside Egypt*, Leiden 1976, p. 38.

The result of Ptolemy Auletes' bribery of Roman officials and the Roman seizure of Cyprus was the king's expulsion from Alexandria⁶³. The very acts that had finally won Auletes Roman recognition had in turn caused the loss of his throne.

While the people of Alexandria promptly placed Auletes' eldest daughter, Berenice, on the throne in his stead, he set out for Rome to seek assistance for his restoration. Late in 57, after nearly two years of negotiation, the task of restoring the king was entrusted to Lentulus Spinther, to whom the province of Cilicia had been assigned. Spinther was, however, prevented by a Sibylline oracle which forbade the use of an army for the job⁶⁴. Ptolemy was prepared to allow Pompey to escort him, minus armed force, back to Egypt, but Pompey's enemies were *not* prepared to allow this. They cited Pompey's responsibility for the grain supply as the reason for him to stay in Rome⁶⁵. Ptolemy left Rome for Ephesus, still negotiating, almost certainly despairing, and, above all, waiting.

After two more years of delay and at an immense cost to Auletes, Aulus Gabinius, governor of Syria, was commissioned to restore the Egyptian king to his throne. Ptolemy himself brought a letter from Pompey to Gabinius and promised he would supply large sums of money both to the proconsul and to the army, some to be paid at once, the rest when he was restored. The proconsul hastened to invade Egypt. He encountered and conquered the Egyptians on the same day and handed the kingdom over to Ptolemy⁶⁶. The newly restored king immediately put his faithless daughter to death, as well as the foremost and wealthiest citizens, «because he had need of much money»⁶⁷. Gabinius was later tried for accepting sixty million denarii from Ptolemy and was said to have sold himself to the king: *se ipsum regi Alexandrino vendidit*⁶⁸.

Auletes was back in power by virtue of a Roman army, not by popular demand, and the money still owed to pay for this privilege had to

⁶³ Dio XXXIX 12.1-3; Strabo XVII 1.11; Livy, *Per.* 104.

⁶⁴ Cic., *Ad Fam.* I 1-7; *QF* II 2.3 and 3.3; *In Pison.* 50; *Pro Rab. Post.* 21; Plut., *Pomp.* 49; Dio XXXIX 12-16.

⁶⁵ Dio XXXIX.16.

⁶⁶ Cic., *Ad Att.* IV 10.1; *Pro Rab. Post.* 19-21, 30-31; *In Pison.* 48-50; Strabo XVII 1.11; Livy, *Per.* 105; Val. Max. IX 1; Joseph., *AJ* XIV 98-100; Plut., *Ant.* 3; Dio XXXIX 55-58. See I. SHATZMAN, *The Egyptian Question in Roman Politics*, *Latomus* 30 (1971), p. 363-369.

⁶⁷ Dio XXXIX 58.

⁶⁸ Cic., *In Pison.* 48; *Pro Rab. Post.* 21, 30. Cf. E. FANTHAM, *The Trials of Gabinius*, *Historia* 24 (1975), p. 425-443. For a full consideration of Gaius Rabirius Postumus, see M. SIANI-DAVIS (n. 51), p. 38-65.

come from somewhere. If Gabinius could be accused of having sold himself to Ptolemy, Ptolemy could be accused of having sold his country to Rome. The king invited the Roman banker Gaius Rabirius Postumus to become his finance minister⁶⁹. Rabirius undoubtedly imagined it would be an ideal way to insure the payment of the king's huge debt, but his violent methods made him so unpopular that he was forced to flee Egypt⁷⁰. The king must have been as unpopular as his foreign finance minister. Nevertheless, once he was restored to the throne, Auletes held the Egyptian realm, less Cyrene and Cyprus, until his death. With a Roman garrison left in Egypt, his opponents had little choice⁷¹.

The long list of troubles and threats Auletes confronted in his own reign will have been in his mind as the end of his life approached and will account for the care he took to assure a smooth transition of power at his death. He did not consider it sufficient to leave the matter to chance. Cleopatra seems to have been chosen to act as her father's co-ruler during his lifetime, and this suggests a conscious effort on his part to tutor her in royal offices, to introduce her to Egypt as its new queen, to ease and endorse the transition to her reign after his death. As for the stipulations of the will, had the young Ptolemy XIII alone succeeded his father, Auletes would have been risking the alienation of the throne away from his descendants altogether. Even presuming the marriage of Ptolemy XIII to his sister, «the traditional Ptolemaic insistence on male precedence among co-rulers»⁷² would have given the male-child's advisors the advantage over the royal couple. Auletes *named* his eldest, surviving daughter and his eldest son joint-heirs of his kingdom. He was careful to make specific provisions for Cleopatra, not merely assuming that the traditional Ptolemaic sibling-marriage would provide her with a position as sister-wife, and thus queen. She was to be officially acknowledged as a co-ruler. The deposit of his will in Rome as well as Alexandria demonstrates Ptolemy's wish to guarantee that his heirs would be recognized as allies by the Romans and that their positions would be protected by this association — from ambitious Romans who might again recall the will of Ptolemy X Alexander, as well as from Alexandrians who might remain hostile to Auletes. Because Cleopatra was the nearer to adulthood of the

⁶⁹ Cic., *Pro Rab. Post.*, 4.

⁷⁰ Cic., *Pro Rab. Post.*, *passim*.

⁷¹ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 4.4; III 108.5; III 110.2; *Bell. Alex.* III 3; App., *Bell. Civ.* II 84-85; Dio XLII 5.4.

⁷² P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664.

two heirs, it was logical that she should have precedence; that Auletes even encouraged this seems clear from the particular favor she was shown in the last months of her father's life. Cleopatra's ascendancy was, far from being contrary to the wishes of her father, apparently in accord with them. The ailing king was depending upon his eldest surviving daughter to secure the transition of power within the royal family.

Whether Cleopatra's ascendancy horrified her subjects and provoked such hostility that it led to her removal from power is less easy to determine. Some contend that she outraged her subjects and that she was under pressure to admit her young brother to joint-rule; the pressure is said to have reached a head by August of 50. She had supposedly been 'shaken' by a veritable 'national crisis' and left no choice but to acknowledge Ptolemy XIII⁷³. While we know comparatively little about the first three years of Cleopatra's reign, what we do know does not attest official actions designed to antagonize the general population. In spite of Dio's remark that those who killed Pompey «brought a curse upon themselves and all Egypt, since they not only perished themselves before long, but the Egyptians were ... handed over to Cleopatra, which they wanted least of all» and his claim that during Caesar's initial stay in Alexandria the Egyptians «feared they might be surrendered to Cleopatra,»⁷⁴ there is no evidence for widespread hostility toward the queen among the population of Egypt generally, or even of Alexandria specifically. The conduct of her early reign for which we have any record suggests a conscious commitment to patronizing and winning the sanction of a broad base among her subjects. Tracing the impact of her conduct is admittedly difficult, when not impossible, but it is essential to try to discover the queen's friends and enemies. Let us, therefore, consider what methods Cleopatra employed to secure her throne and the hearts of her countrymen, and determine, when possible, what support those methods won for the queen.

The earliest official act of the young queen about which we have any knowledge is her aforementioned participation in the installation of the Buchis bull, the sacred animal of Hermonthis in Upper Egypt, in March 51⁷⁵. From the inscription of Hermonthis it seems that she was personally present and played a key role in the transportation of the sacred bull

⁷³ M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 49-50; Cf. P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664; M. CHAUVEAU (n. 3), p. 23; G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 231.

⁷⁴ Dio XLII 3.4.

⁷⁵ R. MOND – O.H. MYERS (n. 9), II, p. 12, no. 13.

to its shrine and its installation therein. This show of interest in the cult is in keeping with her father's support of native cults and cult sites and suggests that she intended to continue his extensive patronage of Egyptian temples⁷⁶. Cleopatra may have been urged by Auletes to participate in the Buchis ritual, but she continued to honor native cults after his death and throughout her reign. Her patronage of the bull sacred to Thebes and Hermonthis bespeaks, among other things, an attempt to guarantee the support of Upper Egypt.

Although, in view of Cleopatra's conduct, one might expect to find defenders of her reign in Hermonthis and the neighboring region, one cannot say with absolute certainty that Cleopatra's regard for the Buchis bull won the immediate and unwavering loyalty of the priesthood and population of that region. Later evidence does, however, highlight that priesthood's support for the queen. In 47 BCE, in association with the birth of her first child, Ptolemy Caesar, Cleopatra ordered the construction of a birth-temple at Hermonthis. Hieroglyphic texts from the temple proclaim that the Egyptian god Ra fathered the boy, albeit in the form of Julius Caesar⁷⁷. Considering the hostility Julius Caesar, as a Roman official, encountered upon his arrival in the country, the declaration was undoubtedly intended to advertise the sacred and very Egyptian nature of the boy and to disable any opposition to him on the grounds of his paternity⁷⁸. This advertisement, more than four years after the queen's involvement in the installation of the Buchis bull, constitutes a native priestly endorsement of her son and heir and attests ongoing friendly relations between Cleopatra and the religious leaders of Hermonthis.

Cleopatra did not restrict her attention to Upper Egypt. In her balanced concern for the well-being and good opinion of her subjects, Memphis likewise received its due⁷⁹. The queen made generous contributions to

⁷⁶ His patronage extended to the Horos temple at Edfu, and temples at Karnak, Dendera, Kom Ombo, Deir el Medina and Medinet in Thebes, Philae, Dabod, Athribis, Medamud, and Armant. On temple building, see B. PORTER – R.L.B. MOSS, *Topographical Bibliography of Ancient Hieroglyphic Texts, Reliefs, and Paintings*, Oxford 1937-, *passim*. On the relationship between the Ptolemies more generally and Egyptian temples, see D.J. THOMPSON, *Memphis Under the Ptolemies*, Princeton 1988, p. 106-154.

⁷⁷ R. LEPSIUS, *Denkmäler aus Aegypten und Aethiopien*, IV, Leipzig 1897, 60a; W. OTTO, *Priester und Tempel in hellenistischen Ägypten. Ein Beitrag zur Kulturgeschichte des Hellenismus*, II, Leipzig – Berlin 1905, p. 270; H. VOLKMANN (n. 18), p. 75.

⁷⁸ A. BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ (n. 37), II, p. 217 n. 1; H. VOLKMANN, *RE* XXIII (1959), *Ptolemaios XV. Kaisar (Kaisarion) Theos Philopator Philometor*, col. 1760. On Caesar's reception in Alexandria, see *Caes.*, *Bell. Civ.* III 106; cf. *Dio* XLII 7.

⁷⁹ On the importance of Memphis to the native religion and to the Ptolemies, see D.J. CRAWFORD, *Ptolemy, Ptah and Apis in Hellenistic Memphis*, in *Studia Hellenistica* 24 (1980),

the mourning rituals for the Apis bull that died in the third year of her reign. These contributions, memorialized on the Harmachis stele, included funding for the construction of a table of offerings and the actual necessities for the worship, and demonstrate an extraordinary degree of personal interest⁸⁰.

As with Hermonthis, it is difficult to gauge the lasting impact of Cleopatra's gesture at Memphis. The stele, on which her gifts were recorded, certainly confirms the appreciation and acknowledgement of the native Memphite priesthood, but whether this recognition included practical support for her reign cannot be determined. The priesthood at Memphis is, like that at Hermonthis, later certainly aware of the birth of Ptolemy Caesar — a surviving stele requests Apis' blessing at the time of the boy's birth⁸¹. This confirms priestly support for the queen at *that* time, but it fails to prove that that support had been unbroken since the death of the bull of the Cow Ta-nt-Bastet. There is, however, nothing to indicate otherwise, and it is likely that Cleopatra's marked personal attention to Apis would have won the lasting affection of the Memphite priests. She had shown evidence of such generous patronage to them that they could confidently hope for future assistance.

It might be argued that Cleopatra's very particular care for native Egyptian religion would have alienated the Greeks in the country, particularly the large Greek population in Alexandria, proceeding on the assumption that long-standing and serious divisions existed between Greek and Egyptian in Ptolemaic Egypt⁸². Even if divisions did exist, Cleopatra's sensitivity to native religion in no way proves she disregarded the interests of the non-Egyptian population in Alexandria or elsewhere. Like Memphis and the Thebaid, Alexandria too came in for Cleopatra's solicitude. The October 50 decree governing the transport of grain shows her awareness of the value, indeed the necessity, of a satisfied population in Alexandria as well as in the *chora*⁸³. She must have been sensitive to

p. 1-42; J. QUAEGBEUR, *The Genealogy of the Memphite High Priest Family in the Hellenistic Period*, in *Studia Hellenistica* 24 (1980), p. 43-82; D.J. THOMPSON (n. 76), *passim*.

⁸⁰ E. REVILLOUT, *Leçon d'ouverture prononcée à l'école du Louvre, le lundi, 19 Décembre 1887*, *Revue égyptologique* 6 (1891), p. 133, Louvre stele 24; D.J. THOMPSON (n. 76), p. 124.

⁸¹ Louvre stele 335.

⁸² See especially N. LEWIS, *Greeks in Ptolemaic Egypt*, Oxford 1986, *passim*. As a corrective, compare D. J. THOMPSON, *Language and Literacy in Early Hellenistic Egypt*, in *Ethnicity in Hellenistic Egypt (Studies in Hellenistic Civilization, III)*, ed. P. Bilde, Aarhus 1992, p. 39-52.

⁸³ BGU 1730.

the disruption of her father's rule and keen to avoid any brewing discontent among the inhabitants of her capital city. The decree issued in the name of both king and queen, at a time of drought and impending famine, guaranteed that Alexandria would be supplied with food. Whether the decree succeeded in guaranteeing the fidelity of the volatile Alexandrians is unknown. With few exceptions, the literature provides no information about specific subgroups of the Alexandrian population that might have been particularly devoted to the queen or have supported her in her office⁸⁴. When Strabo makes mention of the city's response to Cleopatra's queenly appointment, he says simply that «the Alexandrians proclaimed as sovereigns the elder of the boys and Cleopatra.»⁸⁵ Strabo's account is notably abbreviated, and the reader would naturally wish to know more. Still, while this description falls short of a ringing endorsement, apparently the Alexandrians generally approved, or at least gave no hint of antagonism to, her accession. Whoever the queen's enemies, there is no indication that they successfully undermined the approval of the broader populace, nor that that populace played a part in her expulsion.

We are, alas, left with an *argumentum e silentio*. There is no evidence for an enthusiastic base of support for Cleopatra within the capital, but there is also no evidence for general hostility to her. Given her care for the city's food supply, one must imagine that she had friends in Alexandria, but who they were and how numerous cannot be determined. The sources mention almost no individual supporters of the queen. Plutarch names one trusted friend, Apollodorus the Sicilian, upon whom she relied after her expulsion from the city to have herself smuggled into Alexandria to address Caesar⁸⁶. Presumably Apollodorus was her friend before she was forced to depart. Beyond him we know of no friend by name from Cleopatra's earliest years.

While no picture of widespread unpopularity emerges from the ancient evidence, Cleopatra clearly had enemies, and when any clear information about those enemies is given, a few names regularly appear⁸⁷. After the

⁸⁴ That there existed population subgroups in Alexandria is, however, clear. See P.M. FRASER (n. 40), I, p. 39-92.

⁸⁵ Strabo XVII 1.11.

⁸⁶ Plut., *Caes.* 49.

⁸⁷ The identities of these men, discussed below, and their opposition to Cleopatra has been noted, among others, by H. HEINEN (n. 5), p. 46-48; P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664; L. HUGHES-HALLETT, *Cleopatra. Histories, Dreams and Distortions*, New York 1990, p. 17; M. CHAUVEAU (n. 3), p. 23; G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 231; W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 707. More recently see D.E.E. KLEINER (n. 5), p. 77.

queen's expulsion, there were present with Ptolemy XIII at Pelusium associates and advisors of the young king preparing to withstand her efforts to regain her throne. They are the same men said to enjoy great influence with the young king, and they are sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly blamed for Cleopatra's removal. Caesar says that Ptolemy XIII drove his sister out *per suos propinquos atque amicos*⁸⁸. While they are not identified in this passage, elsewhere Caesar does name certain of these associates: Pothinus, the eunuch, who was at Alexandria when Caesar arrived and was administering the kingdom in the king's absence and on account of *aetatem pueri*, and Achillas, who had charge of the forces at Pelusium and led them (or at least some contingent of them) to Alexandria to oppose Caesar⁸⁹.

While Appian does not name specific parties hostile to Cleopatra, he, like Caesar, surrounds the king at Pelusium with Achillas and Pothinus, as well as with Theodotus, the king's tutor. These men figure prominently as advisors to the young king. At Pompey's approach, they were those who advised Ptolemy to lay a trap for Pompey and kill him—advice that was promptly followed⁹⁰.

Livy also names Achillas, Pothinus, and Theodotus as the men responsible for Pompey's murder⁹¹. In his account too, they are at Pelusium and are represented as men of great authority with the king.

These sources do not explicitly identify this trio as the enemies of the queen and the authors of her removal, but we may assume it. The thirteen-year old ruler had little hope of undertaking it on his own initiative, and their influence with the young king can not have originated with the debate over Pompey's fate. Their presence at Pelusium was surely due to their pre-existing role with Ptolemy, their past opposition to Cleopatra, and their instrumentality in her expulsion.

Other sources confirm this. Strabo declares that the associates of the king caused a revolt and drove out Cleopatra⁹². Plutarch is more specific, describing Pothinus as «the most influential person at court» and saying that he had recently killed Pompey and «driven out Cleopatra.»⁹³

⁸⁸ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 103.

⁸⁹ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 108.

⁹⁰ App., *Bell. Civ.* II 84.

⁹¹ Livy, *Per.* 112

⁹² Strabo XVII 1.11. Strabo calls them συνόντες.

⁹³ Plut., *Caes.* 48

Why men like Pothinus and the others, advisors and tutors to a boy king, resisted and challenged Cleopatra is not difficult to explain. They could enjoy more power if she were removed from the scene. Ptolemy XIII was young enough to control, but there is no indication that Cleopatra requested or required the benefit of their advice. It is uncertain whether they felt that her *brother's* status was threatened by her, but their own influence certainly was. Her increasing maturity, and perhaps popularity, would threaten to make them obsolete. This would be reason enough for them to become her enemies and to begin machinations to weaken or eliminate her.

We can identify one other group that opposed the queen, for they too were present at Pelusium in support of Ptolemy XIII. Caesar explains that Achillas had 20,000 soldiers, among whom were the men of Gabinus and 2000 cavalry. Caesar specifies these as the number and composition of the troops opposing him in Alexandria, but he also notes that they were brought to the city secretly from Pelusium⁹⁴. These were the soldiers led to Egypt by Aulus Gabinus in 55 BCE to restore Ptolemy Auletes to his throne. They had been left there to guarantee that same king's position and had remained ever since. Caesar describes them as veterans of numerous wars at Alexandria⁹⁵. It is clear that Pothinus, Achillas, and Theodotus enjoyed the military support of these so-called Gabinians against the queen at Pelusium, and, if they were on hand to block Cleopatra's attempt to return to power, we may infer that they had had a role in her removal⁹⁶. How and when her enemies succeeded in winning such soldiers over to their side must be considered.

One particular act from the early part of Cleopatra's reign requires discussion. Grant views it as an event of transitional importance, and indeed it seems to have been so, although perhaps not for the reasons or in the timeframe he gives. In the early summer of 50 BCE the newly appointed governor of Syria, M. Calpurnius Bibulus, sent two of his sons to Egypt to negotiate for the Roman troops stationed there. He desired their assistance in a campaign against the Parthians. In response to the attempted levy, the Gabinians killed the sons of Bibulus. Cleopatra arrested the men presumed responsible for the murders and sent them to Bibulus in

⁹⁴ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 108, 110.

⁹⁵ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 110.

⁹⁶ H. HEINEN (n. 5), p. 47, likewise points out that the presence of these troops on the side of Ptolemy XIII and assumes that they had provided the armed force behind Cleopatra's expulsion.

chains⁹⁷. Several scholars agree that Cleopatra precipitated a crisis by her response to the incident. Grant believes that the queen took thereby a «grave risk», not only that the whole Gabinian army might rise in revolt, but that they might be joined by those Alexandrians who had been hostile to Auletes' Roman policy. He traces the queen's supposed inability to withstand pressure to include her brother in her rule to this event, saying she was «shaken by the national crisis caused by her handing over of the murderers of Bibulus' sons.»⁹⁸ Green agrees that Cleopatra caused offense by her handling of the situation and that her presumption in acting «on her own initiative» aroused opposition⁹⁹. Hughes-Hallett likewise assumes that the queen's actions alienated her subjects, provoking the particular enmity of Pothinus, and links the incident directly to Cleopatra's removal¹⁰⁰.

On examination it is difficult to speak of anything so serious as a 'national crisis' at this juncture. On the contrary, one might argue that Cleopatra's response forestalled a crisis. The murders had all the makings of an international incident. A Roman proconsul had sent his sons to make a request for Roman troops. Those sons, sent in the official capacity of messengers of that request, were murdered in Egypt. If Cleopatra had done nothing, Bibulus might have threatened Roman-backed reprisals. Had she challenged or implicated all the Gabinian soldiers she might indeed have faced a troop uprising at home. Her actual response seems ideally suited to avoid pitfalls. She singled out a few individuals, sparing the legionaries generally while making quite a show of condemning the murders and their perpetrators — she theatrically sent the guilty all the way to Bibulus in chains. It was a calculated risk, but a controlled one, and the risks of doing nothing were certainly more serious.

It need not be supposed that her discipline of the few roused the prompt and universal anger of the troops. Their opposition to her policy was not so overwhelming that she found her efforts to arrest some of them blocked. There is no evidence that her decision at once resulted in a crisis that undermined her authority. It was a demonstration of shrewd diplomacy and underscores the political cunning of the queen.

⁹⁷ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 110; Cic., *Ad Att.* IV 10.1; VI 5.3; *Ad Fam.* II 17.6; *Rab. Post.* 19-21; Strabo XVII 1.11; Livy, *Per.* 108; Val. Max. IV 1.15, 9.1; Joseph., *AJ* XIV 98-100; Plut., *Ant.* III 2-6; App., *Bell. Civ.* II 24; Dio XXXIX 55-58; XLII 2.4.

⁹⁸ M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 49, 50.

⁹⁹ P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664.

¹⁰⁰ L. HUGHES-HALLETT (n. 87), p. 17.

While Cleopatra's management of the incident involving the sons of Bibulus was designed to diffuse tensions and generated no immediate revolt against her, there is reason to argue that therewith the seed was planted for an animosity against Cleopatra that would serve her enemies well. Ambitious government officers may eventually have seized it as an opening for fomenting worry about and sentiment against the queen among the members of the Roman garrison. It is quite certain the Gabinians had not wanted to be given over to active military duty with the Syrian governor against the Parthians. After all, the murder of Bibulus' sons seems to have been in direct response to their efforts to draft into service at least some part of the Gabinians. Cleopatra's enemies could, at their later convenience, showcase her willingness to punish some of the soldiers and represent this to them as proof that she was willing to sacrifice them if necessary. Other occasions for the queen's enemies to misinterpret her conduct to the Gabinians also presented themselves.

In 49 BCE, it must be recalled, Gnaeus Pompey was likewise levying troops from among the Gabinians at Alexandria. With Cleopatra's approval, he apparently requisitioned five hundred soldiers and approximately fifty to sixty ships¹⁰¹. A full year after Bibulus' attempt to recruit members of the Roman garrison from Egypt, Pompey's agents were recruiting again in that same field and from among the same men — this time successfully and with the support of the queen. Perhaps Pothinus, Achilles, and Theodotus (or some of their spokesmen) suggested to the troops that still more were at risk of being drafted into service. The soldiers had witnessed the arrest of their associates after the Bibulus affair and now the departure of others at Pompey's behest: they could not depend upon Cleopatra, daughter of the man they had been sent to restore and protect, to protect them from the levies. Their now established lifestyle was threatened¹⁰².

¹⁰¹ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 4; App., *Bell. Civ.* II 49, 71. A. BOUCHÉ-LECLERCQ (n. 37), II, p.183-184, emphasizes the ships, mentioned by Appian, that were given over to the «arrogant and hateful Romans,» specifically to Pompey, before Pharsalus. He suggests that *popular* displeasure was turned against Cleopatra on this account, and describes this displeasure as the cause of her expulsion.

¹⁰² D.E.E. KLEINER (n. 5), p. 78, acknowledges the significance of Cleopatra's contributions to Pompey, but she, like Bouché-Leclercq, goes further than would I, claiming that the queen's actions «weakened [her] support among her people» and that the incident created «an opportunity for Ptolemy and Arsinoë to mount an insurrection.» «This uprising,» she says, «was severe enough to cause Cleopatra to flee Alexandria.» While the aid sent to Pompey seems to have indeed been a catalyst, it is, I believe, necessary to look at the concerns of the Gabinians specifically — their presence in the forces ranged against

Indeed, Caesar emphasizes how firmly settled these veterans were in Egypt and how loath to have their comfortable lives disrupted. Referring to the Gabinians among Achilles' forces, he says: *Haec constabant ex Gabinianis militibus, qui iam in consuetudinem Alexandrinae vitae ac licentiae venerant et nomen disciplinamque populi Romani dedidicerant uxoresque duxerant, ex quibus plerique liberos habebant*¹⁰³. These men would not relish the prospect of resuming strict military lives. Even setting aside the moralizing tone and the point that they had grown lax and unaccustomed to discipline, many Gabinians had personal reasons to oppose any threat — real or imagined — of resumed campaigning under a Roman commander. They had been in Alexandria long enough to marry and have children. They had made lives for themselves in Egypt and would do their utmost to preserve them.

We find another indication of the Gabinians' unwillingness to be reassigned outside of Egypt in their behavior at Pelusium. Defeated at Pharsalus, Pompey came to Egypt in fall of 48 seeking safe haven and, presumably, aid in his fight against Caesar. Indeed, we read that Pompey's envoys to the Egyptian king started to talk too freely with the king's soldiers after giving their assigned message, and to urge them to help their commander. Those forces brought by Gabinius from Syria to Alexandria had, after all, once been Pompey's own troops. But Caesar tells us that one of their number, the military tribune Lucius Septimus, assisted Achilles in the actual assassination of Pompey¹⁰⁴. Since the envoys had been urging the Gabinians *ut suum officium Pompeio praestarent*¹⁰⁵, it seems likely that Lucius Septimus agreed to the murder, in part, to avoid another levy by that Roman general.

The Gabinian attitude to possible levies seems clear, but this attitude alone fails to explain how Cleopatra's enemies succeeded in convincing the Gabinians that Cleopatra's rule posed a threat to them while that of Ptolemy XIII would not. After all, this was a Roman garrison, and a Roman commander representing the Roman state could, we must assume, legally requisition these troops. How could Ptolemy XIII protect them any more than Cleopatra? We may derive a hint from Lucan. According

the queen at Pelusium is confirmed in the ancient sources, and reasons for their particular hostility to Cleopatra can be imagined, while there is no strong case for *popular* hostility to her.

¹⁰³ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 110.

¹⁰⁴ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 104.

¹⁰⁵ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 103.

to his poetic account, Pompey and the senate-in-exile at Thessalonica recognized Ptolemy XIII as the legitimate ruler of Egypt; Cleopatra apparently had no part in the exchange¹⁰⁶. While this does not amount to Cleopatra's deposition, it may have provided her enemies with at least the appearance of the Roman sanction Ptolemy and his advisors wanted in order to win over the Gabinians. Unlike Cleopatra, who was excluded from the settlement, Ptolemy now enjoyed the official backing of the powerful Pompey and the Senate of Rome. Possibly the recognition included the award of the title of 'friend and ally of the Roman people', which Ptolemy's father had won at so great cost. This new legitimacy, the king's advisors might have argued, would give the young king rights with Pompey and with the Senate that the queen did not enjoy. One can imagine Cleopatra's enemies representing the matter to the Gabinians: the king has official standing and influence with Pompey and can preserve you from reassignment to military duty outside of Egypt; Cleopatra — witness Gnaeus Pompey's levies of a few months earlier — can not. Thus they would have persuaded the Gabinians to support Ptolemy XIII and remove Cleopatra¹⁰⁷.

Having considered how a few, albeit influential, individuals excluded an apparently popular queen from the throne, we must locate the event in a correct timeframe. Those who support the traditional chronological limits for Cleopatra's expulsion assume that the queen had descended to a dangerously inferior and unpopular position within the first year and a half of her reign. The ancient sources fail to support this assumption. The scant evidence we have regarding the date of Cleopatra's expulsion from Alexandria and Egypt suggests a date later than that typically assumed, although no later than September of 48 BCE¹⁰⁸.

Given March of 51 as the *terminus ante quem* for her reign¹⁰⁹, Grant theorizes that Cleopatra was driven out of Alexandria as early as October of 50 BCE, and that she was then officially deprived of the throne

¹⁰⁶ Lucan V 58-64. See below for quotation and full discussion of Lucan's text.

¹⁰⁷ If, as seems likely, the king's advisors discussed money as well, the soldiers will have looked forward to remuneration for their services. But money alone seems an inadequate explanation for the Gabinian role in Cleopatra's removal, since Cleopatra herself could also offer material rewards.

¹⁰⁸ Cleopatra was certainly beyond the borders of the Ptolemaic kingdom organizing her attempted return against the opposition of her brother, Ptolemy XIII, and his forces when Pompey arrived in Egypt in September of 48 BCE. See Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 103, 107; App., *Bell. Civ.* II 84.

¹⁰⁹ See discussion of the installation of the Buchis bull above.

between June and September of 49 BCE¹¹⁰. Other scholars have allowed for a somewhat later date for Cleopatra's flight from the capital, but agree that she had been excluded from power by the fall of 49¹¹¹.

The above-mentioned royal decree dated to October of 50 BCE is cited to make the case that Cleopatra was losing influence and had departed the capital by that time¹¹². As the edict restricts the conveyance of grain to the low country and upper Egypt, while allowing it to be sent to Alexandria, some scholars argue that this decree points to a split between Cleopatra and her brother Ptolemy and that it was intended to divert supplies from the queen, presuming that she had been driven out of Alexandria by the time the decree was issued and that the Delta and Thebaid were under the control of, or threatened by, her faction¹¹³.

The text allows, however, for alternative readings. First of all, there is disagreement about the date of the decree itself — it is not unanimously attributed to Cleopatra's reign. Bloedow presents it as evidence for a crisis early in the reign of Ptolemy XII Auletes and places it in the year 79/8 BCE¹¹⁴. Even allowing the document to come from the joint reign of Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy XIII, the decree does not constitute proof of a decisive rupture between the royal siblings. The decree is issued in the name of both king and queen. Cleopatra is still officially recognized as co-ruler, and, while the queen is named second, she is not eliminated from the declarative formula¹¹⁵. The year for the decree is 'year 3', which refers presumably to both king and queen, with no distinctive dating formula being adopted for each sibling. This demonstrates rather more harmony than one finds in other papyri¹¹⁶. Nowhere in the decree is Cleopatra stigmatized, nor even mentioned outside the introductory reference.

¹¹⁰ M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 51-52. P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664, follows Grant.

¹¹¹ H. HEINEN (n. 5), p. 32; L. CRISCUOLO (n. 6), p. 328; G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 232; M. CHAUVEAU (n. 6), p. 18. W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 709, represents Cleopatra's brother as sole ruler by October of 49. But compare A. MEADOWS (n. 3), p. 24.

¹¹² BGU 1730.

¹¹³ M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 53. Cf. M. CHAUVEAU (n. 6), p. 17; G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 231; H. HEINEN (n. 5), p. 28 n. 1; P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664. Cf. also T.C. SKEAT (n. 11), 103-104.

¹¹⁴ E. BLOEDOW (n. 8), p. 22-23.

¹¹⁵ M. CHAUVEAU (n. 6), p. 17, sees this papyrus as an indication that Cleopatra «ranked second» at this point, but had not yet been driven from the country.

¹¹⁶ See, for example, *P. Berol.* 16277 and *P. London* 827, each of which uses a dual royal dating formula, referring to both the 'first year' (presumably that of Ptolemy XIII) and the 'third year' (that of Cleopatra).

How are we to understand the decree if it does not allude to a threat from Cleopatra and her faction outside of Alexandria? The simplest explanation is also the best. It is generally acknowledged that Egypt at the time of the decree was suffering from severe drought and the concomitant inadequacy of Nile floods. Bad harvests and the fear of famine were real¹¹⁷. Several papyri from this period underscore the stresses created by a natural disaster: orders from the *dioiketes* regarding the grain from the Heracleopolite nome have a certain urgency; priests from Hierakonpolis complain of the departure of much of the local population and its effect on the cult there; the desertion of the town of Tinteris in 50 or 49 is attributed to a severe water shortage¹¹⁸. And, as Thompson notes, «Pliny's notice of the lowest flood ever in the year of Pharsalus suggests ... the culmination of a flood failure lasting over at least three years.»¹¹⁹ It is reasonable to assume that the directive of October 50 was designed to avoid famine in Alexandria and thus forestall the riots that were common enough in the capital city at times of crisis.

There is, moreover, documentary evidence of Cleopatra's acknowledged sovereignty in 50. An inscription from Medinet Habu, dates to «Year 3, the 28th of Hathyr of Queen Cleopatra and King Ptolemy,» indicating that Cleopatra was still publicly recognized as queen in 50 BCE¹²⁰. Thissen identifies the month as Hathor, which, if accurate, informs us that that public recognition extended at least to the beginning of December of 50 BCE.

Other texts confirm the security of Cleopatra's royal title in the regnal year that ran from September 50 to September 49 BCE. In *P. Lond.* 827, dated to June 49, one still finds a dual dating formula, indicating that any rupture between Cleopatra and Ptolemy XIII cannot have been official by that time¹²¹.

An inscribed stele from the Serapeum, which dates from «the third year of King Ptolemy,» speaks of the construction of a burial vault for the Apis bull, although the bull was apparently not yet dead, for the inscription also refers to «a priest of the living Apis of the cow

¹¹⁷ See D. THOMPSON, *CAH* IX², p. 323, for discussion and references. Cf. M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 49, P. GREEN (n. 3), p. 664; G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 231; M. CHAUVÉAU (n. 6), p. 23.

¹¹⁸ See *BGU* 1760, datable to May 50 BCE; *BGU* 1835, datable to 51-50 BCE; *BGU* 1835, datable to 51-50 BCE; *BGU* 1842; cited by D. THOMPSON, *CAH* IX², p. 323.

¹¹⁹ D. THOMPSON, *CAH* IX², p. 323; cf. Pliny, *NH* V 58.

¹²⁰ H.J. THISSEN, *Die demotischen Graffiti von Medinet Habu: Zeugnisse zu Tempel und Kult im ptolemäischen Ägypten*, Sommerhausen 1989, no. 45, p. 30-32.

¹²¹ H. HEINEN (n. 5), p. 32.

Ta-nt-Bastet.»¹²² The king's name appears alone in this stele, and it has been read as proof of Cleopatra's removal within year 3 of Ptolemy XIII, in other words, before September of 49¹²³, but to read the text thus is to fail to consider another stele from the same site and the same year. The Harmachis stele, which has already been mentioned, must have closely followed the one which chronicles the construction of the burial vault. It records the mourning for the bull from the cow Ta-nt-Bastet and is likewise dated to year three. The latter stele, however, is proof of the continued official presence of the queen, for it celebrates Cleopatra's personal provisions for this bull. The inscription records the queen's generous monetary and other material offerings for the worship and the mourning ceremony¹²⁴. Cleopatra obviously assumed a formal role in the rituals for the Apis bull that died in that year, and it is difficult to imagine the queen performing such duties if her authority had waned sufficiently for her to have been driven from throne and country. As these texts cannot be dated more narrowly than 'year three', it remains uncertain whether Cleopatra made the monetary provisions for the Apis bull in late 50 or in 49, and, while the Harmachis stele clearly disputes any claim of the queen's loss of power as early as 50, it cannot securely guarantee her sovereignty in 49. We must look elsewhere for evidence of that.

Papyri from early 49 BCE do verify that Cleopatra was still acknowledged queen at that time. Two Demotic contracts, dated to March 15 of 49, refer to «King Ptolemy and Queen Cleopatra, the gods who love their father» as the rulers¹²⁵.

There is even an inscription from Medinet Habu dated to «Year 5 on the 14th of Thoth of King Ptolemy and Queen Cleopatra, the gods who love their fathers.»¹²⁶ If, as Chauveau suggests, this refers to Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy XIII, it confirms that Cleopatra was, at least on one occasion, still designated queen alongside her brother as late as 24 September

¹²² H. BRÜGSCH, *Der Apis-Kreis aus den Zeiten der Ptolemäer*, ZÄS 24 (1886), p. 38, no. 54 = Mariette no 3376.

¹²³ H. HEINEN (n. 5), p. 32, and M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 52. According to Samuel's chronology, year three extends from September 50 to September 49 BCE. For the sole name, see H. BRÜGSCH, *loc. cit.*

¹²⁴ The queen herself is said to have contributed 412 silver coins for the establishment of a table of offerings; she also paid for daily allowances of milk, wine, and loaves, as well as for grain, beans, oils, and meat. See E. REVILLOUT (n. 80), p. 133, Louvre stele 24. See D.J. THOMPSON (n. 76), p. 24.

¹²⁵ *P. Cairo Dem.* 30616 a and b. See M. CHAUVEAU (n. 6), p. 17.

¹²⁶ H.J. THISSEN (n. 120), p. 18-21, 182.

48 BCE¹²⁷. It is difficult to imagine Cleopatra still being identified as queen at this late date, if she had, in fact, been driven from power as early as 50, or even 49 BCE. If her expulsion was of more recent date, the identification, or possible misidentification, of the queen is perfectly comprehensible.

In addition to the documentary evidence, the histories are likewise clear that Cleopatra remained in a position of authority at least as late as the spring/summer of 49. It was at that time that Pompey was levying his forces in the east and sent his son Gnaeus Pompey to Egypt for reinforcements. As already noted, the son successfully obtained the 500 men from among the troops of Gabinius at Alexandria and fifty or sixty ships, over which he himself had command in the conflict that followed between his father and Caesar¹²⁸. When enumerating the forces of the eastern nations that aided Pompey, Appian remarks that sixty ships were contributed by Cleopatra and her brother, who «was still a boy», naming the queen first and emphasizing Ptolemy's youth¹²⁹. This supposes that Cleopatra was still acting as co-ruler when Pompey was amassing his forces. Plutarch hints that Cleopatra may have seduced, or at the least flirted with, the younger Pompey during his visit¹³⁰. The very little historiographical testimony that survives for Gnaeus' visit to Egypt suggests that he negotiated primarily with Cleopatra. Whether she was the chief Ptolemaic figure in the exchange or not, she is clearly described as part of the process and must have been acting in her official capacity as queen in 49.

¹²⁷ In spite of his identification of the 'Queen Cleopatra' of this inscription as Cleopatra VII, M. CHAUVEAU (n. 6), p. 23, believes that Cleopatra had fled from Alexandria well before this time and interprets the inscription only as evidence of a prevailing confusion. It should be noted that H.J. THISSEN (n. 120), p. 21, reads it as year 5 of Ptolemy XII and Cleopatra V Tryphaena.

¹²⁸ *Caes., Bell. Civ.* III 4.4; III 5.3; III 40; III 111; *App., Bell. Civ.* II 49, 71. Among others, G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 232, places Gnaeus Pompey's arrival in Alexandria in the spring/summer of 49.

¹²⁹ *App., Bell. Civ.* II 71. M. CHAUVEAU (n. 6), p. 17, says, «Despite Appian's assertion regarding Cleopatra's preeminence, this agreement was apparently concluded in the name of young Ptolemy XIII, with his sister's name placed second.» But the sources he cites, Appian and Plutarch, give no indication that this was so. He is presumably reasoning back from the senate-in-exile's decree in fall of 49, which, according to M. CHAUVEAU (n. 6), p. 18, «officially bestowed the title 'friend and ally of the Roman people' on Ptolemy XIII in return for his assistance» and «made no mention of Cleopatra.» More will be said of this decree below.

¹³⁰ *Plut., Ant.* 25; *Pomp.* 62.2.

Nevertheless, some maintain that Cleopatra's loss of official standing must have occurred by October of 49¹³¹. By then Pompey and the senate-in-exile were resident in Thessalonica, where they apparently recognized Ptolemy XIII as the legitimate ruler of Egypt¹³². Lucan's account explicitly excludes Cleopatra from the settlement, for he tells us that thereby *regnumque sorori ereptum est*¹³³. This would seem to constitute firm evidence that Ptolemy XIII and his supporters had by this time fully realized the elimination of Cleopatra from royal power. Lucan's poem, however, does not assure this interpretation. A poetic chronicle like Lucan's is hardly a reliable source for precise chronology. Even if it were, an alternative reading of it is possible. It may be that Ptolemy XIII and his advisors sought recognition from Pompey precisely because at that stage the young king was overshadowed by his sister. Pompey had been entrusted with one copy of Auletes' will, naming both Cleopatra and her brother as heirs of the kingdom, and he could conceivably be persuaded to guarantee the son's position as he had the father's¹³⁴. Pompey's backing, they hoped, would give them the authority to undermine, or at least weaken, Cleopatra's position. As for Lucan's claim that the senate-in-exile's settlement snatched the kingdom from Cleopatra, it need not mean that she lost her position in that moment. Lucan also tells us that the senate's recognition of Ptolemy snatched from Caesar the chance to murder his son-in-law: *regnumque sorori ereptum est soceroque nefas*¹³⁵. Caesar did not lose the power to dispose of Pompey in that instant. Instead, the context for Pompey's death in Ptolemaic Egypt was created. Because of the debt owed to him by this exchange with Ptolemy XIII, Pompey would eventually flee to Egypt. There he would lose his life, and Caesar the power to take that life himself. But that was almost a year in the future. Lucan's decidedly telescoped description likewise suggests that the acknowledgement of Ptolemy's royalty set the stage for, but did not simultaneously accomplish, Cleopatra's loss of power. The senate's settlement may well mark the beginning of her enemies' success rather than the end of their efforts.

¹³¹ H. HEINEN (n. 5), p. 32; G. HÖLBL (n. 3), p. 232; W. HUSS (n. 3), p. 709; M. CHAUVÉAU (n. 6), p. 18.

¹³² Lucan V 58-64.

¹³³ Lucan V 64.

¹³⁴ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 108.4-6; *Bell. Alex.* 33; Cic., *Ad Att.* IV 10.1; *Pro Rab. Post.* 19-21, 30-31; *In Pison.* 48-50; Strabo XVII 1.11; Livy, *Per.* 195; Val. Max. IX 1; Joseph., *AJ* XIV 98-100; Plut., *Ant.* 3; Dio XXXIX 55-58.

¹³⁵ Lucan V 64.

The traditional dates assigned to Cleopatra's loss of the throne contradict, moreover, every literary source in which a close to precise date for the event is given. Caesar, who is the most specific on this point, indicates that Cleopatra had been driven out just a few months before Pompey's September arrival at Pelusium in 48 BCE: *Ibi casu rex erat Ptolemaeus, puer aetate, magnis copiis cum sorore Cleopatra bellum gerens, quam paucis ante mensibus per suos propinquos atque amicos regno expulerat*¹³⁶. This would locate her removal sometime in the spring of 48¹³⁷.

Appian, like Caesar, suggests that Cleopatra's expulsion from Egypt only shortly preceded Pompey's arrival there: 'Ο [Pompey] μὲν δὴ διὰ τὰδε ἐς τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἔπλει. ἄρτι δ' ἐκπεσοῦσης ἀπ' Αἰγύπτου Κλεοπάτρας, ἥ τῷ ἀδελφῷ συνῆρχε...¹³⁸. The adverb ἄρτι clearly must be read in relationship to Pompey — Cleopatra had 'recently' been expelled relative to Pompey's arrival in Egypt.

Livy gives no specific date, but does place Cleopatra's departure in the summary of other events from 48 BCE¹³⁹.

Plutarch and Strabo give only relative hints — the queen had been driven out by the time Caesar came to Egypt in pursuit of Pompey¹⁴⁰.

What proof we have strongly suggests that Cleopatra was not driven from power in Egypt until spring of 48. There is no convincing reason to accept an earlier timeframe, no proof of Cleopatra's removal or of insurmountable opposition to her within Egypt before that date.

¹³⁶ Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 103. For Pompey's arrival and death, see Plut., *Pomp.* 74-80, *Caes.* 48; Caes., *Bell. Civ.* III 102-104; App., *Bell. Civ.* II 83-86; Dio XLII 2-5; Flor. II 13.51-52; Vell. Pat. II 53.1-4.

¹³⁷ M. GRANT (n. 3), p. 52-53, tries to get around Caesar's assertion by saying that Caesar himself provides an explanation when he tells us that Cleopatra was «no longer in Upper Egypt but away on the far side of the eastern borders of the country.» Caesar, however, does not specify where Cleopatra is *not*, but simply where she *is* at the time of Pompey's arrival. Nowhere does he suggest that she has come to Pelusium after having spent time in Upper Egypt. There is no documentation for a stay in Upper Egypt after her expulsion from Alexandria outside the Byzantine writer, John Malalas, *Chronica* 10.279. Had she gone there first, there is no good reason to assume she could not have come to Pelusium from Upper Egypt within the few months mentioned by Caesar.

¹³⁸ App., *Bell. Civ.* II 84.

¹³⁹ Livy, *Per.* 111.

¹⁴⁰ Plut., *Pomp.* 77; *Caes.* 48; Strabo XVII 1.11.

CONCLUSION

The early threats to Cleopatra's rule originated, as we have seen, with a comparatively small group. The ancient sources identify some few individuals by name: Pothinus, Achillas, and Theodotus. These men in turn enlisted the veterans of Gabinus to fight against her, likely promising them freedom from military service outside Egypt in exchange for their assistance in the queen's expulsion. There is no evidence for a general uprising against the queen, either throughout Egypt at large or within Alexandria, and Cleopatra was surely not without support, but the practical reliability of that support and the insecurity of the Ptolemaic throne had been indisputably manifest. When the concentrated opposition of Pothinus, Achillas, and Theodotus, backed by the armed force of the Gabinians, made the capital city unsafe, Cleopatra fled and, as Lucan describes, if not at the time his account implies, *regnumque sorori ereptum est*¹⁴¹.

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¹⁴¹ Lucan V 64.

POLYBIUS II 24: ROMAN MANPOWER AND GREEK PROPAGANDA*

Abstract: In his account of the Gallic wars of the 220s BC Polybius includes a unique survey of troops and men able to bear arms in Italy. Polybius derived these figures from the work of Fabius Pictor. The Gallic digression, culminating in the battle of Telamon, should be seen against the background of contemporary Hellenistic propaganda. Succeeding the Persians, the Galatians served as archetypal enemies of Greece, and victories over these barbarians were exploited by Hellenistic kings to legitimize their rule. Fabius Pictor used the same propagandistic tool to present Rome as the saviour of the civilized world. Greek diplomatic discourse emphasized that only a united Greece could withstand its external enemies. Hence, there was a long tradition among Greek writers to present details on the coalitions that had defeated Persians and Galatians. In Polybius II 24 Italy is presented as united under its hegemon Rome. When including a survey of troops and manpower, Fabius Pictor was following the Greek example. The strength of Italy under Roman leadership is deliberately presented not as that of the aggressor threatening neighbouring states, but as the defender of prosperity and peace in Italy.

1. POLYBIUS II 24

The only detailed evidence for the population of Italy during the mid-republic is found in Polybius' account of the invasion of the Gaesatae in 225 BC. Polybius II 24 offers truly unique figures — we have nothing comparable on the population of Italy (not even in the form of the census figures of the first century BC). However, in my view modern historians discussing Polybius' survey of Italian manpower do usually not pay attention to its purpose and background¹.

Let me first present the passage concerned. Polybius starts with enumerating the various forces, consisting of infantry and cavalry, stationed

* I wish to thank John Rich and Luuk de Ligt for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this article. I am also very grateful to Simon Northwood for improving the English text.

¹ H. BELLEN, *Metus Gallicus – metus Punicus. Zum Furchtmotiv in der römischen Republik*, Mainz 1985, and J.H.C. WILLIAMS, *Beyond the Rubicon. Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy*, Oxford 2001, miss the implications of Fabius Pictor's role as Polybius' source for our interpretation of the Gallic digression. Roman terror of the Gauls is reduced to more plausible proportions by V. ROSENBERGER, *The Gallic disaster*, CW 96 (2003), p. 365-373.

in and around Italy. Then he gives manpower figures for the Romans, Campanians and southern allies.

The lists of men capable of bearing arms that were supplied to the authorities read as follows. Latins, 80,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry; Samnites, 70,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry; Iapygians and Messapians, 50,000 infantry and 16,000 cavalry; Lucanians, 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry; Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani and Vestini, 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. In Sicily and Tarentum there were two reserve legions, each consisting of about 4,200 infantry and 200 cavalry. The total number of Romans and Campanians whose names appeared on the roll amounted to 250,000 infantry and 23,000 cavalry. Thus the number of Romans and their allies able to bear arms totalled more than 700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry (Polybius II 24.10-16).

Polybius' main source on the Gallic wars was Fabius Pictor, a Roman senator and contemporary of the events described, who wrote in Greek and probably even primarily for a Greek audience². It is certain that Polybius derived the above figures from his Roman predecessor, because Orosius and Eutropius quote figures from Fabius Pictor that are very close to those of Polybius³. The manpower figures of Rome and its Italian allies, as preserved by Polybius, are unique, and not repeated in the extant historiography on ancient Rome. We are therefore justified in asking why Fabius Pictor included such a survey and, in particular, why he did so on this occasion. The availability of the figures is no answer, since they were surely available on many other occasions.

The purpose of the present article is to show that, even though Polybius did not slavishly follow his Roman predecessor, Pictor's involvement is crucial for our understanding of the purpose and background of

² Thus M. GELZER, *Römische Politik bei Fabius Pictor* (orig. 1933), in: *Kleine Schriften*, vol. III, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 51. The idea that Pictor wrote in Greek because Latin was inadequate as a literary language is contradicted by the fact that Livius Andronicus and Naevius wrote in Latin at the time. On Pictor's audience, see S. NORTHWOOD, *Quintus Fabius Pictor. Was he an Annalist?*, in: N.V. SEKUNDA, *Corolla Cosmo Rodenwald*, 2007. On Fabius Pictor as Polybius' main source on the Gallic wars: H. BELLEN (n. 1), p. 11; A.M. ECKSTEIN, *Senate and General. Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 BC*, Berkeley 1987, p. 4. P. BRUNT, *Italian Manpower*, Oxford 1971, p. 185, points out that Pictor must have been Polybius' source on various figures concerning Gallic strength, casualties, captives etc. Officer in 225 BC: Eutropius, *Brev.* 3.5; Orosius IV 13.6. Also Pliny, *H.N.* X 71. G.P. VERBRUGGHE, *Three Notes on Fabius Pictor and his History*, in *Miscellanea di studi classici in onore di Eugenio Manni*. Vol. 6, Rome 1980, p. 2161, 2163.

³ Eutr. 3.5 (F19b Peter; *FRH* 30a); Oros. IV 13.6-7 (F 23 Peter; *FRH* 30b).

Polybius' 'catalogue of forces', which was not part of a dry, matter-of-fact account of war, but closely fitted a contemporary propagandistic context. The digression reflects contemporary propaganda, in which we may distinguish the contemporary ideal of a Greece united in the face of outside powers and Fabius Pictor's attempt to liken Rome to the Hellenistic monarchies.

2. THE GAULS: ARCH-ENEMIES OF ROME

The Gallic invasion is treated in the first half of Polybius' book II, the second half being concerned with Greek affairs. I have argued elsewhere that the account of the Gallic invasion is deliberately distorted when claiming that the Gallic threat dominated Roman policy for years and hampered Rome from making an adequate response to the expansion of Punic power in Spain. In fact, the Gallic invasion came as a surprise to Rome at a most inopportune moment. Rome had started a more aggressive policy towards Carthage, but in 225 BC had to take a step back when confronted with this unexpected enemy. The result was the Ebro treaty (which therefore has to be dated to 225 BC, probably at some time before the battle of Telamon)⁴.

The digression on the Gauls culminates in the invasion of 225 BC and it is stressed that the alliance facing Rome in this year was a formidable one. The two largest Cisalpine tribes, Polybius (II 22.1-2) writes, united themselves with the Gauls «who are called Gaesatae because they serve for hire, this being the proper meaning of the word».

[Their kings] became so eager for the expedition that on no occasion has that district of Gaul sent out so large a force or one composed of men so distinguished or so warlike. (Polybius II 22.6)

The Gauls are depicted as fierce and experienced warriors, but also as typical barbarians, lacking in stamina, discipline, and planning ability. It was these typically Roman virtues that in the end gave Rome the upper hand in the struggle with the Gauls⁵.

Polybius emphasizes that Transalpine Gauls had invaded northern Italy on previous occasions and that Rome had every reason to be aware of the

⁴ P. ERDKAMP, *Polybius, the Ebro Treaty and the Gallic Invasion of 225 BC*, CPh (forthcoming).

⁵ E.g. C.B. CHAMPION, *Polybian Demagogues in Political Context*, HSPh 102 (2004), p. 114ff.

threat of war in the north. His account of the wars of 225-222 BC is preceded by a brief history of the Gallic occupation of the Po plain and their wars with neighbours and with Rome (from II 17 onwards). In 237 BC Rome was alarmed when Alpine Gauls arrived in the territory of the Boii. However, fighting broke out between the newcomers and the Boii and thus the invasion came to naught. The plans for a common invasion of Italy were revived when in 232 BC the Romans decided to distribute land amongst their citizens that had been taken from the Senones some fifty years earlier. Polybius alleges that Flaminius' measure convinced the neighbouring Insubres and Boii that Rome intended the extermination of all Gauls (II 21.9). The Cisalpine peoples concluded an alliance and again sent envoys to the northern Gauls to invite them to make war on Rome. Polybius stresses that the thought of masses of warlike Gauls streaming across the Alps struck absolute terror into the hearts of Romans and allies alike. The image that Polybius conveys is one of a prolonged threat of war, terror in Italy, and frantic preparation. When the Gaesatae finally crossed the Alps, Rome and its allies prepared themselves for war on an unprecedented scale:

All their subjects in general were commanded to supply lists of men able to bear arms, as they wished to know what their total forces amounted to. Of corn, missiles and other war material they had laid in such a supply as no one could remember to have been collected on any previous occasion. (II 23.9-10)

The survey of Italian manpower, Polybius (II 24.10) informs us, is based on the lists of available military manpower that Rome demanded from its allies on this occasion.

There is little to support Polybius' claim that the Gaesatae required an invitation to invade Italy in 225 BC. What he in the end describes is a looting expedition rather than a full-blown war against Rome. In fact Polybius' account of the war cannot hide the reality that the actual threat to Rome and Italy was grossly exaggerated. Similar doubts have been expressed about Hannibal's alleged alliances with the Gauls in southern France, the Alps and in Cisalpine Gaul in 218 BC. In fact Hannibal could not count on Gallic assistance, and often had to use force against them⁶. Polybius consistently, but at times falsely, draws a picture of nearly all Gauls united in animosity towards Rome⁷. The overall image of a grand

⁶ P. BENDER, *Rom, Karthago und die Kelten*, *Klio* 79 (1997), p. 98ff.

⁷ The only important exception are the Cenomani, who joined Rome in 225 BC. Note that the Veneti, who joined the alliance at the same time, were not Gauls.

alliance of Transalpine and Cisalpine Gauls united in hostility towards Rome should be rejected. It serves to strengthen the impression (which is not necessarily totally wrong) of the Gauls as the natural enemies of Rome, ready to stream across the Alps and invade the prosperity of Italy.

3. THE GALATIANS AND GREECE

The natural animosity between Rome and the Gauls must have been appreciated by the Greeks, and we need to keep in mind that both Fabius Pictor and Polybius primarily wrote for a Greek audience⁸. It had not been so long ago that Greece itself had been ravaged by Gallic invaders: in the winter of 280/279 BC Celtic peoples from the northern Balkans, later called Galatians, exploited the deaths of Lysimachos and Seleukos, and invaded Macedon, where they wiped out a Macedonian army. In 279 BC the Greeks failed to halt the enemy at Thermopylae, and a party of the invaders under the command of Brennus took the Thessalian town of Kallion, the population of which was massacred. A Greek coalition, consisting mainly of Aetolians and Phocians, defeated part of the Galatae, who had attacked Delphi under their leader Brennus⁹. The rest crossed the Bosphorus and eventually settled in central Anatolia. The Greeks in the coastal cities were terrified of their new neighbours. Their savagery and cruelty, and their threat to prosperity and civilization were stressed in contemporary inscriptions and literary writings. The Greek writers loved to stress the barbaric nature of these warriors, who butchered men, women, and children, who raped every woman and girl, «who mated with the dying, mated with the already dead»¹⁰. Scholars have recently pointed out that the Galatians in the third century BC replaced the Persians as the model of the barbarian¹¹. Before long, the Galatians served as

⁸ Polybius was well aware that Romans would read his work (VI 11.3; XXI 22.8ff), but his main aim was to teach male upper class Greeks how to deal with Rome (in particular I 3.7ff).

⁹ K. STROBEL, *Keltensieg und Galatersieger. Die Funktionalisierung eines historischen Phänomens als politischer Mythos der hellenistischen Welt*, in E. SCHWERTHEIM (ed.), *Forschungen in Galatien*, Bonn 1994, p. 72ff; J.B. SCHOLTEN, *The Politics of Plunder. Aitolians and their Koinon in the Early Hellenistic Era, 279-217 BC*, Berkeley 2000, p. 31ff. On Greek attitudes towards barbarians, C.B. CHAMPION, *Cultural Politics in Polybius' Histories*, Berkeley 2004, p. 30ff.

¹⁰ Pausanias X 22.2.

¹¹ K. STROBEL (n. 9), esp. p. 82f.

mercenaries in the armies of every Hellenistic state. However, the Antigonids, Seleukids, and Ptolemies preferred to celebrate the victories they won over the Galatians, not the victories they won with their assistance. Stephen Mitchell writes: «Without exception the major Hellenistic monarchies used their own Galatian victories to argue that they had saved the Greeks from the new barbarian peril and thus to justify their own right to rule.»¹² Especially the Attalids in Pergamon¹³, but also the Macedonian kings made good use of this propagandistic tool.

4. THE GALATIANS IN THE WORK OF POLYBIUS

A good example of the propagandistic value of victories over the Galatians occurs in the work of Polybius in the speech of the Acarnanian Lyciscus at Sparta in 210 BC. On this occasion, a year after the Aetolian-Roman alliance, ambassadors from Aetolia and Acarnania — the latter supporters of Macedon — each tried to convince Sparta to join their side. Polybius is no friend of the Aetolians, and his anti-Aetolian stance is reflected in the very effective arguments he assigns to their opponent Lyciscus. The Aetolians had accused Alexander and his successors of enslaving Greece, but Lyciscus points out the great service by Alexander and Macedon in delivering the Greeks from their worst enemies (Polybius IX 34.2-3).

You pride yourselves on having resisted the attack of the barbarians on Delphi, and say that the Greeks ought to be grateful to you for this. But if thanks are due to the Aetolians for this single service, how highly should we honour the Macedonians, who for the greater part of their lives never cease from fighting with the barbarians for the sake of the security of Greece. (Polybius IX 35.1-2)

Polybius has Lyciscus even turn the cornerstone of Aetolian propaganda - their victory over the Galatians in 279 BC — against them by pointing out that the invasion as such was the result of a temporary weakness of Macedon (IX 35.4).

¹² S. MITCHELL, *The Galatians. Representation and Reality*, in A. ERSKINE (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Oxford 2003, p. 284. Cf. K. STROBEL (n. 9), p. 84ff.

¹³ K. STROBEL (n. 9), p. 86ff: «Seit der Annahme des Königstitels durch Attalos I [...] bildete dieser politischer Mythos einze zentrale Legitimationsbasis der attalidischen Dynastie» (p. 90). Also E. KOSMETATOU, *The Attalids of Pergamon*, in A. ERSKINE (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*, p. 170ff.

Hence Polybius was fully aware of the propagandistic value of the Galatians in Greek diplomacy. Decades of propaganda had ensured that Polybius could not deny or ignore the victory at Delphi, but he is eager to diminish its importance in relation to the greater victories won by other states, in particular Macedon, in their fight against the Gauls. Polybius' speech surely reflects the arguments used at the time¹⁴.

One of the last generals, however, to boast victories over the Galatians was a Roman: Manlius Vulso defeated them in two battles in 189 BC and received crowns from the Greek cities in Asia for having delivered them from fear and from the lawless violence of these tribes¹⁵. In this sense also the Romans were the successors of the Hellenistic powers in the East. After the Romans had eliminated their monarchic competitors, they even became «the benefactors of all people»¹⁶.

Polybius explicitly relates the Roman defeat of the Gauls to the Greek victory in the lines that conclude his account of the Gallic affairs of 225 BC:

It is not only in old times but more than once in my own days that the Greeks have been alarmed by the prospect of a Gallic invasion, and this especially was my motive for giving here an account of these events, summary indeed, but going back to the beginnings. (II 35.9-10)¹⁷

A few lines earlier, Polybius writes about the great purpose that historians serve when writing about such events:

For indeed I consider that the writers who chronicled and handed down to us the story of the Persian invasion of Greece and the attack of the Gauls on Delphi have made no small contribution to the struggle of the Hellenes for their common liberty. (II 35.7)

Hence, Polybius refers here to an element of propaganda of the third and early second centuries BC, the importance of which for the diplomatic

¹⁴ C. CHAMPION, *Polybius, Aetolia and the Gallic Attack on Delphi (279 BC)*, *Historia* 45 (1996), p. 324, concludes: «the mention of the Aetolian repulse of the Gauls before Delphi in 279 (9.35.1) strikes a discordant note with the rest of the speech: the Aetolian service to Greece is implicitly acknowledged». «The historian's integrity is well illustrated here: Lyciscus' concession to Aetolian heroics at Delphi hardly fits well with the Polybian image of Aetolia.» In my view, however, Polybius does not praise the Aetolians. Hence there is no discordant note, nor does he contradict his usual defamation of the Aetolians.

¹⁵ Polybius XXI 40.2. S. MITCHELL (n. 12), p. 289: «This Roman triumph over the Galatians was in fact exploited for propaganda reasons just as surely as the earlier victories of Hellenistic kings had been.» Also J.H.C. WILLIAMS (n. 1), p. 162.

¹⁶ A. ERSKINE, *The Romans as Common Benefactors*, *Historia* 43 (1994), p. 85. Erskine notes that one of the precedents for this phrase relates to Eumenes II, who in 184 BC is called 'saviour and benefactor' of 'all those living in Asia' after a victory over the Galatians (p. 74).

¹⁷ Cf. Polybius II 20.6.

relations between the Greeks and the Hellenistic kingdoms cannot be overrated. The Gallic digression in book II of Polybius' histories should be seen against the background of contemporary Hellenistic propaganda. If the Gauls were the natural enemies of the Greeks, so they were of the Romans! It is to the battle at Delphi that Telamon served as a counterpart, although it needed some manipulation of the facts to make the Gaesatae play the role of the Galatians and the events in Italy in 225 BC comparable to those in Greece in 279 BC. Polybius refers to something that struck a chord in every reader's mind, since the comparison of the Greek victories against the Persians and the Galatians was commonplace in Hellenistic historiography¹⁸.

5. FABIVS PICTOR

There is good reason to assume that Fabius Pictor already made the comparison between Telamon and Delphi and exploited the diplomatic value of a Roman victory over the Gauls. One of the few facts that are known about Fabius Pictor is that he was sent to Delphi in 216 BC. According to Livy, he was sent there to ask the oracle what actions Rome should take in order to propitiate the Gods, and to inquire when the hardships of the Romans would end¹⁹. It is likely, however, that Fabius Pictor's voyage was not only concerned with the oracle, but also included a diplomatic mission to find support in Greece²⁰. The Aetolians had controlled the

¹⁸ K. STROBEL (n. 9), p. 77. It may be as a result of Polybius' dislike of the Aetolians and Athenians that he does not identify them as the victors at Marathon or Delphi. Thus, C. CHAMPION (n. 14), p. 327f.

¹⁹ Livy XXII 57.5; XXIII 11.1-6; Plutarch, *Fab.* 18.

²⁰ Some may want to argue that at the time Rome was desperate not to provoke Macedon. However, this is not really an argument against a diplomatic mission in 216 BC to the Aetolians, who were traditional enemies of Macedon. Rome could indeed expect Philip V to join Hannibal (which he did in 215 BC). Polybius says that he ended the Social War in 217 BC precisely to be able to interfere in the West. In case Philip V declared war, Rome desperately needed an ally in Greece. We may also note that this was not the first instance of Roman diplomacy in Greece. In 229 and 228 BC — after the First Illyrian War — Rome sent envoys to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues, and to Corinth and Athens (Polybius II 12). Some of these states were clearly hostile towards Macedon. Cf. M. GELZER (n. 2), p. 54f; G.P. VERBRUGGHE (n. 2), p. 216f. On the Roman-Aetolian treaty, E.S. GRUEN, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*, Berkeley 1984, p. 377f; P. OLIVA, *Die Wolken im Westen. Griechenland und die Ankunft der Römer*, *Gymnasium* 100 (1993), p. 6f; K. SCHOLTEN (n. 9), p. 229ff.

oracle of Delphi since 279 BC, precisely because they had played a major role in defeating the Galatians at the sanctuary. The Aetolians legitimised their position in Delphi with this victory, which they soon started to claim as largely their own²¹. In commemoration of the victory at Delphi, the Aetolians celebrated the annual Amphictionic Soteria. In 246/5 BC they reorganized this celebration and turned it into a grander penteteteric festival²². Various monuments celebrated the Aetolian victory over the barbarous hordes. The Aetolians matched the Athenian dedication of their spoils of Marathon in the northern and eastern halls of the sanctuary by displaying the spoils of the battle of Delphi in the southern and western halls. Hence the link between the repulsion of the Persians and the Galatians was already made by the Aetolians long before Polybius offered it in his epilogue to the Gallic digression (II 35). The Aetolians presented themselves as the saviours of Greece in the third century BC, just as the Athenians had in the fifth. The monuments were even to be seen in the time of Pausanias²³. In short, there was a clear connection between the Aetolians and the Gallic defeat at Delphi, and the Aetolians liked to be reminded of it.

Hence, when Fabius Pictor in his history of Rome, written in Greek and intended primarily for a Greek readership, stressed not only the Gauls' longstanding animosity towards Rome, but also the danger of the invasion of 225 BC and the greatness of the victory at Telamon, he used a propagandistic tool that was common in the Hellenistic world and placed Rome alongside the main powers, including Aetolia, Pergamon, and Macedon, as the saviour of civilisation. The connection between Delphi and the Gauls may have been made quite early at Rome, if it is true that Claudius Marcellus sent a golden bowl to Delphi to commemorate his victory over the Insubres in 222 BC²⁴. By doing so, Marcellus may have claimed a place for Rome amongst the civilized peoples of the Hellenistic world. It is

²¹ C. CHAMPION, *The soteria at Delphi. Aetolian Propaganda in the Epigraphical Record*, *AJPh* 116 (1995), p. 213, 218; K. SCHOLTEN (n. 9), p. 37ff.

²² K. STROBEL (n. 9), p. 76ff; C. CHAMPION (n. 14), p. 317; K. SCHOLTEN (n. 9), p. 99ff; J.H.C. WILLIAMS (n. 1), p. 158ff. Note that an inscription from Delphi, containing Roman complaints against Perseus and dating to 171/0 BC, refers to the Gallic attack of 279 BC. *Syll.*³ 643.

²³ Pausanias X 19.4. C. CHAMPION (n. 14), p. 319f.

²⁴ Plutarch, *Marc.* 8.6. After the battle at the Metaurus spoils were sent to Delphi as a gift, i.e. at the time of the Roman-Aetolian alliance against Macedon (Livy XXIX 10.6). On further Roman visits to Delphi, see J.H.C. WILLIAMS (n. 1), p. 164f. H. BELLEN (n. 1), p. 18f, failed to notice the link between Delphi and the Gauls.

impossible that Fabius Pictor was not aware of contemporary propaganda and of the diplomatic potential of the comparison between Telamon and Delphi²⁵.

Polybius adds a personal note to the epilogue of the Gallic digression, which shows that he did not simply copy his Roman source. Polybius claims to have seen personally the result of Rome's wars against the Gauls: «I have witnessed them not long afterwards entirely expelled from the plain of the Po, except a few regions close under the Alps» (II 35.4). This was probably somewhat of an exaggeration, but it served his purpose to stress the success of Rome in defeating the Gauls and pacifying their northern frontier²⁶. In short, Polybius incorporated Fabius Pictor's piece of Roman propaganda in his own work, because he had no reason to doubt the magnitude of the Gallic threat in 225 BC, and because it agreed with his own ideas.

6. UNITY & FREEDOM

What function did the manpower survey serve in this context? One of the purposes of the survey is clarified in the lines that directly precede it in the account of Polybius:

On every side there was a ready disposition to help in every possible way; for the inhabitants of Italy, terror-struck by the invasion of the Gauls, no longer thought of themselves as the allies of Rome or regarded this war as undertaken to establish Roman supremacy, but every man considered that the peril was descending on himself and his own city and country. So there was great alacrity in obeying orders. (II 23.11-12)

Hence the Gallic invasion shows Italian peoples united under Roman leadership against a common foe, finding strength in unified manpower²⁷. It is unknown whether the Italian sentiments expressed here ultimately derive from Fabius Pictor's account, but it may have been a point of

²⁵ We may also note that Rome had been celebrated by Greek cities after the First Illyrian War for having delivered the Greeks from «the common enemy of all» (Polybius II 12.6).

²⁶ At II 31.8, Polybius says that the victory at Telamon encouraged the Romans in their hope that they would be able entirely to expel the Celts from the plain of the Po.

²⁷ H. BELLEN (n. 1), p. 16, misses the point and merely sees this passage as confirming the *metus Gallicus* amongst Rome's allies.

Roman diplomacy towards Greece to present the 'Italian confederacy' as a blessing for its various peoples, eager to rally round their *hegemon*.

Strength in unity is an idea also expressed in the work of Polybius, for instance in the opening lines of the speech of Agelaus at Naupactus in 217 BC (V 104.1). Agelaus' wish for unity clearly echoes the passage on Italian unification in II 23, including the barbarian invasion. Agelaus' speech is one of the most important speeches in Polybius' work. At the end of book V it signifies the beginning of the *symplokê*: «It was at this time and at this conference that the affairs of Greece, Italy and Africa were first brought into contact.»²⁸ One modern scholar has rightly pointed out: «Agelaus' speech is a vehicle for Polybius' editorial voice, and it highlights two sweeping ideas in his historical vision, the unification of the *oikoumenê* and the crucial role that Philip played in that historical development.»²⁹ One may add a further point. In his speech Agelaus warns against «the dark cloud that looms in the West to settle on Greece». Polybius, of course, had the advantage of hindsight, so when he made Agelaus say that the victor of the struggle in the West — either Carthage or Rome — will turn against Greece, our Greek historian and his readership knew who this victor was.

It may seem odd that Polybius chose an Aetolian as his mouthpiece, the more so as it was the Aetolians that only a few years later would unite with 'the dark cloud in the West', but that is possibly to be explained as underscoring Polybius' anti-Aetolian stance³⁰. In fact, there are three speeches in the extant work of Polybius that contain both an appeal to Greek unity and a reference to Rome as a threat to the freedom of the Greeks. Apart from the speech of Agelaus, the same message is conveyed in Lyciscus' speech at Sparta in 210 BC and in the speech of a neutral

²⁸ Polybius V 105.4. O. MØRKHOLM, *The Speech of Agelaus at Naupactus 217 BC*, *C&M* 28 (1967), p. 240; J. DEININGER, *Bemerkungen zur Historizität der Rede des Agelaos 217 v.Chr. (Polyb. 5,104)*, *Chiron* 3 (1973), p. 103; C. CHAMPION, *The Nature of Authoritative Evidence in Polybius and Agelaus' Speech at Naupactus*, *TAPhA* 127 (1997), p. 111. U. HOFFMANN, *Der Anfang reicht bis zum Ende. Drei Bemerkungen zu Polybios' teleologischer Denkweise*, *Saeculum* 53 (2002), p. 210ff.

²⁹ C. CHAMPION (n. 28), p. 126; see also ID. (n. 14), p. 55ff. The nature of Agelaus' speech is disputed. O. MØRKHOLM (n. 28) and ID., *The Speech of Agelaus Again*, *Chiron* 4 (1974), p. 127-132, argues that the speech is entirely Polybius' own making. His conclusions are supported by C. CHAMPION (n. 28), but disputed by J. DEININGER (n. 28) and P. OLIVA (n. 20), p. 4. E.S. GRUEN (n. 20), p. 324 observes: «the polarity is too stark», arguing that Polybius may have used authentic material to compose his own speech.

³⁰ Cf. M. GELZER (n. 2), p. 53; O. MØRKHOLM (n. 28), p. 252f; J. DEININGER (n. 28), p. 107.

ambassador in 207 BC³¹. As we have seen, Lyciscus' speech was aimed against the Aetolians and tried to persuade the Spartans to join Macedon. In 207 BC an unknown ambassador, presumably a certain Thrasyrates, tries to convince the Aetolians to come to terms with Philip of Macedon on behalf of Greek unity. Ironically, as the latter two speeches emphasize, it is the Aetolians that in later years cause the most harm to Greek liberty by joining the western barbarians against Greeks³². In short, these three speeches have a common theme, which partly reflects Polybius's ideas, partly the political disputes of the time³³.

The idea of 'strength in unity' is also present in Pausanias' digression on the invasion of the Galatae (X 19-23), which is our main source on the events of 279 BC. Pausanias, writing in the second century AD, based his long excursus on the Gallic invasion of 279 on a detailed work of the third century BC³⁴. He uses the Persian and Gallic invasions to show that Greece's greatest feats were accomplished in unity, while disunity led to its later downfall. Although Pausanias uses these examples to make his own point, it is unlikely that they were his own original idea. The invasion of the Persians and the Galatae were cornerstones of Greek identity and propaganda in the third century BC, and it is most likely that Pausanias got the idea from his third-century sources³⁵.

³¹ Polybius IX 32.3-39.7; XI 4.1-6.8. J. DEININGER (n. 28), p. 104, regards these speeches as «einen besonderen Komplex innerhalb des Polybianischen Werkes», whose anti-Roman stance does not reflect Polybian thought. F.W. WALBANK, *Polybius between Greece and Rome*, in *Polybe. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique*, vol. 20, Geneva 1974, p. 3ff, emphasises that it is unlikely that Polybius' views on Rome remained constant. Hence the depiction of Rome as a threat to Greece in the early books is not in conflict with his later pro-Roman views. C. CHAMPION (n. 14), p. 321f, points to "verbal echoes of Polybius' narrative in the speech of Lyciscus". In a later publication [ID., *Romans as Barbaroi. Three Polybian Speeches and the Politics of Cultural Indeterminacy*, CPh 95 (2000), p. 433ff], he argues that Polybius deliberately recorded anti-Roman sentiments in much detail, reflecting his own ideas when he was still a political prisoner in Rome. Cf. O. MØRKHOLM (n. 28), p. 248ff; E.S. GRUEN (n. 20), p. 322ff; P. OLIVA (n. 20), p. 8f.

³² On anti-Roman propaganda in Greece, C. CHAMPION (n. 31), p. 428, 433ff.

³³ E.S. GRUEN (n. 20), p. 324: «The charges suited the speakers' purposes and fitted Polybius' conception.» O. MØRKHOLM (n. 28), p. 131 considers it possible that Polybius used Aetolian anti-Roman propaganda published in political pamphlets. On Polybius' use of written or oral sources for speeches, see Champion (n. 28), p. 113ff.

³⁴ W. AMELING, *Pausanias und die hellenistische Geschichte*, in: *Pausanias' Historien. Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique*, vol. 41, Geneva 1996, p. 135, 150: «Die Quelle des Pausanias [...] ist nah an den Ereignissen, gut informiert, detailliert...». Cf. C. HABICHT, *Pausanias' Guide to Ancient Greece*, Berkeley 1985, p. 86, 97; S. MITCHELL (n. 12), p. 280.

³⁵ W. AMELING (n. 34), p. 142ff, argues that Pausanias' idea of 'Panhellenismus' is an imperial invention. Even if true, that does not show that the idea of unity against foreign

7. FABIVS PICTOR AND ROMAN MANPOWER

Rome's overwhelming power threatening Greece was certainly not the image that Fabius Pictor wanted to convey to his Greek readers when he included manpower figures in his account of the Gallic invasion. The strength of Italy under Roman leadership is deliberately presented not as that of the aggressor threatening neighbouring states, but as the defender of prosperity and peace of Italy. We have evidence that exactly at this time Roman manpower had made an impression on contemporary Greeks. No less a person than Philip V of Macedon refers to it in his letter to Larisa (dated 214 BC), when urging this city to give citizen rights to foreigners in order to strengthen its power and resources. The Romans, he says, even included freedmen in their citizenry, and thus managed to make their city great, and in addition founded seventy colonies³⁶.

When Fabius Pictor exploited the propagandistic value of Telamon and its comparison to Hellenistic victories over the Galatians, it was probably this parallel that compelled him to include a survey of troops. From the time of the Iliad onwards, surveys of war-time alliances are a feature of Greek historiography. One famous example is Herodotus' survey (VIII 43-48) of Greek peoples and their contribution to the fleet fighting at Salamis. More to the point, such a survey is also included in the main source on the invasion of the Galatians in 279 BC, which makes the by now familiar comparison between the repulsion of the Galatians and that of the Persians. On behalf of those readers who wish to know the strength of the armies opposing the Persians and the Galatians, Pausanias writes, he includes a brief survey of the Greek alliance on both occasions and of the number of troops they provided³⁷. I quote his figures on Thermopylae in 279 BC, leaving out his details on commanders.

threats was not present in his Hellenistic sources. Moreover, on third-century BC 'panhellenism', P. DEROW, *The Arrival of Rome. From the Illyrian Wars to the Fall of Macedon*, in A. ERSKINE (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*, Oxford 2003, p. 57.

³⁶ *Syll.*³ 543. Cf. M. GELZER (n. 2), p. 69f. Translation and references in K. BRODERSEN – W. GÜNTHER – H.M. SCHMITT (eds.), *Historische griechische Inschriften in Übersetzung*, vol. III, *Der griechische Osten und Rom (250 – 1 v.Chr.)*, Darmstadt 1999, p. 27-29.

³⁷ Pausanias X 20.1-5. W. AMELING (n. 34), p. 148, assumes that the comparison of the manpower figures of the Persian and the Gallic invasions was Pausanias' idea, in imitation of Herodotus. The long tradition of comparing both events, which is ignored by Ameling, makes this an unlikely assumption. Moreover, Pausanias can only have derived the third-century figures from his source(s). Cf. W. AMELING, p. 153.

To meet the barbarians who came from the Ocean the following Greek forces came to Thermopylae. Of the Boeotians 10,000 hoplites and 500 cavalry [...] From Phocis came 500 cavalry with footmen 3,000 in number. [...] The Locrians] numbered 700, and no cavalry was with them. Of the Megarians came 400 hoplites [...]. The Aetolians sent a large contingent, including every class of fighting men. The number of cavalry is not given, but the light-armed were 790 and their hoplites numbered more than 7,000. [...]The Athenian] forces consisted of all their seaworthy triremes, 500 horse and 1,000 foot.

Later he adds figures for the coalition opposing the Galatians at Delphi³⁸.

Hence, when giving a survey of Roman troops and Italian manpower at the occasion of the Gallic invasion of 225 BC, Fabius Pictor followed the lead of Greek literature on Delphi. Writing in Greek for a Greek audience, it is not surprising that Fabius Pictor followed the model of his Greek predecessors³⁹. He did not have a Roman historiographic tradition that he could follow. However, the figures were given the opposite meaning: the Greeks had won their victories against superior numbers. «The great Persian invasions of Greece and the Greek resistance against the Gallic attack on Delphi [...] serve as paradigmatic manifestations of logic and reason overcoming superior numbers at great odds.»⁴⁰ In comparison, the figures for Italy in 225 BC were huge. Fabius undoubtedly knew that the magnitude of the figures he presented would not fail to impress his Greek readership. Rome is a mighty protector, it implies — but also a mighty foe. We must remember that the latter meaning is the one used by Polybius in II 24.

8. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE MANPOWER FIGURES

Few ancient figures are problem-free and taken at face value in modern studies, and a case in point is Polybius II 24, which has been debated and variously interpreted by modern scholars. Two centuries of scholarship have resulted in three interpretations of the figures outlined above. Few scholars have accepted Polybius' figures as correct. Most have found it necessary either to reject or alter some of his figures, or to correct

³⁸ Pausanias X 22.13.

³⁹ G.P. VERBRUGGHE (n. 2), p. 2167 even writes: «Pictor, dependent on Greek models for his History and following Greek sources [...] wrote a Greek work indistinguishable in form and content from previous Greek histories on the same subject.» This may go too far, but the point remains that Pictor was greatly influenced by his Greek examples. Cf. S. NORTHWOOD (n. 2).

⁴⁰ C. CHAMPION, (n. 14), p. 325.

Polybius on what his figures exactly mean. A notable exception is Lo Cascio, whose interpretation adheres much more closely to the text⁴¹.

Although the survey of arms and manpower in Polybius II 24 is possibly based on official figures, it is a construct in the sense that deliberate choices were made concerning the form in which the available numbers were presented⁴². Figures are given for regional or 'ethnic' entities: Latins, Samnites, Iapygians and Messapians, Lucanians, and Marsi, Marucini, Frentani and Vestini. Obviously these entities are not utterly without foundation. They may reflect the perception in Rome of ethno-political blocs among its allies, but the entities did not have any administrative or military purpose, which may also explain the many difficulties modern scholars have with their apparent incomplete and arbitrary nature.

These 'blocs' had no function in the census or mobilisation of troops. The men able to bear arms among the allies were counted within their own communities. Even the Latins, who had a much more uniform status in relation to Rome than the other allies, did not have common officials. The Latins consisted of more than 30 communities which functioned independently. There is no sign of a 'Latin' entity that had any role in recruitment or census. The same applies even more strongly to the other 'entities'. There was no organisation of Iapygians and Messapians which conducted a regional survey. If the Roman authorities had recourse to *katagraphai* of men able to bear arms among their Latin and other allies, this surely was in the form of lists presented by individual communities. However, a long and detailed list of numerous communities would not have served the purpose of Fabius Pictor or Polybius, but nor would the simple statement that Italy could muster more 700,000 foot and 70,000 horse. The main function of II 24 lies in stressing the composite nature of the alliance under Roman hegemony and thus in presenting a unified Italy confronting a common enemy. In short, the figures that Polybius gives in II 24 are probably based on official data on army size and manpower potential, but are presented to the readers in a way that was determined by the Greek example and by the need to convey the image of a strong and unified Italy.

⁴¹ E. LO CASCIO, *The Population of Roman Italy in Town and Country*, in J. BINTLIFF – K. SBONIAS (eds.), *Reconstructing Past Population Trends in Mediterranean Europe (3000 BC – AD 1800)*, Oxford 1999, p. 161-171.

⁴² W. SCHEIDEL, *Human Mobility in Roman Italy. I: the Free Population*, *JRS* 104 (2004), p. 4, even suggests that the survey «was constructed from the top down, by designing seemingly precise allied tallies that fit into a preconceived template derived from known active and passive Roman troop strength».

9. CONCLUSIONS

Fabius Pictor used the invasion of the Gauls for propagandistic purposes by stressing that the Gauls were the natural enemies of the Romans and by exaggerating the danger of the invasion of 225 BC. Telamon was made into the counterpart of the defeat of the Galatians at Delphi in 279 BC. Pictor exploited a common theme of Hellenistic propaganda, where kings legitimised their power by saving Greek prosperity and civilisation from the barbaric Gauls. It is difficult to say which elements derive from Fabius and which from Polybius. However, it does seem that the latter followed Fabius concerning the Gallic wars because he had no reason to doubt his veracity in this case and because the propagandistic content partly suited his own purposes. First, it provided his Greek readership with an example of the importance of unity in the face of outside threats, which is the theme of the most important speeches Polybius included in his work. Secondly, the causal relation between the Gallic invasion and the Ebro treaty fitted his idea of the interlocking of events in different parts of the Mediterranean world⁴³.

In his survey of arms and manpower in II 24 the most important element for both Fabius and Polybius is the positive image of Italian unity under Roman leadership and the large manpower resources that it demonstrated. Pictor included such a survey because the historiography on the invasion of the Galatians, which he followed, provided figures on the Greek alliances which confronted the Persian and Galatian invasions. The purpose was twofold: it showed Rome's strength as a protector, not as an aggressor, but it also could not fail to impress his Greek readership. The five regional or 'ethnic' entities representing the manpower potential of the southern allies are artificial constructs without any function in recruitment or warfare. Attempts to reconstruct the functioning of the allies within the Roman army on the basis of Polybius' 'catalogue of forces' are futile.

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⁴³ The same tendency may be responsible for Polybius' curious remark that, owing to the Gallic wars and the impending war with Carthage, Demetrius of Pharos began to make light of Roman power, thus provoking his own downfall. As E. BADIAN, *Notes on Roman Policy in Illyria (230-201 BC)*, in: *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, Oxford 1964, p. 12f, shows, Polybius' interpretation makes little sense. See also A.M. ECKSTEIN, *Polybius, Demetrius of Pharos and the Origins of the Second Illyrian War*, CPh 89 (1994), *passim*.

STAGING POWER AND AUTHORITY AT ROMAN AUCTIONS*

Abstract: Roman sources report the frequent employ of auctions in patrimonial and commercial contexts. The available testimonies make it possible to reconstruct some of the legal and financial mechanisms attached to this economic practice. They provide significant information on the goods sold, on their sellers, purchasers or intermediaries and their socio-economic contexts. On account of the effectiveness and transparency attributed to this sale-system, public authorities also made regular use of it in transfers of goods and services. Auctions were further resorted to as instruments of power. Besides military sales related to war-booty or political proceedings attached to the proscription of citizens and the confiscation of their patrimonies, voluntary auctions held by rulers and emperors emerge as recurrent short-term financial solutions and public stages of propaganda and political messages.

An auction may basically be defined as a process of selling something — generally to the highest bidder — after a public competition between potential purchasers. Just like nowadays, this procedure was attested in Antiquity in various forms and socio-economic contexts¹. Particularly in the Roman world, literary testimonies highlight the frequent use of this practice by emperors, magistrates and other authorities as a convenient financial mechanism connected to achieving and preserving military and

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¹ In the 2nd century AD, Pollux' *Onomasticon* provides the unique ancient definition of auction known to us, designed as πλειστηριασμός: *to negotiate the price of something and sell it to the best bidder*, Poll. IV 164, VII 14. On auctions in the Graeco-Roman world, see M. TALAMANCA, *Contributi allo studio delle vendite all'asta nel mondo classico*, Roma 1954 and F. PRINGSHEIM, *The Greek Law of Sale by Auction*, in *Scritti Ferrini* III, Milano 1949, p. 284-343. On public auctions in fourth-century Athens and other Greek poleis, see M. LANGDON, *Public Auctions in Ancient Athens*, in: R. OSBORNE – S. HORN-BLOWER (eds), *Ritual, Finances, Politics. Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis*, Oxford 1994, p. 253-265; K. HALLOF, *Der Verkauf konfiszierten Vermögens von den Poleten in Athen*, *Klio* 72 (1990), p. 402-426; S.D. LAMBERT, *Rationes Centesimarum. Sales of Public Land in Lykourgan Athens*, Amsterdam 1997. On private auctions in Rome see J.A.C. THOMAS, *The Auction Sale in Roman Law*, *The Juridical Review* 1 (1957), p. 42-66; G. THIELMANN, *Die römische Privatauktion. Zugleich ein Beitrag zum römischen Bankierrecht*, Berlin 1961; H. ANKUM, *Quelques problèmes concernant les ventes aux enchères en droit romain classique*, in *Studi in onore di Gaetano Scherillo* I, Milano 1972, p. 377-393; J. ANDREAU, *Les affaires de Monsieur Jucundus*, Rome 1974; *Licitatio*, *DNP* 7 (1999), p. 179-180; M. GARCIA MORCILLO, *Las ventas por subasta en el mundo romano: la esfera privada*, Barcelona 2005. See also the recent approach on public sales in Roman Egypt by S. ALESSANDRI, *Le vendite fiscali nell'Egitto Romano*, I. *Da Augusto a Domiziano*, Bari 2005.

political power. Focusing on the enormous potential and the effectiveness of this sale-system for both sellers and purchasers, this essay explores the manners and the background of its propagandistic and political use in ancient Rome. The analysed testimonies, covering a wide span of time from the Republic to the Principate, allow us to distinguish two kinds of political auctions from the seller's perspective: the sale of goods or patrimonies belonging to defeated enemies, political rivals or condemned citizens; and the voluntary sale of personal goods organised by rulers themselves. Sources provide, as we will see, valuable insights into these practices as complementary to other financial measures, displays of authority, generosity and euergetism by politicians and emperors. Auctions were often employed as platforms for the humiliation or glorification of individuals, whose image and popularity, represented by their goods and patrimony, were publicly exhibited through the mechanism of the sale. Equally, the numerous and varied literary references to political auctions transmit cognisant depictions of the phenomenon as an efficient way to illustrate the sociological impact of power performances.

Beyond differences in pattern and performance, the most recognisable feature of auctions both in the Greek and the Roman World was the intervention of a herald — the *kêryx* or *praeco* — who conducted the sale, regulated the offers and assigned to the best bidder². The incorporation of this procedure by the public authorities into sales of land and transfers of goods and services can be explained by the transparency ascribed to the whole process, regarded as the best possible means to guarantee the delivery of the object and the transmission of its possession³. Particularly in Rome, even while lacking a proper juridical definition, both the mechanism and its terminological uses allow us discover clear connections

² On the *kêryx* in Graeco-Roman Egypt see R. TAUBENSCHLAG, *The Herald in the Law of the Papyri*, in ID., *Opera minora*, vol. 2, Warszawa 1959, p. 151-157. On the *praeco* see F. HINARD, *Remarques sur les 'praecones' et le 'praeconium' dans la Rome de la fin de la République*, *Latomus* 35 (1976), p. 730-746; N. RAUH, *Auctioneers and the Roman Economy*, *Historia* 38 (1989), p. 451-471; J.-M. DAVID, *Le prix de la voix. Remarques sur la clause d'exclusion des praecones de la table d'Héraclée*, in Th. HANTOS (ed.), *Lauraea internationalis. Festschrift für Jochen Bleicken zum 75. Geburtstag*, Stuttgart 2003, p. 81-106.

³ A good example of the necessity of performing transparency and legality at public auctions is the affair of King Ptolemy Auletes of Cyprus, whose possessions were sold in 58 BC. The literary reception of this episode focuses on the enormous benefits for the Roman treasury reached at the sale, but also on its significance for the political prestige of Cato, who was responsible for the procedure, see Cic., *Sest.* 57; Plin., *Nat.* XXIX 96; Plut., *Cat. Mi.* 36; Val. Max. IV 3.2.

between the civil and the military sphere, in which auctions were attested for the first time. Reminiscent of military sales, auctions were soon staged by public authorities on the forum. Thus, the *sectio bonorum* was the sale by a *quaestor*, *praetor* or *ensor* of a patrimony confiscated from condemned or proscribed citizens or belonging to legacies without heirs⁴. The goods were sold *en bloc* to a merchant or *sector*, and later commercialised on the private market⁵. The auctions of confiscated patrimonies following proscriptions of citizens, their dramatic consequences and the immense influx of money generated by them are predominantly attested in the last period of the Republic. They are particularly prominent during Sulla's dictatorship and the so called second triumvirate⁶. Similar to this practice was the *venditio bonorum*. Private creditors were here authorised by the *praetor* to take possession of the patrimony of insolvent debtors and to advertise its sale. This was a common cause of patrimonial auctions in the Roman world⁷. From the seller's point of view, patrimonial auctions were the consequence of debts and other financial difficulties, but also of inheritances and socio-economic strategies. Apart from patrimonial backgrounds, private auctions were documented in urban environments and market-places, dealing with slaves, luxury items, fish, wine, oil and other commercial wares⁸. Likewise conducted by *praecones*, who were granted a cut of the profit, private auctions were charged by a percentage-tax deducted from the final price⁹. Connected to these

⁴ On the *sectio bonorum*, see G. SCHERILLO, *Appunti sulla 'sectio bonorum'*, *Iura* 4 (1953), p. 197-205; M. TALAMANCA, *op. cit.* (n. 2), p. 158-175.

⁵ According to the jurist Gaius, *inst.* IV 146: *Item ei, qui publica bona emerit eiusdem condicionis interdictum proponitur, quod appellatur sectorium, quod sectores vocantur qui publice bona mercantur*. Well-known instances of *bonorum sectiones* held by Sulla are evoked in Cicero's *Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino*, 8.21, 29.80, 31.88, 33.94, 36.103, 43.124, 51.149, 52.151-152, and by Plutarch, *Comp. Lys. Sull.* 41 (3).5.

⁶ See F. HINARD, *Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine*, Rome 1985.

⁷ On the *venditio bonorum* see E. CARELLI, *Per una ipotesi sulle origini della bonorum venditio*, *SDHI* 4 (1938), p. 429-483; S. SOLAZZI, *Il concorso dei creditori in diritto romano*, I, Napoli 1937; V. GIUFFRÉ, *Sull'origine della "bonorum venditio" come esecuzione patrimoniale*, *Labeo* 39 (1993), p. 320-321; M.-P. PÉREZ ÁLVAREZ, *La 'bonorum venditio'. Estudio sobre el concurso de acreedores en Derecho Romano clásico*, Madrid 2000.

⁸ See for instance *CIL* VI 9181, 9182, 9183, 9189, 37807; Sen., *Epist.* 95.42, on urban auctions concerning wine and fish. On slave-auctions: Plaut., *Merc.* 426-498; Apul., *Met.* VIII 23-25; Sen., *Epist.* 47.9; Mart. VI 66; Gell. 42.1; Dig. XXI 1; M. GARCIA MORCILLO, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 190-233.

⁹ On the auction-tax, introduced by Augustus, see Tac., *Ann.* I 78, II 42; Suet., *Cal.* 16.9; Dio LIX 9.5; *Lex metalli Vipascensis*, in S. RICCOBONO (ed.), *FIRA I, Leges*, Florentiae 1941, no. 105.1; R. CAGNAT, *Les impôts indirects chez les romains jusqu'aux*

proceedings was the intervention of financial intermediaries offering credit to purchasers and guarantying payment to the seller¹⁰. A variety of specific cases concerning the socio-economic elites, such as the sales of precious works of art or the valuable estates attested in Cicero's correspondence, demonstrate that auctions held in the private sphere could eventually also turn into theatres of political competition¹¹. Taking the distinctiveness of these practices and their patrimonial framework for granted, the focal point of the present approach lies in auctions directly linked to the exercise of military and political authority.

But how specifically was power exerted through auctions? Which are the keys to understanding the use of an established economic practice by rulers as a medium for the transmission of political messages?

The advertisement, the public competition and the adjudication to the highest bidder by the herald were sequences of a process the trappings of which audiences perceived to be a kind of theatre of everyday life¹². The recognition of mechanisms of auctions enabled sellers to display striking and comprehensible visions of ideas and symbols. As we will see in the following pages, besides predominant financial reasons for selling their own goods or alien property, rulers looked to propagating messages of generosity, supremacy, legitimacy, humiliation, submission, dependences or hierarchy. The images of the *dominus rei* and *dominus auctionis*, coinciding on occasions, were directly connected with the finality attributed to the sale and with the handling of the exhibit articles. The objects on sale consisted mostly of items conveying prestige, personal and patrimonial goods that broadcasted both material and inherent social values. Other less tangible assets, such as positions of power, are also attested as objects

invasions des Barbares, d'après les documents littéraires et épigraphiques, Paris 1882, p. 227-232; M. CORBIER, *L'aerarium militare*, in A. CHASTAGNOL (éd.), *Armées et fiscalité dans le monde antique. Colloques Nationaux du C.N.R.S., Paris 14-16 octobre 1976*, Paris 1977, p. 223-227; E. LO CASCIO, *Il princeps e il suo impero, Studi di storia amministrativa e finanziaria romana*, Bari 2000, p. 41-42, 53.

¹⁰ Roman private bankers have been particularly studied by J. ANDREAU, *op. cit.* (n. 1); *La vie financière dans le monde romain: les métiers de manieurs d'argent (IV^e siècle av. J.-C. - III^e siècle ap. J.-C.)*, Rome 1987; *Banking and Business in the Roman World*, Cambridge 1999 (with further bibliography).

¹¹ See in this regard for instance the hereditary affaire of the *Horti Scapulani*, located at the *campus Vaticanus* and pretended by Cicero in 45 BC, *Att.* XII 40.4, XII 38a.2, XII 43.3, XII 44.2, XIII 29.1, XIII 31.4, XIII 33a; M. GARCIA MORCILLO, *op. cit.* (n. 1), p. 260-265.

¹² «Auctions make a good theatre; but they are also very practical affairs»: Ch.W. SMITH, *Auctions. The Social Construction of Value*, London 1985, p. 131.

of economic competitions. Literary accounts reveal that the Romans were very much aware of the phenomenon and its use as rhetoric mechanism. But to which extent did auctions contribute to the construction of ideologies? Were rulers equally attentive to the sociological impact of the ceremonial of auctions on the viewers? How did the ritual's mechanisms of participation and exclusion work? And how did recipients react to them?

PERFORMING CONQUEST AT AUCTIONS

The most striking imagery at auctions might be the submission of booty and prisoners to the victor. In this context, the mechanism and their performers were directly connected to Rome's military expansion and the literary construction of a Roman collective memory by chroniclers such as Polybius or Livius¹³. The expressions *vendere sub corona*, *sub hasta* or *sub praecone* evoked the ritualised capitulation of the defeated and the submission of the war booty to the authority of Roman generals, represented by the symbol of the spear and the herald¹⁴. The procedure was soon transferred from the battlefield to the forum of the city as part of the celebrations attached to the triumph¹⁵. In terms of symbolisms, both *hasta*

¹³ The collective impact of this kind of auctions and the triumphs attached to them was manifest in a ritual celebrated during the *Ludi Capitolini*, which commemorated the victory against the *Veientani* and the sale of the prisoners, Plut., *Rom.* 25.6-7; *Moral., Quaest. Roman.* 277 C-D; Fest. p. 472-474. On this episode see F. COARELLI, 'Magistri capitolini' e mercanti di schiavi nella Roma repubblicana, *Index* 15 (1987), p. 179-190. See also Polyb. XIV 7.3, on sales of booty undertaken by Scipio during his campaign in Africa between 204 and 203 BC. On the authority of Roman generals over booty and the management of military resources, see Polyb. X 17; I. SHATZMAN, *The Roman General's Authority over Booty*, *Historia* 21 (1972), p. 177-205; M. TARPIN, *Le butin sonant et trébuchant dans la Rome républicaine*, in J. ANDREAU – P. BRIANT – R. DESCAT (éds), *Économie antique. La guerre dans les économies antiques. Entretiens d'Archéologie et d'Histoire*, Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges 2000, p. 365-376. A *denarius* of the 1st century BC evoking a naval victory against Philip V of Macedon provides a graphic testimony of the *venditio sub hasta* and its propagandistic use, see E. BABELON, 1886, II 474.

¹⁴ A. EHRHARDT, *Sub corona vendere*, *RE Suppl.* VII (1940), col. 96-97; P. BONA, *Preda di guerra e occupazione privata di 'res hostium'*, *SDHI* 25 (1959), p. 309-370; P. LEUGERANS, '...achat sous la couronne d'esclaves...', *Index* 15 (1987), p. 191-206; K.-W. WELWEI, *Sub corona vendere. Quellenkritische Studien zu Kriegsgefangenschaft und Sklaverei in Rom bis zum Ende des Hannibalkrieges*, Stuttgart 2000.

¹⁵ One of the oldest episodes of *venditio sub hasta* reported by the literary sources took place in Rome in 388 BC following the victory of Camillus against the Etruscans, cf. Liv. VI 4.1-2. Livy refers also to the use in his own epoch of the traditional expression *bona*

and *praeco* displayed an image of legitimate authority in the civil and private sphere as well, where the ceremonial of auctions facilitated their acceptance as reliable mechanisms of sales by audiences and actors.

The association between auctions and military conquest becomes apparent in Pliny's revisionist picture of Roman imperialism. Rather than as symbols of authority, auctions of war-booty are evoked in the *Naturalis Historia* as telling examples of the negative consequences of the Roman expansion to the East. In 146 BC, Lucius Mummius sold the booty obtained from the sack of Corinth and the victory over the Achaeans in Rome¹⁶. Some years later, in 132 BC, the splendid legacy of King Attalus of Pergamon, inherited by the Romans, was likewise auctioned at the Forum¹⁷. This event completed the annexation of the prosperous kingdom of Pergamon. Yet, the general appeal of the occasion and the high prices paid by individuals in both sales are highlighted by Pliny as the beginning of the end of virtuous and traditional Roman art and the inauguration of a new era dominated by *luxuria* and cupidity¹⁸. The public sale of Attalus' legacy broadcasted the glory of Rome as successful conqueror, but also enabled citizens to become buyers and to participate actively in this ritual of victory by taking material profit of it. Pliny's account places a particular emphasis on the sociological impact of material wealth as a vehicle for the introduction of stigmatised Hellenistic culture into Roman society¹⁹.

Porsennae regis vendendi evoking the auction of the goods offered to Rome by the defeated Etruscan king Porsenna, Liv. II 14.1-4.

¹⁶ Plin., *Nat.* VII 126: *Aristidis Thebani pictoris unam tabulam centum talentis rex Attalus licitus est...*; *Nat.* XXXV 24: *Tabulis autem externis auctoritatem Romae publice fecit primus omnium L. Mummius, cui cognomen Achaici victoria dedit. namque cum in praeda vendenda rex Attalus emisset tabulam Aristidis, Liberum patrem....* This was, according to Pliny, the first time a work of art was publicly exhibited in Rome.

¹⁷ Plin., *Nat.* XXXIII 148-150: *... at eadem Asia donata multo etiam gravius adflixit mores, inutiliorque victoria illa hereditas Attalo rege mortuo fuit. tum enim haec emendi Romae in auctionibus regiis verecundia exempta est urbis anno DCXXII, mediis LVII annis erudita civitate amare etiam, non solum admirari, opulentiam externam, inmenso et Achaicae victoriae momento ad impellendos mores, quae et ipsa in hoc intervallo anno urbis DCVIII parta signa et tabulas pictas invexit. ne quid deesset, pariter quoque luxuria nata est et Carthago sublata, ita congruentibus fatis, ut et liberet amplecti vitia et liceret...*

¹⁸ On the perception of Roman art's decadence as literary *topos* see J.J. POLLITT, *The Impact of Greek Art on Rome*, TAPA 108 (1978), p. 155-174; F. COARELLI, *Cultura artistica e società*, in G. CLEMENTE – F. COARELLI – E. GABBA (edd.), *Storia di Roma*, II: *L'impero mediterraneo*, I: *La repubblica imperiale*, Torino 1990, p. 159-185.

¹⁹ On this *topos* see P. GROS, *Vie et mort de l'art hellénistique selon Vitruve et Pline*, REL 56 (1978), p. 289-313. V. NAAS, *Le projet encyclopédique de Plin l'Ancien*, Rome 2002, p. 99-104.

Accordingly, the ritualised mechanisms of public competition in auctions are here regarded as the incarnation of the arising of material criteria in the appreciation of art. This idea is clearly exposed by Pliny elsewhere: *cum ad infinitum operum pretia creverint, auctoritas artis extincta est*²⁰. In connecting auctions with the cultural transformations following Rome's military expansion, Pliny presents an image of this practice not only as palpable expression of economic materialism, but also as a symptom of changing social values.

Besides auctions of war-booty, military campaigns became also scenarios of sales with propagandistic purposes. A crucial episode of the Second Punic Wars was the threatening presence of Hannibal's army *ante portas* in 211 BC. The response of the senate was the symbolic public auction of the territory occupied at that moment by the enemy. Livy reports the positive response of buyers, which reinforced the reliance of the Romans on the final victory. Hannibal's immediate reaction was to announce the sale of the *tabernae argentariae*, placed in the public area of the *Forum Romanum*²¹. According to Florus, Hannibal's unsuccessful manoeuvre presaged the fatal destiny of the Punic campaign in Italy²².

Plutarch provides a similar account in his description of Galba's insurrection in Hispania in 68 AD. Nero's strategy was to underline his authority and his financial position by destroying the economic basis of his rival. After declaring him public enemy through the Roman senate, Nero auctioned Galba's possessions in Italy²³. Galba then announced the auction of Nero's properties in Hispania. Plutarch emphasises the benefits obtained by Galba, greater than Nero's, auguring his forthcoming victory²⁴.

The choice of the auction to display confidence and trust on military victories demonstrates in both cases a conscious use of its propagandistic impact.

POWER FOR SALE

Within the framework of power struggles, literary sources attest the use of auctions as instruments of literary and political rhetoric, dealing with

²⁰ Plin., *Nat.* XXXIV 5. See also M. GARCIA MORCILLO, *Der Preis der Begierde. Auktionen von Kunst- und Luxusobjekten in der römischen Welt*, *Laverna* 15 (2004), p. 11-32.

²¹ Liv. XXVI 11.7.

²² Flor. I 22.48.

²³ Plut., *Galba* 5.4-5.

²⁴ Plut., *Galba* 5.6.

immaterial ideas. In such contexts, the sale to the highest bidder is resorted to as a metaphor to condemn cases of specific abuse of power. Accordingly, Cicero evokes the *topos* of the *auctio populi Romani* in order to illustrate the negative consequences for the *res publica* of Rullus' *lex agraria*, and to condemn Marc Antony's authoritarian resolutions following Caesar's death²⁵. Plutarch attributes to Brutus an analogous moral judgement on the manœuvres carried out by the triumvirs in order to obtain the support of the soldiers, "purchased like in an auction", which he regarded as a serious menace to the Republic²⁶. The literary reception of the political struggle provoked by Pertinax' death provides an even more patent picture of the idea of power offered to sale: the famous *auctio imperii* between Didius Julianus and Sulpicianus held by the praetorians in their camp. The reports of the sale by Cassius Dio, Herodianus and the *Historia Augusta* offer a heterogeneous version of the episode according to the image attributed to both pretenders²⁷. Dio's description in particular employs typical features of auctions-sales as economic competitions, such as the market-place, the ritual of overbidding and the role attributed to the praetorians as *praecones*²⁸. The procedure of the auction is thus per-

²⁵ Cicero equates the sale of *agri publici* intended by the *lex* with an auction of the Roman people, *Leg. agr.* I 2.4: *Auditis auctionem populi Romani proscriptam a tribuni plebes...* See also *Leg. agr.* II 18.48: *...quam tu mihi ex ordine recita de legis scripto populi Romani auctionem*. In the same way, Cicero accuses Antony of selling the *imperium populi Romani*, *Phil.* II 36.92: *... neque vectigalia solum, sed etiam imperium populi Romani huius domesticis nundinis deminutum est*; *Phil.* III 4.10: *omnes quorum intererat totum imperium populi Romani nundinabantur*; V 4.11: *... Calebant in interiore aedium parte totius rei publicae nundinae; mulier sibi felicior quam viris auctionem provinciarum regnorumque faciebat...* A similar use is found in the Speech against Verres, *Verr.* I 1.54.141-142, II 2.32.78, II 2.49.122, II 2.53.133, II 3.16.40-41, II 3.57-58.132-133.

²⁶ Plut., *Brut.* 23.1: Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πρώταις ἐπιστολαῖς τοιοῦτος ὁ Βροῦτος ἤδη δὲ τῶν Μὲν ὡς Καίσαρα, τῶν δ' ὡς Ἀντώνιον δισταμένον, ὧνίων δὲ τῶν στρατοπέδων ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κήρυκι προστιθεμένων τῷ πλέον διδόντι, παντάσιν ἀπογνοῦς τῶν πραγμάτων ἔγνω καταλιπεῖν Ἰταλίαν.

²⁷ Hdn. II 6.4-7, II 6.12-13; Dio LXXIV 11.2-6; SHA, *Did.* 2.3-7, 3.1-2. The favourable portrait of Julianus in the *Vita* contrasts with the accounts by Dio and Herodianus, contemporaries of the events. This applies particularly to Dio, espousing rather critical views of the new emperor. See in this respect F. KOLB, *Literarische Beziehungen zwischen Cassius Dio, Herodian und der Historia Augusta*, Bonn 1972, p. 54-70. Employing Cassius Dio and Herodianus as main sources, the *Historia Augusta* seems to avoid the episode of the auction deliberately, presenting as generous donatives what in fact had been the sale's price.

²⁸ Dio LXXIV 11.3-5: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν ἀγορᾷ καὶ ἐν πωλητηρίῳ τινὶ καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς πᾶσα ἀπεκρήχθη. καὶ αὐτὰς ἐπίπρασκον μὲν οἱ τὸν αὐτοκράτορά σφον ἀπεκτονότες, ὧνῆτιον δὲ ὁ τε Σουλπικιανὸς καὶ ὁ Ἰουλιανὸς ὑπερβάλλοντες ἀλλήλους, ὁ μὲν ἔνδοθεν ὁ δὲ ἔξωθεν. καὶ μέχρι γε πεντακισχιλίων δραχμῶν

ceived by these sources as an immoral mechanism illustrating the illegitimacy of the transmission of the imperial power²⁹.

MESSAGES OF AUCTIONS AT THE EPILOGUE OF THE REPUBLIC

As suggested above, auctions of confiscated goods to Roman citizens put the tight bond between politics and patrimony on display. From the early Republic on the *quaestores* were in charge of their benefits, which sustained the *aerarium populi Romani*³⁰. Every auction dealing with patrimonies or commercial wares commenced with the *proscriptio*, or written advertisement, which was followed by the *licitatio*, in which bidders presented their offers. Also, recalling the whole political process involving the confiscations of private goods, the *proscriptio* was generally regarded in such contexts as a public humiliation of the citizen's *dignitas*, as represented by his patrimony³¹.

The public auction of Pompey's patrimony held at the *Forum Romanum* symbolised the victory of the Caesarians in the Civil War. Cicero's *Philippicae* evokes the *infamia* of this episode. The detailed report of Pompey's goods, bought *en bloc* by Antony who later resold part of them, provides a strident picture of Pompey's memory being shamed by the *hasta* and the *praeco*³². Cicero's dramatic description conveys a

κατ' ἄνδρα κατὰ βραχὺ προστιθέντες προῆλθον, διαγγελλόντων τινῶν καὶ λεγόντων τῷ τε Ἰουλιανῷ ὅτι “Σουλπικιανὸς τοσοῦτον δίδωσι· τί οὖν σὺ προστίθης;” καὶ τῷ Σουλπικιανῷ ὅτι “Ἰουλιανὸς τοσοῦτον ἐπαγγέλλεται· τί οὖν σὺ προσυπισχνη;” ...

²⁹ See further metaphoric uses of auctions: Lucan. I 176-182; Mart. IX 3; Sen., *Benef.* I 9.5; *Epist.* 118.3; Dio XLVII 6.1; also in Christian literature, Tert., *Apol.* XIII 5; Ambr., *Ioseph.* IV 20; *In Luc.* VII 113-114; IX 19-20; X 94; *Iac.* I 3.10; *Epist.* X 73.12; *Spir.* III 123.

³⁰ During the Principate the management of the *aerarium* was entrusted to the *praetores*, known as *praetores aerarii* and later as *praefectii aerarii Saturni*; see M. CORBIER, *L'Aerarium Saturni et l'aerarium militare. Administration et prosopographie sénatoriale*, Rome 1974, p. 476-478.

³¹ Cicero's two early speeches, *Pro Quintio* and *Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino*, approach the negative impact of Sulla's proscriptions and stigmatize the immorality of those making profit of the misfortune of the condemned people, Cic., *S. Rosc.* 21-23; *Quinct.* 50.

³² Cic., *Phil.* II 26. 64: ...*Hasta posita pro aede Iovis Statoris bona Cn. Pompei – miserum me! consumptis enim lacrimis tamen infixus animo haeret dolor – bona, inquam, Cn. Pompei Magni voci acerbissimae subiecta praeconis. Una in illa re servitutis oblita civitas ingemuit servientibusque animis, cum omnia metu tenerentur, gemitus tamen populi Romani liber fuit. Expectantibus omnibus, quisnam esset tam impius, tam demens, tam*

negative reception of the sale on the part of the frightened public and points out Antony's *luxuria* and blindness for having taken such an unpopular initiative³³.

Cicero describes the unworthy fate of Pompey's patrimony. While his Roman house and gardens were sold and occupied by Antony, other goods, like an immense store of wine, a vast collection of the finest silver, precious clothing and magnificent furniture, seemed to have simply vanished, sucked up by the *vorax Charybdis*: *nihil erat clausum, nihil obsignatum, nihil scriptum*³⁴. Other items and properties were later sold by Antony. Cicero's negative picture of Antony's auction, its *miserabilis aspectus*, including even a stained dress of Pompey, fractured silver glasses or *sordida mancipia*, displays the degradation of Pompey's *possessiones* in Antony's hands, objecting that nothing of the former remained to be admired³⁵. Plutarch's *vita Antonii* describes the high price paid for Pompey's Roman house and points out the unpopularity caused by Antony's ignoble private use of the *domus*³⁶.

The image of the auction emerges in the *Philippicae* as a mirror of the polarized description of both characters. Introduced as *exemplum* of the Pompeians' destiny, this episode is regarded as a prophetic prologue to the imminent dark times of the second triumvirate³⁷. In the face of the

dis hominibusque hostis, qui ad illud scelus sectionis auderet accedere, inventus est nemo praeter Antonium, praesertim cum tot essent circum hastam illam, qui alia omnia auderent; unus inventus est, qui id auderet, quod omnium fugisset et reformidasset audacia. See also Florus, *Anth.* II 18.5: *Sed inopportunitates Antonii, et Pompeianorum bonorum, quorum sector ille fuerat, praeda devorata...* A further passage in the *Philippicae* reports Antony's usual participation as *sector* in auctions of confiscated goods, *Cic., Phil.* II 29.72.

³³ *Cic., Phil.* II 26.65: *Tantus igitur te stupor oppressit vel, ut verius dicam, tantus furor, ut primum, cum sector sis isto loco natus, deinde cum Pompei sector, non te execratum populo Romano, non detestabilem, non omnis tibi deos, non omnes homines et esse inimicos et futuros scias? At quam insolenter statim helluo invasit in eius viri fortunas, cuius virtute terribilior erat populus Romanus exteris gentibus, iustitia carior!*

³⁴ *Cic., Phil.* II 27, 66-68. Among the unworthy fate of Pompey's personal items, Cicero mentions his purple tapestries, which were now covering beds of simple slaves.

³⁵ *Cic., Phil.* II 29, 73: *Qui risus hominum, tantam esse tabulam, tam varias, tam multas possessiones, ex quibus praeter partem Miseni nihil erat, quod, qui auctionaretur, posset suum dicere! Auctionis vero miserabilis aspectus: vestis Pompei non multa eaque maculosa; eiusdem quaedam argentea vasa conlisa, sordidata mancipia, ut doleremus quicquam esse ex illis reliquiis quod videre possemus.*

³⁶ *Plut., Ant.* 10.3, 21.2-3.

³⁷ On the participation of Caesar's partisans in sales of confiscated patrimonies, see *Cic., Att.* XII 3.2, XIII 37.4. Suetonius reports Caesar's manipulation of sale-procedures during the Civil Wars and evokes an anecdote concerning Servilia, who was favoured as purchaser at auctions with very low-priced properties, *Suet., Iul.* 50.2.

negative reports, we should consider the fact that the unpopular image of proscriptions and of the proceedings connected with them was mainly broadcasted by those threatened with dispossession, thus representing a *topos* of the senatorial tradition and Roman historiography. However, by the same token we may regard the sale of Pompey's possessions as an epilogue of the Civil Wars, performed through a ritual evoking the treatment of war-booty. It is possible to assume that, as in every political or military conflict, only the losing faction would have condemned the whole procedure and the involvement of bidders³⁸.

Both political and financial strategies are displayed by Cassius Dio in his report of the triumviral proscriptions and their consecutive auctions. The author describes manipulations of sales with the purpose of satisfying the soldiers, who were thus granted economic profits, properties, and offices once belonging to the condemned³⁹. Furthermore, the triumvirs tried to maintain low-priced auctions in order to benefit themselves, prohibiting the participation of external bidders⁴⁰. The propagandistic purpose of these auctions was the reinforcement of the military alliance against Caesar's murderers, who at that time were raising funds and manpower for their army in the East. After facing a certain resistance in Asia, Cassius and Brutus took some successful coercing measures against the population of Rhodos and Xanthos⁴¹. In Patara, however, the local resistance against the conspirators was reinforced by the solid opposition of the slaves and the poorest of citizens, who had recently been granted their freedom and remission of their debts, respectively. This difficulty led Brutus to order the Xanthian captives to be brought to Patara, realising that many of them had family ties with the Patarians. Brutus decided to sell them by auction at the city walls with the object of enforcing an arrangement. Perhaps anticipating the neg-

³⁸ Cicero reveals that some of these goods were later purchased by Pompey's followers and by his own son, Sextus, who pretended to buy Pompey's estates, Cic., *Phil.* XIII 5.10-12.

³⁹ Dio XLVII 14.3-5. While Syme attributes the triumvirs' proscriptions to financial difficulties (*The Roman Revolution*, Oxford 1952, p. 195-196), Hinard considers this aspect a complementary factor to the political one: F. HINARD, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. 227-229, 301-302.

⁴⁰ With the purpose of rewarding the soldiers, confiscated possessions were lowered in price or offered for free. In order to secure these benefits, the triumvirs ordered that no one but themselves and the soldiers could attend the auction, unless someone really wanted to buy something, being constrained in that case to pay the highest prices, so that many desisted in their intention to buy. The triumvirs feared that external purchasers could provoke increments on prices in detriment of the soldiers.

⁴¹ Dio XLVII 33.

ative reaction of the population being repulsed by the idea of becoming buyers in such a market, Brutus set free those captives who had not yet been sold. With this gesture of *clementia*, Brutus succeeded in obtaining not only the support of Patara but also that of Myra, where he repeated this strategy, being able to control other regions in a short period of time⁴². Despite the lack of literary censure on Brutus's strategy, the performance and purpose of these forced sales do not differ essentially from the triumvirs' confiscation policies in Italy.

After Caesar's death, Octavian started some popular initiatives with the aim of broadcasting his image as the dictator's legitimate heir⁴³. In addition to games and festivals dedicated to his adoptive father, Octavian distributed among the *tribus* money accrued by selling his own possessions⁴⁴. Appian's narration underlines the personal attendance of Octavian at the sale-places, where he ordered to announce the sale of the articles at the lowest prices. The auctions included part of the patrimony passed on as inheritance to Octavian by Caesar, the family possessions inherited from his father Octavius, and other goods, including those belonging to his mother and to L. Marcius Philippus, and the shares he asked for from Q. Pedius and L. Pinarius Scarpus⁴⁵. The economic profit and the popularity achieved by these sales enabled Octavian to find a way around the inconvenience that a large part of Caesar's inheritance had been retained

⁴² Plut., *Brutus* 30.5-8, Cassius Dio XLVII 34, and Appian, *BC* IV 77 report other instances of the *clementia Bruti* during his military campaign. On the attribution of this kind of strategies to Brutus, see W. STEWENS, *Marcus Brutus als Politiker*, Zürich 1963, p. 83-86.

⁴³ On the successful propagandistic politics by Octavian for the consolidation of his power see R. SYME, *op. cit.* (n. 39), p. 116-117; G. ALFÖLDY, *Two Principes: Augustus and Sir Ronald Syme*, *Athenaeum* 81 (1993), p. 101-122.

⁴⁴ App., *BC* III 23: ὁ δὲ Καῖσαρ ἀντιθεραπεύων τὸ πλῆθος, ὅσον ἀργύριον ἐκ τῆς πράσεως ἐγίγνετο, αἰεὶ κατὰ μέρος τοῖς φυλάρχοις ἀνεδίδου νέμειν τοῖς θάνουσι λαβεῖν· καὶ ἐξ τῶν πωλητήρια περιουσιῶν ἀποκηρύσσειεν ἔλεγεν ὅσου δύναιντο πάντα τοὺς πιπράσκοντας ὀλιγίστου, διὰ τε δίκας ἀμφίβολα ἢ ἐπίφοβα ἔτι ὄντα καὶ διὰ τὴν Καίσαρος σπουδὴν. ἅπερ αὐτῶ πάντα τὸν δῆμον εἰς εὐνοίαν ἤγειρεν καὶ ἐς ἔλεον, ὥς ἀναξίῳ τοιάδε πάσχειν...

⁴⁵ App., *BC* III 23. L. Marcius Philippus had married Octavian's mother after his father's death; Q. Pedius was *consul suffectus* in 43 BC and Caesar's nephew, and Lucius Pinarius Scarpus was a general of Caesar's. On Octavian's financial strategy see A. ALFÖLDY, *Octavians Aufstieg zur Macht*, Bonn 1976, p. 89-91, 99-101; D. KIENAST, *Augustus, Prinzeps und Monarch*, Darmstadt 1993, p. 125-128; U. GOTTER, *Der Diktator ist tot! Politik in Rom zwischen den Iden des März und der Begründung des zweiten Triumvirats*, Stuttgart 56-59; M.A. SPEIDEL, *Geld und Macht. Die Neuordnung des staatlichen Finanzwesens unter Augustus*, in A. GIOVANNINI (éd.), *La révolution romaine après Ronald Syme. Bilans et perspectives*, Genève 2000, p. 113-150.

by Antony⁴⁶. The positive reception of the monetary donations helped to transmit the message that the distributions proceeded not from Caesar but from his son and heir⁴⁷.

The memorable episode of Actium emerges as commonplace in the construction of Augustus' political ideology. Cassius Dio reports that after the victory, Octavian headed for Brundisium, where he was triumphantly received by the enthusiastic masses, the members of the Senate and a delegation of the *equites*⁴⁸. Octavian then faced some dissatisfaction among the veterans, who demanded the grants promised by him as rewards for the victory⁴⁹. Some of the veterans were dispensed with distributions of money and others with Italian land conquered in the territories under Antony's control. The former owners were partially compensated with land in Dyrrachium, Philippi and other territories⁵⁰. Since the huge war expenditure had been bigger than the profits of the victory, Octavian hoped to be able to satisfy the remaining soldiers with the spoils of the Egyptian conquest. Accordingly, he organised an auction of his own properties and those belonging to his collaborators in order to allow any who so desired to purchase⁵¹. Dio's account of the episode emphasises that no one ventured to buy or exchange anything. By this means Octavian obtained a precious delay for the payment of his debts until he finally secured the Egyptian booty⁵². The text suggests that potential purchasers could have been dissuaded or forced to renounce the auction⁵³.

⁴⁶ Appianus reports Octavian's difficulties to access Caesar's inheritance, which had been kept back by Antony with the excuse that Caesar had been in debt with the public treasury and other borrowers, App., *BC* III 20. See also B.R. MOTZO, *Caesariana et Augusta I: Antonio, Ottaviano e il tesoro di Cesare*, *AFLC* 4 (1931-33), p. 1-24; W. SCHMITTHENNER, *Oktavian und das Testament Cäsars. Eine Untersuchung zu den politischen Anfängen des Augustus*, München 1973², p. 77-78.

⁴⁷ Appianus reveals that the positive reception of Octavian's initiative was the first symptom of the end of the Romans' tolerance towards Antony, App., *BC* III 23.

⁴⁸ Dio LI 4.3-4.

⁴⁹ Dio LI 4.1-4.

⁵⁰ Dio LI 4.5.

⁵¹ Dio LI 4.7: συχνὰ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἐκ τῆς νίκης ἐκτήσατο, πολλῶ δὲ ἔτι πλείω ἀνῆλiske. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ προέγραψεν ἐν τῷ πρατηρίῳ τὰ τε ἑαυτοῦ κτήματα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐταίρων, ἵνα ἂν τε πρίασθαι τι αὐτῶν ἂν τε καὶ ἀντιλαβεῖν τις ἐθελήσῃ, τοῦτο ποιήσῃ.

⁵² On Octavian's intentions concerning the veterans, see P.A. BRUNT, *Italian Manpower 225 B. C. – A. D. 14*, Oxford 1971, p. 332. Suetonius provides further literary anecdotes of auctions held by Augustus and related with the *princeps' auctoritas*, *Aug.* 24, 75.

⁵³ Dio LI 4.8: καὶ ἐπράθη μὲν οὐδέν, οὐδ' ἀντεδόθη οὐδέν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐτόλμησεν ὁποτερονοῦν αὐτῶν πράξαι; τῆς δὲ δὴ ἐπαγγελίας ἀναβολὴν ἐκ τούτου εὐπρεπῇ λαβὼν ὕστερον αὐτὴν ἐκ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων λαφύρων ἀπήλλαξε.

One year later, Maecenas in a speech recommended the auctioning of public land to make possible the remuneration of the soldiers, unveiling the insufficiency of the Egyptian income after Actium⁵⁴.

Octavian's strategies evidence a decisive resorting to voluntary auctions as a medium for financing the costs of war and achieving military and civil support. By these means, he also succeeded in transmitting the essential message of a personal contribution to the salvation of the *res publica* through a generous use of private funds⁵⁵. Augustus' later measures would further reveal the necessity of ensuring such incomes through more regular channels, such as the introduction of taxes or the creation of a military treasure, for the consolidation of his *imperium*⁵⁶.

LIBERALITAS, BENEVOLENTIA, LUXURIA? AUCTIONS AND IMPERIAL PROPAGANDA

Beyond the close attention devoted by literary sources to the proscriptions of the last period of the Roman Republic, such practices are also documented during the Principate as an instrument of imperial power. From the ruler's perspective, the sources reveal the usefulness of confiscations as legal mechanisms to remove political enemies⁵⁷. The common outcome of these practices was the public sale of private patrimonies destined to increase the revenues of the *aerarium*⁵⁸. The progressive involvement of procedures and officers provided by the *fiscus* and the *princeps*'

⁵⁴ Dio, LII 28. See M. REINHOLD, *From Republic to Principate. An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio's Roman History, Books 49-52 (36-29 B. C.)*, Atlanta 1988, p. 136.

⁵⁵ So Augustus' *Res gestae*, 1: ... *exercitum private consilio et private impensa comparavi* ...

⁵⁶ See M.A. SPEIDEL, *op. cit.* (n. 45) p. 121-126.

⁵⁷ An illustration of this is the episode of proscriptions carried out by Septimius Severus against the followers of Clodius Albinus in 197 AD, which made possible generous donations by the *princeps*, SHA, *Sept. Sev.* 12-13, 23; Dio LXXV 4-5, LXXV 9; Hdn. III 8.2, III 8.6-7. On this episode and its causes see G. ALFÖLDY, *Eine Proskriptionliste in der Historia Augusta*, BHAC 7 (1968-1969), Bonn 1970, p. 1-11; J. REMESAL, 'Mummius Secundinus', el 'Kalendarium Vegetianum' y las confiscaciones de Severo en la Bética (HA Severus 12-13), *Gerión* 14 (1996), p. 195-221.

⁵⁸ See for instance the *Senatus consultum de Cnaeo Pisone patre* (Dec. 10, 20 AD), 120-124: ... *bona(ue) eorum ab pr(atoribus) qui aerario praessent venire et in aerariu[m] redigi placere...*; W. ECK – A. CABALLOS – F. FERNANDEZ, *Das Senatus Consultum de Cn. Pisone patre*, München 1996, p. 38-51. See also SHA, *Aur.* 24.9; *Avid. Cas.* VII 6.; *Sept. Sev.* XII 1; *Alb.* XII 4.

ratio privata in the management of cash-incomes illustrates an increasing interest of putting these more or less extraordinary resources under the direct control of the emperor⁵⁹. Nevertheless, the available testimonies do not provide enough indices to determine the frequency of voluntary or forced auctions held by emperors, since the literary tradition tends to link them to military and financial crises or phases of political instability⁶⁰.

Some relevant events of Caligula's reign display the effectiveness of auctions as short-term financial mechanisms⁶¹. The literary reports evidence Caligula's use of auctions of confiscated patrimonies and own goods to face the scarcity of the public treasure. Suetonius and Cassius Dio report Caligula's strategy: the increase of *vectigalia*, pillages, forced nominations in testaments⁶², and the organization of auctions with items from the circus and survivors of gladiatorial games⁶³. As Dio reports, Caligula engaged consuls, praetors and all those who had shown their opposition to the games, forcing them to buy at exaggerated prices⁶⁴. Others came to the auction just to satisfy Caligula, or to provoke the ruin of their enemies bidding against them. Finally, there were those who considered it better to pay such a monetary tribute than to run the risk of losing their lives⁶⁵. Suetonius' account reveals that many of those forced to

⁵⁹ In this regard, Dig. XLIX 14.5 (*Ulp. 63 ed.*); G. BOULVERT, *L'autonomie du droit fiscal: le cas des ventes*, ANRW 2.14 (1982), p. 816-849; L. DE LIGT, *Tax Transfers in the Roman Empire*, in L. DE BLOIS – J. RICH (eds), *The Transformation of Economic Life under the Roman Empire*. Proceedings of the second workshop of the international network Impact of Empire (Roman Empire, c. 200 B. C. – A. D. 476) (Nottingham, July 4-7, 2001), Amsterdam 2002, p. 48-66, part. 63. On the existence of *procuratores rationis privatae* dealing with incomes related with the *patrimonium* of the emperor, see AE 1961, 280; F. MILLAR, *The Emperor in the Roman World (31 BC - AD 337)*, London 1977, p. 627-630; E. LO CASCIO, *op. cit.* (n. 12), p. 97-149. On the Graeco-Roman *idios logos*, which managed properties confiscated by the *fiscus*, see P.R. SWARNEY, *The Ptolemaic and Roman Idios Logos*, Toronto 1970.

⁶⁰ According to Birley, the only really effective long term strategy to solve the problems of cash was the devaluation of coins, A. BIRLEY, *Marcus Aurelius. A Biography*, London 1987², p. 160. On this point see R. DUNCAN-JONES, *Money and Government in the Roman Empire*, Cambridge 1994, p. 101, 241.

⁶¹ Suet., *Cal.* 37.

⁶² Suet., *Cal.* 38.1: *Exhaustus igitur atque egens ad rapinas convertit animum vario et exquisitissimo calumnarum et auctionum et vectigalium genere*. On further monetary strategies pursued by Caligula, including illegal inheritances, see Dio LIX 15; Suet., *Cal.* 38.5.

⁶³ Suet., *Cal.* 38.8; Dio LIX 14.1-2.

⁶⁴ Dio reports that Caligula himself was sitting at the *pratêrion* and controlling the bids, Dio. LIX 14.2: αὐτὸς τε ἐπὶ τοῦ πρατηρίου καθεζόμενος καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπερβάλλων.

⁶⁵ Dio LIX 14.3-4.

pay immense prices and being dispossessed of their patrimony committed suicide⁶⁶. A vivid picture of Caligula's cruelty is to be encountered in the story of the praetor Aponius Saturninus, to whom thirteen gladiators for the price of nine million *sestertii* were ascribed, although he had been sleeping during the auction⁶⁷.

These events were followed by Caligula's unexpected departure to Gallia in the winter of 39 AD, under the pretence of intending to begin a military campaign against the Germans⁶⁸. Dio connects this episode to the political conspiracy put down the same year by Caligula and headed by Cn. Lentulus Gaetulicus, governor of Germania Superior, and M. Aemilius Lepidus, married to the emperor's sister Drusilla⁶⁹. Caligula also accused his two other sisters, Agrippina and Livilla, of being involved in the treason. According to Dio, when Caligula arrived at the Rhine, he turned back heading north to the sea coast and to Gaul, where he pillaged, confiscated and executed citizens he accused of having participated in the conspiracy⁷⁰. Caligula held also auctions of confiscated properties, forcing bidders to offer high prices for items worth much less⁷¹. Suetonius adds some details about the items sold. Among these were clothes, slaves, and furniture belonging to the emperor's sisters, ordered to be transported from Rome, confiscating for that purpose animals and vehicles usually employed for the grain distributions in the Urbs⁷². The

⁶⁶ Suet., *Cal.* 38.8: *Auctione proposita reliquias omnium spectaculorum subiecit ac venditavit, exquirens per se pretia et usque eo extendens, ut quidam immenso coacti quaedam emere ac bonis exuti venas sibi inciderent.*

⁶⁷ The *praeco* was constrained to accept each involuntary sleeping head gesture of Saturninus as an economic offer for the gladiators. See Suet., *Cal.* 38.9: *Nota res est, Aponio Saturnino inter subselia dormitante, monitum a Gaio praeconem ne praetorium virum crebro capitis motu mutantem sibi praeteritet, nec licendi finem factum, quoad tredecim gladiatores sestertium nonagies ignoranti addicerentur.*

⁶⁸ The fact that, according to Cassius Dio, Caligula was accompanied on his journey by actors, gladiators, women and assorted luxury items, suggested indeed a very different aim, Dio LIX 21.1-2.

⁶⁹ Dio LIX 22.5-6. The implication of Gaetulicus and Lepidus is also reported by Suetonius, *Claud.* 9. For the first see the *Acta Fratrum Arvalium*, CIL VI 2029d = J. SHEID (éd.), *Commentarii fratrum Arvalium qui supersunt. Les copies épigraphiques des protocols annuels de la confrérie arvale (21 AV. – 304 AP. J.-C.)*, Rome 1998 (AFA), n. 13.17 (Oct. 27, 39 AD); on the conspiracy see C.J. SIMPSON, *The 'Conspiracy' of AD 39*, in C. DEROUX (ed.), *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History II*, Brussels 1980, p. 347-366; A.A. BARRETT, *Caligula. The Corruption of Power*, London 1989, p. 91-113; I. COGITORE, *La légitimité dynastique d'Auguste à Néron à l'épreuve des conspirations*, Rome 2002, p. 191-202.

⁷⁰ Dio LIX 21.3-4.

⁷¹ Dio LIX 21.5.

⁷² Suet., *Cal.* 39.1; Dio LIX 21.5.

text underlines that Caligula denounced the provincials for being richer than the emperor, which forced him to sell to ordinary people possessions belonging to a prince⁷³. To illustrate Gaius' extravagance, Suetonius reports the case of a provincial who paid 200.000 *sestertii* simply for being invited to one of the dinners organized by the emperor⁷⁴. Recognising the same person the next day during the auction, Caligula allotted to him an object for the same price he had paid before and gave him a personal invitation to dinner⁷⁵.

Dio's account emphasizes the nature and origin of the items: «with them would be sold also the fame of those persons who once owned them»⁷⁶; including Caligula's own comments to each one during the auction: «this belonged to my father», «this to my mother», «this to my grandfather», «this to my great-grandfather», «this Egyptian piece was Antony's, the prize of victory for Augustus». Like Suetonius, Dio finishes the passage pointing out that Caligula justified the sale by claiming that the provincials only pretended to be poor, but actually were wealthier than he. The purchase of each article transmitted also the reputation attached to it⁷⁷. In the following paragraphs we are informed about the benefits obtained by these sales, which were insufficient for compensating the huge expenditures incurred by Caligula, such as games at Lugdunum and grants for the legions⁷⁸. Dio, as Suetonius, establishes a connection between these episodes and the conspiracy headed by Gaetulicus and Lepidus during Gaius's stay in Gaul⁷⁹.

⁷³ Suet., *Cal.* 39.2.

⁷⁴ Suet., *Cal.* 39.3: *Compererat provincialem locupletem ducenta sestertia numerasse vocatoribus, ut per fallaciam convivio interponeretur, nec tulerat moleste tam magno aestimari honorem cenae suae ...*

⁷⁵ Suet., *Cal.* 39, 3.

⁷⁶ Dio LIX 21.5: καὶ αὐτῶν τὰ κτήματα αὐτὸς πιπράσκων πολλῶ καὶ ἐκ τούτου πλείω ἡργυρολόγει πάντες γὰρ ἠναγκάζοντο παντοίως τε καὶ πολὺ γε ὑπὲρ τὴν ἀξίαν ὠνεῖσθαι, δι' ἃ εἴρηκα. ἀφ' οὗπερ καὶ τὰ τῆς μοναρχίας κειμήλια τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ τιμιώτατα μεταπεμψάμενος ἀπεκήρυξε, τὴν δόξαν τῶν ποτε χρησαμένων αὐτοῖς συμπωλῶν σφισιν (transl. E. Cary).

⁷⁷ Dio LIX 21, 6: ἐπέλεγε γοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ «τοῦτό μου ὁ πατήρ ἐκτήσατο, τοῦτο ἡ μήτηρ, τοῦτο ὁ πάππος, τοῦτο ὁ πρόπαππος· Ἀντωνίου τοῦτο Αἰγύπτιον, Αὐγούστου τὸ νικητήριον.» κἀν τούτῳ τὴν τε ἀνάγκην ἅμα τῆς πράσεως αὐτῶν ἐνεδείκνυτο, ὥστε μηδένα ὑπομένειν ἀπορεῖν δοκεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἀξιώμα σφισι συναπεδίδοτο (transl. E. Cary).

⁷⁸ For which he was acclaimed *imperator* by the soldiers, «though he had won no battle or slain no enemy», Dio LIX 22.1 (Trans. E. Cary).

⁷⁹ Dio LIX 22.5-9. Dio reports Caligula's decision to send Agrippina to Rome with the bones of the executed Lepidus, before being deported together with her sister Livilla, which

Both the auction of items belonging to Caligula's sisters and the sale of imperial articles reported by Dio are primarily regarded as measures to alleviate monetary needs⁸⁰. As in the auctions held in Rome, we find here purchasers forced to buy at elevated prices. Yet in this case Caligula's manoeuvre was also intended to display his generosity towards the provincials. In searching for reconciliation, Caligula pretended to reinforce their political and economic support after the uncertainty provoked by the condemnations and proscriptions as a result of the conspiracy⁸¹. The sale of imperial items, introduced by Caligula himself, made it possible for buyers to obtain objects of distinguished provenance by the simple gesture of a purchase. Thus the economic estimation of the items turned the *dignitas* attached to them into something tangible and available to the provincials.

The position of power won by Gaetulicus in Germania Superior and specially Lepidus' privileged proximity to the *princeps* and his family indicates a dynastic background motive for the conspiracy⁸². Accordingly, Dio's detailed account of the auction of imperial items suggests to me an intentional staging of Caligula's family's roots. The anecdote of the mysterious Egyptian piece evokes Augustus' victory over Antony at Actium. The public celebration of this episode became one of the distinctive features of Augustan propaganda, linked to the spreading of Antony's negative image. The introduction of this anecdote by Dio seems to follow a literary tradition attributing to Caligula a specific approach to the figure of Antony and a demonstrative rejection of Actium as a memorable episode of Roman history, recalled by the object itself⁸³. Yet we must be cautious in assign-

indeed does not prove that they accompanied the emperor on his travels and stayed with him in Lugdunum at that moment. On this episode see A.A. BARRETT, *op. cit.* (n. 69), p. 107.

⁸⁰ R. DUNCAN-JONES, *op. cit.* (n. 60), p. 10, points out that the reason for the transport of the items to Lugdunum could have been the obtaining of much more expensive prices than in Rome.

⁸¹ This political interpretation is followed by A.A. BARRETT, *op. cit.* (n. 69), p. 103-105; M. KLEIJWEGT, *Caligula as Auctioneer*, *AC* 39 (1996), p. 59-66, and A. WINTERLING, *Caligula. Eine Biographie*, Ulm 2003, p. 110.

⁸² In this regard, according to Dio, Caligula pretended to make Lepidus his heir, Dio LIX 22.6-7, and even after Drusilla's death he continued to be favoured by the emperor, Dio LIX 11.1. On the dynastic character of the conspiracy see also I. COGITORE, *op. cit.* (n. 69), p. 191-202.

⁸³ According to Suetonius, *Cal.* 23.2, Caligula removed the consuls of the year 39 AD on account of having participated in the traditional celebration of the victory at Actium, qualified by him as *calamitosa et funesta* for the Romans. Tacitus, *Ann.* II 59-61, relates

ing to this sale a political intention according to this tradition⁸⁴. Caligula's auction of items belonging to certain members of his family mainly reveals the propagandistic performance of his singular dynastic lineage. As reaction to the conspiracy, Caligula would have thus attempted in this way to affirm the legitimacy of his *imperium*. Dio's allusion to the items most likely evokes the figure of Germanicus and Agrippina, Augustus — his grandfather after the adoption of Germanicus — and his great-grandfather Antony⁸⁵. All of them — and in particular the Egyptian object — seem to evoke, therefore, Caligula's double genealogical lineage: his direct descent both from Augustus and Antony. The auction of these possessions would consequently result in a reinforcement of his dynastic legitimacy in the eyes of the provincials, who were invited, through the mechanism of the purchase, to approach the imperial house and its unique heir⁸⁶.

As we will see below, the image of extravagance and private *luxuria* of Caligula's voluntary sales transmitted by Cassius Dio and Suetonius

the visit paid to Actium by Germanicus, where he honoured his grandfather Antony. On Germanicus' imitation of Antony in Egypt, see Plin., *Nat.* VIII 185. Dio, LIX 20.2, points out Caligula's preference for Antony's dynastic lineage. See also A. MOMIGLIANO, *La personalità di Caligola*, *Annali della R. Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Storia e Filosofia*, NS 1 (1932), p. 205-228; J. COLIN, *Les consuls du César-pharaon Caligula et l'héritage de Germanicus*, *Latomus* 1 (1954), p. 394-416. On Caligula being attracted to oriental Egyptian rituals and cults and his assumed contempt of Roman traditions, see F. MARCO, *Caligula, artisan d'un nouveau monde*, in *Marc Antoine, son idéologie et sa descendance*. Actes du colloque organisé à Lyon le jeudi 28 juin 1990, Paris 1993, p. 85-92.

⁸⁴ Epigraphic and numismatic sources seem to contradict this literary tradition. The *Acta Fratrum Arvalium* attest for instance Caligula's participation in the year 38 AD in sacrifices honouring the victory of Actium at the Temple of Augustus, *CIL* VI 2028 = *CIL* VI 32344 = *AFA* SCHEID n. 12c; P. HERZ, *Die Arvalakten des Jahres 38 n.Chr. Eine Quelle zur Geschichte Kaiser Caligulas*, *BJ* 181 (1981), p. 89-110. Some coins remembered also both Augustus and Agrippa, see for instance *RIC* I, n. 58, with a representation of Agrippa and an evocation of the naval battle at Actium. Other coins showed Agrippina, Germanicus and Antonia. Ceaulescu interprets Caligula's reject of Actium not as gesture of repulse towards Augustus and the legitimisation of his *imperium*, but as public demonstration of the negative consequences of this event among the Romans provoking the ostracism of Antony and his followers, P. CEAULESCU, *Caligula et le legs d'Auguste*, *Historia* 22 (1973), p. 269-283. Barrett sees the auction of the Egyptian object as performed disrespect towards Antony's memory, BARRETT, *op. cit.* (n. 69), p. 219. Barrett's view of the auction does not consider the fact that Caligula sold also items belonging to other members of his family.

⁸⁵ The list would have probably excluded his grandfather Agrippa, general of Octavian's army at Actium. In this regard, see Suet., *Cal.* 23, 1-2, Plut., *Ant.* 65.

⁸⁶ In the so called *Grand Camée*, Augustus is represented as protector and *pater familias*, outlining the fact that Germanicus was indeed married to Augustus' own granddaughter. On this double genealogy, see P. GRIMAL, *Sénèque ou la conscience de l'Empire*, Paris 1978, p. 86.

contrasts with the pictures of *benevolentia* and generosity generally attributed to auctions held by other emperors⁸⁷.

The striking political symbolism accorded by Cassius Dio to the auctions staged by Caligula in Gaul is also found in an interesting report by the same author of a voluntary sale performing a demonstration against the Roman senate. In the year 44 AD, Umbonius Silio, proconsul of the province Baetica, was expelled from the Senate accused of irregularities in the provision of grain destined for the army in Mauritania. According to Dio, as a protest against this decision and claim of his innocence, Silio brought his many and splendid possessions to the sale-place with the intention of offering them at auction⁸⁸. The only object he actually sold was his senatorial dress, representing his public life. He refused, therefore, to sell his own goods, which would enable him to enjoy life as private citizen⁸⁹. Dio's account reveals that the real cause of the accusation could have been an offence to some powerful *liberti* of the province by the proconsul. This suggests a link between Silio's demonstration and some well known episodes of the Claudian principate concerning the restriction of the Senate's authority and the increasing influence of freedmen in the imperial administration⁹⁰. The way Silio chose to stage his disregard for the Senate's authority intended to imitate the degrading procedure of the *sectio bonorum*. In saving his patrimony from the sale, Silio pretended to emphasize the separation between public and private life, attaching his *dignitas* not to the former but to the latter. The use, display

⁸⁷ Millar mentions this auction as one of the numerous eccentricities attributed to Caligula, F. MILLAR, *op. cit.* (n. 59), p. 148. Reekmans comments on Suetonius' generally negative view of auctions held by emperors: T. REEKMANS, *La politique économique et financière des autorités dans les Douze Césars de Suétone*, in *Historiographia Antiqua. Commentationes Lovanienses in honorem W. Peremans septuagenarii editae*, Leuven 1977, p. 292. Wardle points out that the absence of other auctions in the *Vitae* could be a sign of the rarity of this procedure or of its negative perception by Suetonius: D. WARDLE, *Suetonius' Life of Caligula. A Commentary*, Brussels 1994, p. 288.

⁸⁸ Dio, LX 24. 5. The presence of the army in Mauritania was due to the military campaign against the rebelling populace of the region after its division into two provinces, the Mauretania Tingitana and Caesariensis. On Umbonius Silio and his italic origin, see G. ALFÖLDY, *Fasti Hispaniensis. Senatorische Reichsbeamte und Offiziere in den spanischen Provinzen des römischen Reiches von Augustus bis Diokletian*, Wiesbaden 1969, p. 153-154.

⁸⁹ Dio LX 24.6: καὶ ὃς συνήνεγκε μὲν ἐς τὸ πρατήριον πάντα τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιπλά, πολλὰ τε καὶ περικαλλῆ ὄντα, ὥς καὶ πάντα αὐτὰ ἀποκηρύζων, μόνην δὲ δὴ τὴν βουλευτικὴν ἐσθῆτα ἐπώλησεν, ἐνδεικνύμενός σφισι διὰ τούτου ὅτι οὔτε τι δεινὸν πεπονθὼς εἶη καὶ δύναιτο ιδιωτεύων ἡδέως βιοτεύειν.

⁹⁰ See B. LEVICK, *Claudius*, London 1990, p. 53-60, 93-95.

and destiny of private patrimony therefore affected not only the economic condition of the owner but also his socio-political status⁹¹.

Nerva's and Trajan's access to imperial power was accompanied by a series of demonstrative decisions manifesting their public rejection of Domitian's confiscations and sales of private property⁹². According to Cassius Dio, Nerva's efforts to eradicate the traces of proscriptions resulted in important financial recompenses to those citizens affected by the confiscations. Moreover, he distributed and sold at low prices land of an estimated worth of sixty millions *sestertii*⁹³. Among the goods sold were his own possessions and items belonging to the imperial palace, including dresses and objects of gold and silver. He also auctioned estates of the imperial house at advantageous prices for purchasers⁹⁴. Beside these initiatives, Nerva tried to balance the cash-deficit through the reform of some taxes and the creation of the subsidiary institution of the *alimenta*, continued by Trajan⁹⁵. Pliny's *Panegyricus* defines the contrasting political strategies of Domitian and Trajan: «the first one tried to increase his possessions at expenses of other patrimonies while the last one was prepared to make the empire richer even at his own cost»⁹⁶. «By selling an enormous quantity of goods» — continues Pliny — «he

⁹¹ As Cicero illustrates in his *Pro Quinctio*, the loss and sale of the own private patrimony was considered as a kind of public funeral, Cic., *Quinct.* 14.49.

⁹² On the financial difficulties faced by Domitian see Suet., *Dom.* 12.1-4. Martial provides a parodic portrait of Domitian's politics of confiscations and sales of properties, Mart. IX 3: *Quantum iam superis, Caesar, caeloque dedisti si repetas et si creditor esse velis, grandis in aetherio licet auctio fiat Olympo coganturque die vendere quidquid habent* ... Rogers suggests that such unpopular financial strategies could have made possible the distribution of many *congiaria* during Domitian's principate and even part of the *alimenta* programme started by Nerva, P.M. ROGERS, *Domitian and the Finances of State*, *Historia* 33 (1984), p. 60-78.

⁹³ Dio LXVIII 1-2. According to Grainger the obtained amounts could have been used for the purchase of Italian properties, because of which the populace in the end received little support, J.D. GRAINGER, *Nerva and the Roman Succession Crisis of AD 96-99*, London 2003, p. 58.

⁹⁴ Dio LXVIII 2.2: χρημάτων δὲ ἀπορῶν πολλὰ μὲν ἱμάτια καὶ σκεύη καὶ ἀργυρὰ καὶ χρυσᾶ, ἄλλα τε ἐπιπλά καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων καὶ <ἐκ> τῶν βασιλικῶν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ χωρία καὶ οἰκίας, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντα πλὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀπέδοτο· οὐ μέντοι καὶ περὶ τὰς τιμὰς αὐτῶν ἐμικρολογήσατο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ πολλοὺς εὐηργέτησε.

⁹⁵ Galba maintained for instance the *aurum coronarium*. Gold and silver Statues of Domitian were also destroyed to create new coins. On Nerva's financial strategies see J.D. GRAINGER, *op. cit.* (n. 93), p. 52-60.

⁹⁶ Plin., *Pan.* 50.1-4 (transl. B. Radice).

demonstrated Domitian's detestable *avaritia* and unlimited ambition»⁹⁷. «At that time, the possession of a commodious *domus* or a pleasant villa was a fatality for its owner, on the contrary in our days the *princeps* himself searches new owners for the same properties... the famous *horti* of a great emperor or those suburban estates belonging to the imperial family are contented at auction, bought and occupied»⁹⁸. In his acclamation of the *benignitas principis* and the *securitas temporum*, Pliny also brings implicitly to mind Domitian's 'dark period'. The public auction serves as rhetorical instrument to display the worst and the best side of imperial power⁹⁹. The acquisition of possessions once confiscated tried to compensate those senators and wealthy land-owners affected by Domitian's politics. This initiative can be also related to other economic measures following the lack of readily available finances caused by the Dacian war, or the crisis of Italian agriculture and the consequent obligation for senators to invest in Italian land. Regarding the progressive high-priced estate market of the Urbs and the Suburbium, Trajan's strategy of selling imperial property was received very favourably by the senatorial class¹⁰⁰. Assuming the likelihood that such sales took place regularly, it is also possible that M. Ulpius Martialis, recorded in a Roman inscription as *coactor argentarius Caesaris n(ostris)*, could have been entrusted with the public sale of imperial items, furnishing loans and payment facilities to purchasers¹⁰¹. Other testimonies confirm the frequent participation of

⁹⁷ Plin., *Pan.* 50.5: *Circumfertur sub nomine Caesaris tabula ingens rerum venalium, quod fit detestanda avaritia illius, qui tam multa concupiscebat, cum haberet supervacua tam multa* (transl. B. Radice).

⁹⁸ Plin., *Pan.* 50.6: *Tum exitialis erat apud principem huic laxior domus, illi amoenior villa; nunc princeps in haec eadem dominos quaerit, ipse inducit; ipsos illos magni aliquando imperatoris hortos, illud numquam nisi Caesaris suburbanum licemur emimus implemus* (transl. B. Radice).

⁹⁹ Plin., *Pan.* 50.7.

¹⁰⁰ Trajan's initiative is commented on by Pliny in a letter, Plin., *Epist.* 6.19: ... *Concursant ergo candidati; certatim quidquid venale audiunt emptitant, quoque sint plura venalia efficiunt. Proinde si paenitet te Italicorum praediorum, hoc vendendi tempus tam hercule quam in provinciis comparandi, dum idem candidati illic vendunt ut hic emant.* On its socio-economic consequences, see for instance R. MARTIN, *Pline le Jeune et les problèmes économiques de son temps*, *REA* 69 (1967), p. 62-97, part. 95; N. MORLEY, *Metropolis and Hinterland. The City of Rome and the Italian Economy 200 BC – AD 200*, Cambridge 1996, p. 90-94.

¹⁰¹ *CIL* VI 8728 (= XI 3820 = *ILS* 7506), As proposed by Andreau, the administration of the *princeps' res privata* was managed by a procurator, J. ANDREAU, *op. cit.* (n. 10), p. 166, 404, 634. Until the Severans, the management of the *res privata* was dealt with independently from the emperor's *patrimonium*, which legitimated his *imperium*. See H. NESSELHAUF, *Patrimonium und res privata des römischen Kaiser*, *BHAC* 2 (1963), Bonn 1964, p. 73-93; Lo Cascio, *op. cit.* (n. 9), p. 133-147.

members of the *familia Caesaris* in financial and administrative services attached to the management of the *princeps*' patrimony¹⁰².

A similar favourable literary image is attributed to the financial measures taken by Antoninus Pius and Marcus Aurelius. The *Historia Augusta* shows Antoninus reacting to financial difficulties through the sale of his own goods: *species imperatoriae superfluae et praedia*, and refusing the *publicatio bonorum*¹⁰³. As a consequence of monetary emergencies incurred by the Marcomannic Wars, and having declined the introduction of taxes charging the provincials and the Senate, Marcus Aurelius advertised an auction of personal items at the Forum of Trajan. The immediate benefits in cash of this auction were destined for *largitiones*¹⁰⁴. The literary tradition constructs this event as a distinguishing mark of Marcus' political portrait¹⁰⁵. Being the main source for the *Historia Augusta* and for an *epitome* of Aurelius Victor' *Liber de Caesaribus*, Eutropius refers to the auction of imperial items (*instrumentum regii cultus*) with the term *sectio*, usually employed for public sales of confiscated patrimony, and gives a highly detailed account of some of the items: *vasa aurea, pocula crystallina et murrina, uxoriam ac suam sericam et auream vestem, multa ornamenta gemmarum*¹⁰⁶. Evoking the

¹⁰² For instance a *libertus* of Trajan: *M. Ulp. Secundus nummularius offic. monetae*, *CIL VI 8463b*. Boulvert suggests that the imperial *libertus* T. Flavius Firmus Narcissianus, *relator auctionum*, could have been involved in sales of goods belonging to the emperor. G. BOULVERT, *Les esclaves et les affranchis impériaux sous le Haut-Empire romain I*, Aix-en-Provence 1964, p. 141. On the attribute *Caesaris nostri* and its link with the *res privata* of the *princeps*, see *CIL VI 8826*, *CIL VI 8498*; P.R.C. WEAVER, *Familia Caesaris. A Social Study of the Emperor's Freedmen and Slaves*, Cambridge 1972, p. 54-56.

¹⁰³ SHA, *Pius* 7.10.

¹⁰⁴ On the big expenditures of the *aerarium* on account of the frequent monetary distributions by Marcus Aurelius, see R. DUNCAN-JONES, *op. cit.* (n. 60), p. 14.

¹⁰⁵ Eutr. VIII 13.2: ... *ad huius belli sumptum cum aerario exhausto largitiones nullas haberet neque indicere provincialibus aut senatui aliquid vellet, instrumentum regii cultus, facta in foro divi Traiani sectione* ...; SHA, *Aur.* 17.4: *Cum autem ad hoc bellum omne aerarium exhausisset suum neque in animum induceret, ut extra ordinem provincialibus aliquid imperaret, in foro divi Traiani auctionem ornamentorum imperialium fecit* ...; 21.9; Ps. *Aur. Vict., epit.* 16.9-10; Dio. Chrys., *Exc. Salm.* 117; Zon. XII 1. On the sources of the *Historia Augusta* see J. SCHWARTZ, *Avidius Cassius et les sources de l'Histoire Auguste*, *BHAC* 2 (1963), Bonn 1964, p. 156; *La Vita Marci* 17, 4 et ses développements (*Problèmes de composition et de polémique anti-chrétienne*), *BHAC* 10 (1970), Bonn 1972, p. 249-269. On the literary reception of Marcus Aurelius see S.A. STERZ, *Marcus Aurelius as Ideal Emperor in Late-Antique Greek Thought*, *CW* 70 (1977), p. 433-439; A. DUBREIL, *Le message idéologique de la Vita Marci dans le recueil de l'Histoire Auguste*, *CEA* 29 (1995), p. 171-178.

¹⁰⁶ Eutr. VIII 13.2.

sale as an *auctio ornamentorum imperialium*, the *Historia Augusta* practically repeats Eutropius, adding the following: *gemmas quin etiam, quas multas in repostorio sanctiore Hadriani reppererat*¹⁰⁷. A later reference to the auction in the *Historia Augusta* also includes *signa cum tabulis magnorum artificum*¹⁰⁸. Both sources report that the auction lasted two months, assembling a great quantity of gold. They refer also to the emperor's promise to pay back the price to those purchasers who decided to restore the objects bought, respecting those who wanted to keep them¹⁰⁹.

With the sale of personal and familiar items, Marcus thus propagated the idea of private involvement in the crisis¹¹⁰. It has been suggested that the reiteration of mentions of *gemmae*, *vestes sericae*, and other objects of gold, silver or *murrina* in the *Historia Augusta* served to accentuate the contrasting portraits of model characters such as Marcus Aurelius or Severus Alexander, and unworthy ones such as Lucius Verus, Commodus or Heliogabalus¹¹¹. The auction of personal goods as a gesture of *magnitudo animi* in view of the *necessitas publica* is also attributed to Severus Alexander, who sold all his *gemmae*, paying the gold obtained into the

¹⁰⁷ SHA, Aur. 17.4: ... aurea pocula et cristallina et murrina, vasa etiam regia et vestem uxorem sericam et auratam...

¹⁰⁸ SHA, Aur. 21.9. According to J. SCHWARTZ, *op. cit.* (n. 105), p. 250, this passage would have been invented by the author of the *Vita Marci*.

¹⁰⁹ Eutr. VIII 13.2: ... ac per duos continuos menses ea venditio habita est multumque auri redactum.; SHA, Aur. 17.4.5: Et per duos quidem menses haec venditio celebrata est, tantumque auri redactum.... Eutr. VIII 13.2: ... post victoriam tamen emptoribus pretia restituit, qui reddere comparata voluerunt; molestus nulli fuit, qui maluit semel empti retinere. SHA, Aur. 17.4.5: ...ut reliquias belli Marcomannici ex sententia persecutus postea dederit potestatem emptoribus, ut, si qui vellet empti reddere atque aurum recipere, sciret licere. Nec molestus ulli fuit qui vel non reddidit empti vel reddidit.

¹¹⁰ The description of Faustina's *vestes* of gold and silk recalls indeed Pompey's *vestes maculosa* or those of Caligula's sisters. The mention suggests an intentional public display of personal intimacy, represented by the clothes. No further indications let us here suppose any performing of a negative gesture of disdain towards Faustina by the emperor. Ancient sources often attest that clothes were considered to be infused with the personality of their owner. Touching or owning the garment of a person allotted the one catching hold of it or purchasing it part of that very person; see in this regard S. KNIPPSCHILD, *Drum bietet zum Bunde die Hände. Rechtssymbolische Akte in zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen im orientalischen und griechisch-römischen Altertum*, Stuttgart 2002, p. 72-75.

¹¹¹ Schwartz underlines a possible influence of Jerome in the treatment of silk dresses, gems and other precious objects, J. SCHWARTZ, *op. cit.* (n. 105), p. 254. On the attribution of such luxury items as *topoi* of the *luxuria* see SHA, Ver. 5.3, *Heliog.* 26.1; 29.6; *Alex.* 40.1; *Aurelian.* 44.4; D. MAGIE, *The Scriptores Historiae Augustae II (LCL)*, London-Cambridge (Mass.) 1953, p. 156.

*aerarium*¹¹². The commentary added in Marcus' *vita* about the *gemmae* belonging to Hadrian's *repostorium sanctius* is not mentioned either by Aurelius Victor or Eutropius. The intention of the interpolation could have been to emphasize that Hadrian kept such precious objects in the privacy of his room, which contrasted with the public generosity of Marcus Aurelius in offering them publicly at auction¹¹³. The positive reception of the auction is likewise reflected in the conditions of payment proposed by Marcus Aurelius to the purchasers, resembling guaranteed loans, which made possible the later reimbursement of the money paid in exchange for the items¹¹⁴. The propagandistic effect of this agreement contributed to reinforce the *publica fides* in the *princeps* and to propagate his generosity¹¹⁵.

The scenario of the auction, the *Forum Divi Traiani*, had been also used by Hadrian to publish the obligations of private debtors whose possessions were confiscated and sold in case of failure of payments¹¹⁶. This indicates a possible regular use of certain structures of the forum for the announcement and sale of confiscated goods or for trials related to private patrimonies¹¹⁷.

Both Cassius Dio and the *Historia Augusta* report the sale of Commodus' possessions by Pertinax¹¹⁸. According to Dio, the first measure taken by Pertinax as emperor had been the promise of a donation of 12.000 *sestertii* to the praetorians¹¹⁹. In view of the tightness of the imperial treasure, which contained at that moment only one million *sestertii*, Pertinax resolved the situation by selling items belonging to Commodus such as statues, weapons, horses, furniture or young slaves. This allowed

¹¹² According to the same source, Alexander made use of his own wife as exemplum against the *luxuria* of the women of the imperial palace, SHA, *Alex.* 41.1-2. In this regard, see also SHA, *Aurelian.* 45.2. An imperial edict of 384 AD, *Cod. Theod.* XV 9.1, forbids the public donation of silk dresses and objects of gold or ivory.

¹¹³ SHA, *Hadr.* 10.5.

¹¹⁴ In contrast to Caligula's practices in Gaul, nothing is said here on the possibility that Marcus could have forced purchasers to buy.

¹¹⁵ SHA, *Aur.* 17.5.

¹¹⁶ SHA, *Hadr.* 7.6-7.

¹¹⁷ We cannot rule out that the architectural complex known as the Mercati Traianei, as part of the Trajan Forum, could have been employed as auction-place and temporary depository of goods.

¹¹⁸ The *Historia Augusta* seems to adopt Dio as source, as shown by J. STRAUB, *Cassius Dio und die Historia Augusta*, BHAC 10 (1972), Bonn 1972, p. 271-285.

¹¹⁹ Dio LXXIV 1. He tried in this manner to stifle those voices suspecting intentions of cancelling all the privileges previously conceded by Commodus. SHA, *Pert.* 6.1, only mentions the monetary promise.

him to fulfil his promise and to distribute among the population 100 *denarii* per person¹²⁰. Cassius Dio relates that all these precious objects, having been employed by Commodus in gladiatorial games or horse races, were exhibited at the *pôlêtêrion* or sale-room, with the purpose of showing the customs of Commodus but also of discovering the identity of those interested in purchasing them¹²¹.

The *Historia Augusta* adds some other urgent measures taken by the new emperor, like the punishment of informers, the publication of laws forbidding the *fiscus* to become beneficiary of testamentary inheritances, distributions of the *annona*, and the concession of donatives and *congiaria* already promised by Commodus¹²². The state of the *aerarium* nevertheless obligated him to reintroduce some regular incomes previously remitted by Commodus¹²³. The unpopularity of this last measure contrasts with the *auctio rerum Commodi*, which is reported with detail in the following paragraphs of the *Vita*. The heterogeneous sale-catalogue included *pueri* and *concubinae*¹²⁴, precious clothes and *instrumenta militaria*¹²⁵. Further articles are also mentioned: Herculean swords, gladiatorial necklaces, *vasa* made of amber, gold, ivory, silver or glass and other *curiosa* and extravagances revealing the *vitia* of the emperor¹²⁶. The manipulation of Dio's Text by the compilers of the *Vita* can be

¹²⁰ Dio LXXIV 5.4.

¹²¹ Dio LXXIV 5.5: ... ἐκατὸν δραχμάς. σύμπαντα γὰρ ὅσα ὁ Κόμμοδος ἐπὶ τῇ τρυφῇ καὶ ἐς ὀπλομαχίαν ἢ καὶ ἐς ἄρματῆλασίαν ἐκέκτητο, ἐς τὸ πωλητήριον ἐξετέθη, τὸ μὲν πλεῖστον πράσεως ἔνεκα, ἥδη δὲ καὶ ἐς ἐπίδειξιν τῶν τε ἔργων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν διαιτημῶν, καὶ προσέτι καὶ ἐς ἔλεγχον τῶν ὀνησομένων αὐτὰ (Xiph. 284, 12–285, 19 R. St.).

¹²² SHA, *Pert.* 7.1–6.

¹²³ SHA, *Pert.* 7.6–7.

¹²⁴ Except those who had been forced by Commodus, and *scurrae* or buffoons, whose *nundinatio* made possible the donatives to the soldiers, SHA, *Pert.* 7.8–11: *Auctionem rerum Commodi habuit, ita ut et pueros et concubinas vendi iuberet...scurras turpissimum nominum dedecora perferentes proscripsit ac vendidit. cuius nundinationis pecuniam, quae ingens fuit, militibus donativo dedit.* The *Vita* alludes also to the money demanded to Commodus' *liberti*, SHA, *Pert.* 8.1–2: *A libertis etiam ea exegit, quibus Commodo vendente ditati fuerant. Auctio sane rerum Commodi in his insignior fuit....*

¹²⁵ SHA, *Pert.* 8.2–3: *vestis subtegmine serico aureis filis [insignior] praeter tunicas paenulasque lacernas et chirodytas Dalmatarum et citarras militares purpureasque clamides Graecanicas atque castrenses et cuculli Bardaici et saga armaque gladiatoria gemmis auroque composita.*

¹²⁶ SHA, *Pert.* 8.4–5: *... et maceras Herculaneas et torques gladiatorias vasaque electro, auro, ebore, argento vitroque composita atque etiam † phando vitrobuli ex materie eadem et vasa Samnitica calfactandae resinae ac pici devellendis homonibus ac levigandis. Nec non vehicula arte fabricae nova perplexis diversisque rotarum orbibus et*

explained with a view to the moral role attributed to specific articles¹²⁷. In opposition to the luxuriant way of life ascribed to Commodus, the *Historia Augusta* displays Pertinax's austerity, reflected in his financial politics¹²⁸. Contrasting Dio's laconic account with the exhaustive description of the articles presented in the *Vita*, the sale appears here as a mirror of Commodus' luxurious life. The *auctio rerum Commodi* thus broadcasts the clearly visible distance between the immediate past and the new political mores introduced by Pertinax. The *Historia Augusta* practically omits the financial causes of the sale. These are on the contrary explicitly evoked by Cassius Dio, who connects the monetary needs of the *aerarium* with the promises made by Pertinax to secure his *imperium*¹²⁹. At the end of the biography we are told that Pertinax could not fulfil his promise to the soldiers because of his sudden death¹³⁰. The *Historia Augusta* does not provide any link between the auction and the materialisation of Pertinax's monetary promises. Whereas Cassius Dio presents the failure of the payment as one of the causes of Pertinax's tragic end, this appears on the contrary in the *Historia Augusta* as a consequence of it. Prioritizing the transmission of a negative image of Commodus, the *Historia Augusta* makes again conscious use — as in the *Vita* of Marcus — of the auction's advertising apparatus to lay bare Commodus' unworthy qualities, which appear here attached to the character and employ of the personal items¹³¹.

exquisitis sedilibus nunc ad solem declinandum nunc ad spiritus opportunitatem per vertiginem; et alia iter metientia horasque monstrantia et cetera vitiis eius convenientia.

¹²⁷ Here we find some of the *topoi* attached to the *luxuria* already known in other biographies, such as *vestes, purpurae* or *gemmae*, which construct a stereotype portrait of the emperor's moral deficiencies. The mention of Dalmatian *chirodytae* or the Greek *clamydes*, probably copied from Dio, accentuates the image of Commodus as oriental king, as defends F. KOLB, *Kleidungsstücke in der Historia Augusta: Textkonjekturen und –emendationen zu AS 33, 4, 41, I. A 45, 5, mit einem Excurs über die dalmatica*, BHAC 12 (1972-1974), Bonn 1976, 153-171. On the use of Greek and oriental dresses by the emperors see A. ALFÖLDI, *Die monarchische Repräsentation im römischen Kaiserreiche*, Darmstadt 1970, 268-269.

¹²⁸ Pertinax ordered for instance the reduction of expenditures and prices, SHA, *Pert.* 8.10-11.

¹²⁹ C. LETTA, *La dinastia dei Severi*, in A. MOMIGLIANO – A. SCHIAVONE (eds.), *Storia di Roma II, L'impero mediterraneo II, I principi e il mondo*, Torino 1991, p. 646 considers the initiative as a symbolic gesture more than a real financial measure.

¹³⁰ SHA, *Pert.* 15.7.

¹³¹ On the amplification of the auction-scene and the polemic on the donatives, see STRAUB, *op. cit.* (n. 118), p. 274-275.

CONCLUSIONS

Sources highlight the connection between auctions and the frequent dependence on effective short-term cash-mechanisms for the consolidation of military and political positions. Particularly during the Principate, sales of own belongings and confiscated patrimonies held by emperors seem to have taken place fairly regularly and in association with other propagandistic or financial strategies. In this regard, the available testimonies provide traces of a progressive involvement of structures and personnel of the public *aerarium* and of the imperial *fiscus* in such activities. Beyond the economic background, the episodes reported above demonstrate that Romans made use of the auction's mechanisms as an effective channel to advertise and express political and moral messages. Yet the most rhetorical and striking use of auctions consisted of an abstract idea transmitted by the sources as the most immoral of business: the *auctio imperii* or *populi Romani*, which enclosed the essential thought that everything, even Rome and its institutions, could be sold to the highest bidder. Auctions are contemplated so far negatively or positively according to the reception of their uses and users. The episode of the *auctio rerum Commodi*, reported in a completely different way by Cassius Dio and the *Historia Augusta*, illustrates to which extent auctions and their sociological impact became conscious instruments of ideological constructions. Sales of goods belonging to political rivals or defeated emperors were eventually associated to proscriptions and confiscations of private patrimonies and consequently to the unfortunate portrait of personalities such as Sulla, Antony, Caligula, Commodus and Septimius Severus. However, they were regarded as necessary measures by the biographers if they were resorted to by emperors, like Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius¹³².

According to the ideological significance attributed by Romans to the patrimony as symbol of the private and public identity of the citizens — as we saw for instance in the affair of Umbronius Silio — the sale of personal items through the performed ritual of the *auctio* was perceived as

¹³² SHA, *Comm.* 5.12-14, *Sev.* 12-13. In the last both cases proscriptions appear as the unique possible solutions against the conspirators Atilius Titianus and Cornelius Priscianus. A general renouncing of such practices is attributed to Antoninus and Marcus, SHA, *Pius* 7.3-4: *Publicatio bonorum rarior quam unquam fuit...*; SHA, *Aur.* 23.1: *Si quis unquam proscriptus est a praefecto urbi, non libenter accepit*. An exception was the sale of the goods belonging to the *usurpator* Avidius Cassius, SHA, *Aur.* 24.9, *Avid. Cas.* 7.6.

an essential feature in the moral depiction of rulers and their enemies. In this respect, performing an epilogue of the Civil Wars, the scene of the auction of Pompey's possessions stages the relation between ideology and patrimony in a dramatic way. On the other hand, the propagandistic initiatives taken by Nerva, Trajan or Pertinax were intended to reinforce the legitimacy of their power in establishing and performing obvious differentiations between themselves and the politics and images attributed to their predecessors, such as Domitian or Commodus. In offering his own inheritance for sale, Octavian aspired equally to consolidate his authority not only thanks to the distribution of the monetary gains obtained from the auction, but to the successful performance of his role as Caesar's unique legitimate heir. A similar propagandistic function can also be observed in the auction of imperial items held by Caligula in Gallia. Despite the traditional interpretation attributed to this episode as a gesture of extravagance, its literary description presents many coinciding points to the *auctio* organised by Marcus Aurelius at the *Forum Traiani*, regarded by the sources on the contrary as an exemplary display of his renowned *liberalitas*. By searching to set up recognisable signs of authority, both measures were basically conceived as reactions to a monetary and political crisis. Their performance, broadcasted through the auction's characteristic and regulated rituals, and including proffering information on personal details of the items sold, suggests a calculated intention of enabling the subjects, freely or not, to approach the figure of the emperor. By the action of bidding, purchasers consequently turned into main characters of a ritual of power, contributing to its success or failure.

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THE FOUNDATION YEAR OF SAMARIA-SEBASTE AND ITS CHRONOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS*

Abstract: This paper considers the foundation year of Samaria-Sebaste and the implications it has for the chronology of some related events. In doing so, a new time setting will be proposed for three topics: 1) the grant of Trachonitis, Batanea and Auranitis; 2) the Syrian governors Varro and Cicero the Younger; and 3) the departure of Alexander and Aristobulus IV for Rome.

1. THE FOUNDATION YEAR OF SAMARIA-SEBASTE

The historical background of Sebaste's foundation

In 40 BC, Antony and Octavian proclaimed Herod king (*B.J.* I 282-285; *A.J.* XIV 377-389), but Herod was principally Antony's ally. When Octavian defeated Antony at the Battle of Actium on 2 September 31 BC¹, Herod found himself in a precarious position. Tactfully, he rendered himself to Rhodes to submit himself to Octavian². He openly confessed his former loyalty to Antony and expressed his hope for Octavian's goodwill (*B.J.* I 386-390; *A.J.* XV 187-193). Octavian appreciated Herod's sincerity and thus confirmed him in his rule (*B.J.* I 391-393; *A.J.* XV 194-195).

When Octavian had captured Alexandria on 1 August 30 BC³, Antony and Cleopatra committed suicide soon thereafter⁴. In the aftermath, Herod rendered himself to Egypt where Octavian conferred several favours upon Herod, among which was the grant of Samaria (*B.J.* I 396-397; *A.J.* XV 217)⁵. In recognition of Octavian's benefits, Herod decided to rebuild the

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¹ The Actian campaign took place when Messalla and Caesar were consuls (Dio Cassius L 10.2) = 31 BC (SAMUEL, *Chronology*, p. 267). Augustus' victory took place on 2 September (Dio Cassius LI 1.1).

² Octavian stayed on Rhodes in the first half of 30 BC: FITZLER & SEECK, *Augustus*, col. 333.

³ KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 62.

⁴ FITZLER & SEECK, *Augustus*, col. 335-336; SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 302.

⁵ The exact significance of Samaria's grant is unclear given that Herod possessed Samaria already before (*B.J.* I 213, 229, 302, 344; *A.J.* XIV 284, 411, 413, 467; Appian, *Bell. civ.* V 75, see OTTO, *Herodes I*, col. 18). Several proposals have been made in order to explain this apparent contradiction. OTTO, *Herodes I*, col. 49, 55, proposes that the grant

city Samaria and to dedicate it to Octavian-Augustus, changing its name into Sebaste (*B.J.* I 403; *A.J.* XV 292-298, Greek Σεβαστός = Latin *Augustus*).

The year of Sebaste's foundation

As to the foundation date of Sebaste, it certainly happened after 16 January 27 BC, the day Octavian received the title Augustus⁶. Numismatic evidence helps to fix the foundation year more precisely⁷:

(1) The Roman emperor Commodus (180-192 AD) minted in year 216 of the local Sebastian era. Commodus was assassinated on 31 December 192 AD⁸. Therefore, year one of Sebaste started at the latest in 24 BC (215 years earlier).

(2) In year 226 of the local Sebastian era, the Roman emperor Caracalla (198-211 AD) — who ruled contemporaneously with his father Septimius Severus (193-211 AD) — issued a coin very similar to a die used on the occasion of Sebaste's becoming a Roman colony, which thus seems to have happened in the year 226. It is not known for sure in which AD year Sebaste became a colony. As Septimius Severus stayed in the Syrian province in the summer of 199 AD and again from late 200 AD until early 202⁹, the years 199 and 201 seem possible. If it was in 199 AD, year one of Sebaste would start in 27 BC (225 years earlier); if in 201, year one would start in 25 BC.

Most scholars opt for a foundation in 27 BC because Herod likely dedicated the city to Augustus shortly after Octavian had received the title Augustus¹⁰. Only some scholars prefer the year 25 BC¹¹. The latter option

signifies the abolition of tribute which Herod had paid for Samaria until then (Appian, *Bell. civ.* V 75). SCHALIT, *Herodes*, p. 161, 162 n. 64, argues that somewhere between 39 and 30 BC Samaria was given to Cleopatra and then remitted to Herod in 30 BC. JONES, *Review*, p. 229-230, tries to solve the dilemma by suggesting that Herod received the region Samaria in 39 BC but the city Samaria in 30.

⁶ FITZLER & SEECK, *Augustus*, col. 343; KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 63.

⁷ BARAG, *Castle*, p. 16 n. 6.

⁸ KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 148.

⁹ SPIELVOGEL, *Severus*, p. 120-122, 127-129.

¹⁰ OTTO, *Herodes I*, col. 53-54 n. *, 76-77 and n. *; HAEFELI, *Cäsarea*, p. 9; SCHALIT, *Herodes*, p. 358; SMALLWOOD, *Jews*, p. 77 n. 55; PRAUSE, *Herodes*, p. 354; GÜNTHER, *Herodes*, p. 258; WHITE, *Herod*, p. 376. BARAG, *Castle*, p. 16 n. 6, favours the year 27 BC because Severus gave Eleutheropolis (Beth Govrin, Idumea) and Diospolis (Lod, Judea) the titles Λ(ενκία) Σεπ(τιμία) Σεου(ρία) in 199 or in 199/200 AD. Analogously, Severus would have made Sebaste a colony in 199 AD, which implies a foundation in 27 BC.

¹¹ *BMC* 27, p. xxxix, noting that Severus' foundation of Tyre likely dates to 201 AD; SCHÜRER, *History I*, p. 290 («25?»); I, p. 290-291 n. 9 (referring to the possibility of 27 BC, but finally opting for 25 BC); II, p. 163 («probably 25 B.C.»); SARTRE, *Alexandre*, p. 531.

is sometimes influenced by Josephus' statement in *A.J.* XV 299: «Now in this (same) year, which was the thirteenth of Herod's reign, the greatest hardships came upon the country» (translation by Marcus and Wikgren). Given that the preceding passage *A.J.* XV 292-298 relates the foundation of Samaria-Sebaste, «in this (same) year» would imply that the foundation happened in Herod's thirteenth year. Scholars assume that Herod's years were reckoned from Nisan (March/April) 37 BC¹², so that Herod's thirteenth year is interpreted as the year Nisan 25/24 BC¹³. Thus, Samaria-Sebaste's foundation would have happened in 25 BC. On the other hand, those who date Sebaste's foundation to 27 BC assign only the hardships to the thirteenth year (and not Sebaste's foundation)¹⁴. It seems indeed unjustified to prefer the year 25 BC above the year 27 BC merely on the basis of the expression κατὰ τοῦτον μὲν οὖν τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν in *A.J.* XV 299. With the majority of scholars, I adhere to the year 27 BC. The implications of this choice — in difference with Schürer's option for the year 25 — will be worked out in the next sections.

2. THE GRANT OF TRACHONITIS, BATANEA AND AURANITIS

A grant «after the first Actiad»

According to the *Jewish Antiquities*, Alexander and Aristobulus IV¹⁵ were sent to Rome after Samaria-Sebaste had been founded (*A.J.* XV 342) and before Augustus granted the districts of Trachonitis, Batanea and Auranitis to Herod (*A.J.* XV 343). The *Jewish War* situates this grant «after the first period of the Actian era» (*B.J.* I 398 μετὰ δὲ τὴν πρώτην Ἀκτιάδα, translation by Thackeray)¹⁶. Augustus' victory at Actium on 2 September 31 BC was commemorated by quadrennial games¹⁷. Similar to an Olympiad, an Actiad was the period of four years between the games. Schürer makes the following assumptions: (1) the first Actian Games were held in September 28 BC (with subsequent games in 24, 20,

¹² SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 326-328 n. 165.

¹³ SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 291.

¹⁴ OTTO, *Herodes I*, col. 76-77 and n. *. Otto adds still another possibility: the thirteenth year may refer to the completion of Sebaste in 25 BC (with work starting in 27 BC). CORBISHLEY, *Chronology*, p. 25, proposes that the thirteenth year for Sebaste's foundation was reckoned from Herod's nomination as king in 40 BC: 40 BC – 28/27 BC, but the hardships' thirteenth year from Herod's capture of Jerusalem in 37 BC: 37 BC – 25/24 BC.

¹⁵ Alexander and Aristobulus IV were sons of Herod by his second wife Mariamme I: SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 321, 614.

¹⁶ Whiston translates «on the completion of the first Actiad».

¹⁷ Strabo, *Geogr.* VII 7.6; Suetonius, *Aug.* 18.2; Dio Cassius LI 1.2, 18.1.

16, etc.) and (2) the counting of Actiads started with the first Actian Games. Thus, the first Actiad would correspond to the period September 28 BC – September 24 BC. The grant of territories took place after that four-year cycle: at the end of 24 BC or at the start of 23 BC¹⁸.

Nevertheless, it seems that the first Actian Games were held in September 27 BC (four years after the Battle of Actium) rather than in 28 BC¹⁹. Moreover, the Actiads were probably reckoned from the Battle of Actium itself instead of from the first Actian Games, especially as no era starts at the first games, while there is the well-known Actian era of 31 BC²⁰ (attested even in Josephus: *A.J.* XVIII 26 «The registrations of property that took place in the thirty-seventh year after Caesar's defeat of Antony at Actium», translation by Feldman). Accordingly, the first Actiad likely corresponds to the four-year period between the Battle of Actium and the first Actian Games: September 31 BC – September 27 BC.

Furthermore, the word Ἀκτιάς denotes not only the four-year period between the games but also the games themselves²¹. Thus, the expression μετὰ δὲ τὴν πρώτην Ἀκτιάδα «after the first Actiad» not only means 'after the first Actian quadrennial cycle' (September 31 BC – September 27 BC) but also 'after the first Actian games' (held in September 27 BC). Both translations imply that the districts were granted after September 27 BC²².

¹⁸ SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 291 n. 10, followed by THACKERAY, *Josephus* II, p. 186-187 n. c (on *B.J.* I 398, end 24 BC or start 23 BC); SCHALIT, *Herodes*, p. 423 (23 BC); KAHN, *Caesarea*, p. 139 (23 BC); GÜNTHER, *Herodes*, p. 258 (23/22 BC); WHITE, *Herod*, p. 368 (23 BC). OTTO, *Herodes I*, col. 68-69 and n. *: HOEHNER, *Antipas*, p. 9 and n. 4, opt for the year 22 BC (about two years after September 24 BC).

¹⁹ TIDMAN, *Foundation*, p. 123-125; MORETTI, *Iscrizioni*, p. 205-206; RIEKS, *Sebastia*, p. 96-116; ROLLER, *Herod*, p. 229.

²⁰ Dio Cassius LI 1-2.

²¹ Strabo, *Geogr.* VII 7.6; Dio Cassius LI 1.2; BAILLY & EGGER, *Dictionnaire*, p. 70: «Ἀκτιάς Ἀκτιάδος: 1 *adj.* f. d'Actium; 2 *subst.* ἡ Ἀκτιάς célébration des jeux d'Actium». Cf. the use of the word ὀλυμπιάς, see SAMUEL, *Chronology*, p. 189: «The [Olympic] games themselves were held at four year intervals and were called in Greek ὀλυμπιάς, a term which came to be applied as well to the four year period made up of the year in which the games were held plus the three following years».

²² Cf. SARTRE, *Alexandre*, p. 507 n. 200: «Josèphe *AJ* 15.345 mentionne simplement que les faits eurent lieu au temps de Varro, gouverneur de Syrie, qui fut chargé de faire appliquer la mesure; mais en *BJ* 1.398, il situe ces événements 'après la première actiade', soit après 27 av. J.-C., tout en faisant mention du même Varro. Il ne faut sans doute pas repousser trop loin après 27 cette mesure». Nevertheless, Sartre (*Alexandre*, p. 507) dates the grant between 27 and 23 BC, probably because he situates Sebaste's foundation in 25 BC (*Alexandre*, p. 531) and the grant has to follow that foundation (*A.J.* XV 342-343).

We might suppose that Schürer (proposing September 28 BC – September 24 BC) could not come to this seemingly more logical interpretation for the first Actiad (September 31 BC – September 27 BC) because it is incompatible with his foundation year of Sebaste (25 BC)²³. *A.J.* XV 342-343 implies that the districts were given after that foundation. Therefore, Schürer was forced to find an interpretation for «after the first Actiad» (*B.J.* I 398) — the grant's time setting — which falls no earlier than 25 BC. Subsequent scholars did not discern why the end of the first Actiad was put in 24 BC, so that — even when they date Sebaste's foundation to 27 BC — they adopt the year 24/23 BC for the grant²⁴. However, if Sebaste was founded in 27 BC, the first Actiad can end in that year, which allows for the obvious meaning of the first Actiad: September 31 BC – September 27 BC. Consequently, the districts would have been granted at the close of that first Actiad: at the end of 27 BC.

Objection to a grant at the end of 27 BC

After relating the grant of Trachonitis, Batanea and Auranitis (*A.J.* XV 343-349), the *Jewish Antiquities* continue with Herod's winter visit to Marcus Agrippa in Mytilene (*A.J.* XV 350). Marcus Agrippa stayed in Mytilene from 23 until 21 BC²⁵. Thus Herod's visit happened in the winter of 23/22 or in the winter of 22/21 BC²⁶. Most scholars opt for the winter of 23/22, supposing that Herod would have expressed his loyalty to Marcus Agrippa as soon as possible²⁷. Some scholars prefer the winter of 22/21 BC²⁸. The visit in the winter of 23/22 or 22/21 is sometimes cited in support of the conventional date of the grant (24/23 or 22, respectively) as the winter visit is related just after that grant²⁹.

²³ Schürer does not explicitly say that his reconstruction of the first Actiad depends on Sebaste's foundation year.

²⁴ SCHALIT, *Herodes*, p. 358 (foundation in 27 BC), 423 (grant in 23 BC); GÜNTHER, *Herodes*, p. 258 (foundation in 27 BC, grant in 23/22 BC); WHITE, *Herod*, p. 368 (grant in 23 BC), 376 (foundation in 27 BC).

²⁵ Tacitus, *Ann.* XIV 53; Suetonius, *Aug.* 66.3; Suetonius, *Tib.* 10.1; Dio Cassius LIII 32.1, LIV 6; SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 256; KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 72.

²⁶ SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 291 n. 11.

²⁷ REINHOLD, *Agrippa*, p. 84 n. 47; SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 291 n. 11; KASHER, *Jews*, p. 159 n. 76; HOHLFELDER, *Coincidence*, p. 248 and n. 30; WHITE, *Herod*, p. 368.

²⁸ OTTO, *Herodes I*, col. 70; SCHALIT, *Herodes*, p. 424; GÜNTHER, *Herodes*, p. 132.

²⁹ The passage preceding the grant (*A.J.* XV 343) concerns Caesarea's construction by Herod (*A.J.* XV 331-341), which work scholars generally date to 22 – 10/9 BC; OTTO, *Herodes I*, col. 65, 78; HAEFELI, *Cäsarea*, p. 12, 26; SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 291; PRAUSE,

However, the text does not imply that the grant and the visit followed each other immediately. The Greek πέμπεται δὲ Ἀγρίππας τῶν πέραν Ἰονίου διάδοχος Καίσαρι (*A.J.* XV 350 «Now Agrippa was sent as Caesar's deputy to the countries beyond the Ionian Sea», translation by Marcus and Wikgren) makes no chronological link with the preceding passage concerning the grant (*A.J.* XV 343-349). Moreover, after the winter visit (*A.J.* XV 350-353, including the ensuing Gadarene opposition against Herod), Josephus describes Augustus' visit to Syria (*A.J.* XV 354-363), which happened in 20 BC³⁰. As some time elapsed between these two passages (winter 23/22 BC or winter 22/21 until 20), there might be some separation in time between the grant (*A.J.* XV 343-349) and the winter visit (*A.J.* XV 350-353) as well. In fact, these latter two passages — which both concern Herod's relationship with Zenodorus³¹ — are just an introduction to Herod's final problems with Zenodorus in 20 BC (*A.J.* XV 354-360). The episodes do not need to follow each other immediately in time, so that the grant might have happened at the end of 27 BC and the Mytilene meeting in the winter of 23/22 or 22/21 BC.

3. THE SYRIAN GOVERNORS VARRO AND CICERO THE YOUNGER

The Syrian governor Varro

In its turn, the grant's date influences the chronology of the Syrian provincial rule. Trachonitis, Batanea and Auranitis were given to Herod in the emperor's name by the Syrian governor Varro (*B.J.* I 398-399; *A.J.* XV 345). Varro governed Syria until 23 BC, when he was replaced by Marcus Agrippa³². The year Varro's Syrian office started is disputed.

Herodes, p. 354; KAHN, *Caesarea*, p. 130; HOHLFELDER, *Coincidence*, p. 241; SARTRE, *Alexandre*, p. 532 n. 11; GÜNTHER, *Herodes*, p. 225, 258. Therefore, OTTO, *Herodes I*, col. 68-70 and n. *; HOEHNER, *Antipas*, p. 9 and n. 4, propose the following sequence of events: Caesarea's foundation in 22 BC (*A.J.* XV 331-341); the journey of Alexander and Aristobulus IV to Rome in 22 BC (*A.J.* XV 342-343a); the grant of Trachonitis, Batanea and Auranitis in 22 BC (*A.J.* XV 343b-349); and the Mytilene meeting in the winter of 22/21 BC (*A.J.* XV 350-353). (Hoehner does not mention the Mytilene meeting.)

³⁰ Dio Cassius LIV 7.4-6.

³¹ Zenodorus ruled part of Iturea from about 34 BC (the year Lysanias, the former king of Iturea, died) until his death in 20 BC: SCHÜRER, *History I*, p. 565-566.

³² SCHÜRER, *History I*, p. 256.

As Schürer dates the grant to the end of 24 BC or to the start of 23 BC, he situates Varro's Syrian governorship in 24-23 BC and proposes that this Varro might be identical to Marcus Terentius Varro³³, who subdued the Salassi in the Alps in 25 BC³⁴. Similarly, Dąbrowa dates the grant of Zenodorus' territory to the autumn of 24 BC and makes Varro's governorship start in the second half of 25 BC (because Varro would have arrived some time before the grant)³⁵. However, if the grant happened about the end of 27 BC, Varro would have been in office in Syria by that time already, which excludes identification with Marcus Terentius Varro.

In 27 BC, the Roman provinces were divided between Augustus and the Senate. Syria belonged to the provinces that were assigned to Augustus, who appointed legates to govern them in his name³⁶. A new Syrian governor must have arrived in 27 BC. If Varro was in Syria by the end of 27 BC, it follows that he was the governor nominated on Augustus' allotment of Syria. Thus, Varro may have presided over Syria in the years 27-23 BC.

The Syrian governor Cicero the Younger

Varro's chronology further touches on the career of Marcus Tullius Cicero the Younger. Cicero preceded Varro as Syrian governor, but it is still unclear whether Cicero governed Syria in 29-27 or in 27-25 BC³⁷. In the light of Varro's arrival in 27 BC, Cicero would have governed the province in 29-27 BC (not in 27-25 BC). The year 29 BC agrees well with the indication that Cicero became Syrian governor soon after his consulship of 30 BC³⁸.

³³ SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 254 (the date of Varro's Syrian office is given with question mark).

³⁴ Strabo, *Geogr.* IV 6.7; Dio Cassius LIII 25.3-5.

³⁵ DĄBROWA, *Syria*, p. 17-18. Cf. ECK, *Varro*, col. 1130, dating Varro's legateship to ca. 25-23 BC.

³⁶ Strabo, *Geogr.* XVII 3.25; Dio Cassius LIII 12.5-7, 13.1; FITZLER & SEECK, *Augustus*, col. 342.

³⁷ SYME, *Revolution*, p. 303 n. 1: «About the date, no evidence. The period 29-27 B.C. is attractive, but 27-25 not excluded»; HANSLIK, *Tullius*, col. 1286, prefers 27-25 BC; SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 254, leaves the question open: «29-27? (27-25?)».

³⁸ Appian, *Bell. civ.* IV 51.

4. THE DEPARTURE OF ALEXANDER AND ARISTOBULUS IV FOR ROME

A departure in 27 BC

The grant's date influences the time setting for Alexander and Aristobulus IV's journey to Rome as well. These sons of Herod were sent to Rome after Samaria-Sebaste's foundation (*A.J.* XV 342) and before the grant of Trachonitis, Batanea and Auranitis (*A.J.* XV 343). In consequence of a grant dated to 24/23 BC, the voyage has been dated no later than 24 BC³⁹ or about 23 BC⁴⁰. However, if the grant took place at the end of 27 BC, Herod's sons would have gone to Rome in 27 BC, just after Sebaste's foundation (in conformity with *A.J.* XV 342). Augustus was in Rome by August 29 BC until the early summer of 27 BC⁴¹. Thereafter, he visited Gaul and Spain, returning to Rome only in 24 BC⁴². If *A.J.* XV 343 «Permission was given (them) [Alexander and Aristobulus IV] to stay with Caesar himself, for he received the boys with the greatest consideration» (translation by Marcus and Wikgren) implies that Herod's sons met Augustus on their arrival, then they reached Rome at the latest in the early summer of 27 BC⁴³.

The year 27 BC is a likely proposal as it makes their arrival coincide with the year Octavian was allotted the title Augustus and proconsular power over Syria, a province important for Herod's kingdom. In the aftermath of Sebaste's foundation in 27 BC — which happened in Augustus' honour — Herod might have sent his sons with personal gifts to Rome in order to congratulate Augustus with his new position. Moreover, Herod had executed Mariamme I — mother of Alexander and Aristobulus IV — shortly before: at the end of 29 BC⁴⁴. Herod might well have sent her sons to Rome to 'change their minds' after the death of their mother.

³⁹ KOKKINOS, *Dynasty*, p. 369.

⁴⁰ SCHALIT, *Herodes*, p. 423, 588; SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 291, 321; BRAUND, *Rome*, p. 10; GÜNTHER, *Herodes*, p. 129, 154, 258; WHITE, *Herod*, p. 375 (23/22 BC). In conformity with the year 22 BC they propose for the work at Caesarea (*A.J.* XV 331-341) and for the grant (*A.J.* XV 343-349), OTTO, *Herodes I*, col. 68 and 68-69 n. *; HOEHNER, *Antipas*, p. 9 and n. 4, date the voyage to 22 BC. SARTRE, *Alexandre*, p. 550, also situates the voyage in 22 BC but the grant between 27 and 23 (*Alexandre*, p. 507).

⁴¹ FITZLER & SEECK, *Augustus*, col. 339-343; KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 62-63.

⁴² FITZLER & SEECK, *Augustus*, col. 346; KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 63.

⁴³ In any case, they must have arrived before 11 November, when the sailing season on the Mediterranean closed (Vegetius, *Rei mil.* IV 39). Winter travelling occurred only in urgent situations, which was not the case.

⁴⁴ HOEHNER, *Antipas*, p. 9; SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 289.

A departure at the age of nine and eight

Herod married Mariamme I during his siege of Jerusalem in 37 BC (B.J. I 344; A.J. XIV 467)⁴⁵. Alexander (their eldest son: B.J. I 435; A.J. XVI 234) was born about 36 BC and their second son Aristobulus IV around 35 BC at the earliest⁴⁶. Consequently, Alexander was nine and Aristobulus IV eight years old, at the most, when sent to Rome in 27 BC. This might seem very young, but it is possible. On the *Ara Pacis* of Augustus (9 BC)⁴⁷, two boys in foreign dress appear. The one on the south frieze seems to be five to seven years old and might represent one of Phraates' sons⁴⁸. The one on the north frieze is younger and might be a Gallic child. Both would depict foreign children entrusted to Augustus⁴⁹. Similarly, on Augustus' Boscoreale cup and on a coin of Lugdunum (Lyon) of 8 BC, Gauls are depicted passing their infant children to the seated Augustus, with the obvious implication that the emperor — who stretches out his hand — will take the children as hostages to Rome⁵⁰. These iconographic data confirm that foreign children could be sent to Rome when still very small. The possibility of such a young age is further evidenced by Agrippa's youth. Agrippa I died in the fifty-fourth year of his life, in the year 44 AD (B.J. II 219; A.J. XIX 343-352)⁵¹. Accordingly, he was born in 10 BC⁵². Agrippa I was brought to Rome for education shortly before Herod's death (A.J. XVIII 143, although in the company of his mother Berenice). Given that Herod is supposed to have died in 4 BC, Agrippa I was sent to Rome «as a boy scarcely six years old»⁵³.

⁴⁵ According to B.J. I 241; A.J. XIV 300, Herod was betrothed to Mariamme in 42 BC but did not consummate the marriage until five years later: SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 283-284.

⁴⁶ On the basis of a marriage about the spring of 37 BC, HOEHNER, *Antipas*, p. 13 n. 4, argues that Alexander «could not have been born much before the end of the same year [37 BC]» and that Aristobulus was born «not earlier than 35 BC».

⁴⁷ KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 64.

⁴⁸ The sons of the Parthian king Phraates IV (38-2 BC) were sent to Rome: *Res gest. divi Aug.* 32; Strabo, *Geogr.* XVI 1.28; Velleius Paterculus, *Hist. rom.* II 94.4; Suetonius, *Aug.* 21.3; Justin 42.5.

⁴⁹ ROSE, *Parthians*, p. 36-44.

⁵⁰ ROSE, «*Princes*», p. 460-461.

⁵¹ SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 452 and n. 43.

⁵² HOEHNER, *Antipas*, p. 154; SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 443 and n. 2. Given that Schwartz situates Agrippa's death in 43 or 44 AD, he proposes 11 or 10 BC for Agrippa's birth: SCHWARTZ, *Agrippa I*, p. 39 and n. 1.

⁵³ SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 443. Schürer's chronology (10-4 BC) is followed by SARTRE, *Alexandre*, p. 550. According to SCHWARTZ, *Agrippa I*, p. 40, Agrippa was «around five at the time of the move».

It thus seems possible that Alexander and Aristobulus IV were sent to Rome in 27 BC, being about nine and eight years old.

A complete education

Alexander and Aristobulus IV were brought back to Palestine by Herod when he journeyed to Italy to meet Augustus (*A.J.* XVI 6), in the context of Herod's eighteenth year (*A.J.* XV 380) = Nisan 20/19 BC⁵⁴. Given that Augustus was absent from Italy until the autumn of 19 BC and again from the summer of 16 BC⁵⁵, scholars date the journey to 18, 17, or 16 BC⁵⁶. The year 17 seems probable:

- Some time after Herod had returned from Rome to Palestine, he heard that Marcus Agrippa had left Italy for Asia (*A.J.* XVI 12). Marcus Agrippa departed for the East by the autumn of 17 BC⁵⁷. It follows that Herod visited Rome when Marcus Agrippa was still there: before that autumn.
- Early in 17 BC, Augustus adopted Gaius and Lucius as his sons⁵⁸. Herod might have wanted to congratulate the emperor on this occasion⁵⁹.
- In 17 BC, Augustus celebrated the Secular Games (*ludi saeculares*) from 31 May until 12 June⁶⁰. Herod might have attended these festivities⁶¹.

If Alexander and Aristobulus IV were brought back to Palestine in June 17 BC, they were about nineteen and eighteen years old on their return, having spent ten years in Rome: early summer 27 - June 17 BC. Roman boys joined the *ludus litterarius* from the age of seven until the

⁵⁴ SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 292, 308.

⁵⁵ In 22 BC, Augustus left Italy in order to organise Rome's eastern frontier. He came back by the autumn of 19 BC: FITZLER & SEECK, *Augustus*, col. 349-353; KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 63. Augustus was in Gaul from the summer of 16 BC until the spring of 13: FITZLER & SEECK, *Augustus*, col. 356-357; KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 64.

⁵⁶ OTTO, *Herodes I*, col. 72 (18 or 17 BC); CORBISHLEY, *Chronology*, p. 27-29 (17 and 16 BC, or early 16 BC); HOEHNER, *Antipas*, p. 13 n. 4 [17 BC (or 16 BC)]; SCHÜRER, *History* I, p. 292 (18 or 17 BC); PRAUSE, *Herodes*, p. 355 (about 18 BC); KOKKINOS, *Dynasty*, p. 370 (17 or 16 BC); GÜNTHER, *Herodes*, p. 137, 154, 258 (18/17 BC); WHITE, *Herod*, p. 376 (17 BC).

⁵⁷ KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 72.

⁵⁸ Dio Cassius LIV 18.1; KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 63.

⁵⁹ KOKKINOS, *Dynasty*, p. 370.

⁶⁰ Tacitus, *Ann.* XI 11; KIENAST, *Kaisertabelle*, p. 63-64.

⁶¹ KOKKINOS, *Dynasty*, p. 370.

age of eleven or twelve, and the *ludus grammaticus* from the age of eleven or twelve until fifteen (sometimes sixteen or seventeen). Education continued with the *schola rhetoris* until the age of eighteen (in later antiquity even twenty)⁶². The Roman school system fits in with the years of age proposed for Alexander and Aristobulus IV: they arrived at the age of about nine and eight (a convenient age for the *ludus litterarius*)⁶³ and left at the age of about nineteen and eighteen (when a boy's formation ended). Indeed, on their return from Rome, Herod's sons had finished their education (A.J. XVI 6). Conventional chronology assigns only about five years to their stay in Rome: ca. 23/22-18/17 BC, which is far too less for a common Roman formation.

5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I resume Schürer's and my own proposed chronology:

	Schürer	New chronology
Sebaste's foundation	25 BC	27 BC
The first Actiad	September 28-24 BC	September 31-27 BC
The districts' grant	End 24 or start 23 BC	End 27 BC
Varro governor	24-23 BC	27-23 BC
Cicero governor	29-27 or 27-25 BC	29-27 BC
Herod's sons in Rome	23-18/17 BC	27-17 BC

Most scholars do not follow Schürer's year 25 BC for Sebaste's foundation, but prefer the year 27 BC. However, they do follow Schürer in his other proposals, although these seem to rely on Sebaste's supposed foundation in 25 BC: (1) the first Actiad is made to end no earlier than 25 BC (given that it followed Sebaste's foundation): September 28 BC – September 24 BC; (2) the grant (at the close of the first Actiad) is put at the end of 24 BC or at the start of 23; so that (3) Varro's Syrian governorship (24-23 BC) is made to start in 24 BC (as he gave the grant) and (4) the term of Cicero's Syrian legateship could be 29-27 BC or 27-25 BC; and (5) the departure of Alexander and Aristobulus IV for Rome, just before the grant, is put in 23 BC.

⁶² BONNER, *Education*, p. 136-137; EYBEN, *Youth*, p. 129.

⁶³ *Contra* HOEHNER, *Antipas*, p. 13 n. 4 (who situates their arrival in Rome in 22 BC): «This would mean that they were about thirteen years old, the age at which a boy became Bar Mitzvah, that is, of an age to assume religious duties».

However, on the basis of a foundation year 27 BC, (1) the first Actiad can end in 27, so that the first Actiad can correspond to September 31-September 27 BC, (2) with the grant at the end of 27 BC. (3) Varro was in office by that time (27-23 BC), which (4) fixes Cicero's legateship in 29-27 BC. (5) Herod's sons would have left for Rome in 27 BC, completing an ordinary Roman education in ten years' time: 27-17 BC.

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ROMAN ECONOMIC POLICIES DURING THE THIRD CENTURY AD: THE EVIDENCE OF THE *TITULI PICTI* ON OIL AMPHORAE

Abstract: Although the food supply of Rome has generated numerous publications, many details remain obscure. This contribution focuses on the oil supply during the 3rd century and the changes in the *tituli* on Dressel 20 oil amphorae. After a status quaestionis and refutation of the main hypotheses, the author argues that the *tituli* indicated the person(s) who were legally responsible for the cargo during the voyage. When during the reign of Septimius Severus the emperor's name appears on the amphorae, the emperor is taking full liability for the transported cargoes. This was meant to be a way of stimulating skippers to serve the Roman supply system. Two episodes in Roman history prove that the central government had turned to this method before. Because of the great financial risks the emperor took, the financing of the supply system was once again reorganised by Severus Alexander.

Every historian interested in the economic structure of the Roman Empire is bound to be confronted sooner or later with the so-called *annona* or food supply of the city of Rome. It is generally known that the import of food, especially grain and to a lesser extent olive oil was vital for the survival of several cities in Antiquity. Rome, the absolute centre of the Mediterranean world with an ever-increasing population, relied more than any other city on the import of grain and oil. During the last decades, several distinguished authors have tried to grasp the complexity and the immense organisational tasks the Roman emperors must have faced in developing and securing a regular and feasible supply of foodstuffs: several thorough studies are now available concerning the central administration of the *annona* in Rome by the *praefectus annonae*¹, the legal framework by which the Roman government could enter into contracts with skippers (*navicularii*) and merchants (*negotiatores* and *mercatores*) for the delivery of the supplies² and the general organisation of transport³.

¹ H. PAVIS D'ESCURAC, *La préfecture de l'annone. Service administratif impérial d'Auguste à Constantin*, Rome 1976.

² A.J.B. SIRKS, *Food for Rome. The Legal Structure of the Transportation and Processing of Supplies for the Imperial Distributions in Rome and Constantinople*, Amsterdam 1991; E. HÖBENREICH, *Annona. Juristische Aspekte der stadtrömischen Lebensmittelfversorgung im Prinzipat*, Graz 1997.

³ L. DE SALVO, *Economia privata e pubblici servizi nell'impero romano: i corpora naviculariorum*, Messina 1992.

Many details however remain obscure and hard to understand. Therefore, it is the purpose of this article to tackle one of those problems primarily connected with the supply of Spanish oil during the third century AD. It has long been generally acknowledged that in imperial times large amounts of the oil consumed in Rome originated from Baetica, the southern region of Spain; the oil was then transported to the capital in Dressel 20 amphorae. How much Rome was depending on the Spanish import can, even today, clearly be seen at the Monte Testaccio (Rome), the famous artificial hill totally made up of oil amphorae fragments⁴. Apart from stamps and graffiti, Dressel 20 amphorae are often marked with several *tituli picti*, each indicated by a Greek letter, which contain valuable information about the organisation of the Spanish oil trade. The exact meaning of some of the *tituli* though is still heavily debated⁵. This article will not try to solve all problems related to the *tituli picti*, but concentrate only on the situation during the third century and the alterations of the *titulus β*, which mentions the name or names of the people who are considered to be responsible for the amphorae transport. Those names (*tria nomina*) are always written in the genitive. There are however different typologies: *titulus β* often contains the name of only one person, e.g. *D. Caecili Hospitalis*⁶ or *T. Litucci Sabini*⁷, but we also find traces of partnerships between members of the same family, like the frequently encountered *Vinisorum Sereni et Vinisiantis*⁸ or between two merchant families, like *L. Mari Phoebi et Vibior(um) Viat(oris) et Rest(ituti)*⁹. The

⁴ Not all fragments found at Monte Testaccio belong to Dressel 20 amphorae. For the different amphorae typologies and the structure of the hill, see in particular E. RODRIGUEZ-ALMEIDA, *Bolli anforari del Monte Testaccio I*, BCAR 84 (1974-1975), p. 199-248; J.M. BLAZQUEZ MARTINEZ, *Ultimas aportaciones a los problemas de la produccion y comercio del aceite en la Antigüedad*, in: *Producción y comercio del aceite en la Antigüedad*. Segundo Congreso Internacional (Sevilla 1982), Madrid 1983, p. 19-100 and E. RODRIGUEZ ALMEIDA, *Il Monte Testaccio: ambiente, storia, materiali*, Roma 1984.

⁵ Especially *titulus δ* raises difficulties. According to Remesal Rodríguez, the greatest authority on Dressel 20, and his research group CEIPAC (<http://ceipac.gh.ub.es/>), *titulus δ* is a fiscal or toll mark. Remesal has defended his interpretation in numerous publications, of which I cite the most recent: J. REMESAL RODRIGUEZ, *Las ánforas Dressel 20 y su sistema epigráfico*, in: J. REMESAL RODRIGUEZ, (ed.), *Epigrafía anfórica*, Barcelona 2004, p. 127-148. His views have been heavily contested by B. LIOU & A. TCHERNIA, *L'interprétation des inscriptions sur les amphores Dressel 20*, in: *Epigrafia della produzione e della distribuzione*, Rome 1994, p. 133-156.

⁶ CIL XV 3762-3764.

⁷ CIL XV 3934-3938 and J.M. BLAZQUEZ MARTINEZ, *Excavaciones arqueológicas en el Monte Testaccio (Roma)*, Madrid 1994, nos. 108-110.

⁸ CIL XV 4052-4054.

⁹ CIL XV 3951-3955 and 3958-3959.

exact occupation however of the people mentioned in those *tituli* will be discussed later on, as I believe this may be the key to some problems related to the third-century oil trade¹⁰.

During the first two centuries AD, no alterations were made to the drafting of the *titulus β* as described above. Apparently, for more than two centuries, the Spanish oil trade was organised and dominated by merchants and merchant families working on a small or large scale according to the available means. However, when the Severi started to rule the Roman Empire and added oil to the regular food distributions, the names of the oil merchants suddenly disappear completely and are replaced by the formulae *Dominorum nostrorum* (sometimes accompanied by *Augustorum*) followed by the names of Septimius Severus, Caracalla and between 205 and 211, Geta. After the murder of Caracalla in 217, the imperial names are substituted by the phrase *fisci rationis patrimoni provinciae Baeticae* or *fisci rationis patrimoni provinciae Tarraconensis*. From 230 onwards, the names of individual merchants appear again on the amphorae, in addition to the *tituli* with a *fisci*-phrasing¹¹. Several authors have tried to

¹⁰ It should be noted that a few people mentioned in the *tituli* are more than just names to us. Some are also known from epigraphical sources. I refer to P. EICH, *Ökonomischer Interventionismus im 3. Jh.? Anmerkungen zur Interpretation der epigraphischen Zeugnisse auf Dressel 20-Amphoren aus der Severerzeit*, in: L. RUSCU e.a., *Orbis Antiquus. Studia in honorem Ioannis Pisonis*, Cluj – Napoca 2004, p. 58-72 (especially 60), for a comprehensive survey and further notes of the 6 merchants who mention their profession on the stones. It is remarkable that we find a *navicularius* (P. Olitius Apollonius in *CIL* XII 4406), a *mercator olei Hispani ex provincia Baetica* (L. Marius Phoebus in *CIL* VI 1935), a *negotiator olearius ex Baetica* (D. Caecilius Hospitalis in *CIL* II 1474) and 3 *diffusores olearii* (D. Caecilius Onesimus in *AE* 1980, 98; D. Caecilius Abascanthus in *CIL* VI 1885; M. Iulius Hermesianus in *CIL* II 1481). This striking difference in nomenclature has generated numerous articles trying to pinpoint the exact meaning of each term, but due to the very isolated nature of the available information, neither of them can be more than a hypothesis. Of the more recent literature, I mention J. REMESAL RODRIGUEZ, *L. Marius Phoebus, mercator olei hispani ex provincia Baetica. Consideraciones en torno a los términos mercator, negotiator y diffusor olearius ex Baetica*, in: G. PACI (ed.), *Epigraphai. Miscellanea epigrafica in onore di Lidio Gasperini*, Roma 2000, p. 781-797; R. ETIENNE, *Diffusor olei ad annonam Urbis*, in: M. GARRIDO-HORY & A. GONZALES, *Histoire, espaces et marges de l'Antiquité: hommages à Monique Clavel-Lévêque*, Besançon 2003, p. 245-253 and C. RICO, *Mercatores, negotiators et diffusores olearii et le commerce de l'huile de Bétique à destination de Rome aux I^{er} et II^e siècles de notre ère*, *REA* 105 (2003), p. 413-433.

¹¹ E. RODRIGUEZ ALMEIDA, *Vicissitudini nella gestione del commercio dell'olio betico da Vespasiano a Severo Alessandro*, in: *The Seaborne Commerce of Ancient Rome. Studies in Archaeology and History* (MAAR, 36), Roma 1980, p. 277-290; ID., *Los tituli picti de las ánforas olearias de la Bética, I. Tituli picti de los Severos y la ratio fisci*, Madrid 1989, p. 27; P. EICH, *Interventionismus* (n. 10), p. 61. Rodríguez Almeida's reconstruction is

explain this remarkable evolution, but none of the hypotheses is, as I hope to prove, really convincing.

Rodríguez Almeida, who in particular studied the *tituli picti* of the Severi, argues that the change in the *tituli* could be connected with the high expenses for the maintenance of a «flota annonaria que hubiera estado inmóvil buena parte del año» and the profits made by the oil merchants, which Septimius Severus preferred to cash in himself¹². He thinks Septimius Severus wished to deal directly with the *navicularii* who controlled the transport means, without having to take into account the *mercatores*' interests. These purely financial grounds would have forced the Severi to reorganise and supervise the oil trade. Rodríguez Almeida adds that there is no need to link the phrasing of the *titulus* with the confiscation of oil producing estates in Baetica by Septimius Severus after defeating Clodius Albinus¹³. It had been assumed that once the emperor had acquired the means to bring large amounts of oil to Rome, he took firm control over the oil trade, a reform which should have been reflected in the *tituli*.

This idea was further elaborated by Remesal Rodríguez, who claimed the Severi not only radically transformed the organisation of the oil import, but effectively controlled a major part of the trade. He even characterised this economic evolution with rather forced words as «staatliche Intervention» and «intervencionismo estatal, directo y absoluto»¹⁴. By trying to reduce the costs of supplying Rome with Spanish oil and to rationalise the import system, the Severi would actually have terminated the intermediary role of the merchants we met in the first two centuries of the Empire.

However, this 'Spanish' reconstruction of Severian economic policies not only leaves many questions to be answered, but also starts from a few assumptions that I believe can hardly be true.

partially based on R. Etienne's pioneering research of Monte Testaccio and the third-century amphorae, *Les amphores du Testaccio au III^e siècle*, MEFRA 61 (1949), p. 152-181.

¹² E. RODRIGUEZ ALMEIDA, *Los tituli picti* (n. 11), p. 36.

¹³ SHA, *Sept. Sev.* 12.1-3.

¹⁴ J. REMESAL RODRIGUEZ, *Ölproduktion und Ölhandel in der Baetica: ein Beispiel für Verbindung archäologischer und historischer Forschung*, MBAH 2, 2 (1983), p. 91-111, especially 106; ID., *Mummius Secundinus. El Kalendarium Vegetianum y las confiscaciones de Severo en la Bética*, *Gerión* 14 (1996), p. 195-221, especially 208; ID., *Escrito en barro: el Monte Testaccio y la Historia Augusta*, in: G. BONAMENTE – M. MAYER (ed.), *Historiae Augustae Colloquium Barcinonense*, Bari 2005, p. 249-256.

First of all, these 'interventions' by the Severi are never explicitly discussed: they 'reorganised' the oil import and 'intervened most rigorously', but we are kept dangling about the real alterations: which parts of the oil trade were now controlled by the emperors? Who exactly took the merchants' place in the transport organisation? Who then was responsible for the cargoes in Baetica and during the voyage? If one proclaims that an economic system, functioning properly for more than two centuries, was suddenly discarded and completely altered, one must substantiate his reconstruction with strong and valid arguments, which I believe are simply not available. For example, it is nowhere recorded or supported that it was financially impracticable to maintain a merchant fleet for the food supply by the time the Severi were in charge, as Rodríguez Almeida proposes; still, we could argue that details about economic structures and evolutions are rarely mentioned in contemporary sources. Of greater importance however is that the very idea of a merchant fleet organised or controlled by the government is in fact alien to Roman economic policy. We have no testimonies of a fleet financed by the emperor to secure the *annona*, except for an untrustworthy fragment of the *Historia Augusta*, in which Commodus is said to have created a *classis Africana* to support the import of grain from northern Africa¹⁵. This allegation however has been convincingly refuted by Pavis d'Escurac, so there is no reason to believe that a state-controlled merchant fleet ever existed in Roman history¹⁶. This would of course imply that the very foundation of Rodríguez Almeida's rather vague reconstruction and Remesal Rodríguez' elaboration must be turned down.

Furthermore, Eich rightly remarks that a total reorganisation of the oil trade would definitely not have come up with a financially more attractive supply system¹⁷. For several reasons, it is hardly likely that the Severi would have been able to regulate the various stages of the oil import more efficiently than it was before. The Roman central government

¹⁵ SHA, *Comm.* 17.7-8.

¹⁶ H. PAVIS D'ESCURAC, *Réflexions sur la classis Africana Commodiana*, in: *Mélanges Seston*, Paris 1974, p. 397-408. Nevertheless, the existence of a merchant fleet owned and controlled by the Roman state has also been supported by G. CHIC GARCIA, *Epigrafía anfórica de la Bética II: los rotulos pintados sobre ánforas olearias. Consideraciones sobre la annona*, Sevilla 1988, p. 68, who refers to the situation in Egypt, where Nile vessels were the emperor's property. This is however a continuation of a Ptolemaic tradition which cannot be generalised for the entire empire. Cf. H. HAUBEN, *Femmes propriétaires et locataires de navires en Égypte ptolémaïque*, *JJP* 23 (1993), p. 61-74.

¹⁷ P. EICH, *Interventionismus* (n. 10), p. 63.

simply lacked a well-structured, extensive administrative apparatus capable of organising and executing such a radical change. And even if they succeeded in eliminating the individual merchants and merchant families from the oil transport, who would replace them? Who was to furnish the necessary ships and the crew aboard? Rodríguez Almeida's claim that the emperor merely tried to get rid of the intermediate merchant and entrusted the transport to the *navicularii*, is rather strange: this implies there was a clear distinction between *negotiatores* and *mercatores* on the one hand and *navicularii* on the other, which simply did not exist in Roman commerce. A merchant could on the one hand undertake a voyage with wares he had bought at his own expense hoping to sell them in the next port, thus acting as a *negotiator* or *mercator*, while on the other hand he could also transport other people's wares as a *navicularius*. This is made perfectly clear by the merchants known from the *tituli* β who also left a trace in epigraphy: as already stated, some are called *mercator*, some *diffusor*, others *negotiator* and another *navicularius*. Furthermore, when Septimius Severus took control of a considerable number of Spanish oil-producing estates and consequently included oil in the *annona*, which will be discussed later on, he had larger amounts of oil shipped to Rome than had been hitherto transported. Therefore, additional means of transport had to be provided. It makes no sense, then, why the emperor would eliminate people from the oil trade who controlled a part of these transport means.

Moreover, the knowledge of maritime commerce and the network of business partners, trade agreements and correspondents could never be replaced overnight. Trying to set up an alternative system for the oil trade would be a tremendous task, which would force the emperor to invest money, time and effort just to replace a perfectly organised, smoothly functioning trade system.

Thirdly, it would really be surprising if the part played by the merchants was to be taken over by a Roman emperor. Although naturally he would not in person be involved in the commercialisation of Spanish olive oil by stating his name on the amphorae, the emperor would in theory be linked to the world of the *negotiatores* and *mercatores olearii*, which would have been totally unacceptable. It is well known that the Roman elite despised most commercial activities, especially sea-borne trade: they did not want to be linked to a world populated by inferior business agents, sailors and freedmen, even though it is now generally accepted that the money that financed these activities quite often originated from a senatorial treasure chest¹⁸.

Therefore, I believe there are firm grounds to cast serious doubt on the interpretation proposed by Rodríguez Almeida. As several other historians have tried to shed some light on the problems connected with the *titulus β*, we shall look in the following paragraphs at two other suggestions to reconstruct the various stages of the third century oil trade.

In her famous study of the *navicularii*, Lietta De Salvo dedicates a whole chapter to the olive oil trade and the importance of the *tituli* for the research of Roman commercial activities.

According to her, the appearance of the emperors' names on the amphorae has an economic as well as political background¹⁸: first of all, Septimius Severus may have wished to get rid of the intermediary merchants who were able to make a living as middlemen in the oil supply, apparently because their intervention made the whole import organisation more expensive. By eliminating them from the supply system, the emperor hoped to replenish the treasury. Furthermore, De Salvo assumes that the oil destined for Rome was gathered from the imperial estates in Baetica or as *tributum* the inhabitants had to pay in kind. Because the emperor was thus *de facto* the owner of the olive oil, he could, as an act of propaganda, stress the fact that he actually did his utmost to take care of the *annona*, that he personally ensured the regular arrival of oil in Rome.

It is immediately clear that De Salvo, though she claims otherwise, does nothing more than resume Rodríguez Almeida's hypotheses, which, for the reasons stated above, does not convince me. Moreover, it is difficult to corroborate her claim that only oil that was demanded by the emperor, either as the yield of his domains or as *tributum*, was transported to Rome: it is not very likely that the oil collected in this manner

¹⁸ The involvement of the Roman elite in commerce has been thoroughly studied by J.H. D'ARMS, *Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome*, Cambridge 1981. See also Th. SCHLEICH, *Überlegungen zum Problem senatorischer Handelsaktivitäten*, I: *Senatorische Wirtschaftsmentalität in moderner und antiker Deutung*, *MBAH* 2, 2 (1983), p. 65-90 and ID., *Überlegungen zum Problem senatorischer Handelsaktivitäten*, II: *Zwischen 'otium' und 'negotium': Gelegenheitsunternehmungen und domestizierte Wirtschaft*, *MBAH* 3, 1 (1984), p. 37-76.

¹⁹ L. DE SALVO, *Economia privata* (n. 3), p. 204-205, a hypothesis which De Salvo had previously elaborated in *Pubblico e privato in età severiana: il caso del trasporto dell'olio betico e l'epigrafia anforaria*, in: *Navires et commerces de la Méditerranée antique. Hommage à Jean Rougé*, *CH* 33 (1988), nos.3-4, p. 333-343.

would suffice to meet the huge demands of the capital²⁰. As for the propaganda, it is unlikely that the Roman people, who regularly received a certain amount of oil, were always able to see the amphorae. Upon their arrival in Rome, the oil was usually stockpiled in *dolia* in *horrea*. Was the oil then poured into smaller containers to facilitate its distribution? And even if the rather voluminous Dressel 20 amphorae were used during the distributions, were the *tituli* large enough to be read by the Roman *plebs*? And did they need the emperors' names on the amphorae to know who furnished the oil? Surely they were aware of the Septimius Severus' reform! We simply do not know the details of these distributions, but until more information is available, I think it rather hazardous to consider the change in *titulus* β as part of an imperial propaganda campaign. In the first place, the *tituli* must have been a sort of guideline or warranty for the merchants and customers, providing them with the necessary information about the weight of the amphora, the person who was responsible during the voyage etc.

The last hypothesis we will be discussing before offering an alternative explanation is the one proposed by the aforementioned Peter Eich, who tries to connect the different phrasing in the *titulus* with an alleged total disruption of the transport system in the early third century AD²¹. He begins his argumentation with a discussion of the famous inscription CIL III 14165, 8, which is most likely to be placed in the first decade of the third century²². This fragmentary text, engraved on a bronze plate, relates

²⁰ P. BALDACCI, *Commercio e stato nell'età dei Severi*, RIL 101 (1967), p. 729-747, already stated that the Roman emperor's estates in Spain were not as vast as once thought. See also J.M. BLAZQUEZ MARTINEZ, *The Latest Work on the Export of Baetican Olive Oil to Rome and the Army*, G&R 39, 2 (1992), p. 173-188, especially 184, and L. WIER-SCHOWSKI, *Die römische Heeresversorgung im frühen Prinzipat*, MBAH 20, 2 (2001), p. 37-61, in particular 45.

²¹ P. EICH, *Interventionismus* (n. 10), p. 65-67.

²² [C(audius) I]ulianus naviculariis | [mar]inis Arelatensibus quinque | corporum salutem | [Qui]d lecto decreto vestro scripserim | [3] a [5] s [7] proc(uratori) Aug(ustorum) e(gregio) v(iro) subilci iussi opto felicissimi bene valeatis | e(xemplum) e(pistulae) | exemplum decreti naviculariorum marinarum Arelatensium quinque corporum item eorum quae apud me acta | sunt subieci et cum eadem querella laltius procedat ceteris etiam inplorantibus auxilium aequitatis cum quadam delnuntiatione cessaturi propediem obsequi | si permaneat iniuria peto ut tam indemnitati rationis quam securitati hominum | qui annonae deserviunt consulatur | inprimi caractere regulas ferreas et | adplicari prosecutores ex officio tuo iubeas qui in urbe pondus quod susceperint tradant. Max[im—] | utique [—] | et ex[—] | tor ex[—] | cianu[s—] | nes pr[—]na | vicula[ri—] | feci [—] | eiusdem [mani?—] | legi decret[um Aug(ustorum)?—] | ltes hom[in]es [—] | liones [—] | est ut [—] | | con[—]an | non[a?—] | lses [—] | r[—].

the measures taken by the *praefectus annonae* in response to a complaint by the *navicularii* in Arles and is addressed to the *quinque corpora naviculariorum*. Somewhere in the past (but we lack more precise information), the skippers must have been faced with corruption and fraud and even threatened, along with some unknown colleagues (?)²³, to stop providing their services to the *annona*. Eich considers this last part to be essential and concludes from the passage that early in the third century, not only the skippers in Arles but the whole maritime commerce and transport must have had to deal with a considerable setback due to widespread internal mismanagement and corruption. According to him, this situation must have forced the Roman emperors to take drastic actions and reform the supply system. When trying to furnish some details of this reorganisation, Eich relies on the aforementioned study of Sirks²⁴. In this study of the legal position of the *navicularii* during the Empire, one of the main threads of Sirks' argument is his claim that the *corpora* which united the skippers in the provinces, were not the result of a spontaneous cooperation by the *navicularii*, but instead a deliberate creation by the emperors to secure the food supply. Following the same course, Eich supposes Septimius Severus tried to face up to the general crisis the transport system went through by regrouping the skippers and merchants in Baetica into a single *corpus*, thus hoping to at once avoid fraud and centralise the transport organisation. The functioning of the *corpus* would then have been organised in the same way as the other *corpora*: in exchange for some privileges and the payment of the *vecturae* or transport costs²⁵, the members of the *corpus* would have been the ones responsible for supplying Rome with oil. Citing the emperors' names in the *titulus β* would therefore be nothing more than a reminder of Severus' initiative to remedy the problems maritime commerce was then facing.

Ingenious as this reconstruction may seem, there are, as I hope to demonstrate, again several reasons to discard Eich's hypothesis. First of all, the inscription addressed to the skippers of Arles orders *inprimi caractere regulas ferreas*. This measure clearly indicates that the fraud the skippers were confronted with, had something to do with the cargo

²³ It is not known who exactly the *ceteris inplorantibus* were, though I will suggest a possible solution in the commentary on Eich's hypothesis.

²⁴ A.J.B. SIRKS, *Food for Rome* (n. 2).

²⁵ In *CIL* II 1180, which can be placed in the second half of the second century AD, Sextus Iulius Possessor is instructed by the central government to pay the *navicularii* the due *vecturae*.

transported: apparently, the *regulae* or rods that had to be installed in the ship's hold were meant to ensure that the amount of goods loaded in the port of departure corresponded to the amount discharged at the final destination. This only makes sense if the commodities in question are loosely transported²⁶. It is hard to see how this can be connected to the stowage of Baetican olive oil amphorae; grain on the other hand may well have been loosely stocked in the hold²⁷. Therefore, this inscription should be considered as a unique testimony of fraud in the grain trade, but has nothing to do with the oil transported from southern Spain.

Secondly, one can hardly deduce from this sole inscription a total disruption of the maritime commerce in the early third century. Eich's reading of *ceteris inplorantibus* etc. suggests that the *navicularii* of Arles were not the only ones confronted with corruption. However, if one tries to view the inscription in the proper context, I do not think his interpretation is tenable. What we have here is the response of the *praefectus annonae*, in which he notifies the conclusions of his investigation and the decisions made (*item eorum quae apud me acta sunt*). In this way he tries to deal with the very specific complaints reported by the skippers. There is no indication that he hopes to remedy a general crisis or a widespread corruption. However, the *praefectus annonae* seizes the opportunity to prevent future abuses. If the corruption and consequently similar complaints were to continue (*cum eadem querella latius procedat*) and if others asked for help (*ceteris inplorantibus*), then the provincial *procurator* mentioned at the beginning of the inscription could rely on this document to take the necessary actions, with the approval of the *praefectus annonae*. I believe the *praefectus annonae* intended this document to serve as a precedent, a directive in case the *procurator* would have to deal with a similar case. It is very likely that this was also the reason why the *navicularii* wished to publish the *praefectus*' response: the document must have been used as a way of protection, a clear proof that the central *annona* administration guarded the *navicularii* from fraud.

This small digression on *CIL* III 14165, 8 makes perfectly clear that in fact the Roman government was willing to help the skippers in Gaul perform their duties in the utmost conditions and that there are absolutely no

²⁶ E. HÖBENREICH, *Annona* (n. 2), p. 114-115.

²⁷ *Dig.* XIX 2.31 (Alfenus): *In navem saufeii cum complures frumentum confuderant, saufeius uni ex his frumentum reddiderat de communi et navis perierat: quaesitum est, an ceteri pro sua parte frumenti cum nauta agere possunt oneris aversi actione*. See also G.E. RICKMAN, *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*, Oxford 1980, p. 132-133.

firm grounds to suppose maritime commerce was as a whole in great difficulty at the beginning of the third century.

Thirdly, nothing is known of a *corpus naviculariorum* in Baetica. If the emperor regrouped the skippers in Spain in a single *corpus* like he is supposed to have done in Gaul, Ostia and Africa, it would be a striking coincidence that our sources, both epigraphical and literary, keep completely silent over this alleged organisation, especially as all the other *corpora* are well documented in legal texts and various inscriptions²⁸. On the other hand, a few inscriptions from Spain and Rome prove the existence of a *corpus oleariorum*²⁹. This *corpus* however can be traced back to the early second century, so it certainly cannot have been founded by Septimius Severus to remedy a commercial crisis³⁰.

Furthermore, I believe the main reason to cast serious doubts on Eich's reconstruction is the fact that he relies on a very disputable part of Sirks' study. This is not the place to embark on a detailed discussion of the way the *corpora naviculariorum* came into being, but I hope to have proven elsewhere that there is absolutely no reason to think the *corpora* were founded by the Roman emperors³¹. On the contrary, the *corpora* are merely the last stage of a slow but spontaneous evolution of professional associations, without the central government of Rome forcing skippers and merchants to be members of a certain *corpus* and dictating their commercial activities. Hence, because of all the reasons provided, I do not

²⁸ L. DE SALVO, *Economia privata* (n. 3), *passim*.

²⁹ AE 2001, 1186: *M(arco) Iul(io) H[er]mesian[o] | diffusori olei ad annon[am] | urbis c[urator]i corpo[r]is | olea[r]iorum st[ationi]s(?) | Romul[ae] 3|i[3]te[3] | huic corpus [ole]ari[orum] | splend[idissi]mum | mer[entissimo] s[tatu]am | pon[enda]m iussit | M(arcus) Iulius Hermes Fro[nti]n[us] | filius honore accepto | impensam remisit; AE 2001, 1187: *Miner[vae] Aug[ustae] | Valeria Qu[3] | Valeri Valentis [f]ilia | ad cultum operi[s] | a patre optumo(!) exorna[t]i | in honorem corporis | oleariorum d[onum] d[edit]; AE 2002, 716: *Veneri Genitrici | Augustae | Valeria Valentina | Valeri Valentis filia | ad cultum operis | a patre optumo(!) exornati | in honorem corporis | oleariorum d[edit] d[edit] | D(is) M(anibus) s(acrum) | C(aio) Sen[ti]o Reguliano eq[ui]ti R(omano) | diffus(or)i oleario ex Baetica | curator(i) eiusdem corporis negot(iatori) vinario Luguldun(i) in canabis consisten(ti) | curator(i) et patrono eiusd(em) corporis nautae Ararilco patrono eiusd(em) corporis | patrono IIIIvir(o) Luguduni | consistentium L(ucius) Silenius | Reginus Aus et Ulattia | Metrodora et fili(i) eiusdem ponendum curaverunt | procurante Dionysio et | Belliciano et |***

³⁰ G.E. RICKMAN, *The Corn Supply* (n. 26), p. 90-91; P. HERZ, *Studien zur römischen Wirtschaftsgesetzgebung. Die Lebensmittelversorgung (Historia Einzelschr., Heft 55)*, Stuttgart 1988, p. 127-135 and P. LEROUX, *L'huile de la Bétique et le prince sur un itinéraire annonaire*, REA 88 (1986), p. 247-271.

³¹ Cf. W. BROEKAERT, *Creatio ex nihilo: the Origin of the corpora naviculariorum Reconsidered*, Latomus 67 (2008), forthcoming.

think we can attach credence to Eich's claim that the change in *titulus* β was the result of Septimius Severus' attempt to confront a commercial setback by founding a *corpus* in Baetica.

Of course, one cannot content oneself with the mere refutation of other researchers' hypotheses; in the next pages, I will offer an explanation of the different phrasing of the *tituli*, which I believe is consistent not only with the evolution the *annona* went through during the reign of the Severi, but also with earlier Roman economic policies connected with the food supply.

Let us start with a very simple observation: all *tituli* β take the genitive case, which implies that the people mentioned in those *tituli* are somehow considered to be the owners of the amphorae and the olive oil. Hence we could assume they were oil producers who only had their wares transported by merchants without being involved personally in the actual transport. However, it has long been shown that the names in the *tituli* β in fact refer to the merchants responsible for the transport of the cargo³². Like any other commercial activity, we can imagine the maritime oil trade could then be organised in two ways: either the merchant bought the olive oil in southern Spain at his own expense, hoping to sell the cargo for a considerable profit (this person would then be referred to as a *negotiator* or *mercator olearius*); or he merely provided the necessary means to transport the olive oil someone else wanted to have brought to a certain port (in which case he would be a *navicularius*)³³. In the first case, the genitive in the *titulus* is perfectly logical: the merchant is the owner of the cargo and is also responsible for the wares and their delivery. In the second case however the skipper is strictly speaking not the owner of the cargo; he merely places his ship at someone else's disposal³⁴ and

³² A. HÉRON DE VILLEFOSSE, *Deux armateurs narbonnais: Sex. Fadius Secundus et P. Olitius Apollonius*, *MSAF* 74 (1915), p. 153-180. See also the previously mentioned merchants, known from both *tituli* β and epigraphical sources (see n. 10).

³³ Both *negotiator* / *mercator* and *navicularius* are found on the stones mentioning someone we also encounter in the *tituli* (see n. 10). It was of course very well possible that the same person sometimes acted as a *negotiator* / *mercator* and sometimes as *navicularius*.

³⁴ This does not necessarily imply that the *navicularius* is also the *dominus navis* or shipowner. A *navicularius* only exploits the ship for commercial use, whether he is the owner or not: *Dig.* L 6.6.6 clearly indicates that it was not necessary to possess one or more ships to be a member of a *corpus naviculariorum*. Most authors however seem to identify the *navicularii* with the *domini navium*: P. HERZ, *Studien zur römischen Wirtschaftsgesetzgebung* (n. 29), p. 114-115; L. DE SALVO, *Economia privata* (n. 3), p. 233; A. FÖLDI,

enters into a transport contract (*locatio conductio ad onus vehendum*)³⁵. As clearly indicated by Roman legal literature³⁶, this kind of contract still holds the merchant responsible for the cargo during the voyage³⁷. According to the law, the merchant can then be considered to be, as it were, the 'temporary owner' of the wares, i.e. as long as it takes to deliver them to their destination. Hence again the genitive in the *titulus*: during the voyage, the merchant, whether he acts as a *negotiator* / *mercator* or as a *navicularius*, is *de facto* the owner of the cargo and thus responsible for its delivery, even if *de iure* the wares belong to someone else. I therefore believe the *titulus* β was meant to be a means of verification and inspection in two ways: in the port of departure, the name of the merchant was painted on the amphora for very obvious reasons, i.e. to indicate which lot of amphorae was to be loaded in whose ship and to ensure the merchant he embarked with the right cargo. At the same time, the *titulus* offered the addressee a way to hold someone responsible in case something went wrong with the cargo: it so happens that the merchant could have bribed the people who filled the amphorae with olive oil to commit a fraud by altering the quantity or quality. That way, the *tituli* β would not only give evidence of the economic organisation of the oil trade by providing the names of the merchants involved, but also of the legal implications of transport contracts: during the entire voyage, the merchant is obliged to look after the cargo entrusted to him, he bears the financial risks in the event of damage or loss (except for *vis maior*) and can be prosecuted if there is a suspicion of fraud.

Where do these conclusions lead us now with regard to the third-century change in the *tituli* β and the appearance of the emperors' names?

Die Entwicklung der sich auf die Schiffer beziehenden Terminologie im römischen Recht, RHD 63 (1995), p. 1.

³⁵ L.R. MÉNAGER, *Naulum et receptum rem salvam fore. Contribution à l'étude de la responsabilité contractuelle dans les transports maritimes en droit romain*, RD 38 (1960), p. 177-213 and 385-411; T. GIMÉNEZ CANDELA, *La responsabilidad de los Nautae*, in: T. HACKENS & M. MIRO, *Le commerce maritime romain en Méditerranée occidentale / El comercio marítimo Romano en el Mediterráneo occidental*. Colloque international: El comercio marítimo Romano en el Mediterráneo - Barcelona, 16-18 mai 1988, Rixensart 1990, p. 35-45.

³⁶ Dig. XIV 2.10.1, XIX 2.13.1.

³⁷ During the Empire, Roman maritime laws anticipated various cases of *vis maior*, e.g. in the event of jettison and shipwreck. For a comprehensive survey, see C.H. BRECHT, *Zur Haftung der Schiffer im antiken Recht*, München 1962; A.J.M. MEYER-TERMEER, *Die Haftung der Schiffer im griechischen und römischen Recht*, Zutphen 1978 and L. DE SALVO, *Economia privata* (n. 3), p. 343-369.

One thing is for certain: early in the third century, the Spanish oil trade was reorganised and the Severi somehow seem to have taken the initiative. In the previous paragraphs, I refuted various hypotheses that attempted to explain the change of phrasing by assuming a fundamental reform of the oil import. In my opinion, it is very unlikely that the Roman emperors either abolished a trade system that had been in practice for more than two centuries (Rodríguez Almeida) or forced the merchants to join a *corpus* (Eich). The alternative I propose implies that the alterations introduced by the Severi must somehow be connected with the inclusion of Spanish olive oil in the *annona* and the legal meaning of the *titulus β*.

It is well known that the regular distribution of olive oil was introduced by Septimius Severus. According to the *Historia Augusta*, he bestowed upon the city a free daily allowance of oil in perpetuity³⁸. Although olive oil was also distributed for free during the second century under the reign of Antoninus Pius³⁹, the emperor's magnanimity was certainly intended to remedy a temporary shortage (*penuria*), not to install a regular distribution.

The Severan addition to the *annona* implied that from then on, the central government was faced with the obligation not only to provide enough oil for the distributions, but also to ensure the oil was brought to Rome on a regular basis. This means that the supply could not only be left to private oil merchants, who had been importing oil during the first two centuries. The oil trade now had to be organised along the same lines as the grain trade, which meant that first and foremost merchants must be found who could guarantee regular transport means. When we look at the regulations concerning the grain trade, we see that the *navicularii* responsible for the import were stimulated by Roman law to undertake the food supply by granting them several privileges and the exemption of certain fiscal burdens⁴⁰. Some of these laws however, which can be dated to the second half of the second century, also mention merchants who seem to be mainly concerned with the oil trade⁴¹. This may be an

³⁸ SHA, *Sept. Sev.* 18.3: *Tripolim, unde oriundus erat, contusis bellicosissimis gentibus securissimam reddidit, ac populo Romano diurnum oleum gratuitum et fecundissimum in aeternum donavit.*

³⁹ SHA, *Ant. P.* 8.11: *vini olei et tritici penuriam per aerarii sui damnum emendo et gratis populo dando sedavit.*

⁴⁰ Dig. L 4.5; L 6.6.3; L 6.6.5. These privileges are thoroughly studied by A.J.B. SIRKS, *Food for Rome* (n. 2).

⁴¹ Dig. L 4.5, written by Scaevola, bestows the *vacatio muneris publici* upon *navicularii* and *mercatores olearii*. Dig. L 6.6.6 contains a *rescriptum* by Marcus Aurelius,

indication that even before the free distribution of oil became part of the *annona*, the Roman emperors from time to time entered into contracts with oil merchants to supply the city of Rome⁴². When Septimius Severus in the early third century added oil distributions to the *annona* and consequently had to look after the necessary transport means, he could not only rely on a commercial network of merchants who had been importing Spanish olive oil for several centuries, but he could also use the connections his predecessors had with these traders and the contracts they had made. The only thing left for Septimius Severus was to intensify these contacts in order to procure a regular transport system, exactly as previous emperors had done to encourage grain merchants to place their ships at the disposal of the *annona*. Therefore, Septimius Severus must have sought additional ways to secure a steady supply system. To trace the way in which Septimius stimulated the oil supply, we need to study two similar cases in Roman economic history, when the central government was also in want of transport means.

The first case takes us back to the year 215 BC during the Hannibalic War. Livy relates how the soldiers in Spain informed the Senate that they were distressed by a total lack of money, clothes and grain. The Senate immediately recognised the precarious situation but lacked the resources to help out the army. They decided to call on those who had been on previous occasions engaged in state-contracts to deliver the wares on credit to the soldiers. Three *societates publicanorum* were willing to make the contract with the Senate, on two conditions. They required first to be exempted from military service, and secondly demanded that the state would bear all the risks during the voyages, which meant that the state would also pay for cargoes that did not reach their destination due to circumstances beyond the *publicani*'s control⁴³.

While the first condition is very understandable, the second forced the Senate to comply with an unfavourable regulation previously unseen in maritime law. Compared to imperial times, Republican commercial laws about the shipper's liability were rather embryonic. Most transport contracts usually stipulated that the shipper was liable for damage and loss due to negligence and malice, unless the so-called *receptum nautarum*

which implies that τῶν ναυκλήρων καὶ τὸν σῖτον καὶ ἔλαιον ἐμπορευομένων were freed from *munera*.

⁴² Maybe the emperors contracted with these merchants to bring oil to Rome for occasional distributions, like Antoninus Pius (n. 38).

⁴³ Livy XXIII 48.4-49.4.

was added to the contract. In that case the shipper was also responsible for damage and loss caused by circumstances beyond his control (e.g. piracy and bad weather conditions). In Livy's account, the *publicani* were not only exempted from this liability, they even managed to shift the responsibility to the state. This stipulation gave the *publicani* plenty of opportunities to commit fraud and, sure enough, Livy tells us that two of the *publicani* invented stories of shipwrecks or deliberately wrecked some worthless cargoes and shattered ships⁴⁴.

Interesting though this story may be, many authors have considered it to be spurious, doubtful and anachronistic⁴⁵. It is indeed very likely that Livy's account drew on a late Republican source, because hostility towards the *publicani* was normal practice in those days, but certainly not in the third century BC. However, it is not necessary to discard the stipulations of the state-contract as described by Livy. Though the episode may be falsified, the details of the contract and legal implications are undoubtedly realistic and possible within the frames of Roman maritime law.

The second case we need to examine is situated under the reign of Claudius: in 51 AD, Rome was confronted with a severe food shortage. Suetonius vividly relates how Claudius encountered on the Forum an angry mob throwing pieces of bread at the emperor; Claudius apparently understood the dangers of shortage and threats of mutiny and immediately made arrangements to ensure the food supply⁴⁶. First of all, he stimulated the merchants to bring grain to Rome, even during the winter, when shipping was highly reduced due to bad weather conditions and consequently great risks⁴⁷. Secondly, he stated that he would cover all expenses of damage and loss they might suffer from storms. Thirdly, Claudius promised certain legal privileges to the people who would build transport ships⁴⁸.

⁴⁴ Livy XXV 3.8-5.1.

⁴⁵ See P. ERDKAMP, *Hunger and the Sword: Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264-30 B.C.)*, Amsterdam 1998, p. 116-119, for a discussion of this episode and further literature.

⁴⁶ Suetonius, *Claud.* 18.2-19.1: *Artiore autem annona ob assiduas sterilitates detentus quondam medio Foro a turba conviciisque et simul fragminibus panis ita infestatus, ut aegre nec nisi postico evadere in Palatinus valuerit, nihil non excogitavit ad invehendos etiam tempore hiberno commeatus. Nam et negotiatoribus certa lucra proposuit suscepto in se damno, si cui quid per tempestates accidisset, et naves mercaturae causa fabricantibus magna commoda constituit pro condicione cuiusque: civi vacationem legis Papiae Poppaeae, Latino ius Quiritium, feminis ius IIII liberorum; quae constituta hodieque servantur.*

⁴⁷ According to Vegetius IV 39, shipping should be avoided from November 11 to March 10.

⁴⁸ This last action is analysed in detail by A.J.B. SIRKS, *A Favour to Rich Freedwomen (libertinae) in 51 A.D. On Sue. Cl. 19 and the Lex Papia*, RIDA 27 (1980), p. 283-294.

We already saw the same procedure in the episode told by Livy: here again, the Roman state was willing to take upon itself the risks for which the shipper was usually liable. On the other hand, Claudius held out the prospect of legal privileges, comparable to the arrangements for the *navicularii* during the second century⁴⁹. Apparently, bearing the risks during the voyage and legal stimuli were the two main ways for the Roman state during the Empire to encourage skippers and merchants to assist the food supply.

It is interesting to note that at the end of this fragment, Suetonius remarks that even in his day Claudius' arrangements still applied (*quae constituta hodieque servantur*). We cannot be certain that all of the measures were still valid, as it is not exactly clear which part of the sentence *quae constituta* is referring to: *quae* is almost certainly to be connected with *magna commoda*, but perhaps could also resonate with the *certa lucra*. Either way, the fact that nearly a century after the shortage, which forced Claudius to intervene in the supply system, some and maybe all of his regulations were still effective, indicates they probably had become a regular part of the advantages offered to those who brought food to Rome.

It is obvious that the stimuli Claudius introduced were meant for grain merchants: grain had been and would for centuries remain the most important food⁵⁰. However, we saw that during the second century, some privileges bestowed on grain merchants and *navicularii* also applied to *mercatores olearii*. Apparently, these oil merchants must have been considered to be closely linked with the *annona*. When Septimius Severus organised a regular distribution of Spanish olive oil and had to ensure there was a well-functioning supply system, it is very well possible he merely extended the privileges the grain merchants and *navicularii* enjoyed, to the oil merchants, thus incorporating them in the Roman supply system. That way, there was no need for new organisational or legal regulations: the *mercatores olearii* from then on enjoyed the same status as the other merchants and skippers working for the *annona*.

With the emperor willing to be liable for possible loss of and damage to the cargoes, the *tituli β* were changed according to the new situation. They now clearly indicated that the Spanish oil was destined for distribution in Rome, and that the emperor was *de iure* the owner of the

⁴⁹ See n. 40 and 41.

⁵⁰ Grain is easy to stockpile and highly nutritious. For more details and contemporary reference material, I refer to L. FOXHALL – H.A. FORBES, *Sitometreia: the Role of Grain as a Staple Food in Classical Antiquity*, Chiron 12 (1982), p. 41-90.

amphorae and also responsible for them during the voyage. As this regulation was very advantageous to merchants and skippers, I think most of the people involved in the former oil trade and transport must have been willing to be placed in the service of the *annona*. This way, independent oil merchants as well as skippers who transported the oil gathered as yield from the imperial domains or as *tributum* were given the opportunity to enlist in the Roman supply system, all enjoying the same favourable conditions. This may also be the reason that until 217 (cf. *infra*), nothing is heard of *tituli* mentioning the names of private merchants or skippers: as a consequence of Septimius Severus' reform, they now worked for the *annona*, so there was no need to indicate their names on the amphorae.

Nonetheless, one should always bear in mind that hypotheses such as mine, are primarily based on the rather small amount (i.e. compared to the thousands of amphorae fragments of Monte Testaccio that still have to be excavated) of *tituli* available today. It is still possible that during a future excavation campaign, *tituli* from Septimius Severus' reign, stating the names of private merchants, will be discovered. Nonetheless, the campaigns organised during the last two decades of the 20th century failed to reveal any similar *tituli*.

However, this was not the only change in the phrasing of the *tituli*. From 217 onwards, the *tituli* now read *fisci rationis patrimonii provinciae Baeticae* or *fisci rationis patrimonii provinciae Tarraconensis*, referring to the provincial chests that managed the imperial patrimony. Apparently, the emperor's own resources were somehow used to support the oil supply. According to Eich, this change did not reflect a different organisation of the oil trade: whether the central administration or the emperor himself and his *patrimonium* financed the transport, the way in which the oil merchants were paid did not really matter much to the supply system. However, he admits the phrasing is too vague to come to a definite conclusion⁵¹.

If we want to shed some light on this complex matter, we must first try to understand what is meant by *fisci rationis patrimonii*. It is obvious that, as two different denotations are found (*Baeticae* and *Tarraconensis*), the *fisci* are organised on a provincial level. Apparently, for both *Baetica* and *Tarraconensis*, the emperor's patrimony maintained a provincial chest. Still, *fisci* which are merely patrimonial seem on the whole to have

⁵¹ P. EICH, *Interventionismus* (n. 10), p. 70-71.

been rather exceptional and have had a well defined purpose⁵². Maybe the very reason these two *fisci* existed can be linked to the incorporation of oil in the *annona*. We know that in Rome the expenses related to the grain import were paid by the chest of the *praefectus annonae*, the so-called *fiscus frumentarius*⁵³. It is very well possible that after 217, the organisation of the oil import came to be grafted on the structure already existing for the grain trade. This may be an indication that the oil trade had become more and more institutionalised: instead of being immediately linked with the emperors who had granted stimuli to start up the supply system, the oil import might have been financed by the resources of two special *fisci*, which may have been created for the provinces that furnished the olive oil. Those *fisci* should then have been responsible for the purchase of the oil (in case the imperial estates did not suffice for Rome's needs), the payment of the *vecturae* and the expenses for the cargoes, even if they had suffered damage or losses. With the *fisci* centralising the financial organisation of the Roman oil import, the emperor was also able to control each shipment of oil: the details of the cargoes were after all recorded in the accounting of the provincial *fisci*.

However, it has to be stressed that this fiscal scheme is purely hypothetical: apart from the reference in the phrasing of the *tituli*, we know nothing of the *fisci*. On the other hand, this theory in my view does not contradict any of the available evidence and is consistent with the organisation of the grain import.

During the reign of Severus Alexander, the phrasing of the *tituli* changed once more: in addition to the *fisci-tituli*, the names of individual merchants appear again on the amphorae. According to Rodríguez Almeida⁵⁴, the actual background of this change is alluded to by various passages of Severus Alexander's biography in the *Historia Augusta*, which comment on the emperor's special care for the food supply: Severus Alexander is said to have used his own private resources to restore the grain stocks

⁵² P.A. BRUNT, *The 'Fiscus' and its Development*, *JRS* 56 (1966), p. 75-91, especially 77. See also E. LO CASCIO, *Mercato libero e commercio amministrato in età tardoantica*, in C. ZACCAGNINI (ed.), *Mercanti e politica nel mondo antico*, Roma 2003, p. 314.

⁵³ *CIL* VI 544, VI 634, VI 8474-8477. Cf. A.H.M. JONES, *The Aerarium and the Fiscus during the Early Empire*, *JRS* 40 (1950), p. 22-29, in particular 27.

⁵⁴ E. RODRIGUEZ ALMEIDA, *Los tituli picti* (n. 11), p. 58-60; ID., *Revisitando el Testaccio*, in: T. HACKENS – M. MIRO (eds), *Le commerce maritime romain en Méditerranée occidentale*. Colloque international tenu à Barcelone (1988), Strasbourg 1990, p. 369-390, in particular 378-385.

depleted by Heliogabalus; merchants were given exceptional privileges to encourage them to bring supplies to Rome, and the Severian oil distributions that Heliogabalus had restricted, were fully restored⁵⁵. After these regulations, the manuscripts give a mysterious and, as generally assumed, corrupt sentence: *ius †conferendi actiones†, quod impurus ille sustulerat, hic omnibus reddidit*. Rodríguez Almeida proposes to read *rationes* instead of *actiones*, and believes the author of the *Historia Augusta* meant that Severus Alexander's *liberalitas* restored the right to bring supplies to Rome, leaving the transport to private merchants, whose names would then again appear on the oil amphorae. Two facts seem to support his emendation. First of all, one of the manuscripts, the Codex Palatinus 899, indeed reads *rationes*. Furthermore, this reading would be perfectly in line with Rodríguez Almeida's interpretation of the Severian reorganisation of the oil trade: the sentence seems to corroborate the hypothesis that in the early third century Septimius Severus personally took care of the transport system, which was during the reign of Alexander Severus again partly entrusted to individual merchants, partly to the *fisci*. Apparently, Severus Alexander did not fully restore the oil supply to a pre-Severan state.

Yet I believe there are some inconsistencies in this reconstruction. First of all, the reorganisation of the transport system is said to have been initiated by Septimius Severus; the *Historia Augusta* however states that Severus Alexander abolished a promulgation by *impurus ille*, an obvious reference to Heliogabalus. We have absolutely no evidence of Heliogabalus forbidding merchants to bring supplies to Rome. It is possible that he reduced the distributions, as the *Historia Augusta* claims, but it would be more than political suicide if an emperor actually prohibited the import of food stuffs. I therefore doubt whether this sentence is to be connected with the *annona*. The phrase *ius conferendi actiones* has been interpreted by some authors as «the right of bringing suit»⁵⁶. According to Rodríguez Almeida, this reading completely ignores the economical context of the

⁵⁵ SHA, Sev. Alex. 21.9-22.2: *Commeatum populi Romani sic adiuvit, ut, cump218p218 frumenta Heliogabalus evertisset, hic emptā de propria pecunia loco suo reponeret. negotiatoribus, ut Romam volentes concurrerent, maximam inmunitatem dedit. oleum, quod Severus populo dederat quodque Heliogabalus inminuerat turpissimis hominibus praefecturam annonae tribuendo, integrum restituit. One of the privileges granted by the emperor to the merchants could have been the remission of a special tax, the so-called aurum negotiatorium (SHA, Sev. Alex. 32.5).*

⁵⁶ Rodríguez Almeida refers to D. MAGIE, *The Scriptores Historiae Augustae*, Harvard 1967, II, p. 219.

fragment. However, after the sentence about the *ius conferendi actiones*, the author goes on to describe the engineering works (*mechanica opera*) Severus Alexander erected in Rome, the restitution of the Jews' privileges and the tolerance the emperor showed towards the Christians⁵⁷, hardly a consequent account. I do not think we should expect the writer of the *Historia Augusta* to have structured his story too logically: the biographies are generally known for the inconsistencies and inaccuracies. It is very well possible that after the phrases concerning the *annona*, the author inserted in his enumeration of the emperor's good deeds a line about a legal adjustment of Severus Alexander. Maybe Heliogabalus did, in fact, abolish 'the right of bringing suit', but one can only guess at the exact meaning of this. Unless we have better proof of Rodríguez Almeida's reading, I think it too risky to assume this fragment has to be related with the *annona*.

Secondly, though the emendation *rationes* seems to be plausible from a palaeographical point of view, it is doubtful whether *ratio* can mean 'supply'. I do not know of a text which uses *ratio* in such a sense.

Thirdly, Rodríguez Almeida does not offer an explanation for the simultaneous existence of *fisci-tituli* and merchant-*tituli*. He merely states that «parece claro que *manus publica* y *manus privata* conviven en buena armonía entre los años 225 y 270»⁵⁸. If Severus Alexander's alleged *liberalitas* tried to favour private commerce, why then at the same time would he keep another transport system? If one tries to reconstruct the evolution of the oil trade in the third century, exactly this kind of peculiarity has to be accounted for.

Last but definitely not least, recent excavation campaigns at Monte Testaccio have revealed some *tituli* with merchants' names from the years 220-221, i.e. the reign of Heliogabalus⁵⁹. This important find convincingly proves that Rodríguez Almeida's reconstruction, which attributes the reorganisation of the oil import solely to Severus Alexander, needs revision. Apparently, one cannot hold on to a far-stretching economic dirigism, where there was no place for private oil trade. This also indicates that the alleged reform Alexander Severus introduced may not have been as radical as has been believed.

How then are we to interpret the coexistence of the two different kinds of *tituli*?

⁵⁷ SHA, *Sev. Alex.* 22.4.

⁵⁸ E. RODRIGUEZ ALMEIDA, *Revisitando el Testaccio* (n. 54), p. 382.

⁵⁹ J. REMESAL RODRIGUEZ, *Escrito en barro* (n. 14), p. 256.

Let us first recapitulate the available information. We know that after the murder of Caracalla and before the reign of Severus Alexander, i.e. when Macrinus and Heliogabalus ruled the Roman Empire, most of the *tituli* found are *fisci-tituli*. We also saw that according to the *Historia Augusta*, Severus Alexander fully re-established the oil distribution⁶⁰: if Severus Alexander's biography can be trusted, Heliogabalus may somehow have restricted the *annona*. Did he diminish the amount of oil, or the number of citizens entitled to participate in the distribution? We lack any further details. When Severus Alexander took over control, the oil supply financed by the emperor's *patrimonium* continued (the *fisci-tituli*), but *mercatores* seem to take part again in the oil trade at their own expense, just like they used to do in pre-Severan times (the *tituli* with merchants' names).

If we try to reconcile the evidence furnished by the oil amphorae and the account of Severus Alexander's economic regulations as described in the *Historia Augusta*, we may consider the evolution in the oil trade to be as follows:

- During the reign of Septimius Severus, Geta and Caracalla, the emperors try to stimulate merchants and skippers to bring oil to Rome by paying the transport costs and taking responsibility for the cargoes. Most of the people involved in the oil trade seem to have complied with the favourable conditions, as until now, all *tituli* refer to the emperors.
- During the short period Macrinus reigned, the *fisci-tituli* appear for the first time. Apparently, the oil transport is financed by the emperor's own means and arranged by the provincial chests. Most likely, there is no organisational difference with the previous period.
- Heliogabalus is then said to have reduced the oil supply. Nevertheless, the emperor's *patrimonium* continued to finance the oil import, as can be deduced from the *fisci-tituli*. I believe Heliogabalus reduced the amount of oil destined for the distributions to the yield of the imperial estates and the *tributum*, and refused to buy the additional oil, necessary to fill up the amounts he received for free. This way, the change he made in the supply system would be maintaining the transport contracts for the skippers, but discharging the oil merchants from the *annona*. From very recent archaeological expeditions, we know that near the end of Heliogabalus' reign private merchants start to appear again in the *tituli*, probably supplementing the reduced oil supplies import by the *annona* as private *mercatores/negotiatores*.

⁶⁰ Cf. n. 55.

- When Severus Alexander restored the distributions to their former size, he opted for a combination of the two previous supply systems. Skippers transporting the ‘fiscal’ oil continued to enjoy the legally favourable condition introduced by Septimius Severus. The merchants on the other hand were not enrolled in the *annona*, but were stimulated to go on with the supply of Rome by granting them certain privileges⁶¹. The reason why Severus Alexander did not again enlist the merchants in the *annona* might have been dictated by the desire to reduce financial risks. We saw earlier the opportunities fraudulent merchants had to swindle the state if the latter accepted all liability. By reorganising the supply system, Severus Alexander may have wanted to distinguish between skippers on the one hand, who transported ‘fiscal’ oil and enjoyed the legal privilege introduced by Septimius Severus, and merchants on the other hand, who replenished the amount of oil needed for the distributions. By granting the skippers this additional legal privilege, Severus Alexander may have been able to combat fraud and corruption in the transport of the state’s oil yields and take the first step in the development of a regular body of skippers who had already proven themselves to be reliable.

If my reconstruction of the evolution in the oil trade is correct, the implications are far-reaching: the reign of the Severi has generally been considered to be a period of constantly increasing dirigisme and government control in social and economic spheres. Septimius Severus would have marked a new area, in which there was no place for an open market system, an economy regulated by supply and demand or a spontaneous collaboration of the central government and the individual merchant. These ideas have without doubt been supported by the various studies by Rodríguez Almeida and had a great influence on research concerning third century economic policies. However, there are, as I hope to have shown, sound reasons to undertake a revision of these assumptions. Historians may well have been too eager to characterise the early third century as the end of individual liberty, the beginning of Roman economic absolutism.

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⁶¹ E.g. the remission of the *aurum negotiatorium* (SHA, *Sev. Alex.* 32.5). Cf. also *Sev. Alex.* 22.1.

THE *PEDITES NUDATI* AGAIN: TWO MATTERS PERTAINING TO LATE-ROMAN INFANTRY EQUIPMENT*

Abstract: This article elaborates on recent research concerning Roman infantry equipment of the Late Empire. In particular, it offers a more nuanced understanding of Vegetius' reference to *pedites nudati* in the *Epitoma Rei Militaris*. The first section, by looking at various ancient descriptions of the performance of the Roman infantry at Adrianople, determines whether Vegetius really did allude to this epoch-making battle in the *Epitoma*. In the second section, the article turns its attention to revisiting a passage in Ammianus' *Res Gestae* describing Roman soldiers wearing armour during the reign of Gratian — contrary to what we are told by Vegetius.

In a previous article in this journal, I discussed the problematic nature of Vegetius' reference to the *pedites nudati*, that is, the unarmoured infantry of the Late Empire described by the epitomator at *Epit.* I 20.2-5¹. Although abiding by my previous contention that the information presented by Vegetius is of a highly rhetorical nature and therefore unlikely to be completely true, this paper intends to review two elements of the paper that warrant reconsideration and — especially in the latter instance — reinterpretation. The first section revisits the debate regarding whether Vegetius referred to the battle of Adrianople (378) in his *Epitoma*. In particular, it looks at similarities between *Epit.* I 20.2-5 and a *locus* in Ammianus not previously adduced to discussions of the problem. The second section re-examines divergent readings of XXXI 10.9 and 10.14 of Ammianus' *Res Gestae*. Here, the paper hopes to shed further light on the two *loci* in question and promote confidence in more recent readings of the text, such as those of Sabbah and Seyfarth. In all, these two closely-related enquiries enable a more thoroughly nuanced understanding of the military equipment of Roman soldiers in late antiquity, in addition to the sources that provide us with such information.

* Abbreviations follow the 'Liste des périodiques' in *L'Année philologique*. Other abbreviations are as per *OCD*³, with the following exception: *Euseb. Werk. 7* = *Eusebius Werke 7. Die Chronik des Hieronymus*, ed. R. HELM, Berlin, 1984. English translations, except where indicated, are provided by the relevant Loeb Classical Library volume, modified where deemed necessary. Finally, all dates in this article are AD. For Vegetius' *Epitoma*, this paper employs the recent text of M.D. REEVE (ed.), *Vegetius. Epitoma Rei Militaris (Bibliotheca Oxoniensis)*, Oxford 2003. I would particularly like to thank *Ancient Society*'s referee for drawing my attention to some important literature that I would not otherwise have included in this discussion.

¹ See M.B. Charles, *Vegetius on Armour: The pedites nudati of the Epitoma Rei Militaris*, *AncSoc* 33 (2003), p. 127-167.

1. VEGETIUS AND ADRIANOPOLE

In my previous article on this theme, I argued that Vegetius need not necessarily have referred directly to the battle of Adrianople in his *Epitoma Rei Militaris*. In particular, I claimed that Vegetius' statement (*Epit.* I 20.2-5) that Roman soldiers without cuirass and helmet were slaughtered by Gothic arrows represents «a collective slab of Roman history, the culmination of which was the Visigothic sack of Rome»². The main intent was to demonstrate that Vegetius' reference to Roman infantrymen laying aside their helmets and cuirasses indicates that the *Epitoma* was written *after* rather than during the reign of Theodosius I (as is most often held)³.

This discussion, while conceding that Vegetius was certainly mistaken in his rhetorical contention that Roman infantrymen normally fought unarmoured from Gratian's reign onward, seeks to revisit the literary material and add greater clarity to the debate. In addition, it adduces an important *locus* from Ammianus' *Res Gestae* — which I initially overlooked — that adds weight to the view that Vegetius' description of unarmoured Roman infantrymen falling to deadly Gothic arrows refers partially to the battle of Adrianople. Indeed, a juxtaposition of *Epit.* I 20.2-5 with Orosius' account, and that of Ammianus, goes some way to suggesting that Vegetius had either misinterpreted his sources for Rome's wars against the Goths — and Adrianople in particular — or else relied overmuch on folkloric versions of events, as discussed in further detail below. Thus Vegetius, as others have previously suggested, may indeed have had Adrianople in mind when he penned *Epit.* I 20.2-5⁴.

First of all, it is important to look at the Vegetian *locus* in its entirety. It reads as follows:

sed in hac parte antiqua penitus consuetudo deleta est; nam licet, exemplo Gothorum et Alanorum Hunnorumque, equitum arma profecerint, pedites constat esse nudatos. ab urbe enim condita usque ad tempus diui Gratiani et catafractis et galeis muniebatur pedestris exercitus. sed

² M.B. CHARLES, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 166.

³ See M.B. CHARLES, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 127 n. 1.

⁴ E.g., L.F. STELTEN, *Flavius Renatus Vegetius. Epitoma Rei Militaris*, New York 1990, p. xv; D.K. SILHANEK., *Vegetius' 'Epitoma', Books 1 and 2: A Translation and Commentary*, diss., New York University 1972, p. 8-9. See also N. LENSKE, *Initium mali Romano imperio: Contemporary Reactions to the Battle of Adrianople*, *TAPhA* 127 (1997), p. 333-352. Lenski (p. 148 with n. 55) provides a list of all the *loci* where Vegetius — or so his article contends — refers specifically to Adrianople.

cum campestris exercitatio interueniente neglegentia desidiaque cesaret, grauiā uideri arma coeperunt quae raro milites induebant; itaque ab imperatore postulant primo catafractas, deinde cassides se refundere. sic detectis pectoribus et capitibus congressi contra Gothos milites nostri multitudine sagittariorum saepe deleti sunt; nec post tot clades, quae usque ad tantarum urbium excidia peruenerunt, cuiquam curae fuit uel catafractas uel galeas pedestribus reddere.

For despite progress in cavalry arms thanks to the example of the Goths, and the Alans and Huns, the infantry as is well known go unprotected. From the founding of the City down to the time of Gratian⁵, the infantry army was equipped with cuirasses and helmets. But upon the intervention of neglect and idleness, field exercises ceased, and arms which soldiers rarely donned began to be thought heavy. So they petitioned the Emperor that they should hand in first the cuirasses, then helmets. Thus with their heads and chests unprotected our soldiers have often been destroyed in engagements against the Goths through the multitude of their archers. Even after so many defeats, which led to the sacking of so many cities, no one has troubled to restore either cuirasses or helmets to the infantry⁶.

I argued that the adverb *saepe* suggests that Vegetius, here, is not referring to one single epoch-making battle, but a series of engagements. This need not be disputed. Despite this interpretation, I would now contend that, for Vegetius, the archetypal conflict of this nature was indeed the battle of Adrianople. This momentous engagement, in which around two-thirds of Valens' Eastern army was slaughtered (Amm. Marc. XXXI 13.18), could not have failed to make a striking impression on men of Vegetius' elite station — it must have represented the quintessential failure of Rome's former military might. If this is so, significant problems clearly remain.

I have previously referred to various *loci* in Ammianus that demonstrate that the bulk of the Roman infantry at Adrianople were equipped with cuirass and helmet, despite what Vegetius tells us⁷. For example, witness Ammianus' assertion that *mutuis securium ictibus galeae perfringebantur atque loricae* («on both sides the strokes of axes split helmet and cuirass», XXXI 13.3), and that the Roman soldiers (*Romani*)

⁵ Literally, 'the deified Gratian', though I can see no reason to retain this translation in English, as I have argued elsewhere; see discussion at M.B. CHARLES, *Vegetius in Context: Dating the Epitoma Rei Militaris (Historia Einzelschriften, 194)*, Stuttgart 2007, p. 65-70.

⁶ Adapted from the translation of N.P. MILNER, *Vegetius: Epitome of Military Science*, Liverpool 1996², *ad loc.*

⁷ M.B. CHARLES, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 139-140.

were distressed *armorum grauantibus sarcinis* («by the heavy burden of their armour», XXXI 13.7)⁸. Given that Ammianus was a former soldier, we must give his testimony concerning Roman military equipment some credence, even if there is bound to be a significant smattering of rhetoric in his combat descriptions, some of which are perhaps based on language found in earlier works⁹. So, we have armoured Roman infantrymen serving at Adrianople — even though Vegetius says quite the contrary.

Let us now look at other descriptions of the battle. As Sabbah has pointed out, a clear thread running through the various accounts, which are of heterogenous length and overall quality, is that the Roman infantry was more or less abandoned by the cavalry¹⁰. Orosius, whose testimony I adduced in my previous article¹¹, is quite adamant that this occurred:

ubi primo statim impetu Gothorum perturbatae Romanorum equitum turmae nuda peditum deseruere praesidia. mox legiones peditum undique equitatu hostium cinctae ac primum nubibus sagittarum obrutae, deinde, cum amentes metu sparsim per deuia cogherentur, funditus caesae gladiis insequentum contisque perierunt (VII 33.13-14).

As soon as the squadrons of Roman cavalry were thrown into confusion by the sudden attack of the Goths, they left the companies of infantrymen without protection. Then the legions of infantry, being surrounded on all sides by the enemy's cavalry and, when first overwhelmed by showers of arrows and then mad with fear they were driven over devious paths, being completely cut to pieces by the swords and lances of those who were pursuing them, perished¹².

Even Jerome, in his abbreviated *Chronicon*, says much the same thing as his fellow-Christian Orosius:

⁸ See also the testimony of Libanius at *Or.* XXIV 5.

⁹ On this matter, see especially F. PASCHOU, «*Se non è vero, è ben trovato*»: *tradition littéraire et vérité historique chez Ammien Marcellin*, *Chiron* 19 (1989), p. 37-54; see also P. RANCE, *Elephants in Warfare in Late Antiquity*, *AAnHung* 43 (2003), p. 365 with n. 48.

¹⁰ See G. SABBAB, *Ammien Marcellin. Histoires VI (Collection Budé)*, Paris 1995, p. 282, who holds that ancient authors treating of the battle «mettent ouvertement en cause la responsabilité de la cavalerie romaine». Even an ecclesiastical writer such as Socrates (*HE* IV 38.9) assigns the blame to the mutinous and cowardly actions of the Roman cavalry, which he suggests «revolted and refused to engage» (τῶν ἱππέων προδεδωκότων καὶ οὐχ ὑπαμείνων τῆς μάχης); trans. of P. Schaff (ed.), *Socrates and Sozomenus. Ecclesiastical Histories*, New York 1886, *ad loc.* It is unfortunate that Zosimus' description of the battle (IV 24.1-2) is so brief as to be completely useless for our purpose, while Malalas' account (XIII 35), as is so often the case, is hopelessly confused. Pseudo-Aurelius Victor says nothing of interest in the *Epitome de Caesaribus*.

¹¹ M.B. CHARLES, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 161.

¹² Trans. R.J. DEFERRARI, *Paulus Orosius. The Seven Books of History against the Pagans*, Washington, D.C. 1964. No pertinent commentary or notes are provided by M.-P. ARNAUD-LINET, *Orose. Histoire (Contre les Païens) III (Collection Budé)*, Paris 1991.

lacrimabile bellum in Thracia. in quo deserente equitum praesidio Romanae legiones a Gothis cinctae usque ad interneconem caesae sunt (*Chron.* a. 379)¹³.

The terrible war in Thrace, in which the Roman legions, stripped as they were of the cavalry's protection and hemmed in by the Goths, were slaughtered to the point of annihilation¹⁴.

When discussing Ammianus' description of Adrianople in my previous study, I somewhat ill-advisedly adduced one of the chapter summaries. Yet I ignored what turns out to be a critically important statement found in the text of the *Res Gestae* itself (at XXXI 13.2). In any case, the division into chapters, in addition to the summaries of them at the beginning of each book, was the work of a modern editor, viz., Hadrien Valois (1681)¹⁵. As Paschoud points out, this totally invalidates Burgess' recent contention that the summaries were composed by an unknown hand in the late fourth century — perhaps even a continuator of the now-lost *Kaisergeschichte*¹⁶. Since Valois compiled the summaries on the basis of other sources also available to us, such as Eutropius and Jerome, they clearly have no independent value¹⁷.

In view of the above considerations, it will be well to look at Amm. Marc. XXXI 13.2 and compare it with the *loci* of Orosius and Jerome introduced previously:

et quia sinistrum cornu ad usque plaustra ipsa accessit ultra, si qui tulissent suppetias, processurum, a reliquo equitatu desertum multitudine hostili urgente, ac si ruina aggeris magni oppressum atque deiectum est. steterunt improtecti pedites ita concateruatis manipulis, ut uix mucronem exserere aut manus reducere quisquam posset. nec iam obiectu pulueris caelum patere potuit ad prospectum clamoribus resultans horrificis. qua causa tela undique mortem uibrantia destinata cadebant et noxia, quod nec prouideri poterant nec cauere.

¹³ Hieron. *Chron.* 379 p. Chr. (*Euseb. Werk.* 7, 249c).

¹⁴ My translation.

¹⁵ See F. PASCHOUD, *Chronique d'historiographie tardive, Antiquité tardive* 14 (2006), p. 342, «la division en chapitres d'Ammien et les indications de contenu mises, chapitre par chapitre, en tête de chaque livre, remontent à Hadrien Valois»; note, too, A.R. BIRLEY, *AD 375: A Year with No Consuls, Electrum* 12 (2007), p. 28-29 n. 57.

¹⁶ R.W. BURGESS, *A Common Source for Jerome, Eutropius, Festus, Ammianus and the Epitome de Caesaribus between 358 and 378, Along with Further Thoughts on the Date and Nature of the Kaisergeschichte, CPh* 100 (2005), p. 185-190, especially p. 185: «agreed to be the work of a later editor and not Ammianus himself».

¹⁷ I thank *Ancient Society's* anonymous referee for bringing this important matter to my attention.

And because the left wing, which had made its way as far as the very wagons, and would have gone farther if it had had support, being deserted by the rest of the cavalry, was hard pressed by the enemy's numbers, it was crushed, and overwhelmed, as if by the downfall of a mighty rampart. The foot-soldiers thus stood unprotected, and their companies were so crowded together that hardly anyone could pull out his sword or draw back his arm. Because of clouds of dust the heavens could no longer be seen, and echoed with frightful cries. Hence the arrows whirling death from every side always found their mark with fatal effect, since they could not be seen beforehand nor guarded against.

Even more so than the account of Orosius, this narrative bears striking similarities to what Vegetius says at *Epit.* I 20.2-5. In particular, Ammianus tells us that the soldiers were unprotected, and were assailed by a mass of Gothic arrows. Furthermore, Ammianus' *improteci pedites* is more or less equivalent to Vegetius' *pedites nudati*, even though the former, at least in my opinion, makes it quite clear that this had nothing to do with being unarmoured — rather, it refers to the cavalry's failure to protect Valens' infantry. Armour, in any case, was certainly not proof against plunging arrows¹⁸.

De Jonge has noted a number of similarities existing between Ammianus' *Res Gestae* and Vegetius' *Epitoma*¹⁹. Despite this, he finds no cause to believe that Vegetius had made use of the *Res Gestae*²⁰. These comparanda must therefore have come about, in some cases, as a result of similar or else identical source material or, in others, on account of turns of phrase gleaned from earlier works describing military themes. Although one could simplistically maintain that Vegetius, in composing *Epit.* I 20.2-5, had misinterpreted Ammianus, this cannot be proved and remains unlikely. Rather, it is possible that Vegetius approached Ammianus through an abbreviated and somewhat untrustworthy intermediary (something of the quality of Orosius perhaps). It may even be the case that Vegetius was working from memory, which, if so, would reveal the extent to which he really was little more than an armchair military critic

¹⁸ On this, see M.B. CHARLES, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 130.

¹⁹ P. DE JONGE, *Ammianus and Vegetius*, in *Studia Latina Petro Iohanni Enk*, Leiden 1955, p. 99-106: «The similarity... should not be explained, in my opinion, by the use of the same sources or by Ammianus' borrowing from Vegetius, who were contemporaries».

²⁰ P. DE JONGE, *art. cit.* (n. 19), p. 101. This view was supported by M.B. CHARLES, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 166. Note that almost all the passages discussed by de Jonge occur in book III of the *Epitoma*.

with very little understanding of the battlefield. This has been argued elsewhere²¹.

In my previous article, I also felt that Vegetius might have included a reference to Adrianople at *Epit.* III 11.7-8: «Vegetius *does* appear to allude to this battle in his military treatise, but this specific occasion occurs in the third book»²². Lenski was also rather circumspect: «the possible reference»²³. Yet, on closer inspection of the *locus* in question, cited in full below, there really should be no doubt:

obseruatur autem ne longo spatio fatigatum militem neuē lassos post cursum equos ad publicum proelium cogas. multum uirium labore itineris pugnaturus amittiti; quid faciet qui ad aciem anhelus aduentat? haec et ueteres declinarunt et superiore uel nostra aetate cum Romani duces per imperitiam non cauissent, ne quid amplius dicam, exercitus perdidērunt. impar enim condicio est lassum cum requieto, sudantem cum alacri, currentum cum eo qui steterit subire conflictum.

Beware also not to force to a pitched battle soldiers who are tired after a long march or horses that are weary from galloping. Men who are going to battle lose much of their strength from marching-fatigue. What is one to do, if he reaches the line exhausted? This is something the ancients avoided, and in the recent past it was the armies, to say no more, who learned the lesson after Roman generals had, through lack of expertise, failed to provide against it. For when a tired man enters battle with one who has rested, or a sweating man with an alert, or one who has been running with one who has been standing, he fights on unequal terms.

²¹ On this, see C.D. GORDON, *Vegetius and His Proposed Reforms of the Army*, in J.A.S. EVANS (ed.), *Polis and Imperium: Studies in Honour of Edward Togo Salmon*, Toronto 1974, p. 45; R. GROSSE, *Das römische-byzantinische Marschlager vom 4.-10. Jahrhundert*, *ByZ* 22 (1913), p. 96; F. PASCHOD, *Roma aeterna. Études sur le patriotisme romain dans l'Occident latin à l'époque des grandes invasions*, Rome 1967, p. 112-117; C. SCHÖNER, *Studien zu Vegetius, Programm der Königlichen bayerischen Studienanstalt zu Erlangen zum Schluss des Schuljahres 1887/88*, Erlangen 1888, p. 12. C.R. SHRADER, *The Ownership and Distribution of Manuscripts of the De re militari of Flavius Vegetius Renatus before the Year 1300*, diss., Columbia University 1976, p. 9-10, holds that, while Vegetius had «no practical military experience and held no high office», his position as *comes sacrarum largitionum* (itself debatable) enabled him to gain some knowledge of military matters («such as recruiting»). Cf. D. SILHANEK, *op. cit.* (n. 4), p. 1, 8 and n. 15.

²² M.B. CHARLES, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 164; see also G. SABBAAH, *Pour la Datation Theodosienne du De Re Militari de Végèce*, *Centre Jean Palerne, Mémoires II*, Saint-Étienne 1980, p. 142; W. GOFFART, *The Date and Purpose of Vegetius' De Re Militari*, *Traditio* 33 (1977), p. 83 n. 85 («this may allude to Adrianople»), with D. PANIAGUA AGUILAR (trans.), *Flavio Végécio Renato. Compendio de técnica militar*, Madrid 2006, p. 40 with n. 116.

²³ See N. LENSKEI, *art. cit.* (n. 4), p. 148 n. 53.

That an army must not be allowed to fight *anhelus*, i.e., «exhausted»²⁴, clearly refers to Valens' extraordinary decision to have his men march for close to eight hours in a burning Thracian summer before fighting the far more composed Gothic enemy²⁵. Ammianus (XXXI 12.10-11) tells us that the Valens' army set off from the town of Adrianople at dawn and did not arrive near the Gothic camp until the eighth hour of the day — perhaps around two o'clock in the afternoon. The soldiers' fatigue was made worse by a combination of dust, thirst and hunger, in addition to the many fires that the Goths had lit in order to aggravate the Romans' discomfort (Amm. Marc. XXXI 12.13).

I previously postulated that Vegetius may have indeed used Ammianus' description of Adrianople when he composed *Epit.* III 11.7-8²⁶. Still, it is not absolutely necessary to maintain this. It could very well be that Vegetius used other sources in his composition of the *Epitoma*. For example, Libanius (*Or.* XXIV 5), in his treatment of the battle of Adrianople, writes that the soldiers' «love of glory was such that they fought heat and thirst, fire and sword, and preferred death to flight» (δόξης δὲ τοσοῦτος αὐτοῖς ἔρως ὥστε ὁμοῦ καύματι καὶ δίψει καὶ πυρὶ καὶ σιδήρῳ μαχόμενοι τὴν τελευτὴν ἡδίω τῆς φυγῆς ἐνόμισαν). Indeed, the tiredness of the Roman troops at the battle of Adrianople may have become almost folkloric by the time of the *Epitoma*'s composition, i.e., in much the same way as the French men-at-arms will always be remembered foundering in the mud at Agincourt in 1415, or Napoleon's retreating and frost-bitten *Grand Armée* will forever be associated with the savage Russian winter of 1812.

In sum, the striking similarities between *Epit.* I 20.2-5 and the other *loci* described herein appear to be more than coincidental. Vegetius, as we know, wrote at some time after 383 (the year in which Gratian died) and was referring to events either after 367 (the year in which Gratian was proclaimed Augustus) or, what is more likely, 375 (when Gratian became the senior western Augustus following the death of his father Valentinian I)²⁷. From the reign of Gratian onwards, the battle of Adrianople,

²⁴ Note that A. ÖNNERFORS, *P. Flavii Vegeti Renati Epitoma rei militaris (Bibliotheca Teubneriana)*, Stuttgart/Leipzig 1995, *ad loc.*, prefers to read *marcidus*, which, of course, means much the same thing as *anhelus*.

²⁵ On this, see also N.P. MILNER, *op. cit.* (n. 6), p. xl and 91 n. 6, with p. 12 n. 3.

²⁶ M.B. CHARLES, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 165 n. 138.

²⁷ Gratian's imperial colleague in the West was his half-brother Valentinian II, who was proclaimed Augustus by the troops almost immediately after his father's decease (he was four years old at the time); see Amm. Marc. 30.10.1-6; Zos. 4.19.1; cf. Philostorg. *H.E.* 9.16.

though its importance was downplayed in its immediate aftermath, was the most significant defeat suffered by the Roman infantry at the hands of a Gothic host equipped with hordes of archers²⁸. As a consequence, it must have influenced every writer touching upon military matters thereafter, particularly after Gratian and Theodosius' presumably reluctant accommodation of the Goths in 382²⁹. Vegetius' mistake, then, is that it was not the infantry's lack of discipline (which caused them to neglect wearing armour) that caused the defeat. Rather, the blame was placed squarely on the Roman cavalry, even though the real cause of the debacle can be traced to the vainglorious actions of Valens, who should have waited until Gratian arrived with his western army before engaging the Goths. Vegetius thus used the defeat at Adrianople as a paradigm for subsequent military failures against the barbarians — hence the appearance of *saepe* and *tot clades*, words which make no sense at all if only one battle is being described.

2. INFANTRY ARMOUR UNDER GRATIAN

We now turn to another matter concerning Ammianus and armour in the late fourth century. As pointed out in my previous paper, it is very much clear that Ammianus believed that Roman infantry serving under Gratian in his campaign against the Lentiensian Alamanni wore armour, at least until 378 (when the narrative of the *Res Gestae* ends). Yet, upon revisitation, there is one aspect of my treatment that requires further explanation, especially since it was used to reconstruct the appearance of what might be termed 'guard' troops, in addition to presumably more regular infantry units³⁰.

²⁸ See N. LENSKE, *art. cit.* (n. 4), p. 139-142.

²⁹ N. LENSKE, *art. cit.* (n. 4), p. 143: «It had become necessary to magnify rather than minimize the effects of Adrianople»; Lenski especially refers to the panegyrics of Themistius (e.g., *Or.* XVI of 383), and that of Pacatus (*Pan. Lat.* II[XII] of 389); see also p. 144: «in retrospect, the shadow of Adrianople loomed larger than the imperial rhetoric had earlier conceded».

³⁰ The Praetorian Guard of the Principate and early Dominate, of course, had been long disbanded. This infamous unit last saw action under Maxentius at the Milvian Bridge in 312, i.e., during the struggle against the forces of Constantine the Great. These scenes are depicted on the contemporary friezes of the Arch of Constantine; see A. ALFÖLDI, *Cor-nuti: A Teutonic Contingent in the Service of Constantine the Great and its Decisive Role in the Battle at the Milvian Bridge*, *DOP* 13 (1959), p. 169-179.

The passage in question (XXXI 10.9), which we shall leave untranslated at this point, reads as follows:

sed in ipso proeliorum ardore infinita hostium multitudine milites uisa uitantesque aperta discrimina per calles consitas arboribus et angustas, ut quisque potuit, dispersi paulo postea stetero fidentius et splendore *conspicui/consimili* proculque nitore fulgentes armorum imperatorii aduentus iniecere barbaris metum.

Our problem concerns whether to read *conspicui*, as does Sabbah in the Budé edition and Seyfarth in the Teubner³¹, or *consimili*, as Rolfe prefers in the Loeb version, and Gardthausen in a now-superseded Teubner text³². It must be pointed out the following analysis is not based on the credibility or otherwise of the various manuscript witnesses (the present author claims no expertise in these technical matters, which are best left to others), yet relies on examining the context of the passage in question.

In the first possibility, *conspicui* must agree with *milites*, which is found earlier in the passage. It is therefore the nominative plural of *conspiciuus*. According to the second possibility, *consimili* agrees with the ablative singular *splendore*, which immediately proceeds the word in question. Rolfe, who also read *consimili*, translated the phrase as «with like resplendence and brilliance of arms». He contended that the presence of *consimilis* suggests that the appearance of these troops was like «that of the imperial troops», i.e., the *imperatorius comitatus* described at Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.14³³. At this *locus*, we read the following: *arma... auro colorumque micantia claritudine iaculatione ponderum [telorum] densa confringebantur* («their armour, gleaming with gold and bright colours, was shattered by the heavy missiles cast upon it»). Thus, according to Rolfe, who I initially followed on this point, the soldiers discussed at Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.9 were — like the imperial troops — equipped with golden armour. This is most likely an allusion to highly polished bronze scale armour (known as *lorica squamata*) and helmets³⁴.

³¹ G. SABBAB, *op. cit.* (n. 10), *ad loc.*; W. SEYFARTH, *Ammiani Marcellini rerum gestarum libri qui supersunt II* (Bibliotheca Teubneriana), Stuttgart/Leipzig 1999, *ad loc.*

³² V. GARDTHAUSEN, *Ammiani Marcellini Rerum gestarum libri qui supersunt II* (Bibliotheca Teubneriana), Leipzig 1875, *ad loc.* (Gardthausen's edition lists *consimili*, *consineu* and *constricti* in the *apparatus*). The reading *splendore consimili* is also found in *Ammiani Marcellini quae supersunt; accedunt auctoris ignoti de imperatoribus excerpta*, Leipzig 1835, *ad loc.* (editor unknown).

³³ Note in J.T. ROLFE, *Ammianus Marcellinus III* (Loeb Classical Library), London/Cambridge MA 1952, rev. edn, p. 448 n. 4.

³⁴ This was suggested at M.B. CHARLES, *art. cit.* (n. 1), p. 137 n. 36.

Sabbah and Seyfarth, as stated above, preferred to read *conspicui* in place of *consimili*. As a result, Sabbah, in his French translation of the *locus*, provides a rather different interpretation. It is important to review this: «et, [les soldats] signalés par leur splendeur, l'éclat de leurs armes brillant au loin, ils inspirèrent la crainte de l'arrivée impériale aux barbares»³⁵. These matters, of course, are only important to the present question if it can be demonstrated that both the *loci* in question, viz., Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.9 and XXXI 10.14, refer to infantry rather than their horse-borne comrades.

It turns out that this, which I previously dealt with in a rather cursory fashion, is surprisingly easy to accomplish (though it is obviously not possible to be absolutely certain). To begin with, Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.9 seems to best suit an infantry context. The Roman soldiers, being outnumbered by the enemy, avoided open ground and found some kind of refuge in lightly wooded country. It is difficult to imagine cavalry operating with any real effectiveness in this sort of environment. To move on to the second *locus*, by the time that Gratian had arrived, the barbarians had ensconced themselves in rocky position in the nearby hills (Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.12). The area was heavily wooded, witness *densitate nemorum tecta* («under the cover of the thick woods», Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.10). The barbarians, it follows, had taken refuge in a raised position and, so Ammianus tells us, were able to cast missiles upon the Romans below. After the attack on the imperial troops described at XXXI 10.14, the barbarians, now hemmed in by Gratian and his men, laid down their weapons and surrendered (Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.17). Again, the context does not seem particularly amenable to cavalry operations, although some cavalry were presumably present at both of the incidents discussed³⁶.

To return to the specific problem of whether to read *conspicui* or *consimili*, it is difficult to understand how, if the latter is preferred, the troops at XXXI 10.9 are meant to anticipate the arrival of the imperial troops. From the context, it is clear that the guard or household troops, if we may call them thus, were equipped with defensive armour of some sort. Yet, if Sabbah and Seyfarth's reading holds, we are left to wonder about

³⁵ G. SABBAB, *op. cit.* (n. 10), *ad loc.*

³⁶ Note the presence of the Frankish king Mallobaudes, *domesticorum comitem* («commander of the household troops»), at Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.6. According to Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.6-7, the Roman force at Argentaria was jointly led by the bold Mallobaudes and the somewhat more circumspect Nannienus (cf. Amm. Marc. XXVIII 5.1).

whether Gratian's regular infantry were so equipped. On the other hand, *conspicui* would suggest that all the troops in question were armoured similarly fashion and that what Ammianus really means is that, on account of their presumably striking appearance, they were mistaken for elite infantry units under Gratian's immediate command. By extension, this would suggest that they were also armoured, like the elite units described at Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.14.

If this is so, a possible implication for military equipment scholars is that, even *before* the battle of Adrianople took place, Rome's enemies could expect some Roman infantry units to be of a rather squalid appearance, perhaps with a very poor standard of uniformity — which, in some small way, could be hinted at by Vegetius in his (presumably) highly rhetorical treatment of Roman military discipline at *Epit.* I 20.2-5³⁷. Armour also may not have been commonplace, or else a variety of styles of equipment were used, especially after extensive campaigning, i.e., when odds and ends were picked up from the battlefield in order to replace damaged items. Unfortunately, Ammianus fails to provide details of the units referred to at XXXI 10.9. If not *legiones palatinae*, they could have been *auxilia palatina* — quite important units in the late fourth century according to the material contained in the *Notitia Dignitatum*. Ammianus himself (XXXI 10.6) says that some *cohortes* previously sent to Pannonia, and those recently stationed in Gaul, were brought together for the campaign — but this obviously helps us very little³⁸.

In view of the above, it is proposed that Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.9 should be read in the following way:

But, in the very heat of the fight, our soldiers, seeing the countless numbers of the enemy, and avoiding combat in the open, dispersed as best they could over the narrow pastures planted with trees, and presently stood their ground with greater confidence; and conspicuous in their splendour and brilliance of arms when seen from afar, they struck the barbarians with fear that the emperor was coming³⁹.

³⁷ The only other possible interpretation is that the very presence of Mallobaudes, who normally commanded Gratian's guard troops, convinced the barbarians that the emperor himself was near. But, in the heat of battle, especially in closely wooded terrain, this makes little sense.

³⁸ Even Ammianus' use of *cohortes* provides no firm clue. In any case, Latin authors were inclined to use words such as *legio*, *cohors* and even *turma* (especially in the Late Empire) almost interchangeably.

³⁹ Adapted from the Loeb translation in light of Sabbah and Seyfarth's reading of the text.

Finally, since we are unable to state — at least with any authority — which units are referred to at Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.9, one might well ponder on the identity of the formations alluded to at Amm. Marc. XXXI 10.14, that is, the *imperatorius comitatus*. Though one cannot obviously be certain, it is not impossible that the latter *locus* refers to the renowned *Iouiani* or *Herculiani*, or perhaps even both units campaigning together⁴⁰. These infantry units had supposedly been the foremost Western *legiones palatinae* since the days of Diocletian and Maximinus⁴¹. For example, in the campaign against the Alamanni in 368, Ammianus (XXVII 10.10) writes that the young Augustus Gratian was protected by the *Iouiani*⁴². Their lofty status is also referred to by Ammianus in his account of Julian's Persian campaign⁴³. Given the importance of these units, it would be surprising to learn that they (or indeed any of the other *legiones palatinae*) had dispensed with cuirasses and helmets during the period in question. If this is so, the references made by Ammianus at XXXI 10.9 should reinforce the belief that even less-exalted units continued to wear the traditional defensive forms of protection into battle, though one need not imagine that units wearing armour were all equipped with flashing golden armour (or rather highly polished scale cuirasses).

To conclude, it is possible that Vegetius, despite my previous treatment of the matter, did indeed refer to Adrianople when he penned I 20.2-5 of the *Epitoma*, even if it should be clear that he refers to a series of disastrous engagements rather than one catastrophic military debacle. It also emerges that Vegetius may have misunderstood (or perhaps misrepresented) previous descriptions of the 'unprotected' Roman infantry at Adrianople being assailed by the barbarian foe. The second matter described herein, viz., Ammianus' references to armour-equipped troops serving under Gratian (XXXI 10.9 and 10.14), adds weight to the notion

⁴⁰ Cf. Claud. Bell. Gild. 418-419, with M.B. CHARLES, *Transporting the Troops in Late Antiquity: Naves onerariae, Claudian and the Gildonic War*, CJ 100 (2005) p. 283.

⁴¹ For a recent full discussion, see especially M.B. CHARLES, *Mattiobarbuli in Vegetius' Epitoma Rei Militari: The Iouiani and the Herculiani*, AHB 18 (2004), p. 109-121; see also Id., *A Regimental Nickname from Late Antiquity: Vegetius and the Mattiobarbuli Again*, AHB, forthcoming. Note that, in the *Notitia Dignitatum* (the final form of which seems to date to c. 420), the shield blazons of the *Iouiani* (Occ. 5.2) and the *Herculiani* (Occ. 5.3) are the first to appear among the western infantry units. Likewise, the *Iouiani seniores* (Occ. 5.145) and the *Herculiani seniores* (Occ. 5.146) are the first of the twelve western *legiones palatinae* listed.

⁴² For another reference to the high status of the *Iouiani*, see Amm. Marc. XXIX 3.7, with M.B. CHARLES, *art. cit.* (n. 41), p. 119 n. 32.

⁴³ See Amm. Marc. XXV 6.2, with XXV 5.8.

that Vegetius heavily exaggerated his claims regarding Roman military discipline. Despite this, the present interpretation suggests that infantry units serving directly under the emperor were regarded by the enemy as in some way better equipped — almost as if their more impressive appearance was an outward manifestation of their presumably greater martial prowess. Whether this was because they wore armour, whereas the members of lesser infantry units could not always be expected to do so, is not made especially clear. Despite this, the *loci* discussed do indicate that a higher degree of uniformity — in addition to a more consistent use of armour — could be expected among the elite units of the late fourth century vis-à-vis less exalted infantry formations.

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CHILD SLAVES AT WORK IN ROMAN ANTIQUITY*

Abstract: Making use of literary, legal, epigraphical and papyrological sources, this article aims at offering a comprehensive survey of instances of labour carried out by child slaves in Roman times. The evidence offered by archaeology, osteology and iconography is also taken into account. The child slaves' jobs and tasks are categorized and the various cases are commented upon. In the end, it turns out that the subject is not only revelatory with regard to the living conditions of young slaves and concepts of slavery, but also the everyday reality of children and Roman concepts of childhood in general.

1. HERCULANEUM BEACH AND ANCIENT HISTORY

The preliminary report by L. Capasso and L. Di Domenicantonio of their findings in the international medical magazine *The Lancet* created quite a stir among ancient historians as well as in the international press. The Italian anthropologists had investigated the spectacular find of 139 skeletons on the former beach of Herculaneum in March 1982: 51 male skeletons, 49 female and 39 children. The discovery was unique because the victims were overtaken by death in the prime of their life, but also because Roman dead from that period were mostly cremated¹. The results of their investigation were appalling. Many of the bodies exhibited injuries due to protracted heavy physical work: costoclavicular syndesmoses, the result of ceaseless movements of head and upper arms or shoulders (often due to rowing or tilling the soil manually). The latter injuries were found on 41.3% of the males, 6.5% of the females and, surprisingly, 11.5% of the children (below age fifteen, and even 24% of people up to the age of twenty). Serious injuries of the upper muscles, so-called syndesmopathies, appeared specifically in male adults: 23 out of 32 skeletons displaying these symptoms were men over twenty, two

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¹ The survival of skeletons is confined to periods of inhumation, that is to the period after 200 AD. See HARLOW & LAURENCE 2007, p. 15.

were women and seven were children or youngsters under the age of twenty. Very young children between the ages of seven and ten already exhibited serious injuries. One child aged barely five had met with lighter bodily harm. Both boys and girls were involved. The skeletons of adult men and women over twenty years also revealed traces of unremitting heavy work and a labour activity already begun in childhood. It was not always possible to define the nature of their activities. In view of Pompeii's geographical situation it may well have been due not only to agricultural work, but also to activities related to the port (loading and unloading of cargo) or rowing small fishing boats².

Capasso and Di Domenicantonio were not the first to examine the rich osteological evidence of the victims of the volcanic disaster of 79 AD. The Australian scholar S. Bisel surprised the scholarly world with two similar publications that come close to the book on daily life in Pompeii by A. Butterworth and R. Laurence as far as vivacity is concerned³. Just one example. The skeleton of a young girl, about 14 years old, was found in a room holding an eleven-month-old baby in her arms. The infant was adorned with bronze ornaments, which shows it belonged to the higher classes. The girl cannot be the mother, since she was still in her prepuberal phase. Moreover she clearly did not belong to the upper class. An analysis of her teeth reveals that she had been severely ill or undernourished in the first year of her life. Various molars displayed abscesses and shortly before her death a few teeth had been extracted. Her shoulder muscles bore traces of unremitting physical effort caused by lifting heavy weights. Most probably, Bisel concludes, she was a slave girl who was given the care of the baby by her master, unfit for other tasks, as she was worn down by hard labour.

The osteological research culminated with the publication of the bulky work of the two Italian anthropologists in 2001. It was entitled *I fuggiaschi di Ercolano*. This study of over 1100 pages looks like a medical report, including radiological close-up shots of sets of teeth and bones, but its importance is fundamental for our knowledge of daily life in an Italian provincial town. Oddly, the volume was hardly noticed by childhood historians⁴. The study of human bones and skeletons seems restricted to specialists of Pompeii or Herculaneum, though very recently social historians have turned their attention to osteo-archaeology from other regions. Thus

² CAPASSO & DI DOMENICANTONIO 2001, p. 1028-1031.

³ BISEL 1986 and 1987; BUTTERWORTH & LAURENCE 2005.

⁴ There is no reference to this study in the fundamental synthesis by RAWSON 2003.

an examination of the Roman evidence from the area of Dorset in Great Britain revealed that the number of environmental stressors liable to cause infants not to grow to their potential height during childhood actually increased in Roman times. The impact of child labour or (parental) violence on children's health is considered a possible factor⁵.

The osteo-archaeological approach offers exciting new opportunities to understand childhood by asking children themselves⁶, as in the Herculanean sample, unhampered by commemorative patterns⁷. Needless to say, even this osteological evidence has its limitations. Apart from the fact that ancient historians are entirely dependent on medical and osteological interpretations, it is obviously impossible on the basis of a skeleton to establish whether a person was freeborn or slave, unless one presumes that every slave was marked by hard labour. The findings at Herculaneum are therefore no unmistakable evidence of child labour of slaves, the subject of this paper. But at least they are good indicators. As a remedy against the silence of ancient historians, I have entered the full inventory of possible evidence of child labour in an appendix. The Italian nicknames often reveal telling stories. The scholarly world is waiting for the new synthesis by E. Lazer, which sets out to reexamine the Pompeian and Herculanean osteological evidence as well as to study it from the angle of social history⁸.

2. CHILD LABOUR, SLAVE LABOUR: METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS

Within Roman social history child labour has been rarely researched⁹. The present study takes an exhaustive approach, collecting every scrap of

⁵ REDFERN 2007. See also GOWLAND 2007 for an osteo-archaeological study on the possibility of relating biological or skeletal age to the deposition of grave goods according to the age of the deceased.

⁶ JAMES 1998, p. 53.

⁷ SCHEIDEL 2001, p. 27.

⁸ The study is announced for 2008. LAZER 2007 says nothing about child labour. For stories on Herculanean women, see DAEHNER 2007.

⁹ This lack of studies does not count exclusively for Roman Antiquity. On cultural blindness to child labour in the past, see SIMON-MUSCHED 1996; KAMP 2002; HARLOW & LAURENCE 2007, p. 11. I have tried to remedy this shortcoming in my synthesis from 2006, a lengthy study written in Dutch, an English version of which is being prepared with Cambridge University Press. See LAES 2006, p. 124-197 on child labour. Earlier studies include LAES 2000; PETERMANDL 1997; HERMANN-OTTO 1994; BRADLEY 1991. KNOCH 2005, p. 149-155 is specifically about slaves' labour (*Arbeitsbedingungen*).

evidence from very diverse sources. It also makes a plea for micro-history, starting from particular case-stories. In order to understand what it meant to be a child slave and to be a child in Roman Antiquity, I evoke a multiplicity of experiences without overlooking the general mechanisms of power that ruled the slaves' existence. Both points, the exhaustive approach and the emphasis on micro-history, perhaps need clarifying.

I collect information about child slaves from all strata of society: small farms and industrially exploited mines, big *latifundia*, extensive and wealthy urban households, the small workshop of an artisan. For this reconstruction a variety of sources is tapped: literary sources in addition to inscriptions, notices on papyri, legal texts, archaeological finds. Iconographic material is only occasionally referred to, since this would require a study of its own¹⁰. Every source has its individuality and its own difficulties. Ancient authors mentioning work by slave children are often moralists condemning excesses, such as Seneca, or satirists putting things into the grotesque, such as Petronius or Martial. However, they referred to situations which could be recognised by their audience: there is some truth in their stories, though the story itself is not entirely 'true'¹¹. It is not easy to detect slave children in epigraphical sources: a simple name may imply the status of a slave, but not necessarily (it does not hold for Greek names – and for free children too a single name is sometimes used). Recently, H. Sigismund-Nielsen has suggested that most children mentioned in Roman inscriptions without a familial context were in fact commemorated in relationships of patronage or work. In the case of slaves, she presumes that even those who were commemorated as sons or daughters of another slave without a specific indication of a job, can also be identified as working, since their status as slaves of a household is indicated. Therefore one can assume that they worked in the household to which they belonged¹². Inscriptions are frequently not exactly dated: they mostly belong to the high days of the epigraphical habit, for Roman inscriptions roughly the first till third century ce. The lack of precise dating should not worry us too much, since we are dealing with history of

¹⁰ SCHUMACHER 2001, p. 91-238 has compiled the evidence for different kinds of slave labour and illustrated his survey with iconographic evidence. His general index however does not contain a reference to *Kind*.

¹¹ See WOOLF 2006 on the perils of using fictitious and satiric sources as 'illustrations' on Roman society.

¹² SIGISMUND-NIELSEN 2007. Obviously, I will not deal with all the inscriptions from Rome which contain the names of slave children without indication of job (more than 100 inscriptions according to the Sigismund-Nielsen sample), only with those containing a specific job indication.

the *longue durée*: slave children worked in the first century, as they did in the fifth. Inscriptions must be set in their archaeological context, which often reveals the social environment of the dedicatees: slaves commemorated in the columbaria of wealthy families obviously belonged to a large household. In legal sources the child slave is primarily referred to in the context of indemnification. But it would be rash to conclude that these children had only material value: the same point could be for Austrian legislation holding that the material damage to a vehicle belonging to a third party is more expensive to the insurer than the death of a child!¹³ In the papyri, the ambiguity of Greek words as παιδάριον or παῖς makes it difficult to discern between working slave children or adult slave labour force¹⁴. Since in ancient art, slaves are often pictured as short in order to emphasize their social inferiority, it is methodologically unsound to consider every image of a smaller working figure as a working child¹⁵.

Some historians have misunderstood the use of micro-history and case stories. They believe that the German school represented by Vogt paid more attention to the concrete, human relationships of the master-slave relations and precisely because of this arrived at a more humane interpretation of ancient slavery, whereas M.I. Finley and his Anglo-Saxon school on the basis of the ideology of power and its mechanisms came to a more severe appreciation, which in essence makes it senseless to advance propositions on the psychology or the mentality of the ancient slave (whom we only know through the repressive influence of the slave holder)¹⁶. In fact, the Anglo-Saxon school has always fully focused its attention on the particular aspect. What it meant to be a slave only manifests itself in concrete stories and reconstructions (ancient historians are at a disadvantage in comparison with historians of nineteenth-century slavery, as they have no diaries, no interviews, no eye-witness reports). A single slave experience

¹³ WILLVONSEDER 2001, p. 97.

¹⁴ On this problem, see SCHOLL 1990, p. 792, 795, 868-869 (on *P. Lond.* VII, 2061 & 2065; *P. Petr.* II, 4 (2)).

¹⁵ See PETERMANDL 1997, p. 120-121 and BRADLEY 1994, p. 194 for some examples. COULON 1994, p. 181-182 exhibits some images from Gallia where we possibly see children at work. In Pompeii, there is a picture of a boy mending a pot, while his father is dealing with a customer. See BALDASSARE 1991, pl. 113-124.

¹⁶ GAMAUF 2001, p. 52-53. For an obstinate rejection of Finley's theses and a strong emphasis on the profound humanity of the ancients, see WALDSTEIN 2001, p. 31-49 (who even recurs to the argument of the high number of abortions in Austria nowadays!). See SCHEIDEL 1993 for appropriate remarks about the controversy and a reappraisal of the Finley approach.

(mentality, psychology) did not exist, because in Antiquity there were so many different slave lives and no homogeneous caste. Social differences among slaves were enormous, and the life of a confidant-secretary was miles away from that of a labourer in the gold mines. But these wholly diverse case stories should not blind us to the underlying mechanisms which determined every slave's life. K. Bradley expressed the latter aptly as instability, humiliation and violence. Reviewers have blamed him for his one-sided approach; he never contended, however, that every slave had to cope with these aspects, only that they were an ever-present threat in a slave's life. Children could be sold on the market as objects (sometimes separated from parents, brothers and sisters), families could fall apart by a sudden caprice or the death of the owner, punishments or torture were ever-present possibilities¹⁷. Though speculating on feelings and psychology of people from the past indeed is a hazardous undertaking, strewn with obstacles of projection and anachronism, K. Hopkins and K. Bradley were convinced that the opposite attitude (to contend that we cannot tell anything sensible concerning feelings of ancient slaves because they are in actual fact simply total strangers to us) testifies to an exaggerated prudence and an obstinate or incurable blindness¹⁸.

3. LEGAL SOURCES

Before moving on to specific instances of working slave children, I want to take a look at normative legal sources, which can basically point to slave children in all kinds of professional activities.

Ancient writers associated labour in the service of another person with submission¹⁹. In the eyes of ancient man slaves did not 'work', they

¹⁷ For such empathic mental exercise, see LAES 2006, p. 140-147.

¹⁸ BRADLEY 1994, p. 179-181 denounces approaches which refuse to take up the challenge of this empathic exercise as «arrogant and futile». Moreover, he states that the view that this question is not historically relevant, is actually telling for the traditional view on Antiquity. The same strong plea for «empathy, rhetoric, psychological insight and story-telling» as tools for the ancient historian is offered by HOPKINS 1993, p. 26-27 in his article on the slave novel about Esopé (see the opening note about his colleagues who read the article as first readers: «In some, the text produced the same reactions as its hero, Aesop; out of respect, I have changed it a little»). McKEOWN 2007, p. 78 has characterized Bradley's views as «a passionate commitment to noble aims», but doubts some of the conclusions reached by him. On Bradley's approach and the use of stories, see also McKEOWN 2007, p. 77-123.

¹⁹ Paulus, *Sent.* II 18.1. See THOMAS 2002, p. 226.

simply did what their master told them to do. A dissociation between the body of a slave and the work he performs occurs in legal thought concerning the letting of services of a slave to a third party. In that case one distinguishes between the slave owner, who has a right to his body and the person who wields power on the slave in order to profit from his work²⁰.

From the age of five slave children could be put on as manpower, according to Ulpian in a passage on compensation (e.g. in the case of loan or loss) for slave labour:

Si minor annis quinque vel debilis servus sit vel quis alius, cuius nulla opera esse apud dominum potuit, nulla aestimatio fiet. (*Dig.* VII 7.6.1)

Compensation is not possible for slave services which according to legislation cannot be claimed (again Ulpian):

ut puta aegrotante servo vel infante, cuius operae nullae sunt, vel defectae senectutis homine. (*Dig.* VII 1.12.3)

In cases of bequests or loan one cannot call on the capacity for work of such a child. Only if the age-limit of five or seven (the normal limit for infancy) is exceeded, can an *aestimatio operae* take place:

Si infantis usus tantummodo legatus sit, etiamsi nullus interim sit, cum tamen infantis aetatem excesserit, esse incipit. (*Dig.* VII 1.55)

Physical maturity (*pubertas* at age fourteen) was not at stake in defining capacity for work for slaves:

Ceterum cum de fructibus servi petiti quaeritur, non tantum pubertas eius spectanda est, quia etiam impuberis aliquae operae esse possunt. (*Dig.* VI 1.31)

These regulations entailed implications for the life of slaves. For free Roman boys the seventh year constituted an important caesura: the start of primary school and the transition from *infantia* to *pueritia*. The life of a slave only knew two caesuras: the age of five as the end of *infantia* and the age of thirty, when one could formally be freed, as a possible end of the *pueritia*²¹. Those who did not obtain this privilege remained *puer* for the rest of their life – *puer* being one of the usual Latin words for slave²². A third caesura might be the retirement age of sixty²³.

²⁰ See the shrewd article by THOMAS 2002 about this «dissociation juridique» which implied at least some recognition of the work carried out by slaves.

²¹ Gaius, *Inst.* I 17. On possible exceptions (*minores XXX annis*), see Gaius, *Inst.* I18.

²² HERMANN-OTTO 1994, p. 307-310.

²³ According to *Dig.* VII 1.12.3 en XXIX 5.3.7 it was forbidden to claim the work of a slave older than sixty. See PARKIN 2003, p. 220-221.

The difference of one to two years between the *infantia* of free people and slaves is a modern preoccupation and should not be overemphasised. Although a great difference in development may exist between a five-year old infant and a seven-year old, in many civilisations the transition from infancy to childhood hinges around the age of six²⁴.

The legal sources also inform on the duties usually entrusted to young slaves. Apparently children were in great demand:

(sc. mancipia) simpliciora esse et ad ministeria aptiora et dociliora et ad omne ministerium habilia. (Dig. XXI 1.37)

Ulpian mentions a few possible tasks one can demand as a patron of young freedmen (somewhat over ten years): we may deduce from this that the skills involved were usually taught to slave children.

Dabitur et in imuberem, cum adoleverit, operarum actio: sed interdum et quamdiu impubes est: nam huius quoque est ministerium, si forte vel nomenclator vel calculator sit vel histrio vel alterius voluptatis artifex. (Dig. XXXVIII 1.7.5)²⁵

A few duties are once again mentioned in the *Digesta* later on:

Potest tamen et imuberes operas dare, veluti si nomenclator sit vel histrio (Dig. XL 12.44.2)

These professions are indeed attested for children in literary and epigraphic sources and will be dealt with further on. *Nomenclatores* are some sort of private heralds or roll callers, *calculatores* a kind of book-keepers or even teachers in arithmetics. The term *histriones* points to various actors. The term *artifex* suggests a schooling or instruction. Jurists indeed made a difference between an *officium*, for which the slave needed no training, and an *artificium* (in Dig. XXXII 65.1 carrying of dustbins is mentioned as an example of *officia*, cooks and weavers as *artificia*). This distinction shows a rudimentary sense of the value of human capital through education and training²⁶.

Clearly the modern idea of child labour was completely foreign to Roman lawyers. An extremely low age limit was only established in order to determine possible indemnifications, it only applied to slaves and is

²⁴ RAWSON 1999, p. 83.

²⁵ For a definition of *ministerium*, see Dig. XXXVIII 1.1: *ministeria operae sunt diurnum officium*: services for one day which may be imposed by a patron on his freedman.

²⁶ SALLER 2003, p. 192.

more or less comparable with instauring a maximum age for the employment of old slaves. In no way it is led by moral or pedagogical concepts.

We have only scant information about the purchase of slaves and the price fluctuations. A recent survey by W. Scheidel has shown that slave prices during the Principate were high compared to daily wages and grain prices²⁷. But all evidence shows that the labour value of young children was recognised. In sales documents on papyri till late Antiquity young children, without parents or family, are offered for sale²⁸. Some are girls aged fifteen or younger. One girl was only three, another one aged six was offered for sale together with a two-year old toddler. A native girl aged fourteen was resold to a third party for the fourth time in AD 221. Sales documents on papyri also mention fifteen boys under fifteen who were resold. The eight-year old Narcissus, son to a home-born slave, was resold on the market after his mother had died. A nine-year old Macedonian slave is sold in Egypt after being imported by ship, and a Gallic boy of fourteen is sold in Phoenician Ascalon²⁹.

The purchase of young children was perhaps a calculated investment by the owners. Well over 30% of the female slaves were purchased in their most fertile period, between 20 and 25 years. Almost the same percentage is between 14 and 20 years old when purchased. Provisos in the sales documents prove that their new owners reckoned with slave children. Awaiting a possible motherhood they could be involved in all sorts of household tasks. The same calculated risk appears from the age of male slaves, who were apparently purchased by preference under fifteen. At the age of ten these boys were certainly capable of performing chores and smaller tasks. It was apparently practical to purchase a young slave, who could be trained meanwhile.

Diocletian's price edict of AD 301 sets maximum prices for many products, including slaves (§29.1-7; prices are in *denarii*)³⁰.

²⁷ SCHEIDEL 2005.

²⁸ For excellent studies on this matter, see STRAUS 2000 and 2004 (p. 270-276 about the breaking up of family ties); BRADLEY 1978 and 1979; DALBY 1979. See also BUSSI 2003. There is only one papyrus that records the sale of two children not from Egypt but from Tell Nessana: *P. Ness.* 89 (late 6th-early 7th century); though it is not certain these are children, the low price indicates as much. During the conference Noel Lenski supplied me with this example, for which I owe him many thanks.

²⁹ For these cases, see *P. Oxy.* II 263; *P. Mich.* V 278; *P. Vindob. Boswinkel* 7; *SB* V 7573; *PSI* XII 1254; *BGU* I 316.

³⁰ See the edition by GIACCHERO 1974, p. 208. Socio-economic studies on this document are by SCHEIDEL 1996 and SALLER 2003.

Age	Male	Female
0-8	15,000	10,000
8-16	20,000	20,000
16-40	30,000	25,000
40-60	25,000	20,000
60+	15,000	10,000

These are prices for unskilled slaves. According to §29.8 the aforementioned price may be doubled for skilled slaves³¹. Moreover, these are maximum prices for the ‘best’ age group of that category: 20,000 in the category 8-16 is the price for a sixteen year old, 30,000 is probably for a person in his early twenties³². This edict partially reflects the age brackets known from literary sources. Eight years comes very close to the end of the *infantia* at the age of seven, and sixteen is not far away from the usual 14 to 15 years (see also: sixty years as the start of the *senectus*). The equal value of eight to sixteen-year old girls and boys is not confirmed by comparative investigation with the United States in the 19th century. As said above, these girls in Antiquity were perhaps appreciated because of their capacity to bear children later on³³.

A similar price list was issued by Justinian in AD 530. The prices, now expressed in *solidi*, are again maximum prices.

<i>Cod Iust.</i> VII 7.1.5 (Hermann-Otto 1994, p. 330)			
<i>Servi + ancillae</i>	under 10		10 solidi
	over 10	<i>nulla arte imbuti</i>	20 solidi
	over 10	<i>artifices</i>	30 solidi
	over 10	<i>notarii</i>	50 solidi
	over 10	<i>medici</i>	60 solidi
	over 10	<i>obstetrices</i>	60 solidi
<i>eunuchi minores</i>	under 10		30 solidi
<i>eunuchi maiores</i>	over 10	<i>sine arte</i>	50 solidi
	over 10	<i>artifices</i>	70 solidi

³¹ *pro mancipio arte instructo pro genere et aetate et qualitate artium... ita duplum praetium statutum in mancipium minime excedere*. According to Philo, *Spec. Leg.* II 33-34 μέγεθος, κάλλος and εὐεξία play an important role in constituting the price value of a slave.

³² SCHEIDEL 1996, p. 71.

³³ SCHEIDEL 1996, p. 71-74. The price tables from the United States cited by Scheidel also reveal age eight and sixteen as liminal ages.

The proposed age limit of ten years looks more realistic than the 5 years of *Dig.* VII 7.6.1 which should rather be considered an absolute minimum. Moreover, these children younger than ten are automatically regarded as slaves without a full training, which does not exclude their being able to perform specific chores (which were less appreciated from an economic point of view).

The age limit of ten is also attested in late antique legislation where the expenses for the education of a child are only made in its first ten years.³⁴ There is explicit mention of castrated slaves. Eunuchs under ten may have been rare, their value was high: a young eunuch is as expensive as a skilled adult craftsman³⁵. Such stipulations cast serious doubts on the efficiency of imperial prohibitions on the castration of young slaves³⁶.

4. COUNTRY LIFE

4.1. Large Estates

Both in theoretical and specialised works Roman authors tackled the management of large *latifundia*. Legal sources also deal with children on large estates. Ulpian provides a definition of the *instrumentum* of a large farm: equipment and manpower both contribute to producing, harvesting and storing the crop. In addition to this there was also the *instrumentum instrumenti*: staff responsible for the feeding, clothing and accommodation of amongst others the employees who belonged to the *instrumentum*³⁷. Typical tasks are bread baking, maintenance of the *villa*; typical professions that of kitchen maid, female weaver and cook³⁸. The country estate with its *instrumentum* could be left as inheritance. A larger inheritance was the so-called *fundus instructus*: the country estate with *instrumentum* plus all

³⁴ *Sent. Syr.* 77 & 98 (Syria; 5th century) and *Lex Visig.* IV 4.3 (Hispania; 6th century).

³⁵ *Sin vero eunuchi sint servi communes maiores decem annis (...) minores etenim decem annis eunuchos non amplius triginta solidis aestimari volumus.* According to *Dig.* IX 2.27.28 the castration of a slave boy enhances his value (the *Lex Aquileia* is not applied in such cases). See Suetonius, *Dom.* 7.1; Plinius Maior, *NH* VII 129; *Dig.* XXXIX 4.16.7 on expensive castrated slaves. See HORSTMANSHOFF 1987 and CORDIER 2002, p. 67.

³⁶ Suetonius, *Dom.* 7.1 and Cassius Dio LVIII 2.4 about this prohibition issued by the emperor Domitian. For similar prohibitions, see Paulus, *Sent.* V 23.13 and *Dig.* XLVIII 8.8.2.

³⁷ *Dig.* XXXIII 7.8 pr (*instrumentum*); *Dig.* XXXIII 7.12.5 (*instrumentum instrumenti*).

³⁸ *Dig.* XXXIII 7.12.6

things contributing to a better equipment for the new *pater familias*. This *fundus instructus* also included women slaves and their children³⁹. These children belonged to the *instrumentum instrumenti*, and it was deemed opportune to include them together with the women in the inheritance in order to avoid a «harsh separation» (*dura separatio*) between husband/wife and/or children⁴⁰. Labour by women and children is thus allotted a somewhat marginal position. Ultimately neither group belongs to the *instrumentum* of labour slaves⁴¹.

From Columella, Varro and *Digesta* XXXIII 7 a list of jobs and tasks at the farm can be drawn up. Theoretically children might qualify for a large number of these functions⁴², though this is not often acknowledged by these authors.

Varro holds child labour in rather low esteem. Obviously a rich landowner will not make use of the labour of his own children, as do poor people. By preference he will make use of hired labour forces, certainly for the more important tasks. An age minimum of 22 is assumed for these hirelings. The aristocratic diffidence of slaves is probably based on the presumption that the latter will not worry about the possessions of their master⁴³.

With Columella there is an evolution towards a more large-scale production based on slave labour. He offers a lot of clues about work fit for slaves and their children (as the term *puer* is used for both, one cannot always tell whether Columella is actually referring to children)⁴⁴. Moreover, as the massive supply of slaves as the result of wars became exhausted in Columella's time, he pays more attention to the education of children of his own slaves. Children were not put to work a whole day. We can imagine them playing in the yard and in the kitchen garden. Columella advises to keep the garden locked against children⁴⁵. A slave boy has to stir the apples regularly with a wooden or reed spatula in order to avoid them burning on⁴⁶. On an ideological level, Columella

³⁹ *Dig.* XXXIII 7.12.33.

⁴⁰ *Dig.* XXXIII 7.12.7 and Paul, *Sent* III 6.35.

⁴¹ SALLER 2003, p. 200-201 for implications on the status of slave women.

⁴² BRADLEY 1994, p. 59-60 lists some 40 different professions.

⁴³ Varro, *RR* I 17.2-3. See GONZALES 2000, p. 240-241. RATHBONE 1991, p. 88-147 on permanent labour force; 148-174 on occasional labour in Egypt.

⁴⁴ GONZALES 2000, p. 241-245.

⁴⁵ Columella, *RR* X 1, v. 33-34: the kitchen garden should be closed by walls or hedges. Priapus' member should scare the boys, as his reaping hook scares off thieves.

⁴⁶ Columella, *RR* XII 42.2.

states that the sexual purity of children makes them fit as kitchen helps. Whoever is concerned with alimentary matters has to be for hygiene's sake either child or abstain from sex⁴⁷. Besides minor domestic chores other small jobs may be required from them. To spade or to prune vineyards or to remove unsuitable twiglets may be ideal tasks for children, though agricultural writers very rarely mention children in this context⁴⁸. A mosaic from the Bardo museum (Tunisia, 4th century) shows the activities in a large African farm owned by Julius: children beat the olive trees with sticks in order to collect the olive harvest⁴⁹. Supervising chickens is a typical task: 200 chickens an overseer are considered normal. Old women are also often entrusted with this task – which puts children clearly in the marginal position of outsiders: both in the matter of age and in the matter of sexual improductivity⁵⁰. Children were also entrusted with small herds. They returned to the farm with their animals every day, whereas adult shepherds stayed in the fields night and day⁵¹. Anyway these young shepherds lived in a tightly-knit group under the command of a youngster who exceeded them in age and experience⁵². Children may also have accompanied herds of cattle: the animals were directed by various people, in the front and in the rear a child followed with a stick to keep

⁴⁷ Columella, *RR* XII 4.3 (*aut impubi aut certe abstinentissimo rebus veneriis*).

⁴⁸ See for instance Columella, *RR* IV 5 and IV 27. Explicitly in *RR* XI 2.44: *Ab idibus Ianuarii usque in calendas Iunias veteranam vineam priusquam florere incipiat, iterum fodere oportet, eandemque et ceteras omnes vineas identidem pampinare. Quod si saepius feceris, puerilis una opera iugerum vineti pampinabit*. Also *RR* II 2.13 (*Verum et si subinde nascentem falce decidas, quod vel puerile opus est*) is most probably an allusion to labour by child slaves.

⁴⁹ YACOB 1978, p. 187-197 situates this mosaic in Carthago and presumes that the small figures are indeed children. DUNBABIN 1978, p. 119-120 (pl. XLIII n. 109) and p. 252 (n. 32) dates the mosaic between AD 380 and 400, but she doubts the presence of children: «Two tiny figures in the hooded capes of peasants beating down olives from a tree and gathering them in an basket». She raises the possibility that social inferiors are depicted. For children in similar labour situations (olive harvest), see PETERMANDL 1997, p. 117-119 who also offers parallels from later periods.

⁵⁰ Columella, *RR* VIII 2.7 (elder women and children supervising small stock animals up to 200 chickens); Palladius, *Agr.* I 28.1 (elder women supervising chickens). Marginal position: GONZALES 2000, p. 249-250.

⁵¹ Varro, *RR* II 10 (*Ad maiores pecudes aetate superiores, ad minores etiam pueros... Itaque in saltibus licet videre iuventutem, et eam fere armatam, cum in fundis non modo pueri sed etiam puellae pascant*).

⁵² Varro, *RR* II 10 (*Qui pascunt, eos cogere oportet in pastione diem totum esse, pascere communiter, contra pernoctare ad suum quemque gregem, esse omnes sub uno magistro pecoris; eum esse maiorem natu potius quam alios et peritorem quam reliquos, quod ei qui aetate et scientia praestat animo aequiore reliqui parent. Ita tamen oportet aetate praestare, ut ne propter senectutem minus sustinere possit labores*).

the animals in check, if need be. Also guarding a donkey was considered a typical children's task⁵³. Economic and psychological foresight on the part of the owner appears from the instructions to train a steward, the *vilicus*, making him familiar from earliest youth with the labour in the country. A trained faithful steward guarantees the success of any *latifundium*⁵⁴.

Thus the evidence on large estates presupposes the continuous presence of working children. Most of these were no doubt slaves, though the vagueness of the terms does not allow to discern between freeborn servant children, child slaves and adult slaves. In practice, those various groups lived and worked together and their living conditions were not all that different. The economic important role of those children (if only because the landowner primarily relied on houseborn slaves in order to continue work after their becoming of age), is never acknowledged by the agricultural writers. The economic integration of children was implicitly admitted by agricultural theorists, but never explicitly mentioned nor problematised. In this sense the concept of child labour did not exist with them⁵⁵.

4.2. Poor Families

The rural population were the great, silent majority of the Roman Empire. Though the peasants constituted two thirds of the population (some estimates even speak of 80%), they are hardly mentioned in the literary and epigraphic sources. This certainly counts for those small farmers who were poor or somewhere between poor and very rich. Of course, the question of poverty in ancient societies is a difficult one, not only because of the sheer range of factors that help determine human deprivation (various sorts of poverty existed), but also because new analysis has implied a broader distribution of wealth across Roman society and therefore supported the existence of 'middling' classes and of 'the poor', the latter constituting perhaps half of the population⁵⁶. By modern standards, most peasants lived a life of risk and survival, vexed by the uncertainties of famine caused by bad harvests, banditism and violence, or disease, though

⁵³ Cattle: though Columella, *RR* VI, pr. 6-7 does not mention children, GONZALES 2000, p. 247 n. 24 deduces their presence from iconographical source evidence. Supervising donkeys: Columella *RR* VII 1.2: *Tum imprudentis custodis negligentiam fortissime sustinet* (*negligentia* being a typical feature of slaves and children, see GONZALES 2000, p. 247-248).

⁵⁴ Columella, *RR* XI 1.7: *a pueritia rusticis operibus edurandus*.

⁵⁵ LAES 2006, p. 189-190.

⁵⁶ SCHEIDEL 2006 is a groundbreaking contribution on 'middling' classes and the poor, questioning traditional concepts on Roman society. See also VEYNE 2001. On typical occupations and jobs for the poor, see Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 7.103-151, with translation and commentary by PARKIN & POMEROY 2007, p. 216-223.

their contemporaries in the towns were even more dependent on food supply from the country⁵⁷.

Few farmers could afford the luxury of a slave. Most looked after their land themselves, often with their own offspring, as already Varro recognised:

Omnes agri coluntur hominibus, servis aut liberis aut utrisque, liberis autem, cum ipsi colunt ut plerique pauperculi cum sua progenie, mercenariis. (Varro, *RR* I 17.2)

Some slave families were abandoned by their master in order to run small farms in isolated areas. Apuleius offers the stark and fictional image of a small group of slaves, living with women and children far away from their master. They kept up a mill and tended herds. They lived a life of poverty in a rude and harsh environment. When a young donkey driver is killed by a bear in a forest and his ass is found with a traveller, the latter is soundly thrashed. When they are informed of their master's death, the slaves take to flight. On their flight they pass an estate kept up by tenants (*coloni*), who think they are dealing with a gang of robbers and heavily-handedly chase them away with watch dogs. Then they reach a village where a slave *vilicus* had run his master's land. Later on, this steward is punished to death by the master for his wrongdoings⁵⁸. Ancient historians should not dismiss this admittedly fictional evidence. *Vilici* did indeed run smaller estates as tyrants due to the distance from the master, and stewards had to fear their masters when they returned to settle things⁵⁹.

Undoubtedly the majority of the peasant population lived in conditions we would consider as poor, though not necessarily in extreme poverty. These people cultivated the land, together with their wife and children, as is sometimes attested in the papyri⁶⁰. For want of direct evidence we are thrown back on comparative investigation, as to the concept of the *Household Life Cycle*. Changes in the make-up of a family (due to death,

⁵⁷ For estimates on the proportion of rural and urban population in the Roman Empires, see JONGMAN 2000, p. 255 and SCHEIDEL 2001, p. 49-72. On farmers, see FLACH 1990. On life conditions and famine, see GARNSEY 1980, 1999 and 1988.

⁵⁸ Apuleius, *Met.* VII 15-28; VIII 1; VIII 15-23 (see VII 24 about the trashing of the traveller; VIII 17 about their being chased away from the estate; VIII 22 about the unfaithful *vilicus*). See also BRADLEY 1994, p. 71.

⁵⁹ Compare with Nonius Marcellus, *De comp. doctrina* 242 (ed. Lindsay: *longe ab urbe vilicari, quo erus rarerer venit, id non vilicari sed dominari est mea sententia*); Columella, *RR* I 2.1 (*sub hoc metu cum familia vilicus erit in officio*).

⁶⁰ *P. Flor.* I 91 (a farmer cultivating royal land together with his wife and children: l. 18-19: σὸν γυναῖκα καὶ τέκνοις). For a demotic example from a Greek milieu, see ZÄS 133 (2006), p. 61 l. 17 («labor of *tff* (of) my wife and my children»). See also p. 63 l. 18 («my wife concerning the money for doing labor, with my children»).

divorce, military service) have implications concerning employment and may lead to women and children temporarily being employed for all kinds of field work. In Italy men in closed communities more often put women and children to work, where they were not disturbed by Noisy Parkers or criticism of people alien to the community. Established socio-cultural values could be trampled on in such communities. Women and children perform their traditional tasks, as well as jobs usually belonging to the male role pattern⁶¹. Slave children took on the same tasks in these environments: olive harvest, tending cattle, gathering wood, cleaning the house, removing stones from the fields, breaking clods of earth — these are but a few tasks that filled their days⁶².

4.3. Mining

Child labour in mining was common in 19th-century industrial Europe. A German law from June 15, 1869 prohibited the employment of children under thirteen, but permitted the employment of thirteen-year olds to a maximum of six hours a day and of fourteen-year olds up to ten hours a day. The coal mines allowed children to work in an eight-hour team system in the period between 5 a.m. and 1 p.m. By a new regulation of 30 April 1938 the use of minors over sixteen was only authorised for preparatory work in the mountains and mines⁶³. In France a law from 1810 forbade all work by children under ten in the mines. In Italy the same age limit was imposed in 1866 for those who had to work in the mines; for those working outside the mine the minimum age was nine years⁶⁴.

The most extensive passage on ancient mining is to be found in the Hellenistic historian Agatharchides of Cnidos (2nd century BC), *On the Red Sea*. It includes an interesting passage on children in ancient gold mines⁶⁵.

⁶¹ SCHEIDEL 1995, p. 210-213 on the (too) high costs of having a house slave, the Household Life Cycle and the role pattern in isolated communities.

⁶² Olive harvest: Palladius, *Op. agr.* I 6.14; *P. Fayum* 102. A little girl with two goats: Ovidius, *Fasti* IV 511. Children carrying other children: Phylarchus 81 F61a = Aelianus, *VH* VI 29. On *gerulae*: Tertullian, *Adv. Marc.* II 13.2; *de An.* 19.8. Though it is possible that *gerulae* actually were nurses, SHAW 1987, p. 42 thinks that they were children. For Greek evidence, see GOLDEN 1990, p. 32-37, 128-129 (also pointing to iconographical material).

⁶³ WOELK 1966, p. 120-121.

⁶⁴ GIARDINA 2000, p. 414-415.

⁶⁵ Agatharchides' text on the gold mines (fr. 23-29) is preserved by Photius (*Bibl.* p. 447.21-p. 449.10a) and with slight variations by Diodorus Siculus (*Bibl.* III 12.1-14.5). Modern scholarship presumes that Photius' text is actually closer to the original. See LAES 2006, p. 190-193 for an extended analysis of the Agatharchides text in the light of child labour.

Agatharchides reports on the winning of gold, scraped together with «infinite trouble and difficulties» (fr. 23) by prisoners of war or criminals. They were hit — dixit Agatharchides — by «the greatest misfortune of harshest slavery». «Some bore this ordeal together with wife and children, others all by themselves». They were continuously chained and toiled night and day. Escape was impossible, because they were guarded by foreign soldiers with whom they could not speak (fr. 24). First young and sturdy labourers hacked a way through the rocks with pick axes and hammers following the course of the gold veins. This labour was physically extremely hard. They could hardly stand up in the narrow shafts and had to tie a lamp to the forehead in order to see something (fr. 25). Children then crept into the shafts and with strenuous efforts collected the pebbles and stones and brought them into the open (fr. 26: ἄνθρωποι παῖδες)⁶⁶. Adult males older (or younger?) than thirty⁶⁷ pulverized these stones, and the women ground them in a mill. In Diodorus' version Agatharchides pathetically enlarges on the untold misery of these people: they are dirty and naked, nobody is spared, not even women, elderly, sick or wounded, they are continuously being beaten. For these people death is preferable to life (fr. 26)⁶⁸.

Furthermore there is only scant other evidence for slave children in the mines. We know of the presence of *impuberes* in the Aljustrel colony in Lusitania⁶⁹, of lower wages for child labourers in the quarries of Mons Claudianus and the gold mines of Dacia⁷⁰. Working conditions in the Dacian mines have been studied by S. Mrozek. The owners usually relied on free working men, whose wife and children lived with them in a workers' colony and performed some tasks in order to secure the income of the family. In the mines of Alburnus Maior a waxed tablet registers the

⁶⁶ In a rhetorical comparison, John Chrysostom refers to children sorting out gold. See John Chrysostom, *In Epist. Rom.* 16.1. I owe this reference to Bernadette Brooten.

⁶⁷ Textual variation between the Photius and the Diodorus version. See SANCHEZ-LEON 2000, p. 181.

⁶⁸ Apparently Agatharchides, who as a courtier had little knowledge of life in the mines, points to the inhuman sufferings of these miners in glaring colours in order to liven up his indictment against Ptolemy VIII, his much-hated sovereign (Agatharchides was actually exiled by him).

⁶⁹ See mainly DOMERGUE 1983 and SANCHEZ LEON 2000, p. 185-187. The *Tabula Vipsca* I 3.4 mentions the presence of *impuberes*.

⁷⁰ CUVIGNY 1996, p. 140-143 and SANCHEZ LEON 2000, p. 186. For Dacia, the gold mines were situated near to Alburnus Maior. In a contract preserved on a waxed tablet and dated 19th May — 13th November AD 164 a wage of 70 denarii for adults and of 10 denarii for children is stipulated: *CIL* III 2, TC X (p. 948-949).

purchase of a little girl, named Passia, six years of age, and of a boy aged between ten and fifteen⁷¹.

The study by C. Domergue for the Iberian peninsula lists 57 miners⁷². In Lusitanian mines, both free persons and slaves performed lighter tasks in the colony, both could work in the mines, though the real harsh labour was carried out in chains, evidently by slaves and/or prisoners. Six out of the 57 attested miners were of servile origin. Of 22 out of 57 the age is known, at the most six are minors, only two are possibly child slaves.

In a first inscription (second century CE) the name Germanus possibly refers to the nationality of the slave who died at the age of fifteen.

Germanus | Marini serv(us) | an(norum) XV h(ic) s(itus) e(st). S(it)
t(ibi) t(erra) l(evis). (A. Blanco Freijeiro, *Antiquédades de Rio Tinto*,
in *Zephyrus* 13, 1962, p. 43)

The other inscription found at Andinuela may mention a young slave from Lusitania⁷³.

Lubecigremeio serv(us) | nomine T[o vel a]nginu[s] | Lusita[n]us |
v(ix)it a(nnorum) X[...] hic si[tus] | est. (*H.A.E.* 2145)

5. CITY LIFE

5.1. *Serving Wealthy Households*

Besides an estate in the country with the staff of the *familia rustica*, well-to-do Romans had a house in town with an equally considerable staff, the *familia urbana*. The extensive *familiae* are a favourite subject for satirising exaggeration. The parvenu Trimalchio, for instance, possessed a battery of specialised servants and even entertainers such as dancers, musicians, acrobats, jesters and handsome young pages⁷⁴. In an undoubtedly hyperbolic epigram by Martial a certain Zoilus disposed of five slaves for specific needs: a boy who made him vomit with a quill, a concubine

⁷¹ MROZEK 1968. For the contracts on wax tablets, see *CIL* III 2, TC VI (girl) and TC VII (boy).

⁷² DOMERGUE 1990, p. 338-342.

⁷³ See the comment by DOMERGUE 1990, p. 338 n. 17 (a slightly different version from the reading of the editor in *H.A.E.*) on the indigenous name Lubecigremeio. He states that Tonginus or Tanginus was the slave's second name.

⁷⁴ On Trimalchio's staff, see BALDWIN 1978. See also BRADLEY 1994, p. 63-64 for this and other examples of large staff in Roman households.

to fan, a slave boy to whack away flies with a twiglet, a masseur and a eunuch who gave a hand during urination⁷⁵. In Martial two boys cleaning the soil of the arena for the games were killed when the guardians lost control of a usually gentle lion — these boys were at the service of the arena staff⁷⁶.

Table service was a standing task of young children in large households. According to Columella servants who are dealing with articles of food, should be *impuberes* for the sake of hygiene. Juvenal mentions his little servants waiting for him at the table, and Ulpian speaks of slaves trained in the *paedagogium* who perform duties in the *triclinium*⁷⁷. A mural painting from Pompeii shows four children busy during a magnificent banquet: a young servant helps a guest take off his shoes; another boy brings a tankard to the same guest; still another young slave supports a man who visibly has to vomit, while a fourth lad (visibly with a dark complexion) is being embraced⁷⁸.

J. D'Arms distinguishes three kinds of slaves responsible for running official banquets (*epulae*) and private dinners (*convivia*). One group was concerned with the reception of guests: *vocatores* took care of the invitations, *nomenclatores* announced the guests, *ianitores* are porters and *triclinarchiae* oversaw the triclinium. A second group was in charge of the food. In addition to cooks and kitchen hands, the *obsonatores* were responsible for the purchase of delicacies. The *pueri ministri* (in the *Cena Trimalchionis* they make no fewer than 35 entrees) brought in the fares. Cup bearers, belonging to the third group added greatly to the prestige of sumptuous banquets. Young, clean-shaven, with long frizzled hair they had to be attractive to the guests, who could also appeal to their sexual services⁷⁹. References to sexual services of slaves in wealthy households,

⁷⁵ Martial, *Ep.* III 82

⁷⁶ Martial, *Ep.* III 75.

⁷⁷ Juvenal, *Sat.* XI 145-160; Columella, *RR* XII 4.3; *Dig.* XXXIII 7.12.32. See also *CIL* IX 1880 = *CLE* 100 for a *poculi minister*, aged eighteen.

⁷⁸ Museum of Naples: Inv. no. 120.029. See *Le Collezioni del Museo Nazionale di Napoli*, Rome 1986, p. 170 no. 342 and GARDNER & WIEDEMANN 1991, ill. 14. PETER-MANDL 1997, p. 125 believes that the fresco depicts a pederastic scene. The embracing figure, however, is a woman.

⁷⁹ Key text is Philo, *De vita contempl.* 50-52 (translated in POLLINI 2003, p. 154-155 and commented upon by SZESNAT 1998). Tiberius used naked girls for his banquets: Suetonius, *Tib.* 42.2. About attractive slave boys, see Horace, *Sat.* II 8.69-70; Petronius, *Sat.* 41; Lucianus, *Sat.* 17.24 and *Symp.* 15. Seneca, *Ep.* 47.7 and 95.124 makes a connection between services offered at the *convivium* and sexual services in the *cubiculum*. See D'ARMS 1991, p. 173-176 and POLLINI 2003, p. 161-166.

mainly in connection with the emperor, are legion: sex slaves are sometimes called *delicium*⁸⁰.

Large households with specialised staff are also attested in inscriptions, e.g. in Livia's tomb. Other elite households from the Julio-Claudian period confirm this picture. In all, almost ninety different professional names or paraphrases of functions were found⁸¹. They vary from trades (goldsmith, shoemaker, tailor), administrative duties (clerk, secretary, archivist), medical functions (doctor, midwife, surgeon, oculist), educational staff (nurse, paedagogus), entertainment (musician, singer, dwarf, page), kitchen personnel (cook, baker, table servants, foretaster) to door-keepers, overseers of windows and statues, or sending off invitations.

This extreme specialisation is explained by Columella in a passage referring to farms, which also applies to urban households⁸²: by assigning a specific function to one simple slave, the latter is never in a position to pass the buck to someone else when the task is not well performed. Thus a certain pride in the job is boosted with slaves. That such pride did exist, is clear from the fact that slaves with humble but necessary functions like dustman, broomstick sweeper, the upkeep of sanitary did not get tombstones mentioning these jobs.

Over the years a slave might stand a chance of promotion. In that case he proudly mentioned his function, for labour was his sole possibility to prove himself⁸³. Though ages are hardly ever mentioned in these inscriptions, we may safely assume that children started early helping with simple tasks.

Large households often trained their young staff themselves. Trimalchio, in his early childhood himself a slave, read Homer during his schooling. The astrologer Maximus explicitly reports on educating domestic staff. From Petronius we know of young slaves who did a training of barber; inscriptions mention apprentice producers of mirrors or even training for handsome and delicate boys (*glabri*) in large households⁸⁴.

⁸⁰ WILLIAMS 1999, p. 31 («a comprehensive catalogue of Roman texts that refer to men's sexual use of their male and female slaves would be massive»); p. 34 about emperors and pederasty. See also LAES 2003 on *delicia*, LAES 2006, p. 220-225 for further comments on pederasty.

⁸¹ TREGGIARI 1973 on Julian-Claudian families; TREGGIARI 1975 on Livia's household. BRADLEY 1994, p. 61-64 offers a survey of attested professions.

⁸² Columella, *RR* I 9.5-6.

⁸³ Artemidorus, *On*. 2.15 and 2.30 on promotion of slaves. See BRADLEY 1994, p. 68-69.

⁸⁴ Petronius, *Sat*. 48.7 & 94.14. Epigraphic testimonia in *ILS* 1779 (*praepositus... discentibus speclariis*); *AE* 1899, 206 (*paedagogus glabrorum*); *AE* 1991, 248 (*paedagogus puerorum*).

The *paedagogium* was the space for training of young slaves⁸⁵. Pliny owned such a *paedagogium* and a room serving as a gymnasium for his slaves, both probably in his Laurentian villa. Whether Pliny's staff of educated slaves came from his own training school, is not known. Seneca complains about the extravagant interior of these training spaces meant to show off the masters' wealth. Pupils attending these schools were dressed in an extravagant page outfit. A complaint of Columella's suggests that these boys acted as servants of decadent luxury⁸⁶. According to Pliny the Elder *pueri* from the *paedagogium* accompanied their master to the baths⁸⁷.

Imperial *paedagogia* are known from Tiberius' time (the so-called Palatine *paedagogium*) up to Caracalla. The later school building was situated on the Coelius hill and was called *Caput Africae*. The age of pupils (*discentes*) ranges from 12 to 18 years. A considerable teaching staff with a sophisticated hierarchy of functions (*procurator* – *praeceptor* – *paedagogus* – *subpaedagogus*) is known from inscriptions. A special attention for cosmetic functions suggests that these young pupils next to their training, also performed representative functions in the imperial household. Also Carthage had its proper imperial *paedagogium* in the first and second century CE⁸⁸.

Typical slave duties in large households are the *nomenclatores* or heralds/announcers. According to Pliny, young slaves of about fifteen years of age were often used to this end, but no children-nomenclators are attested in the inscriptions⁸⁹. *Cursores* walked in front of the master's

⁸⁵ Early studies on the training of slaves include MOHLER 1940 and FORBES 1955, p. 334-336. See also BOOTH 1979; HERMANN-OTTO 1994, p. 315-323; VÖSSING 1997, p. 415 n. 1408; PETERMANDL 1997, p. 223-225.

⁸⁶ Pliny, *Ep.* II 17.7; VII 27.13 & IX 36.4. Pliny calls these slaves *mei*. See also Seneca, *Tranq. an.* 1.8; *Vita Beata* 17.2. On different training institutes, see Columella, *RR* I, praef. 5: *scholas rhetorum ... geometrarum musicorumque vel, quod magis dicendum est, contemptissimorum vitiorum officinas*.

⁸⁷ Pliny, *NH* XXXIII 40.

⁸⁸ See HERMANN-OTTO 1994, p. 319-323 on imperial *paedagogia*. See *CIL* VI 8695 for the youngest known pupil of such schools, aged twelve. On these pupils, see HERMANN-OTTO 1994, p. 317 n. 52 and 323 n. 62. On their trainers, see HERMANN-OTTO 1994, p. 322-323 n. 61-62. Cosmetic functions mentioned in the inscriptions include the terms *ornatrix*, *ornator glabrorum*, *unctor*. HARRIS 1989, p. 147 minimises the literary and cultural education offered by such *paedagogia*. They were rather about serving and handsome looks. On the 369 graffiti which presumably come from the *paedagogium* on the Palatine hill, see ITKONEN-KAILA, SOLIN & VAANANEN 1966.

⁸⁹ Pliny, *Ep.* II 14.6: *nomenclatores mei (habent sane aetatem eorum qui nuper togas sumpserint)*. The youngest *nomenclator* known from the inscriptions was aged 24: see

carriage or acted as messengers. Within a family of three brothers-*cursores* Zonius performed this function from the age of 15. He died the day of his release; perhaps he was actually manumitted on his death bed:

De tres fratris curulolris unuls seplaratlus eslt. || Zonius cursor qui cucurrlrit opere maxime q(u)i cucurrlrit annis VI me(n)sis IIII | qui vixit in iuve(n)tute | sua annis XXI et pos(t) | morte(m) patris luce(m) vildit dies V mens(es) IIII N VIN | qui deces(s)it die man(u)mes(sionis). (CIL VI 9317)

For Mommsen these young messengers were in the service of the *curator operum maximorum*, a direct subordinate of the *praefectus urbis*. *Cursores* in private service are also attested, however⁹⁰.

The *calculator* was the bookkeeper of the *familia*. The thirteen-year-old homeborn slave Melior is praised in an inscription for his cleverness and energy⁹¹. Youngsters in administrative functions are amply attested. An assistant-writer and imperial slave, *subsequens librariorum*, possibly aged fifteen from Dacia is attested⁹². In Cologne the young stenographer

CIL VI 4455 and HERMANN-OTTO 1994, p. 333-334 n. 79. It is unlikely that we are confronted with a nine-year old *nomenclator* in AE 1959, 147 = 1968, 33 = 1987, 67: [. Cor]nelius P(ubli) l(ibertus) Surus | [nome]nclator mag(ister) | [Capito]linus V a(nnis) VIII | [mag(ister)? s]utorum praeco | [ab ae]rario ex tribus | [decuri]eis mag(ister) scr(ibarum) poetar(um) | [ludos] fecit in theatro lapidio | [ac]cens(us) con(n)s(ulis) et cens(or)is. The most recent interpretation has it that Cornelius Surus had been nominated a *nomenclator* five times in a period of eight years. In AE 1968, 33 the editors still raise the possibility of «un petit fonctionnaire».

⁹⁰ See MOMMSEN's comments *ad locum* in CIL VI. For messengers in private service, see Petronius, *Sat.* 28.29. See also G. CICOLINE, in *Dizionario Epigrafico* II (1910), p. 1403-1404.

⁹¹ CIL XIV 475. The boy was also the author of a handbook: *Hic tantae memoriae scientiae | fuit, ut ab antiquorum memoria usque in diem | finis suae omnium titulos superaverit | singula autem quae sciebat volumine potius | quam titulo scribi potuerunt nam | commentarios artis suae quos reliquit | primus fecit et solus posset imitari si eum | iniqua fata rebus humanis non invidissent*. Scholars disagree whether he actually was a kind of teacher of mathematics or an accountant. On this controversy, see HERMANN-OTTO 1994, p. 333 n. 78.

⁹² CIL III 1314: *D(is) M(anibus) | Iustinus Caes(aris) n(ostri) | verna subseque(n)s | librariorum | vix(it) an(n)is XV [...] | Tertius verna | Valdenio | pientissimo | b(ene) m(erenti) p(osuit)*. Other testimonia of young writers do not reveal servile origin: CIL VI 41420a = 8401 = CLE 1388 (a very young *notarius*; l. 2.: *teneris... sub annis*; l. 6: *annis parve quidem sed gravitate senex*); CIL III 7572 (*librarius leg. V*; some years of service at age eighteen); CIL III 1317 (*librarius* from the age of seventeen); CIL III 5435 (*librarius cons.* from the age of nineteen); CIL V 375 (*librarius* from age eighteen); AE 1990, 213 (*librarius* and *notarius* aged nineteen); GV 592 (δρθογράφος in the army, twenty years). *Librarii* and *notarii* were both writers and secretaries. TEITLER 1985 offers a prosopographical list of all attested *notarii* but does not discuss their age.

Xanthias apparently acted as his masters' confidant. The inscription, put in a rapid iambic metre is interesting for various reasons. The first eight lines are devoted to a flute player of the same family, called Sidonius. Both slave boys were the same age (v. 6: *par aetas erat*), though their exact age is not given. Their names point to a Greek or eastern origin. A poem for a *notarius*, composed by Ausonius refers to a similar literary-cultural environment in fourth-century Germania (Ausonius indeed worked in Trier)⁹³. According to lines 21-22 the boy Xanthias was well on his way to becoming his master's confidant.

hoc carmen, haec ara, hic cinis, | pueri sepulchrum est Xanthiae | qui
morte acerba raptus est | iam doctus in compendia | tot literarum et
nominum | notare currenti stilo | quot lingua currens diceret. | iam nemo
superaret legens, | iam voce erili coeperat | ad omne dictatum volans |
aurem vocari ad proximam. | heu morte propera concidit, | arcana qui
solus sui | sciturus domini fuit. (CLE 219, 9-22)⁹⁴

The *capsarii*, young slaves who accompanied their young master to school bearing the school necessities, maybe attended the lessons with their masters and at home served as pages for their master, were still young kids themselves⁹⁵.

It is often argued that these house slaves led a more comfortable life than their partners in the country. Comparative investigation, however, shows that this is not necessarily so. House slaves on U.S. plantations often lived in squalid conditions, on top of their being confronted with their masters' luxury. They were often harassed and treated cruelly by their masters, with whom they lived together on a daily basis⁹⁶. Diverse ancient sources, from fictional accounts to historiography, point to cruelty towards house slaves. For a slight mistake they could be flogged, whipped or treated with the irons⁹⁷. Indirect comments of ancient authors remind of uncertainty of slave existence: the slave who is hit in the eye with a reed pen by an infuriated master, the servant of Augustus whose bones were broken for accepting a tip, the twelve-year old Commodus

⁹³ Ausonius, *Ephem.* 7 ed. Green.

⁹⁴ See COURTNEY 1995, no. 131 and CHESSA 2005 for extended comments on this poem.

⁹⁵ CGL III 379-380 on a young master and his page. See HERMANN-OTTO 1994, p. 333 n. 79 for further literature on *capsarii*.

⁹⁶ D'ARMS 1991, p. 180-181.

⁹⁷ Petronius, *Sat.* 34.6 (beating for stealing a cup); Juvenal, *Sat.* 14.15-22 (burning iron for the stealing of napkins); Ammianus Marcellinus XXVIII 4.16 (three hundred whiplashes for bringing hot water too slowly). D'ARMS 1991, p. 175 offers a full list of punishments and degrading treatment of household slaves.

who had a bath attendant thrown in the oven because the water in the *calidarium* was too hot, the master of Aesop who does his utter best to square his account with his cunning slave by means of the whip⁹⁸. In a moralising passage, Seneca mentions a group of slaves standing by and watching their masters feasting on the best fares. The whole night long they stood there, the slightest noise being punished with the whip, hunger and boredom was their destiny⁹⁹.

5.2. *Trades and Artisans*

Inscriptions refer to slave children performing specific trades. We cannot always tell for sure whether this happened in the context of a large and well-to-do household. Pagus, probably a slave born at his master's home, distinguished himself as a goldsmith. According to his metric epitaph he was only twelve years old when he died.

Quicumque es puero lacrimas effunde viator
bis tulit hic senos primaevi germini annos,
deliciumque fuit domini spes grata parentum.
noverat hic docta fabricare monilia dextra
et molle in varias aurum disponere gemmas.
Novum erat puero Pagus, at nunc funus acerbum
et cinis in tumulo iacet et sine nomine corpus.
Qui vixit annis XII
mensibus VIII diebus XIII ho(ris) VIII.
(CIL VI 9437 = CLE 403)

In this household, a slave boy acted as the darling pet of his master and at the same time took part in specialised work in the workshop of his parents. The nine-year old goldsmith Vincentia was probably a slave. Whether she was also employed in a large household, is uncertain. The father, however did erect the inscription.

Vicentia dulcissima filia | aurinetrix qae (sic) | vixit an(nis) VIII
m(enses) VIII. (CIL VI 9213)

From inscriptions we know of four child-*ornatrices* of possible servile origin. Their profession which demanded a certain dexterity and was probably related to aesthetic care, required a training period of at least two

⁹⁸ Galenus, *De proprii animi cuiuslibet affectuum dignotione et curatione* 4.7-8 (5.17 Kühn); Suetonius, *Aug.* 67; SHA, *Comm.* 1.9; *Vita Aesopi* 58.77a. See D'ARMS 1991, p. 179.

⁹⁹ Seneca, *Ep.* 47.3

months. With the exception of an inscription from Naples from *CIL* X, there is no evidence that any of these young *ornatrices* performed their job in a large household, though the third inscription probably refers to an enterprise involving slaves and freedmen. For S. Treggiari «the other ornatrices from Rome are, or may be, in trade like modern hairdressers»¹⁰⁰.

Pieris | ornatix | vixit | an(nis) VIII | Hilara mater posuit.
(*CIL* VI 9731)

Anthis ornatix | an(norum) XII filia | Antonial (*sic pro Antoniae*)
l(ibertae) Eronis. (*CIL* VI 9726)

Q. Lollius Eros | Caetennius Flor(us) | Sponde Caetennia sibi | Bre-
monti v(ixit) a(nnos) VIII Lalo f(ilio) | Erotis orn(atr)ix v(ixit) a(nnos)
XIX m(enses) VI | Sperata orn(atr)ix v(ixit) ann(os) XIII.
(*CIL* VI 9728)

Clymene orn(atr)ix | puerorum v(ixit) a(nnos) X | v(ivo) Lucrio
Pison[is]. (*CIL* X 1041)

Likewise closely connected with body care was the profession of *unguentaria* or female masseur, as the nine-year old *unguentaria* from Gallia Narbonensis who served Pompeia Iphigenia.

—]miae unguentariae Pomp(eiae) Iphigeniae |
—] an(nos) IX m(enses) XI d(ies) XXIII et sibi vivi fecerunt.
(*CIL* XII 1594, Lucus Augusti)

Martial reports on a slave boy who excelled in the barber's art (*tonsor*) and one young barber is known from an inscription¹⁰¹.

Pistus | N(oni) Vibi Sereni tonsor | Pistus et inpubis situs hic – crudelius
| ultra quid quaeris – formam nec | minor ipse sua | in lachrymas dedit
ossa novas | revocatus in iram surge dolor | tacite ne cadat hora gravis.
(*CIL* VI 9938 = *CLE* 989)

The freedman L. Anicius Felix served as *vestiarius tenuarius*, tailor for light and delicate clothing. Only four years old (himself one year under the age limit for slaves) he probably worked with other tailors in a large household. Early released (or again manumitted on his deathbed?) he was probably destined to work in the house of his master for a long period, but death intervened¹⁰².

¹⁰⁰ TREGGIARI 1976, p. 80. Training of at least two months: *Dig.* XXXII 65.3. See HERMANN-OTTO 1994, p. 335 n. 81.

¹⁰¹ Martial, *Ep.* VI 5.2 (*puerilibus annis*). See *GV* 1350 on a barber called ἀρτιφύη. Apprentice barbers are mentioned, without age indication, in *Philogelos* 199 and 200.

¹⁰² The inscription belongs to the *Monumentum Vineae Aquariorum*. For notes on the early manumission of young slaves with technical skills, see HERMANN-OTTO 1994, p. 335.

L. Anicius L(ucii) l(ibertus) l Felix l vestiarius l tenuarius v(ixit) a(nnos)
IV.
(CIL VI 6852)

A ten-year old woolworker (*lanarius*) seems to be attested in Africa, though both the reading and the slave status are doubtful¹⁰³. A little slave-girl won her spurs in wool work:

C(ai) Paguri C(ai) l(iberti) Gelot[i]s. l Hospes resiste et tumultum hunc
excelsum aspic[e] l quo continentur ossa parvae aetatae l sepulta heic
sita sum verna quouis aetatae l gravitatem officio et lanificio praestitei
l queror fortunae cassum tam iniquom et gravem l nomen si quaeras
exoriatu Salviae. l Valebis hospes opto ut s<ei>s felicior. (CIL V 6808
= CLE 63, Eporedia, Ivrea)

Often children, freeborn or slaves, from smaller households learned the craft at home from their parents. A painting in Pompeii shows a woman holding and helped by a little girl¹⁰⁴. Home industry existed in all regions of the empire. Freeborn girls were probably kept at home for the sake of security, which at the same time accounts for their absence in apprentice contracts. They learned a trade indoors¹⁰⁵. In the apocryphal gospel on Mary's infancy the three-year old Mary concentrates enthusiastically on weaving wool¹⁰⁶. Daily life of an apprentice girl in or a young female servant was actually quite similar: they probably learned and worked together.

A similar situation is attested in apprentice contracts preserved on papyrus. Such contracts, drawn up between a master and the parents, guardians or masters of an apprentice, inform on the nature of the work, the training period, expenses and practical regulations, working hours and holidays¹⁰⁷. The precise age of an apprentice is given once only for a slave girl of fourteen working as a weaver in Antinoopolis¹⁰⁸. Nonetheless we may assume that most children were about twelve or thirteen years old at the start of the contract: at times minority is explicitly mentioned, and almost always a parent, master or other relative negotiates the contract.

¹⁰³ ILAfr 396: Jrius l [...] pius vi[xit ann(nos)] X lanari LO l [...]CAR [-]. For a 17-year old *lanarius*, see CIL V 4505.

¹⁰⁴ See the illustrations in KAMPEN 1981, fig. 90 and ZIMMER 1982, p. 120. The grave-stone of the 13-year old Avidius Felix shows all the attributes pointing to the profession of a wool carder, yet he was no slave: CIL IX 4024.

¹⁰⁵ VAN MINNEN 1998.

¹⁰⁶ Ev Ps.-Math. 6.1: *Insistebat autem in lanificio, et omnia quae mulieres antiquae non poterant facere, ista in tenera aetate posita explicabat.*

¹⁰⁷ The most detailed survey is BERGAMASCO 1995. See also BRADLEY 1991, p. 103-125 and SCHULZ-FALKENTHAL 1972. Since Bergamasco's study, other contracts have been edited or new readings have been proposed by KRUSE 1996; BERGAMASCO 1997, 2006 and FORSELV 1998.

¹⁰⁸ PSI 241.

Since the apprentice is not yet a legal person, someone else negotiates the contract with a master, and if the apprentice does not meet the requirements, the person who had entered the contract has to pay a compensation¹⁰⁹. The contracts concern free children (31, i.e. over 75% among whom only a few girls), slaves male and female (see the appendix). free-born girls apparently learned a craft preferably at home¹¹⁰. All female slaves were trained in weaving. No single trade was specifically connected with free or slave status. Depending on circumstances parents or owners decided to train a child in a specific trade. The difference in the day-to-day reality between slaves and freeborn children, both as to the profession performed and the lack of free choice, will have been minimal.

Some contracts offer more information on the daily life of masters and pupils. In certain cases working hours extended from sunrise to sunset, the pupil going home in the evening. Some apprentices stayed the night at their master's¹¹¹. The distance to the parents' home or the wishes of the master may have played a role. In the *Digesta*, a man had taken a slave apprentice boy abroad, while this was not allowed according to the contract. The boy was killed abroad¹¹². In some contracts the master has to supply food and clothing,. Other papyri determine the number of holidays (between eighteen to twenty a year) and stipulate what should be done when the apprentice falls ill or has a work delay. In four texts the apprentice has to take a test after the training period in the presence of others. One artisan insists that his training period be finalized with an outside master and not with his own father¹¹³. The confirmation by someone outside the family apparently ensured greater objectivity. The master commits himself to paying back a part of the money if the result proves inadequate¹¹⁴.

¹⁰⁹ Minority is expressed in terms as ἀφῆλιξ (*P. Mich.* III 172) or μηδέπω ὄν τῶν ἐτῶν (*BGU IV* 1124). BERGAMASCO 1995, p. 125 deals with the legal non-existence of the apprentice.

¹¹⁰ BRADLEY 1991, p. 108. *P. Heid.* IV 326 is the only apprentice contract of a free apprentice girl in Bergamasco's study. Also *KSB I* 45 (a Coptic papyrus from the 8th century) and *SB XVIII* 13305 contain evidence on free apprentice girls. See VAN MINNEN 1998.

¹¹¹ Daily working: Καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν ἀπὸ ἡλίου ἀνατολῆς μέχρι δύσεως (*P. Oxy.* IV 725). Permanent stay: οὐ γινόμενος ἀπόκοιτος οὐδ' ἀφήμερος ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ διδασκάλου οἰκίας (*P. Oslo* III 141).

¹¹² *Dig.* XIX 2.13.3.

¹¹³ BERGAMASCO 1995, p. 129-130 (holidays); 131 (illness or absence; the one who had entered into the contract had to pay indemnification to the master); 133-134 (examinations). See also *BGU IV* 1124 on the young slave Narcissus who had been sent by his master in order to learn to play the flute: ἐξετασθήσεται ὑφ' ὁμοιοτέχνων τριῶν.

¹¹⁴ *P. Oxy.* II 275 (a master who failed to teach a trade properly will be fined).

Our sources do not show clearly how these youngsters were treated. Obedience to the master only applied to matters related to the trade, which does not exclude harsh treatment¹¹⁵. For that matter also freeborn apprentices might meet rough discipline, witness the story of Lucian who takes to his heels after being thrashed by his uncle-master. The *Digesta* mention a cobbler who beat a fumbling apprentice-slave into blindness with his last. Violence was daily reality; beating up children was normal also at school, life was different from modern sensibilities¹¹⁶. Also in the *Digesta* apprentices fled back to their mother: if the flight was only meant to escape punishment the apprentices are not considered fugitives¹¹⁷. Sources from the 17th century mention excessive ill-treatment of apprentices in London by their masters or slightly older apprentices. L. Stone distinguishes for the period 1640-1800 a specific way of dealing with children by tradesmen and farmers, which would be characterised by an emphasis on the economic use of children, early initiation in the world of labour among others as apprentices and beating as a way to confirm one's authority¹¹⁸.

However, ancient legal sources did not consider brutality normal. In the *Digesta* Ulpian clearly voices his disagreement with Julian's interpretation. For him a complaint on the basis of the *Lex Aquileia* on indemnification can indeed be lodged against the brutal cobbler. Excessive brutality on the master's part should not be tolerated¹¹⁹.

On the other side funerary inscriptions were erected by masters or apprentices for each other in grateful memory at a death¹²⁰. A Greek

¹¹⁵ E.g. *P. Oxy.* II 322: διακονοῦντα καὶ ποιοῦντα τὰ ἔργα πάντα τὰ ἐπιτασσόμενα αὐτῷ κατὰ τὴν γερδιακὴν τέχνην. See BERGAMASCO 1995, p. 125-126.

¹¹⁶ LAES 2005.

¹¹⁷ Lucian, *Somn.* 1-5; Dig. IX 2.5.3: *Si magister in disciplina vulneraverit servum vel occiderit, an Aquilia teneatur, quasi damnum iniuria dederit? Et Iulianus scribit Aquilia teneri eum, qui eluscaverat discipulum in disciplina: multo magis igitur in occiso idem erit dicendum. Proponitur autem apud eum species talis: sutor, inquit, puero discenti ingenuo filio familias, parum bene facienti quod demonstraverit, forma calcei cervicem percussit, ut oculus puero perfunderetur. Dicit igitur Iulianus iniuriarum quidem actionem non competere, quia non faciendae iniuriae causa percusserit, sed monendi et docendi causa.* The same case is repeated in Dig. XXIX 2.13.4-5. See THOMAS 1961. Recently, SIGISMUND-NIELSEN 2007 has taken this passage as symptomatic for the 'utilitarian' use Romans made of children. On fleeing, see Dig. XXI 1.17.5.

¹¹⁸ STONE 1977, p. 167-169, 468-470. The classic study on apprentice boys in London is SMITH 1973.

¹¹⁹ Dig. IX 2.5: ... *an ex locato, dubitat, quia levis dumtaxat castigatio concessa est docenti: sed lege Aquilia posse agi non dubito.* Dig. IX 2.6: *Praeceptoris enim nimia saevitia culpa adsignatur.*

¹²⁰ The most explicit gratitude is expressed in an inscription which clearly refers to freeborn or freed servants. RIT 447: *Iulius hic fuerat nomine summo artificioque Statutus | tractabatque viris aurum mulieribus atque puellis | plenus omni ope moribus vita discipulina beatus | non uno contentus erat pluribus gaudebat amicis | h(a)ec illi semper vita*

metric epigraph from Nicomedia testifies gratitude and pride from the tailor-patcher Euphras remembering his master Vitalis who died aged 35. The young age of the master and the use of ἐξέθρεψε in line 8 suggests that Euphras had lived at Vitalis' place from childhood on, possibly as foundling or *alumnus*. Benevolent kindness appeared to have been the guiding principle of his training¹²¹. In an inscription from Cordoba a master *anaglyptarius* (relief tooler), remembers his apprentice and *alumnus* who had died aged 11 years, 5 months and 6 days. The interpretation, however, is controversial, it might also be about a 40-year old man (if one reads *annorum XL* instead of *annorum XI*), who was *alumnus* and successor of a certain C. Valerius Zephyrus¹²².

Valerius | [—]m Tuccit(anus) | caelator anaglyptarius | incrementum
maximum | annor(um) XI | men(ses) V dier(um) VI | p(ius) i(n) s(uis)
h(ic) s(itus) e(st) s(it) t(ibi) t(erra) l(evis). | C. Valerius Zephyrus | suc-
cesorem suum li(bertum) | et alumnum indulgentissimum hic conse-
cravit. (CIL II 7, 347)

Empathy can reveal something about the living conditions of these slave boys. Contemporaries found themselves with a schoolmaster, who imparted them the rudiments of reading, writing and arithmetic. Since apprentices often stayed with their master night and day, his education included to a great extent the entire life of the youngsters. The craftsman became as it were a new father. With him education is a process involving the entire personality. In many respects he is an example, a paragon the apprentices want to imitate. In the case of slave boys staying as apprentices with a master, a growing mutual sympathy owing to the daily contact cannot be excluded¹²³. In any case, there was a considerable difference with the *ludi magistri* who taught their pupils for just a few hours a day in literacy and literature — subjects that were alien to them and, especially for the lower classes, had at first sight little link with the daily life experience.

fuit mane et sexta lavari | reliquit suboles suae posteros stationis futuros | per quos ut statio statuti(ue) nomen habebit | [t]res paene aetate pares artificio ministros | scripsi haec unus ego ex discipulis prior omnibus illis | Secundinius Felicissimus ego set(!) nomine tantum | [h]oc quot potui magister tibi contraria munera feci | [a]ddo scriptura tuis tumulis sensus sive exter ubique | [s]erves utque tuos amicos meque cum illis | ut quotienscumque tibi annalia vota dicamus | ut et voce pia dicamus Carnunti sit tibi terra levis.

¹²¹ Verse 5: τέχνην διδάξας τῆς πάσης μετ' εὐνοίας. The inscription has been edited by MERKELBACH & STAUBER (*Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten* 3, München 2001) and commented upon by DREXHAGE 2002.

¹²² See *ad hoc* commentary in CIL II. The unusual word *indulgentissimum* testifies of the affection between master and alumnus.

¹²³ FRASCA 1999, p. 150-153.

5.3. Artists and Entertainers

Literary sources and inscriptions mention children as artists: dancers, actors, mime artists, acrobats, rope dancers, jugglers — both boys and girls¹²⁴. Performing artists were not held in high esteem: in this family business sons often followed their fathers¹²⁵. Children performing as entertainers may have grown up in a large and wealthy household which could afford this luxury, or they might have been members of a group of itinerant artists.

A few cases point to young slaves functioning as entertainers inside a household¹²⁶. Some wealthy families had their own group of pantomine players for propaganda¹²⁷. The link with a large household is clear for the young Sidonius in the already mentioned Cologne inscription together with the young bookkeeper Xanthias (see p. 257).

Hoc hos sepulcrum respice | qui carmen et Musas amas | et nostra com-
muni lege | lacrimanda titulo nomina. | Nam nobis pueris simul | ars
varia par aetas erat. | Ego consonanti fistula | Sidonius aera perstrepsens.
(CIL XIII 8355 = CLE 219.1-8)

Though it is not clear what *gymnici* were, a link with artistic pursuits is obvious. Euplus, Elenchius and Vicentius, the three brothers (*gymnici fratres*) can be recognised as slaves by their names, as was their father Basileus. The three little brothers, educated as *alumni* at home, were commemorated by their masters:

D(is) M(anibus). | Hic positi gymnici tres fratres. | Euplusq(ue) vix(it)
a(nnos) V m(enses) VIII/ d(ies) XIII. | Elenchus q(ui) vix(it) a(nnum)
I m(enses) VII. | Vincentius q(ui) vix(it) a(nnos) V m(enses) VIII
d(ies) XXVIII. | Patroni alumni suis | b(ene) m(e)r(enti)bus | et
Basileus fecerunt pater. (CIL VI 10158)

¹²⁴ PROSPERI VALENTI 1985, p. 71-82 and PETERMANDL 1997, p. 127-128 offer important collections — which I have supplemented here with my own finds.

¹²⁵ HUGONOT 2004, p. 233-234 mentions the inscription CIL XIV 2408 mentioning the *adlecti scaenicorum*: 4 out of 60 were sons, 27 out of 60 had the same *nomen gentilicium*.

¹²⁶ Other inscriptions for young entertainers offer at least the suspicion of servile origin. The parents of C. Asinia Doris, a young dancer aged eleven, both had the same *nomen* Asinius Olympus and Asinia Doris. Most probably they were a manumitted couple (CIL VI 10142). The parents of twelve-year-old *emboliaria* Phoebe Vocontia were freed persons from two different households (CIL VI 10127). Eucharis, who was already popular as a thirteen-year-old choral dancer, is a freedwoman of Licinia (CIL VI 10096). Also fifteen-year-old flute player Fulvia Copola was a *liberta* (CIL VI 33970).

¹²⁷ GOURDET 2004, p. 307-325.

Saricius too was, as appears from his name, a boy slave.

D(is) M(anibus). | Sarricio | infanti | gymnico | dulcissimo | qui v(ixit)
a(nnos) IIII | m(enses) VIII d(ies) III | parentes. (CIL VI 10160)

These *gymnici*, perhaps a kind of jesters, artistic gymnasts or acrobats, were extremely young. Even today artistic gymnastics are trained at a very tender age¹²⁸. The five-year old Paridion, a home-trained slave of Julia Hostilia, was an ὀρχηστής, i. e. a dancer-acrobat. His name is a diminutive of Paris, a common nickname for mime actors.

Παριδίων | ὀρχηστής / ἐτῶν ε' | Ἰουλίας Ὅσ/τιλίας θρειαπτός.
(BE 1961, 586 = Rev. Phil., 1958, p. 51-53)

A home-born *verna* was the little dancer Flavia Dionysias, twelve years of age. Her name and the addition *verna* suggest that she was manumitted¹²⁹.

extremum tenui quae pede rupit iter | cuius in octava lascivia surgere
messe | coeperat et dulces fingere nequitias | quod si longa tuae man-
sissent tempora vitae |, doctior in terris nulla puella foret. (CIL VI 18324
= CLE 1166 vv. 2-6)

According to Bücheler line 2 clearly points to a dancer, but this cannot be established with certainty. This young female slave used for entertaining had already early on received a training (*doctior*).

The fourteen-year old dancer Thyas lived in Metilia Rufina's household in Carthago. Her partner was her companion slave Thalamus.

Thyas saltatrix | Metiliae Rufinae | vixit annis XIII | Thalamus spon-
sae suae. (CIL VIII 12925 = ILS 5260)

The fifteen-year old *musicarius* Calocaerus was a home-born slave (*verna*), the dedicatee Daphnus, a fellow slave¹³⁰.

D(is) M(anibus) | Calocaero | vernae dulciss(imo) | et musicario | inge-
niosissimo | qui vixit ann(os) XV | bene merenti fecit Daphnus. (CIL
VI 9649 = ILS 5254)

¹²⁸ PROSPERI VALENTI 1985, p. 79.

¹²⁹ See CLE 1166: praescriptum: *d. M. Flaviae Dionysiadis, quod nomen in carmine breviorē accepit formam* (sc. *Dionysia*), subscriptum: *vixit annis VII m. XI diebus XV: fecit Annia Isias vernae suae b. m.*

¹³⁰ Syntrophillus was a slave of L. Sempronius C[... from Cordoba. CIL II 2241 = CIL II 7, 723: *D(is) M(anibus) S(acrum). | Syntrophillus | musicarius | L(uci) Semproni C[—* (scil. *servus*) | *an(nos) [XV]*. Previous editors have added the age indication arbitrarily: cf. the comment in CIL II 7: *nescio unde* (the inscription is now dated to the end of the 2nd century).

The little singer Bebryx is remembered by his parents and was at the same time the favourite (*delicium*) of the master, like the young goldsmith mentioned above (see p. 258).

formosum cantu detinet iste rogos, | delicium domini, spes expectata
parentum. (CIL X 4041 = CLE 1075, vv. 6-7)

Whereas some slaves acted as entertainers for their wealthy master and his family, other young artists were hired out by a travelling *locator* to show their tricks to wealthy customers¹³¹, though a connection with a wealthy household remains as an unmentioned possibility.

Petauristarii, a sort of acrobats or equilibrists performed at Trimalchio's banquet. While a big and sluggish man held a ladder, a *puer* performed some tricks¹³². Slave status is probable for the young girl Adaugenda who died at age ten¹³³.

Ἀδανγέλνδα μίμας ἔζησε ἔτη | ι´ (CIG 6355 = IG XIV 2179)

The 6-year old Studiosus was a λυδιαστής. The word probably points to dancing and mime¹³⁴.

Στουδιῶσε χρηστέ | χαῖρε ἔζησε ἔτη ζ´ | λυδιαστής. (RSA, 1900,
p. 48 n. 12)

A young *puer* Serapion could be admired in the theatre of the French Antibes for two days.

Dis Manibus | pueri Serapionis annor(um) XII qui | Antipoli in theatro
| biduo saltavit et placuit. (CIL XII 188 = ILS 5258)

In Naples supporters erect an inscription for a slave *gymnicus*, only two years and eight months old, a fact that struck the *CIL* editors with disbelief¹³⁵:

D(is Manibus). Augurio gymnico | incomparabili | dulci exsitioso | vixit
annis II m(enses) VIII | amatores hoc | non merenti f(e)cerunt. (CIL X
2132)

¹³¹ PROSPERI VALENTI 1985, p. 72.

¹³² Petronius, *Sat.* 53. See also Juvenal, *Sat.* 4.122: *pueros inde ad velaria raptos* for young acrobats jumping on sails.

¹³³ PROSPERI VALENTI 1985, p. 76 on her name.

¹³⁴ PROSPERI VALENTI 1985, p. 77-78. The word appears in Diomedes, *Art. Gram.*, p. 487.4 (ed. Keil) in connection with spectacles.

¹³⁵ See the commentary *ad locum*: *erratum est aut infans in ludis exhibitis*.

5.4. *The Poor in the City*

The voices of the impoverished and those living on the fringe in the ancient cities hardly ever reach our sources. And obviously slaves were rare in this proletarian environment, though there might have lived a good deal of runaway slaves and freedmen.

Slavery does come up in connection with abandoned children. These outcasts were abandoned on garbage heaps on the outskirts of the town and could be picked up by slave traders in order to be educated as slaves¹³⁶. Most of them did not survive¹³⁷.

Child abandonment was a survival strategy of families in severe economic or personal difficulties. For one reason or another the child could not become part of a family: the survival of the baby in this family was a threat to the life of the other family members. Fundamentally different from a sociological point of view is the boarding out of children on a temporary basis, though this too is a survival strategy. The child, however, is already older and stands more or less on its own feet. From a legal point of view, the unity of the family is not broken: the child may still return to the family¹³⁸.

Next to abandonment the sale or the temporary hiring out of children (if necessary as a pledge or as debt slaves) is mentioned in literary and legal sources¹³⁹. From the *grapheion* documents in Egyptian Tebtynis (dated 42-46 AD) we know of babies being entrusted to the debtor during the lactation period of two years; when the loan was not returned after this period, they became his slaves¹⁴⁰. Extreme conditions might force parents to capitalize on their own flesh and blood. How hunger (*fames*), poverty (*inopia* or *paupertas*) and dire necessity (*necessitas*) drove parents to this deed, is a rhetorical motif that can be traced back to Herodotus. It was especially dear to Christian authors. Their descriptions are full of baroque pathos. In such passages it is not about reality (which

¹³⁶ Juvenal, *Sat.* 6.603. See Artemidorus, *On.* 2.9 for a link between the poor and garbage heaps.

¹³⁷ Philo, *Spec. Leg.* III 20.115; Seneca, *Contr.* X 4.21; Ps.-Quintilian, *Decl.* 278 p. 134 & 306 p. 204; Firmicius Mathematicus, *Math.* 7.2; Tertulianus, *Apol.* 9.7 and *Nat.* I 15.4. More references in EYBEN 1980-81, p. 19 n. 55; SCOBIE 1986, p. 419 n. 152, HARRIS 1994.

¹³⁸ VUOLANTO 2003, p. 206-207 deals with the sociological and ideological differences between *exposure* and *selling*.

¹³⁹ MEMMER 1991 deals with the ample legal evidence; HUMBERT 1983 and GEBBIA 1987 with the evidence from Augustine. VUOLANTO 2003 is the fundamental study dealing with all aspects of the question.

¹⁴⁰ MANCA MASCIADRI & MONTEVECCHI 1984, p. 13-16.

might inform us e.g. on the frequency of the phenomenon), but rather a matter of mere rhetorics. However, these authors referred to situations that were well known to their audience. When Augustine in a sermon tells how a parish, taking the law into its own hands, attacked a robbers' den and freed 120 prisoners, among them five or six children who had been sold by their parents to slave traders, he is not writing pure fiction¹⁴¹. Making a rhetorical comparison between this world and the divine realm John Chrysostom describes demons tempting our souls just as slave hunters tempt children with sweets, cakes and toys¹⁴². But again, the situation no doubt applied to early periods as well, only the rhetoric is typically late antique.

Legal sources pay ample attention to the sale of children. Up to Late Antiquity legal passages show the selfsame concern. Not the well-being of the individual child, but that of the community is the central issue. From a legal point of view, he who is sold as a freeborn man, hired out or boarded out, can never fall into the status of slave but will always remain *ingenuus*¹⁴³. Selling or boarding out children is never punishable *expressis verbis*, for it belonged to the powers of the *pater familias*. What was forbidden though, was boarding out children to a place too distant from the parents. Apparently children had to work somewhere in the neighbourhood¹⁴⁴. Legislation shows an understanding for extreme conditions which may push parents to this decision¹⁴⁵.

The question arises, however, if it really made much difference whether a freeborn boy was sold on a temporary basis as debt slave, given in pledge or employed as an apprentice. Ancient jurists and authors frequently mix up the various terms. In AD 527 Cassiodorus describes a

¹⁴¹ See VUOLANTO 2003, p. 170-179 for an exhaustive collection of literary sources concerning the selling of one's own children. The most touching passages are in Basil, *Hom. II in psalm. XIV 4* (PG 29, 277) and *Hom. in illud Lucae destruiam 4* (PG 29, 268-269). For Augustine, see his *Serm.* 10*.2.3 & 10*.7.3. See also KLEIJWEGT 2004, col. 927; FINN 2006 and GRIG 2006.

¹⁴² John Chrysostom, *Adv. Iudaeos orat.* 1.1 (PG 48, 855).

¹⁴³ See e.g. *Cod. Th.* IV 8.6 = *CJ VIII 46.10*: *Libertati a maioribus tantum impensum est, ut patribus, quibus ius vitae in liberos necisque potestas permissa est, eripere libertatem non liceret*. See VUOLANTO 2003, p. 179-188 for a survey of the legal evidence.

¹⁴⁴ *CJ IV 43.1* and *Nov. Val.* 33 are understood in this way. See MEMMER 1991, p. 45 and VUOLANTO 2003, p. 186-187.

¹⁴⁵ *Cod. Th.* XI 27.2 (*abhorret enim nostris moribus, ut quemquam fame confici vel ad indignum facinus prorumpere concedamus*) and *Cod. Th.* III 3.1: *omnes quos parentum miseranda fortuna in servitium, dum victum requirit, addixit, ingenuitati pristinae reformatur*. See VUOLANTO 2003, p. 182 & 188.

market where girls and boys are on sale. In his view 'slavery' meant an advantage for these children. Instead of the hard chores in the country their parents provided them with more comfortable jobs as employees with a master in town. From the whole context one can infer that Cassiodorus in this case does not mean slaves *strictu sensu*, but freeborn boys and girls who are being resold to a third party by their parents¹⁴⁶.

By the sale or loan a child passed from the *potestas* of the father into the status of *mancipium* of his new master. In practice such a child was not free to go wherever it pleased¹⁴⁷. The treatment and the quality of life obviously depended on the master with whom one ended up, his relation with the natural father (was it a settlement by mutual agreement or was the child settling a debt), and the profession to be performed. In the fourth century AD the wine-merchant Pamonthios contracted a loan in order to pay his taxes. When he could not settle his debt, he sold all his possessions including his clothes. As this still did not suffice, the creditor took possession of Pamonthios' children who had probably served as a pledge. Herieous, a friend of Pamonthios tried to purchase the children's freedom. It hardly made a difference for these children that they remained freeborn from a legal point of view¹⁴⁸. Subsequent legislation moreover stipulated that parents who had sold their children, could redeem their progeny only by paying back the amount to the buyer adding a 20% interest in compensation for raising the child¹⁴⁹.

For those who survived either as a foundling or as the child of indigent parents the future was not enviable. The maiming of slave children

¹⁴⁶ Cassiodorus, *Var.* VIII 33.4: *Praesto sunt pueri ac puellae diverso sexu atque aetate conspicui, quos non fecit captivitas esse sub pretio sed libertas: hos merito parentes vendunt, quoniam de ipsa famulatione proficiunt*. Further on Cassiodorus indeed uses the term *servi* for those children. See VUOLANTO 2003, p. 192.

¹⁴⁷ On this ambiguous situation, see MEMMER 1991, p. 77-78 and VUOLANTO 2003, p. 189-197. A Roman law seems to imply that children and youngsters could serve as debt slaves till the age of 25, but the interpretation of this measure is uncertain (see *Cod. Th.* IV 8.6 and Augustine, *Ep.* 10*.2.1, on which VUOLANTO 2003, p. 189-190). In *PSI V* 549 a woman hires herself out for a period of 99 (!) years. In this way, she legally escaped slave status, but this hardly made a difference in real life.

¹⁴⁸ *P. Lond.* VI 1915-1916. A similar situation is described by Gregory the Great, *Epist.* 3.55. See VUOLANTO 2003, p. 195-196. See SÖLLNER 2000 for a thorough account on the ambiguous situations of freeborn persons being held as slaves.

¹⁴⁹ An evolution in law seems to have taken place. In *Cod. Th.* III 3.1 (AD 391) a child can be reclaimed by the parents without payment. However *Nov. Val.* 33 (AD 451) states that a sum should be paid. Probably this law was issued to encourage potential buyers of children, who thereby offered a solution to parents who were no longer able to pay for the burdens of raising their children themselves. Legislation is summarized by Justinian in AD 534 in *CJ IV* 43.1-2. See VUOLANTO 2003, p. 185-186.

in order to arouse pity and bring in money as beggars, occasionally mentioned by ancient authors, has parallels in later periods and other areas¹⁵⁰. Some were castrated in order to bring in money as eunuchs afterwards¹⁵¹.

Prostitution of very young children certainly occurred and the supply of abandoned children could fill the demand¹⁵². Law texts also report on unscrupulous pimps forcing children to work in brothels¹⁵³. Christian authors bring out this aspect. A father who visits a brothel runs the risk of unknowingly having incestuous relations with a son or daughter he once abandoned and who is now employed in the prostitution business. According to Vuolanto «the topos of parents forcing their children to become prostitutes was a practical way to brand a certain background or (supposed) attitude towards life as shameful and morally untenable»¹⁵⁴. Though the chance of incest in a brothel will have been extremely reduced, the argument contains an element of truth in the possibility that abandoned children actually could end up in prostitution. Also boys as *pueri meritorii* were available in brothels¹⁵⁵. Picking up abandoned children by a *lanista* in order to train them as gladiators is only mentioned in a declamatory exercise of pseudo-Quintilian, but does indeed seem probable¹⁵⁶.

¹⁵⁰ Seneca the Elder, *Contr.* X 4.7 (*mancipia* are explicitly mentioned) and John Chrysostom, *Hom. in Ep. I ad Corinth.* 21.5 (PG 61, 176-179). For parallel situations in other times and regions, see STONE 1977, p. 475 (England in the 17th and 18th century); MARQUARDT 1898, p. 83 (Mediterranean regions); BOSWELL 1988, p. 113 n. 77 (China); PARKIN 2006, p. 71-73.

¹⁵¹ *Dig.* XLVIII 8.4 & 6.

¹⁵² The theme of child prostitution is widespread. See Plautus' *Rudens* and *Poenulus*, *passim*, about the kidnapping of free children in order to gain profit from them as prostitutes. See Plautus, *Cist.* 38-40; *Asin.* 127-152; *Mil.* 102-110. In Terence's *Heaut.* 639-640 a father believes that his daughter is still alive, working as a prostitute. Such passages are copied from Greek comedy, especially Menander, but the situation must at least have been recognised by the Roman audience. See also KRENKEL 1979 for boy's prostitution and VARRONE (2003) for prostitution in general.

¹⁵³ *Nov.* 14, prooem.: *Quosdam autem sic scelestos existere, ut puellas nec decimum agentes annum ad periculosam deponerent corruptionem.* According to Martial, *Ep.* IX 5.6-9 and 7.1-5, Domitian legislated against poverty which forced mothers to sell their children to *lenones*.

¹⁵⁴ VUOLANTO 2003, p. 176.

¹⁵⁵ Clemens of Alexandria, *Paed.* III 3.21 and Justin, *Apol.* 1.27. See KLEIJWEGT 2004, col. 924-928. Of course, the ambiguous term *pueri* does not allow to say whether they were actually slaves or free boys. On *pueri meritorii*, see KRENKEL (1979) and (1988). Clemens of Alexandria, *Paed.* III 3.21 clearly refers to both girls and boys: *παῖδι πορνεύσαντι καὶ μαχλώσαις θυγατράσι*.

¹⁵⁶ See Ps.-Quintilian, *Decl.* 278 p. 134 and LECLERCQ 1907, p. 1293-1294 (an *alumnus*, clearly a young man, depicted as a gladiator on a mosaic).

Here again generalisations should be avoided. Other abandoned children could indeed be educated as slaves in a household (then so-called *alumni*). Later on they were sometimes assigned confidential positions, and the bond between masters and their *alumni* could be strong. Manumissions of such slaves were common¹⁵⁷.

5. CONCLUSION

This exhaustive collection reveals some important features of slavery and childhood in Roman Antiquity.

Historians of all periods have made pleas for micro-history, which allows to escape broad sweeping generalisation and to focus on the practicalities of everyday social interaction. It is methodologically unsound to take a too strict, absolute approach of slavery, as if the quality of life and labour depended entirely on whether or not one was a slave. In fact there was a good deal of intermingling. A free son who as apprentice joined a craftsman or a slave who was sent by his master to that end: their life was quite similar. Other examples come to mind: the free servant who served as goldsmith in a large household, or the young slave who by the self-same skill aroused the pride and affection of parents and master. A free child or a little slave who traveled with a group of entertainers probably took the same food, shared life's joys and sorrows with each other. In Late Antiquity, some children of artisans and tenants were legally obliged to continue their fathers' work: in these cases there was no freedom of choice, and the financial burdens of the job were considerable¹⁵⁸. Or, on the darker side of the medal: what did it matter to a freeborn boy that he could not legally become a slave, when a callous pimp had picked him up as an abandoned child and forced him to work in a brothel? Was there any difference with the boy next to him who was bought as slave and had to supply the same sexual favours? The same holds true for children of free miners who were deployed in mine shafts — they did the same work as slave children. The 'neutral' osteological findings are symptomatic here. We cannot make out whether someone was a slave simply because

¹⁵⁷ RAWSON 1986, p. 173-186.

¹⁵⁸ WIELING 2005 rightly calls this *Fälle geminderter Freiheit*. One may note that even the sons of the wealthy *nobiles* hardly had to worry about the path to follow: family tradition had for long ensured their future. Hence, also for them, there was no difficult choice, but obviously their path ensured considerably more comfort in daily life.

they shared serious injuries. Both slaves and free men were subject to a harsh existence. And though we may deplore the absence of elaborate cases and dossiers, the inscriptions show us how differently slaves coped with their existence. The young bookkeeper Xanthias from Cologne, the handsome little singer Bebryx, the young darling of the public Serapion from Narbonne, they made somehow the best out of their life as a slave. On the other side, I do not plead for a naively positive interpretation. The horror of ancient slavery was constantly present in the background. Though inhuman exploitation was not the rule, it was always an impending danger. «Tisn't he who has stood and looked on, that can tell you what slavery is — tis he who has endured», as the runaway slave John Little put it in the nineteenth century.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, occasional references from ancient authors, not slaves themselves, point to the same cruelty: legal passages on the punishment of child slaves, the standing servants in Seneca's account or Columella's remark on the constant fear that threatens even a steward.

From an economic point of view the study of children's slave labour teaches us a lot about the importance of both under-aged slaves and free persons. Certainly, children, both free and slaves, were economically important in the Roman Empire. Speculation on young slaves was strong and often their training was of considerable value for the future of an enterprise. In the estates of Varro and Columella the absence of children would have resulted in serious delays in the work and discomforts in the daily doings. For some tasks in the mining industry little children were indispensable. In well-to-do families from the city small luxury slaves brought relief in the day-to-day worries and were useful in all sorts of domestic services. Artisans needed successors in their own off-spring or apprentices, slaves or freedmen: they were cheaper than adult personnel and brought in extra income through their apprentice fee. Many poor families without slaves also relied on children. For domestic services and baby care they were dependent on their young children, as both parents worked on the land and they had hardly time to spend on the infant welfare. «Indispensable et caché» is the motto one could apply to the phenomenon of child labour in Antiquity¹⁶⁰. A meticulous analysis of the various possible forms of child labour may nuance theories that consider

¹⁵⁹ Cited by SCHEIDEL 1993, p. 107.

¹⁶⁰ SIMON-MUSCHED 1996 has used this title for a study on child labour in the Middle Ages.

ancient society as totally dependent on the labour force of adult slaves¹⁶¹. In Egypt, for instance, where slaves were only a small percentage of the population, the economic impact of free children may hardly be underestimated¹⁶². Contemporary economists point to the importance of the so-called small tasks and chores for the welfare of a country¹⁶³.

I have argued elsewhere that the concept of child labour did not exist in Antiquity¹⁶⁴. The term was unknown to the Romans, neither was the idea of working children a moral problem (just as human rights for children or slaves did not exist). An age limit only came up concerning the financial value of slaves. Moral objections only concerned extreme conditions of sale and the abandonment of children, which could result in humiliating work. Just as such objections did not question the use of children in labour, moral indignation was never concerned with the problem of slavery *per se*.

There are obvious similarities in the lives of free children and child slaves. Both could share some basis instruction with a schoolmaster¹⁶⁵. Young slaves worked side by side with lower class children, who could not afford school after their time with the *ludimagister*. Both for slaves and free children there was no drastic transition from 'careless childhood' to work, as work was much more integrated in the familiar environment.

More than other cases, the dossier of child slaves' labour testifies to the Roman utilitarian approach towards children. Recently, H. Sigismund-Nielsen has demonstrated how, by deciphering epigraphical codes, much more of these 'children for profit and pleasure' can possibly be discovered from the inscriptions. This 'utilitarian' approach is indisputably one of the main differences between Roman attitudes and present western concepts. But it is another thing to connect this constatation with moralising conclusions contesting that children were welcome and valued in Roman society, one of the main theses of B. Rawson's synthesis.

¹⁶¹ GARNSEY 1999 points to the economic importance of non-servile labour for agriculture in Antiquity.

¹⁶² Estimates for Roman Egypt, see WESTERMANN 1955: 7% slaves; BIEZUNSKA-MALOWIST 1977, p. 156-158: maximum 10% slaves; SCHEIDEL 2001, p. 61: small amount of slaves in Egypt (6 à 7% outside Alexandria).

¹⁶³ See <http://www.admin.uiuc.edu/NB/95.10/01womenstip.html> which states that the counting in of unpaid domestic work by house-wives would increase the GNP by one third. See SALLER 2003, p. 191.

¹⁶⁴ LAES 2006, p. 194-197.

¹⁶⁵ BOOTH 1979 and 1981 about the possibility of child slaves being together with other lower class children with a *ludimagister*.

Certainly, childhood was not valued as today, and there is an obvious difference between the Roman approach and ours¹⁶⁶. Yet, that a child was economically important, does not exclude its being welcome or valued — even emotional attachment was possible, as was made clear in more than one of the micro-histories in the inscriptions dealt with.

Fully acknowledging the harshness of slave life but at the same time avoiding broad sweeping generalisations, the absence of child labour as a concept and the rapid socialisation of children involving them in the labour process prove that children ‘did belong’ and were integrated more strongly than nowadays in the adult world. As such, the subject of labour by child slaves also shines a light on the lives of children in general and concepts of childhood in the Roman world.

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¹⁶⁶ But in a globalising world, we are daily confronted with childhood approaches which strike us at least as utterly strange.

APPENDIX

1. OSTEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE

Inventory number and archaeological nickname	Pages	Age / sex	Symptoms and traces of labour
E5. La giovinetta scoliotica	121-125	15-16 y / f	Continuous burdening of the shoulders and the upper arms due to the carrying of heavy loads. Dexteros. Scoliosis of the spine.
E7. La fanciulla malaticcia	134-137	5-6 y / f	Possible traces of labour.
E9. La piccola madre accoviata	143-147	30-35 y / f	Traces of continuous labour on the upper arms. She often sat bowed.
E18. Il giovane pastore	210	20-25 y / m	Injuries to the feet due to the wearing of inappropriate footwear.
E25. Il ragazzo pescatore	246-248	14-15 y / m	Traces of continuous harsh labour as a fisherman.
E28. Il giovane con la chiena curva	270-275	17-18 y / m	Traces of continuous harsh labour, causing damage of the spine.
E30. Il facchino	286-288	25-30 y	Traces of continuous harsh labour as a porter.
E33. Il piccolo rematore	303-309	12.5 y / m	Continuous burdening of the shoulders, attesting to harsh labour as a plougher or an oarsman.
E41. L'operaio sulla scala	369-374	20-25 y / m	Traces of continuous harsh labour.
E42. Il mancino dall'infanzia difficile	375-383	30-35 y / m	Traces of continuous harsh labour.
E45. Il mancino scoliotico	396-400	25-30 y / m	Traces of continuous harsh labour and the carrying of heavy loads. Left-handed. Scoliosis of the spine.

E52. La gravida	460-472	20-25 y / f	Pregnant woman with traces of continuous harsh labour due to the carrying of heavy loads.
E55. Il giovane che si grattava la testa	494-500	20-25 y / m	Painful infections of the skin. Continuous pain caused by asymmetrical development of the right leg. Scoliosis of the spine due to the carrying of heavy loads
E56. Brevicollis	501-506	16-18 y / m	Traces of continuous harsh labour. Involved in loading and unloading of ships.
E60. La giovane schiava	537-540	17-18 y / f	Subject to chronical pains and illnesses throughout her life. Rachitis and hernia. The upper arms show traces of continuous harsh labour.
E74. Il fanciullo con la carie	622-625	7-8 y / m	Traces of continuous harsh labour. Bad teeth.
E78. La giovanetta portatrice di pesi	636-640	20-25 y / f	Traces of continuous harsh labour due to the carrying of heavy loads. At death, she had been pregnant at least once.
E83. La piccola lavoratrice	658	10-11 y / f	Traces of continuous harsh labour.
E91. La madre minuscola	696-699	25-30 y / f	Traces of continuous harsh labour due to the carrying of heavy loads. Body length was only 148.7 cm.
E92. La schiavetta con la prugna in tasca	700-702	9-10 y / f	Traces of continuous harsh labour.
E104. La fanciulla nata nel 71 D.C.	749-750	8-9 y / f	Traces of continuous harsh labour.
E121. Il giovanottone caiacco	835	20-25 y / m	Lesions of the shoulder and the upper arm due to continuous rowing with one oar.

E 124. Il ragazzo mancino	838-841	13-14 y / m	Robust boy in good health, hardened by labour.
E 125. La giovane operaia dall' infanzia	842-844	13-14 y / f	Traces of continuous harsh labour.
E 129. Un fanciullo di quasi 4 anni	861-865	3.5-4 y / m	Possible traces of continuous harsh labour.
E 132. La bimba col mal di denti	873-875	8-9 y / f	Traces of continuous harsh labour.
E 150. Il giovane con il cardine	908-913	25-30 y / m	Traces of continuous harsh labour. Hernia.

2. PAPYROLOGICAL EVIDENCE

Papyrus	Date	Profession	Sex	Duration of training	Place
<i>BGU IV 1125</i>	13 BC	flute	boy	1 year	Alexandria
<i>P. Mich. V 346a</i>	13	weaving	girl	2 years 6 months	Tebtynis
<i>St. Pal. XXII 40</i>	150	weaving	girl	1 year 2 months	Soknopaiou Nesos
<i>P. Oxy. IV 724</i>	155	shorthand writer	boy	2 years	Oxyrhynchus
<i>P. Grenf. II 59</i> Nesos	189	weaving	boy	20 months	Soknopaiou
<i>P. Oxy. XIV 1647</i>	end 2 c.	weaving	girl	4 years	Oxyrhynchus
<i>P. Oxy. XLI 2977</i>	239	hairdresser	boy	5 years	Oxyrhynchus
<i>P. Mich. inv. 5191 a</i>	271	weaving	girl	1 year	Karanis
<i>BGU IV 1021</i>	3 c.	hairdresser	boy	3 years	Oxyrhynchus
<i>PSI III 241</i>	3 c.	weaving	girl	1 year	Antinoöpolis
<i>P. Kell. 1, 19 a</i>	299	weaving	girl	2 years	Kellis

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LISTS OF GODS ON PAPYRI AND IN THE *HERMENEUMATA PSEUDO-DOSITHEANA*: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

Abstract: Lists of divinities are a standard part of the thematic glossaries of the bilingual schoolbook *Hermeneumata Pseudo-Dositheana*, of which different versions have been preserved mainly in Western manuscripts of the 9th and 10th centuries. On the other hand, several monolingual as well as bilingual god-lists are extant in papyri from the 3rd cent. BC to the 3rd-4th cent. AD. This article offers a detailed comparison of these ancient and medieval lists (including those of the *Hermeneumata Celtis*) in order to determine whether there is some kind of continuity from the ancient god-lists found in papyri and ostraca to the lists in the medieval manuscripts of the *Hermeneumata*. We are able to show that there was at least an undeniable general correspondence between the two groups of texts, and to reveal their connection with ancient lexicographical literature. At the same time, the dissimilarities within and between the two groups seem to confirm the opinion of Dionisotti that we cannot speak of a traditional stemma or of an 'archetype' for the *Hermeneumata* schoolbooks in general nor for each of its sections.

Although the different versions of the bilingual schoolbook *Hermeneumata Pseudo-Dositheana* have been preserved mainly in Western manuscripts of the 9th and 10th century, they originated as part of the bilingual culture of imperial Rome and early Christianity. But more concrete questions about the origin and development of these *Hermeneumata* remain for the greater part unanswered despite some important studies during the last decades¹. Whereas in the West these texts were copied in view of the instruction of Carolingian scholars who wanted to learn Greek

¹ Cf. A.C. DIONISOTTI, *From Ausonius' Schooldays? A Schoolbook and its Relatives*, *JRS* 72 (1982), p. 83-125; A.C. DIONISOTTI, *Greek Grammars and Dictionaries in Carolingian Europe*, in: *The Sacred Nectar of the Greeks: the Study of Greek in the West in the Early Middle Ages*, edd. M.W. Herren – S.A. Brown, London 1988, p. 26-31; J. KRAMER, *I glossari tardo-antichi di tradizione papiracea*, in: *Les manuscrits des lexiques et glossaires de l'Antiquité tardive à la fin du Moyen Âge*. Actes du Colloque international organisé par le "Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture", éd. J. Hamesse, Louvain-La-Neuve 1996, p. 23-55; K. KORHONEN, *On the Composition of the Hermeneumata Language Manuals*, *Arctos* 30 (1996), p. 101-119; E. TAGLIAFERRO, *Gli «Hermeneumata»: testi scolastici di età imperiale tra innovazione e conservazione*, in: *Ars/Techne: il manuale tecnico nelle civiltà greca e romana*. Atti del convegno internazionale, Università «G. D'Annunzio» di Chieti-Pescara, 29-30 ottobre 2001, a cura di M.S. Celentano, Alessandria 2003, p. 51-77; J. KRAMER, *Essai d'une typologie des glossaires gréco-latins conservés sur papyrus*, *APF* 50 (2004), p. 49-60; J. KRAMER, *Lateinisch-griechisches Glossar: Celtis' Abschrift aus einem Papyruscodex*, in: *Paramone. Editionen und Aufsätze von Mitgliedern des Heidelberger Instituts für Papyrologie zwischen 1982 und 2004*, edd. J.M.S. Cowley – B. Kramer, München 2004, p. 43-62.

in a Greekless environment², their ancient predecessors seem to have answered the demand by a Greek-speaking audience in the East for Latin language learning, especially after 212 AD, although they were probably also used by Latin pupils in the West who went through simultaneous language learning. However, the separate components of these school-books had an even older pedigree: as they have been transmitted to us, they consist of three elements, namely an alphabetic glossary, a series of semantically organised nouns (*capitula*) and some exercises in the form of dialogues (*colloquia*) and short texts (e.g. the *Fables* of Aesop) to practise the obtained skills³, and several versions of at least the alphabetic and thematic glossaries have been preserved in papyri from the 1st century onwards. Closer study of the origin and of the evolution of these three components and of the *Hermeneumata* as a whole is particularly useful, because it can shed light on the still hotly debated relation between both ancient languages⁴, which is historically of utmost importance for interpreting the divergent development of the Eastern and Western part of the Roman empire.

In this article we go back to Antiquity to compare a specific part of the *Hermeneumata*, namely one section of their thematically organised lists, to the corresponding papyrus lists, monolingual as well as bilingual, that have been preserved. This approach has been chosen, because of the importance and popularity of such lists in ancient didactic practice⁵, and

² Cf. A.C. DIONISOTTI 1988, p. 1-56; P. RICÉ, *Le Grec dans les centres de culture d'Occident*, in: *The Sacred Nectar* (n. 1), p. 143-168.

³ Cf. A.C. DIONISOTTI 1982, p. 86-88; K. KORHONEN 1996, p. 109-113; J. KRAMER 2004, p. 57. It is not clear, however, if all the remaining medieval versions of the *Hermeneumata* once contained each of these constituents.

⁴ See B. ROCHETTE, *Le latin dans le monde grec: recherches sur la diffusion de la langue et des lettres latines dans les provinces hellénophones de l'Empire romain*, Bruxelles 1997, and his extensive bibliography: *Le bilinguisme gréco-latin et la question des langues dans le monde gréco-romain: chronique bibliographique*, *RBPh* 76 (1998), p.177-196; in the last decade new groundbreaking work has been achieved in: *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Text*, ed. by J.N. Adams, M. Janse, S.C.R. Swain, Oxford-New York 2002; J.N. ADAMS, *Bilingualism and the Latin Language*, Cambridge 2003.

⁵ The didactic function of the lists with thematically organised nouns goes back to a long tradition. For Mesopotamia and Ancient Egypt, this type of lists is usually called *onomasticon*. An example of such an *onomasticon* is preserved in the papyrus Hood (Brit. Mus. 10202; cf. G. MASPERO, *Manuel de hiérarchie égyptienne*, *Journal Asiatique* 11 [1888], p. 250-280, 309-343; A.H. GARDINER, *Ancient Egyptian Onomastica*, Oxford 1968 [1947], p. 24-63) which lists all the elements of the universe in their strict hierarchical order, starting with the celestial phenomena, waters, rivers and terrains and continuing with the 'beings' of which the god and goddess occupy the first place, followed by the king

more particularly, because so far research has focused on the continuity between the bilingual papyrus lists and the capitula of the *Hermeneumata*, without much attention for the monolingual lists⁶. Also we try to take profit from a partly unedited but unusually extensive version of the *Hermeneumata*, preserved in the Vienna manuscript Cod. suppl. Gr. 43, which yields new parallels with the papyrus lists⁷. Thus we hope to demonstrate that closer study of the *Hermeneumata* lists is needed to interpret the scarce material of the papyrus fragments and its connection with ancient lexicography.

First we briefly restate some important stages in the discussion about the development of the *Hermeneumata* schoolbooks and about the relation between the papyrological and medieval sources. After an overview of the papyrological material, we will compare systematically the quantitative data of the papyrus and the medieval lists and draw some conclusions.

HERMENEUMATA PSEUDO-DOSITHEANA

According to G. Goetz⁸ a schoolmaster in the 3rd century compiled the *Leiden* corpus, the ‘archetype’ of all versions of the *Hermeneumata* schoolbooks preserved in the medieval manuscripts. The date he assumes for the origin of the collection, 207 AD, is mentioned in the preface of the

and his descendants, running through the Egyptian officials and traders, straight to the cobbler. There is also very early evidence of bilingual lists containing thematically organised nouns, cf. the enormous corpus of Sumerian-Akkadian lexical lists (A. CAVIGNEAUX in *Reallexikon der Assyriologie* VI, Berlin-New York 1980-1983, p. 609-641, s.v. *Lexikalische Listen*). Later on such thematically organised lists were introduced into the educational system of the Greco-Roman world in monolingual and later in bilingual form. These lists provided a vast general education and offered a starting point for the teacher in his lessons about history, geography and literature: cf. J. DEBUT, *De l’usage des listes de mots comme fondement de la pédagogie dans l’Antiquité*, *REA* 85 (1983), p. 261-274 (269ff.). J. KRAMER 2004, p. 58 rightly observed that the papyrus fragments confirm the popularity of these onomastic glossaries compared to the two other parts of the *Hermeneumata*.

⁶ For the suggestion to include the monolingual lists, see already the BMCR-review (2002-05-08) by R. CRIBIORE of J. KRAMER, *Glossaria bilingua altera*, München-Leipzig 2001: «Comparing the lists of words in the glossaries with other lists that were used in education and elsewhere would have further illuminated their function».

⁷ We want to thank Professor Ernst Gamillscheg of the *Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek* for enabling us to study the manuscript by means of a microfilm.

⁸ G. GOETZ, *Hermeneumata Pseudodositheana* (*Corpus Glossariorum Latinorum*, III), Leipzig 1892, p. 17ff.

Hyginus text preserved in the *Herm. Leidensia*: *Maximo et Apro consulibus tertio idus Septembres Hygini genealogiam omnibus notam descripsi*. Also on the basis of the *Leidensia*, he manages to reconstruct an overall structure to which, according to him, all the *Hermeneumata* versions once conformed. Besides, he defends the view, which has become traditional⁹, according to which these *Hermeneumata* were originally used by the Greek-speaking public to learn Latin and later by the Romans to learn Greek.

A.C. Dionisotti¹⁰, however, objects firmly to Goetz's suggestion of a traditional stemma for this type of schoolbooks. Although the different versions of the *Hermeneumata* seem to group themselves a little, no close links can be discovered in their general composition, nor in their individual contents. In her opinion the *Herm. Leidensia* is not the archetype, but rather a late gathering of originally separate sections. The content of the schoolbooks, she argues, was liable to excerpting, condensation and elaboration in accordance with the foreknowledge, learning abilities and objectives of the individual student; so a stemmatic textual tradition cannot be the standard for the transmission of the *Hermeneumata*¹¹. Concerning the date of the *Hermeneumata*, Dionisotti warns that the information of the *Hyginus praefatio* cannot without further research be applied to all the *Hermeneumata* versions. Regarding the place of origin of the schoolbook, she finds no evidence to suspect that Greeks in the East used the *Hermeneumata* to study Latin: Greeks only studied Latin as a secondary language, never Greek and Latin simultaneously, which was clearly the methodology of the *Hermeneumata*. In her opinion Greek teachers had been bringing the material of the *Hermeneumata* to the West and it would have been there that they became bilingual.

However, this view can no longer be upheld since the findings of J. Kramer, who studied in detail ancient bilingual glossaries preserved on papyrus and their role in the society of Greco-Roman Egypt¹². He

⁹ See also H.-I. MARROU, *Histoire de l'éducation dans l'antiquité*, Paris 1965, p. 386-388 (p. 386).

¹⁰ A.C. DIONISOTTI 1982, p. 86, 88ff; ID. 1988, p. 26-31.

¹¹ See also J. KRAMER, *Glossaria bilingua altera*, p. 18: «In der Tat, hier kann man den eigentlich für mittelalterliche volkssprachliche Texte geprägten Ausdruck der *mouvance*, Textveränderlichkeit je nach den Publikumsbedürfnissen, mit Fug und Recht einmal auf eine antike Textsorte anwenden». A similar ancient text is the *Alexander Novel*, which has also known a whole series of adjustments.

¹² J. KRAMER, *Glossaria bilingua in papyris et membranis reperta*, Bonn 1983; ID. 1996, p. 34ff; ID. 2001; ID. 2004.

noticed that 8 papyri containing the remains of thematically organised bilingual word lists but antedating the 3rd-century schoolbook which Goetz considers as the 'archetype' of all the *Hermeneumata* versions, corresponded more or less with some of the sections of the medieval thematic lists, among others *De nominibus deorum*¹³. Although there is no *verbatim* agreement between these papyrus lists and the *Hermeneumata capitula* the correspondence cannot be coincidental, so Kramer suspects a 'common model' which originated probably in the first decennia of the imperial era. This means a partial return to the original view of Goetz: only the archetype of both the papyrus glossaries and the medieval manuscripts is dated two centuries earlier.

However, this remains uncertain since it cannot be ruled out that different bilingual word lists which had been composed separately, later fused into one or more schoolbooks. In that case, as Dionisotti stated¹⁴, the schoolbook of 207 AD would «not be a grand archetype, but rather a late (and remarkable) gathering of originally separate material of this kind». Other questions remain unsolved as well. The bilingual papyrus list with the names of gods edited by Priest may be an indication that simultaneous language learning was not necessarily limited to the West of the Roman empire. The format of the *Hermeneumata* suggests that foreign language learning was conceived according to the same didactic principles and stages as the study of native language. This holds particularly true for the *capitula*, as thematic lists had always been a fixed ingredient of primary education and many remains have been preserved in monolingual Greek papyri. Therefore we want to extend Kramer's research of the papyrological evidence to the monolingual thematic lists.

Mainly for pragmatic reasons we have selected the lists of divinities (which also includes heroes, mythological figures, personified abstracts and epithets) as the main object of this study: only for this section within the *capitula* of the *Hermeneumata* has a considerable amount of comparable papyrological material survived (1 glossary and 7 ordinary lists). A detailed comparison of these corresponding items, executed with the help of two tables, is needed in order to determine whether there is some kind of continuity from the ancient god-lists found in papyri and ostraca to the lists in the medieval manuscripts of the *Hermeneumata*.

¹³ Cf. J. KRAMER 1996, p. 35-36, E. TAGLIAFERRO 2003, p. 58.

¹⁴ A.C. DIONISOTTI 1982, p. 90.

Of these *Hermeneumata* we have eight more or less complete redactions, most of them represented by several manuscripts¹⁵. The god-lists have been preserved in each of them, although the Greek has often suffered badly from the incompetence of the copists, viz. the *Herm. Leidensia* (= L; Goetz¹⁶ p. 8-9, Flammini¹⁷ p. 14-17), *Amploniana* (= A; Goetz p. 82-83¹⁸), *Monacensia* (= M; Goetz p. 167-168), *Einsidlensia* (= E; Goetz p. 236-237), *Montepessulana* (= Mp; Goetz p. 289-291), *Stephani* (= S; Goetz p. 348), the *Hermeneumata Bruxellensia* (= B; Goetz p. 393-394) and finally the *Hermeneumata Celtis* (= C; J. KRAMER, *Paramone*, p. 48-51, 56-58)¹⁹. This last manuscript is a Latin-Greek glossary copied in 1495 by the humanist Conrad Celtis²⁰ from a lost medieval original in the abbey of Sponheim²¹: this manuscript gives us the most complete version of the *capitula*. Therefore Dionisotti suggested that it may have been based on a conflation of two different lists, but recently J. Kramer ingeniously argued that its original model was a papyrus codex from the 6th century, from which even today some loose pages have been preserved in the city archive of Cologne and the University Library of Göttingen²². However this may be, in view of the fragmentary or deficient nature of our sources we have to include all available material, even if this results in our tables in a predominance of the names taken from the *Hermeneumata* compared to those preserved in the fragmentary papyri.

¹⁵ Cf. K. KORHONEN 1996, p. 101.

¹⁶ G. GOETZ 1892.

¹⁷ G. FLAMMINI 2004.

¹⁸ Called H = *Hygini Hermeneumata* by K. KORHONEN 1996, p. 103.

¹⁹ For a complete overview of the manuscripts of each of these redactions, see A.C. DIONISOTTI 1982, p. 87.

²⁰ ÖNB Wien Cod. Suppl. Graec. 43: the manuscript contains a 'Grammatica Graeca', 'Colloquia et conversationes Graecae' and a 'Vocabularium rerum admirandum Graecum' (arranged by topics), including in this last part also a section *De diis immortalibus* Περὶ θεῶν ἀθανασίων at the beginning. It starts with *Dii propicii* θεοὶ ἱεροί. For a description of the manuscript see H. HUNGER, *Katalog der griechischen Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek*, Wien 1994, p. 82-83; WUTTKE, *Zur griechischen Grammatik des Konrad Celtis*, in: *Silvae. Festschrift für Ernst Zinn*, Tübingen 1970, p. 297-302; A.C. DIONISOTTI 1982, p. 83, 92-93, who published in the same article a critical edition of the colloquium, but not of the glossary.

²¹ WUTTKE 1970, p. 297-302; A.C. DIONISOTTI 1982, p. 84-85, who thinks that the exemplar may have come from Bobbio Abbey.

²² A.C. DIONISOTTI 1982, p. 92; J. KRAMER, *Paramone*, p. 43-47.

THE PAPYROLOGICAL MATERIAL

The five papyri and three ostraca with lists of gods range from the 3rd cent. BC to the 3rd-4th cent. AD. In the presentation of each of these items below, we give, besides the identification, a general description of the individual god-lists, some specification about the type of names (name of divinities, personified abstracts or epithets), the heading introducing each thematic section and the order maintained in the list.

1. *LDAB* 1054²³ = *Un livre d'écolier du III^e siècle avant J.-C.*, Cairo 1938 (O. Guéraud – P. Jouguet) – Cribiore 379²⁴ – *CPP* 0192²⁵: papyrus roll of uncertain provenance (Fayum?), 3 BC
 - The fragment preserves an important part of a school manual which contains a syllabary, lists of the Macedonian months, numbers, monosyllables, ten Olympian divinities, rivers and personal names of two, three, four and five syllables (mostly of mythological figures), completed by a poetical anthology. The schoolbook is written in a teacher's or professional scribe's hand. The list of divinities itself, which follows the monosyllables, seems to be misplaced and breaks with the careful progression in the teaching of words with mounting syllables. This indicates, according to the editors and J. Debut, the important role of mythology in education²⁶.
 - Characteristics of the list: names of divinities; no heading (not preserved²⁷?); no general principle of organisation, although certain associations are possible in case of the six last divinities, e.g. Ares and Athena (both gods of battle), Hephaistos and Aphrodite (husband and wife) and Apollon and Artemis (brother and sister); Zeus, although not preserved, is assumed to lead the list and Hera is situated among the first names.
2. *LDAB* 5062 = *ZPE* 27 (1977), p. 193-200 (N.E. Priest) = *SB* XIV 12157 (1981-1983) – *CPP* 0142: papyrus of uncertain provenance, AD 2-3
 - This papyrus contains the only bilingual list of divinities we have. It is completely written in the Greek alphabet and has preserved the

²³ *Leuven Database of Ancient Books*, see <http://ldab.arts.kuleuven.be>.

²⁴ R. CRIBIORE, *Writing, Teachers and Students in Graeco-Roman Egypt*, Atlanta 1996.

²⁵ *Catalogue of Paraliterary Papyri*, see <http://cpp.arts.kuleuven.be/>.

²⁶ Cf. *ed. pr.* p. XX-XXI and J. DEBUT 1983, p. 270.

²⁷ The suggestion of a lost heading is based on the insertion of the heading Ὀνόματα δισύλλαβα (l. 67) above the section with polysyllabic words and the heading Ἔπη (l. 130) above an excerpt from the *Odyssey*.

remains of 24 Greek god names, which are followed by their Roman counterparts in the second column. This fragment offers us a specimen of the bilingual Greek-Latin schoolbook tradition already present in Egypt during the 2nd and 3rd cent. AD.

- Characteristics of the list: names of divinities, personified abstract, epithets; heading ‘θεάων ὀνόματα dearum nomina’ precedes the second part of the list with names of goddesses; grouping of male divinities related to the Underworld; Hera is followed by her epithets and is named as one of the first goddesses; association of Artemis and Leto (daughter and mother) and Demeter and Persephone (mother and daughter). The order in the papyrus list is comparable to the order in the *Herm. Montepessulana*²⁸.

3. *LDAB* 5081 = *ZPE* 76 (1989), p. 86, no. 2 (R. Pintaudi – P.J. Sijpesteijn) – *CPP* 0197: ostracon found in Narmouthis, AD 2-3

- This piece of pottery has preserved only three names of divinities, all in the genitive case: Zeus, Serapis and Ammon.
- Characteristics of the list: names of divinities; no heading (not preserved?); no apparent principle of organisation due to poor preservation of the fragment; the trio of preserved divinities represent the supreme divinity in Greek-Egyptian syncretism.

4. *LDAB* 5416 = *P. Oxy.* LXV 4460 (T. Schmidt, 1998) – *CPP* 0068: papyrus roll (?) from Oxyrhynchus, AD 3

- Two fragments from a papyrus roll. The first one is a list of Achaean heroes from the *Iliad*. The second fragment contains a list of gods with their genealogy. In total there are 13 divinities named, 8 in the actual list, the rest in the genealogical explanation.
- Characteristics of the list: names of divinities; heading ‘θεῶν’; this is the only preserved god list with a genealogical organisation of the names starting with Kronos and his offspring (Hestia is missing), followed by two children of Zeus, Athena and Hermes²⁹.

²⁸ Cf. G. GOETZ 1892, p. 168.1-15. The correspondence of this papyrus with the medieval *Hermeneumata Pseudo-Dositheana* was already noticed by N.E. Priest, the first editor of the fragment (p. 195: «It is quite possible that the Michigan text is a forerunner of the sections of the *Hermeneumata* which deal with the gods»). He even made a detailed comparison between the papyrus and the different versions of the *Hermeneumata* in his commentary (p. 197-200); cf. J. KRAMER 1983, p. 79-81 (p. 79).

²⁹ Compare the genealogy in the *praefatio* of Hyginus’ *Fabulae* 13. *Ex Saturno et Ope, Vesta, Ceres, Iuno, Iuppiter, Pluto, Neptunus*; 21. *Ex Iovis capite, Minerva*; 32. *Ex Iove et Maia, Mercurius*.

5. LDAB 0416 = *Pap. Lugd. Bat.* XXV 8 (W. Clarysse – F.A.J. Hoogendijk, 1991) – CPP 0224: papyrus roll (?) of unknown provenance, AD 3
 - Concordance with list of gods to the so-called *Sortes Astrampsychi*, some sort of popular oracle book by which one could obtain answers to questions concerning the future. Only ‘gods who give oracles and signs’ have been included, 42 of the 49 have been preserved in fairly legible condition.
 - Characteristics of the list: names of divinities, epithets and personified abstracts; heading ‘Θεοὶ χρηματισταὶ καὶ σημάντορες’; no apparent general principle of organisation, but first four divinities, Leto, Serapis, Ischus and Agathos daimon, are all important oracle-giving divinities in Egypt; from col. 2 onwards more or less alphabetic; association of Apollon and Asklepios (2 gods of medicine).
6. LDAB 5219 = *O. Mich.* I 656 (L. Amundsen, 1935) – Cribiore 108 – CPP 0310: ostrakon found in Karanis, AD 3
 - This piece of pottery contains a list of seven Egyptian deities, all in the genitive case.
 - Characteristics of the list: names of divinities; no heading; no principle of organisation.
7. LDAB 5503 = *O. Mich.* I 657 (L. Amundsen, 1935)³⁰ – Cribiore 110 – CPP 0143: ostrakon found in Karanis, AD 3-4
 - The ostrakon contains a list of five deities, one Oriental and four Greek.
 - Characteristics of the list: names of divinities; no heading; no principle of organisation
8. LDAB 5538 = *P. Lund* VI 11 (E.J. Knudtzon, 1951-52) – Cribiore 111 – CPP 0319 (re-edition and commentary by N. Baplu in *APF* 52, 2006, p. 14-30): papyrus sheet of unknown provenance, AD 3-4
 - This fragment contains the remains of 15 names, only 13 are legible: 9 abstract ideas, 2 names of divinities (Aphroditê and Hermês) and one

³⁰ The reading of this ostrakon as a list of divinities (cf. L. Amundsen; H.C. YOUTIE, *Sambathis*, *HThR* 37 (1944), p. 209-218; V. TCHERIKOVER, *Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum* III, p. 50-52, p. 81ff.) has been criticized by K. LATTE, *Zwei Götternamen*, in: *Festschrift für F. Zucker*, Berlin 1954, p. 248-250, who interpreted it as a list of personal names. But this is refuted by Youtie (p. 219).

or maybe two geographical names. The high amount of itacism points in the direction of a writing exercise.

- Characteristics of the list: names of divinities and (personified) abstracts, one epithet; no heading; no principle of organisation.

Seven fragments probably belonged to an educational context. Only nr. 5, the concordance list of the *Sortes Astrampsychi*, belongs to a religious context³¹.

SYSTEMATIC COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PAPYRUS LISTS AND THOSE IN THE *HERMENEUMATA*

Below we compare the ancient material and the corresponding items in the *Hermeneumata* by means of two tables. The first table is intended to reveal the items that are shared by ancient and medieval sources. The second gives an overview of the numbers of overlapping names. The items included in these tables are the names of all divinities, heroes, personified abstracts, mythological figures and epithets present in the papyri and ostraca on the one hand, and in the *Hermeneumata* god lists on the other. However, there are some exceptions which have not been included:

- The last 8 items listed under the heading θεάων ὀνόματα in the *Herm. Amponiana* (Goetz p. 83) are units of time, which appear to be somewhat misplaced in the list with names of goddesses. Ἐνιαυτός, ἔαρ, θέρος, φθινόπωρον, χειμών, μῆνες, ἡμέραι and ὄραι seem to form a section on their own and are therefore not included in the list. Probably this group of items originally belonged to the next section of thematically organised nouns, viz. Περί οὐρανοῦ *De caelo*, since the same units of time occur in a similar sequence under that heading in some other versions of the *Hermeneumata*³².
- The *Herm. Einsidlensia* contains a separate section Περί τῶν ἐν τῷ Ἅϊδι *De iis quae in inferno* (Goetz, p. 237). Whereas several of these

³¹ There are two other papyrus fragments containing god-lists, viz. of the gods favouring the Greeks and those favouring the Trojans: *LDAB* 1716, see M. HUYS – T. SCHMIDT, *APF* 48 (2002), p. 213–221, a *hypothesis* to *Iliad* 20 with a catalogue of deities; and *LDAB* 2412 = *PSI* I 18+19 (T. Lodi, 1912): catechismal questions and answers on the Trojan War.

However, these fragments are not included in another type of paraliterary text. These lists should be compared, rather than with the corresponding items in the *glossaria* of the *Hermeneumata*, with the gods named in the *Iliadis compendium*, preserved in the *Hermeneumata Leidensia* (Flammini, p. XVI and p. 117–118).

³² Cf. L (Goetz p. 9; Flammini p. 17–18) and S (Goetz, p. 347).

- divinities and mythological figures related to the Underworld also figure in other lists under a more general heading, some names of places and rivers situated in the Hades, are unique to E and not personified in any of the common sources on Greek mythology: ἡ Ἄβυσσος Abyssus, τὸ Βάραθρον Barathrum, ἡ Γέεννα Geenna³³, τὸ Εὐορνὸν Avernus, τὸ Ἥλυσιον πεδῖον Elysium campus and ὁ Κωκυτός Cocytus.
- There are some items included in the god-lists which no doubt belong to the semantic section of religion and worship, like ἱερεὺς sacerdos (S, Goetz p. 348 and B, Goetz p. 393) and ἀποθέωσις consecratio (M, Goetz p. 168), but do not represent a divine name as such. In the other versions of the *Hermeneumata* these items are classified in other, more suitable sections³⁴.
 - Some words in the god-lists of the *Hermeneumata* have no history of personification or deification, but seem to be added to another name to which it corresponds in meaning. An example is διάφωμα *aurora* in the Mp, Goetz p. 290). Although the word occurs a few times in papyri and in Greek literature³⁵, there is no proof of any religious connotation. Probably it was added because it has the same meaning and Latin equivalent as ἡώς, which precedes διάφωμα³⁶. Other examples of the same mechanism are δι' ἡμέρας *interdies* in the *Herm. Leidensia* (Goetz p. 9; Flammini p. 16), which seems to have been added in connection with the following ἡμέρα and σκιά *umbra* (L, Goetz p. 8; Flammini p. 14), which in Greek as well as in Latin may have the meaning 'phantom, disembodied form of a dead person'. Therefore it might have been added in close relationship to the previous δαίμονες *demonēs*.
 - In some of the *Hermeneumata* schoolbooks, a name like Εἰρήνη does not occur in the god lists but appears in other capitula, e.g. under the

³³ Hebrew, *gé-hinnóm*, the valley of Hinnom, which represents the place of future punishment, cf. *Ev. Matt.* 5.22, al.

³⁴ Ἱερεὺς *sacerdos* is classified in the section Περί ναῶν *De aedibus* (L, Goetz p. 10, Flammini p. 19; A, Goetz p. 83; Mp, Goetz p. 301; S, Goetz p. 362), in Περί θυσιῶν *De sacrificiis* (M, Goetz, p. 171), in Περί θεοσεβείας *De religione* (E, Goetz p. 237); Ἀποθέωσις *consecratio* in Περί ναῶν ἱερῶν *De aedibus festis* (M, Goetz p. 171) and in Περί θυσιῶν *De sacrificiis* (E, Goetz p. 239).

³⁵ Cf. e.g. *P. Lond.* V 1684, 4 (Aphroditopolis, 6th century) πρὸ διαφάματος; *Protevangelium Jacobi* 46.3, Athanasius, *De virginitate* 20.16.

³⁶ The word appears only once more in the *Herm. Vatic.*, a later, Christian re-working of the schoolbook, under Περί Οὐρανοῦ: cf. G. GOETZ 1892, p. 426; see also *Hermeneumata Vaticana* (cod. Vat. Lat. 6925), edd. G. Brugnoli et M. Buonocore, Città del Vaticano 2002, p. 32, where διαφαινα is misleadingly corrected to διαφανια instead of διαφανυα).

heading Περί στρατιᾶς *De militia* (M, Goetz p. 209; Mp, Goetz p. 298; L, Goetz p. 27, Flammini p. 61; S, Goetz p. 352; B, Goetz p. 395) or Περί ναῶν *De aedibus* (Mp, Goetz p. 302). The term also appears in other parts of the *Hermeneumata*, namely in the *Glossae Stephani* (Goetz p. 459), the *Glossae Bernenses* (Goetz p. 496), the *Glossae Vaticanae* (Goetz p. 517) and in a list of questions and answers in S (Goetz p. 385).

TABLE 1

The table is subdivided in three main blocks: the first contains the Greek names, alphabetically ordered, with their Latin equivalents (sometimes written in Greek, as in *LDAB* 5062). We list all the Greek and Latin forms present in the source texts, beginning with the most common orthography (sometimes reconstructed on the basis of *Liddell-Scott-Jones*, if not present in the manuscripts) and completed with variants. Common spelling errors, however, such as double instead of single consonant, or the confusion of vowels following from itacism have been left out. All this is based on the existing editions of the texts, for the papyrological material usually on the most recent edition, for the *Hermeneumata* on Goetz, except for the *Herm. Leid.*, where we used the edition of G. Flammini. All names are listed in the nominative, even if another case is followed in (some of) the manuscripts. Epithets occurring in the manuscripts only in combination with the name of a god have been listed only as combinations, whereas the other epithets are treated as separate entries. The second block offers the papyrological evidence identified by *LDAB* number. The last block includes the different versions of the *Hermeneumata*, denoted by their conventional abbreviations.

Symbols used in the list

+	name is present in the list
-	name is not present in the list
+R	name is reconstructed from the remains on the manuscript or papyrus fragment
-R	name is not present in the manuscript or papyrus, but added on the basis of other sources or of the presence of a translation or an epithet of the god (these names are included in counting)
e	this divine name is only present in the list in combination with an epithet
+e	the epithet as such is present in the list, but not in combination with the name of a god
<i>Italics</i>	this name is a personified abstraction
Aligned to the right	this name is an epithet or can at least be used as an epithet

Greek name	Latin equivalent	1054	5062	5081	5416	0416	5219	5503	5538	C	L	A	M	E	Mp	S	B
Ἐγλαία – Ἀγαλλίασις	<i>Exsultatio</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἐγνεΐα	<i>Castitas</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἄδωνις – Ἀδώνιος	Adonis – Adoneus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-
Ἀθλιότης – Συμφορά	<i>Aerumna</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἀθηνᾶ	Minerva	+R	-	-	+	+R	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Αἰακός	Aeacus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Αἰγίτιπος?	Semicaper	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Αἰδημοσύνη	<i>Verecundia</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἄιδης	Inferi – Infernus – Acnerotes	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Αἰδώς	<i>Pudor</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Αἰσχροκέρδεια	<i>Cupiditas</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Αἰσχύνη	<i>Turpitude</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Αἰών	Aevum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-
Αἰώνιος	Aeternus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἀλαζονεία	<i>Vanitas</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἀλεξάνδρια		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἀλήθεια	Veritas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Ἀληκτώ	Allecto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Ἀμεριμνία	<i>Securitas</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἀμέλεια	<i>Neglegentia</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἄμμων		-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἀμφιτρίτη	Salacia – Venilia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἀνδρεία – Ἰσχύς	<i>Virtus</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-
Ἀνεξίκακος	Depulsur – Depulsor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-R	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἄνεσις?	<i>Commeatus</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἀνθοφόρος	Florifer – Flora	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
Ἀνίκητος	Invictus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-R	-	-	-	-	+	-	-

Greek name	Latin equivalent	1054	5062	5081	5416	0416	5219	5503	5538	C	L	A	M	E	Mp	S	B
Γαμήλιος	Coniugalis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Γαυρίασις	Exsultatio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Γῆ – Γαῖα	Terra – Tellus	-	e	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	e	+	+
Γῆ Μητήρ	Terra mater	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Γῆρας	Senium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Γίγαντες	Anguipedes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Γοργώ	Gorgon	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Γογγυσμός	Rumor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δαίμων	Genius – Daemon	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-R	+	e	+	+	e	-	-
Ἀγαθὸς Δαίμων	Bonus Genius	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-
Δειλία	Pavor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Δεῖμος	Metus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δημήτηρ	Ceres	+R	+	-	+	-	-	+R	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Διάβολος	Calumniator, Diabolus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Δικαιοσύνη – Δίκη	Iustitia – Aequitas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+
Διόνυσος	Liber Pater – Liber Pampineus	-	-	-	-	+	-	+R	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Διόσκοροι – Κάστωρ και Πολυδεύκης	Castores - Castor et Pollux	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Διχοστασία – Ἐριδες	Discordia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δόξα	Gloria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δυναστεία	Potentia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δυσωνία – Τιμότης	Caritas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δυστέλεια	Utilitas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δυσφημία	Infamia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Δωτήρ – Δοτήρες	Dator	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἐγγλυκία	Indulgentia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Greek name	Latin equivalent	<u>1054</u>	<u>5062</u>	<u>5081</u>	<u>5416</u>	<u>0416</u>	<u>5219</u>	<u>5503</u>	<u>5538</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>Mp</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>B</u>
Εἰδῆσις – Γνώσις	<i>Scientia</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Εἰμαρμένη – Μοῖρα	<i>Fortuna – Fatum</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Εἰρήνη	<i>Pax</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἑκάτη – Τρίοδος – Τριοδίτις ³⁷	<i>Trivia</i>	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+2	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
Ἑκατόνχειρ	<i>Centimanus</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἑκδικήσεις - Ἑκδίκησις	<i>Ultrices, - Ultrix</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Ἑλένη		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἑλευθερία	<i>Libertas</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Ἑλευθέριος	<i>Liberalis</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἑλπίς	<i>Spes</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+
Ἑνοδία	<i>Vitica</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἑνστάτης	<i>Infestus</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἑντροπή	<i>Reverentia</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἑνάλιος	<i>Quirinus – Gradivus</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	-
Ενύπνιον	<i>Somnium – Somnus</i>	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἑνώ	<i>Bellona</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	e	e	e	+	+
Ἑνώ μήτηρ Ἄρεως	<i>Bellona mater Martis</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-
Ἑνώ πολεμική	<i>Bellona</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἑπαφροδισία	<i>Felicitas</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἑπιείκεια	<i>Aequitas</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἑπιτάκτης		-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἑπόπτης – Κατόπτης	<i>Inspector Conspector</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἑπίβλεψις	<i>Contemplatio</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἑρεβος	<i>Erebus</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Ἑρκεῖος	<i>Penetralis</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἑρμῆς	<i>Mercurius</i>	+R	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ἑρινύες	<i>Furiae</i>	-	-	-	-	+R	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	+

³⁷ Only C gives Τρίοδος and Τριοδίτης (which we corrected) instead of Ἑκάτη.

Greek name	Latin equivalent	1054	5062	5081	5416	0416	5219	5503	5538	C	L	A	M	E	Mp	S	B
Ἔρως	Cupido – Amor	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ἑστία – Ἐπικουρία	Vesta – Tutela	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	+	+
Ἑσπερος	Vesper	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἑθος – Ἀγωγή	Institutio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Εὐγένεια – Εὐγενία	Ingenuitas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-R	-	-	-	-
Εὐδοξία		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Εὐλογία		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Εὐμάθεια	Experientia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Εὐμένειος	Placabilis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Εὐμενίδες	Eumenides – Furiae	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-
Εὔνοια		-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Εὐνομία – Νομία	Pales	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Εὐρετής	Inventor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Εὐρωστία	Valetudo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Εὐσέβεια	Pietas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-
Εὐτυχία	Felicitas – Occasio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+2	+	-	-	-	+	+	+
Εὐχρηστία	Utilitas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ευφροία	Ingenium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἐφιάλτης	Incubus	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Ἐξουσία	Potestas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ζεύς	Iuppiter – Iovis	-R	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	e5	e6	+	+	+	+	+
(Ζεύς) Ἀστράπτων Ἀστραπαῖος – Ἀστραπῆς ³⁸	(Iovis) Coruscans – Fulgurans – Fulminans	-	-	-	-	+e	-	-	-	+e R	+	+	-	-	+e	-	-
(Ζεύς) Βροντεῖος – Βροντῶν	(Iovis) Tonans – Tonitralis – Nutritur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+e	+	+	-	-	+e2	-	-
(Ζεύς) Κεραύνιος	(Iovis) Fulminator – Fulminans	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+e R	+	+	-	-	+e	-	-

³⁸ It is uncertain whether this was meant in *Pap. Lugd. Bat.* XXV 8.8 as the genitive of a personified abstraction or as an epithet of Zeus or another god (cf. ed. pr., p. 21).

<u>Greek name</u>	<u>Latin equivalent</u>	<u>1054</u>	<u>5062</u>	<u>5081</u>	<u>5416</u>	<u>0416</u>	<u>5219</u>	<u>5503</u>	<u>5538</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>A</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>Mp</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>B</u>
(Ζεύς) Κτήσιος	(Iovis) Pecunialis, Specularis Peculiaris	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+e	+	+	-	-	+e	-	-
(Ζεύς) Μέγιστος	(Iovis) Maximus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+e R	+	+	-	-	+e	-	-
(Ζεύς) Ξένιος	Ospitalis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+e	-	-
Ἥβη	Iuventas – Iuventus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-
ἥλιος	Sol	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+
Ἡμέρα	Dies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-
Ἡμίθεος – Ἡμίθεοι	Semideus - Indigetes	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-R	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Ἥρα	Iuno	+R	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	e	e	+	+	+
Ἥρα Βασίλισσα	Iuno Regina	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
(Ἥρα) Εἰλείθυια	(Iuno) Lucina – Nixa	-	+e	-	-	-	-	-	-	+e	+e	-	+e	+e	+	-	-
Ἡρακλῆς	Hercules	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Ἡφαιστος	Vulcanus	+R	-	-	-	+R	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	+	+
Ἡώς	Aurora	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+2	-	+	-	+	-	-
Θάνατος	Mors	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Θειότης – Μεγαλειότης	Maiestas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Θέμις – Θεμιτόν	Fas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Θεοὶ Ἀθάνατοι	Dii Immortales	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-
Θεοὶ Ἐπίγειοι	Dii Terreni – Dii Terrestres	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-R	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Θεοὶ Θαλάσσιοι	Dii Marini	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-R	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Θεοὶ Ἴλαιοι	Dii Propitii – Dii Propicii	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-

Greek name	Latin equivalent	1054	5062	5081	5416	0416	5219	5503	5538	C	L	A	M	E	MP	S	B
Θεοὶ Καταχθόνιοι – Θεοὶ Ὑπόγειοι – (Θεοὶ) Δαίμονες – Δαίμονες καταχθόνιοι	Dii Inferni – Dii Inferi – Manes Dii	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-R	+	+	-	+2	+	-	-
Θεοὶ Κατοικίδιοι – Ἥρωες Κατοικίδιοι	Dii Penates – Lares Familiares – Lares, Genii	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	-	-
Θεοὶ Κύδιοι	Dii Gloriosissimi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Θεοὶ Μέγιστοι	Dii Maximi – Dii Magni	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Θεοὶ Οὐράνιοι	Dii Caelestes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-R	+	+	-R	+	+	-	-
Θεοὶ Πατῶροι – Θεοὶ Πάτριοι	(Dii) Penates - Dii Patrii - Dii Parentes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-R	-	-	+	+	+2	-	-
Θεοὶ Ὑψιστοὶ	Dii Summi – Dii Superi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+2	-	-	-
Θέσφατον	Fata – Fatum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-
Θεσμοφόρος	Legifera	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Θέτις		-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Θυρεός	Ianus Pater	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἴρις	Iris	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἰρονία		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ἰσις – Φαρία	Isis	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	+
Ἰσχυς	<i>Fortitudo</i> – <i>Virtus</i>	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Καθήκων	Aequus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Κακοεπία		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Καλή θεά	Bona dea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Κάλλιστος	Optimus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Καπιτωλίνος	Capitolinus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Καρποφόρος	Frugifer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-

Greek name	Latin equivalent	1054	5062	5081	5416	0416	5219	5503	5538	C	L	A	M	E	Mp	S	B
Καύχησις	<i>Gloria – Vanitas</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Κένταυρος	Centaurus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Κέρβερος	Cerberus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Κέρδος	<i>Lucrum</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Κληδών – Οἷησις	<i>Opinio – Rumor?</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-
Κληρονομία	Hereditus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Κλύτιος		-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Κλώθω	Clotho	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Κόπος	Labor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Κόρη – Κούρα	Proserpina – Puella	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-
Κουρήτες	Ludiones	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Κρόνος	Saturnus	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	e	e	+	+	+
Κρόνος μέγιστος ³⁹	Saturnus pater	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Κτίστης	Conditior	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Κυβέλη	Cybele	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Κύδιστος	Optimus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Λάμναι	Lamiae	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Λάχεςις	Lachesis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Λευκοθέα	Mater Matuta Albucina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
Λήθη – Λησμοσύνη	Oblivio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Ληναῖος Εἰραφιώτης	Liber pater	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Λητώ	Latona	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Λιμός	<i>Fames</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Λιτότης	<i>Frugalitas</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Λοιμός	Pestis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Λοσιτέλεια	<i>Utilitas</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Μαῖα	Maia	-	-	-	+R	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-

³⁹ In Mp Κρονοςμεγιστος ianuspater is only found in a short additional list of theonyms at the very end of the schoolbook (cf. G. GOETZ 1892, p. 343)

Greek name	Latin equivalent	1054	5062	5081	5416	0416	5219	5503	5538	C	L	A	M	E	Mp	S	B
Μέγαιρα	Megaera	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Μειλίχιος – Μιλίκιος	Milichius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Μεμοφίτης – Μεΐζ?	Sator	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Μήτηρ	Mater	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Μήτηρ Θεῶν	Mater Deum – Mater Deorum	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Μήτηρ Μεγάλη – Μεγάλη Μήτηρ	Mater Magna	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Μεστασύτμιδος ⁴⁰		-	-	-	-	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Μίθρας		-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Μίνως	Minos	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Μῖσος	Odium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Μνήμη	Memoria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Μνημοσύνη	Moneta	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	+	+
Μούσαι	Musae – Camenae	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+
Μοῖραι – Κῆρες	Fata – Parcae	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-
Μόρος – Θάνατος	Letum	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ναΐδες	Naiades	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Νέμεσις – Ἐκδίκησις	Ultrix	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-
Νηρεΐδες – Νηρηΐδες	Nereidae – Salaciae – Veniliae	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
Νίκη	Victoria	-	-	-	-	+R	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-
Νικητής	Victor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Νικηφόρος		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Νόσος	Morbus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Νύμφαι	Nymphae	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	+ 2	-	-
Νυκτινόμη	Noctiluca	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Νύξ	Nox	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-

⁴⁰ In the ed. pr. L. Amundsen read Ταούτμιδος, interpreted as the genitive of the god Θάουτ (Θαῦτ). But according to H.C. YOUTIE, *Critical Notes on Michigan Ostraca*, CPh 37 (1942), p. 142-149 (148-149) Μεστασύτμιδος is the correct reading.

Greek name	Latin equivalent	1054	5062	5081	5416	0416	5219	5503	5538	C	L	A	M	E	Mp	S	B
Ὀλιγορία	<i>Desidia</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ολύμπιος	Olimpius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ὁμόνοια	<i>Concordia</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	+
Ὀνειρος	Visus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Ὀργή – Ὀργαί	<i>Ira – Irae, Furiae</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-
Ὀρθόσιος	Sator – Rector	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-
Ὀσιρις		-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Οὐρανία	Urania – Caelestis	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-
Οὐράνιος	Caelestis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+e	+e	-	+e	+	-	-
Οὐρανός		-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Παλαίμων	Portunus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
ΠΑΝΑΣΚΕΙΑ – ΠΑΝΙΚΙΑ		-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	e	-	-
Πανακία δωτηωντις?	Pola Mater	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Πανίσκος – Πάν	Pan – Silvanus	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
Παντοκράτωρ	Omnipotens	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Παράνοια	<i>Dementia</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Παρθένος	Virgo	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Πάροχος	Praestabilis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Πειθώ	<i>Suado</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Περιποιών?	Tributor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Περσεφόνη	Proserpina	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+
Πηγγή	Fons	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-
Πίστις	<i>Fides</i>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
Πλούτων	Ditis Pater – Dis Pater – Diespiter – Pluto	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Πόθος	Amor – Desiderium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	+

Greek name	Latin equivalent	1054	5062	5081	5416	0416	5219	5503	5538	C	L	A	M	E	Mp	S	B
Πολυστέφανος	Feronia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-
Πόνος	Labor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Πόρος		-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ποσειδῶν	Neptunus	+R	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Πραξιδική	Laverna	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
Πραότης ⁴¹	Clementia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Πρίαπος	Priapus – Fascinus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+	-	-
Πρόβλεψις	Provisio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Προειδήσις	Provisio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Πρόνοια	Providentia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	+
Προσδοκία		-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Προσωπεΐα	Larvae	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Πρωτότοκος	Primigenia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Πύλαιος	Ianus Geminus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	-	+R	-	-
Πῦρ	Ignis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	e	-	-	-	-	-
Αἰώνιον Πῦρ ⁴²	Aeternus Ignis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-
Πυριφλεγέθων	Phlegeton	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Ῥέα	Ops – Mater Magna	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-R	+	+	+	+	+2	+	+
Σαβάδιος	Sabadius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Σαμβαθίς		-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Σέραπις – Σάραπις	Serapis	-	+R	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-
Σάτυροι – Σάτυρος	Satyri – Satyriscus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Σελήνη	Luna	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+
Σεμέλη	Semele – Libera	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Σεμέλη μήτηρ τοῦ Διονύσου – Σεμέλη Διονύσου μήτηρ	Semele mater Liberi patris	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-

⁴¹ The reading Πραοτηβεπηκία (Goetz, p. 291) in Mp should probably be corrected to Πραότης Ἐπιείκεια.

⁴² Thus we interpret conpyr (Goetz, p. 83) in A.

Greek name	Latin equivalent	1054	5062	5081	5416	0416	5219	5503	5538	C	L	A	M	E	Mp	S	B
Σιλβανός	Silvanus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Σιληνός	Nysigena – Silenus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-
Σκύλλα	Scylla	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Στέρησις	Egestas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Στρούφιος	Vortumnus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	+	-	-
Στύξ	Styx	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Συνεργός	Diuturna	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
Σωτηρία	Salvatio – Salubritas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+2	-	-
Ἀγαθή Σωτηρία	Bona Salus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Σωτήριος – Σωτήρ	Salutaris	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Σωφοροσύνη	Pudicitia – Castitas	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	-
Τάρταρος	Tartarus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Τιμή	Honor	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+
Τιμωρία	Kolasis	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Τισιφώνη	Tisiphone	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Τροπαιοῦχος	Feretrius	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Τύχη	Fortuna	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	e	+	+
Τύχη Πρωτογενής	Fortuna Primigenia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Τύχη Ὑπήκοος	Fortuna Obsequens	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἰσχυρὰ Τύχη	Fortis Fortuna	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ἀγαθὴ Τύχη	Bona Fortuna	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ὑγία	Salus – Sanitas	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+2	-	+	+	+
Ὑλέτης	Silvanus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ὑμέναιος	Hymenaeus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Ὑπατος	Consul	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Ὑπνος	Somnus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	+	+	-	-
Ὑπόπτεσις	Suspicio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Greek name	Latin equivalent	1054	5062	5081	5416	0416	5219	5503	5538	C	L	A	M	E	Mp	S	B
Υψιστος	Summus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-R	-	-	-	+e	+	-	-
Φήμη	Fama	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Φειδωλία – Φειδώς	Parsimonia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Φόβος	Metus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Φροντίδες	Curae, Ultrices	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Φύσις	Natura	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Χάος	Chaos – Hiatus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Χαρα	Gaudium	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
Χάριτες	Gratiae	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	-	-
Χάρων	Orcus – Charon	-	+R	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
Χθών	Terra – Tellus – Terra Mater	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-
Χρησμός – Κλήρος	Sors	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Χρόνος	Tempus	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
ῥΩραι	Horae	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-
ῶφελία		-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

There are 317 items in total included in this table, 87 from the ancient material, the papyri and the ostraca, 291 from the medieval manuscripts of the *Hermeneumata*. There is an overlap of 62 items (in bold), which are represented in the papyri and ostraca as well as in the *Hermeneumata* schoolbooks. This latter group is of course the most important for the present research.

Names of gods

Four subcategories can be distinguished within the overlapping items: names of divinities or related mythological figures, names of personified abstracts, names that cover a broader category of divine beings and epithets:

- Gods and mythological figures: Ἀφροδίτη (12)⁴³, Δημήτηρ (12), Ἑρμῆς (12), Ἥρα (12), Ἀθηνᾶ (11), Ποσειδῶν (11), Ἄρτεμις (10), Διόνυσος (10), Ζεύς (10), Λητώ (10), Ἄρης (9), Ἑρως (9), Ἡρακλῆς (9), Ῥέα (9), Σάραπις (9), Γῆ (8), Μοῦσαι (8), Πάν (8), Ἥφαιστος (8), Ἀσκληπιός (7), Διόσκοροι (7), Ἐφιάλτης (7), Ἥλιος (7), Ἴσις (7), Περσεφόνη (7), Κρόνος (7), Ἀπόλλων (6), Εἰλείθυια (6), Χάρων (6), Ἑκάτη (5), Ἐρινύες (5), Ἑστία (5), Κόρη (5), Σεμέλη (5), Ἄιδης (4), Μαῖα (4), Νύμφαι (4), Ἄτλας (2).
- Personified abstracts: Τύχη (8), Ὀμόνοια (7), Ὑγίεια (7), Θάνατος (5), Νέμεσις (4), Νίκη (4), Εὐγένεια (3), Ἀλήθεια (2), Εἰρήνη (2), Ἴσχυς (3), Πανακεία (2), Ἐνύπνιον (2).
- Other divine beings: Ἡρώες κατοικίδιοι (6), Δαίμων (5) and Ἡμίθεος (3).
- Epithets: Μήτηρ θεῶν (7), (Ἥρα) Βασίλισσα (6), Ἀγαθὸς Δαίμων (4), Οὐρανία (4), Γῆ Μήτηρ (3), Παρθένος (2), Μήτηρ Μεγάλη (2), and possibly Ἀστράπτων - Ἀστραπῆς (5) and Μεμφίτης - Μεφίς (2) of which the interpretation remains uncertain.

It is striking that these lists in both the papyri and the *Hermeneumata* schoolbooks remained almost exclusively pagan, even in a society that became more and more influenced by Christianity, with the exception of some unique names such as Βελίαρ and διάβολος in E⁴⁴. With the conservative primary educational program as their vehicle the Olympic divinities were most able to preserve their place in school literature. Besides, the prevalence of the most important traditional divinities of the

⁴³ The number between round brackets indicates the number of attestations in all the sources considered here.

⁴⁴ For the papyri cf. H.-I. MARROU 1965, p. 466: «...au V^e, au VI^e siècle, les petits chrétiens du Fayoum continuent, sans scandaliser personne, à apprendre à écrire en recopiant des listes de noms mythologiques: Europe, Pasiphaë»; for the *Hermeneumata*; cf. A.C. DIONISOTTI 1988, p. 90-91. For the *Hermeneumata*, only in the *Hermeneumata Vaticana* the *capitula* section is reorganized according to the book of *Genesis* and the reduction in the list of divine names is balanced by the considerable amount of epithets for the Holy Trinity (cf. Goetz p. 422ff., *Hermeneumata Vaticana*, o.c., p. 13ff.).

Greek pantheon in the *Hermeneumata* as well as in the papyrus fragments was extended to some other gods of non-Greek origin, who had become important in Greco-roman cult, such as Isis and Sarapis.

Also the relative frequency of some personified abstracts such as Τύχη (*Fortuna*), Ὁμόνοια (*Concordia*) and Ὑγίεια (*Valetudo*) in the preserved lists can be explained by the importance of these personifications not only in the Greek, but also in the Roman world. The repeated appearance and depiction of these abstracts on coins indicate their impact in everyday life⁴⁵. Admittedly this does not hold true for the majority of the abstracts, especially in the *Hermeneumata* and in particular in C where they are much more numerous than in any of the other lists and where many of them are based on more or less philosophical personifications of virtues and vices. However, the presence of these abstracts in lists of divine names has convincing parallels in the monolingual papyrus lists, such as *P. Lund VI 11* (Ὁμόνοια, Ἀλήθεια, Εἰρήνη) and the Astrampsychus oracle papyrus (Ἴσχυς, Πανακεία). Moreover, comparable abstracts, but completely unknown in the preserved *Hermeneumata* lists and without a historically confirmed tradition of religious personification, are also attested in the papyri (oracle papyrus: προσδοκία, ὄφελία; *P. Lund VI 11*: κακοέπεια). This again proves the overall affinity between ancient monolingual god lists and their bilingual medieval successors and should warn us against interpreting the abundance of abstracts in the list of Celtis as due to a later addition.

The epithets are much better represented in the *Hermeneumata* than in the papyri, especially in the versions C and Mp, where an extensive list of epithets, probably to be connected with Zeus, has been inserted in the beginning of the catalogue. Yet they have convincing ancient parallels, not only in the bilingual papyrus list (Γῆ Μήτηρ, Ἥρα Βασίλισσα, Μήτηρ Μεγάλη) but also in monolingual examples, such as the oracle papyrus (Μήτηρ Θεῶν, Παρθένος, Οὐρανία). In the same papyrus Κλύτιος and Ἐπιτάκτης, and in *P. Lund VI 11* Νικηφόρος, which are all unparalleled in the *Hermeneumata*, prove that such epithets were a fixed ingredient of such god-lists.

Headings

In order to separate each semantic section from the previous one, the *capitula* in the *Hermeneumata Pseudo-Dositheana* offer specific headings.

⁴⁵ Cf. N. BAPLU, *APF* 52 (2006), p. 14-30.

Mostly (in C, L, A, M, S, B) there is a division in male (θεῶν ὀνόματα *deorum nomina*) and female entities (θεάων ὀνόματα *dearum nomina*)⁴⁶. This recalls the bilingual god-list LDAB 5062, which offers the same division, although only the second heading, announcing the female deities, has been preserved. In the *Herm. Einsidlensia* there is one heading ὀνόματα θεῶν *nomina deorum*, under which are listed names of male and female divinities, though separated from each other without specific heading (Goetz p. 236). This is followed by a section Περί τῶν ἐν τῷ Ἅιδῃ *De iis quae in inferno* (Goetz p. 237), which is again paralleled in LDAB 5062 (l. 7-10) where four divinities related to the underworld have been grouped, albeit without a heading: Sarapis, Charon, Thanatos, Hypnos (here called Enypnion), the last three of which are also represented in the Einsiedeln list.

Apart from such ‘section headings’, some lists are also introduced by a general heading: in L the list is preceded by Περί θεῶν (Goetz p. 8; Flammini p. 14), extended in C to Περί θεῶν ἀθανασίων. A general heading is also attested in some of the monolingual papyrus lists, such as θεῶν (LDAB 5416) and Θεοὶ χρηματισταὶ καὶ σημάντορες (LDAB 416). One may reasonably guess, then, that in monolingual god-lists as well headings were often added, especially when they were integrated into a larger whole.

Order

Apart from these general divisions preceded by headings, four tendencies can be determined. The list starts in all cases, except in S and B, with an enumeration of categories of divinities, such as θεοὶ θαλάσσιοι and θεοὶ οὐράνιοι. Next in line in the list of the male divinities are Κρόνος and Ζεύς (followed by a list of epithets). In the list of the female divinities Rhea and Hera are usually situated among the first named goddesses, followed by some epithets of Hera (Ἥρα Βασίλισσα and Εἰλειθια), then by other female divinities. Finally the personified abstracts tend to conclude the god-lists. Epithets have been added often immediately after the

⁴⁶ The *Herm. Montepessulana* gives the most incoherent impression as it offers the heading τῶν δώδεκα under which are classified important Olympic divinities, but also βαί-
τυλος *aviaddir* and καρποφόρος *frugifer*. Then there is a heading θεῶν λοιπῶν *deorum reliquorum*, followed by a long list of epithets, before proceeding to a structure comparable to that of the other versions. But male and female divinities and personified abstracts are mentioned at random, and after the remains of a traditional division (Goetz p. 291: θεῶν *deorum* and θεάων *dearum*) we have only one male divinity classified under this heading.

gods to which they belong, especially when they are listed in combinations of god name and epithet. But in other cases they seem to have been inserted at random, as is shown already in the oracle papyrus; where they are listed without the presence of a divine name in col. 3.1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 13. Apparently the bilingual list (*LDAB* 5062) shares most of the described tendencies with the *Hermeneumata*, but apart from this, both in the papyri and in the medieval sources, associations can be made sometimes between subsequent divinities.

TABLE 2

The second table offers the same information as the first, but presents the items in a different way and for a different purpose. The number below each of the sources, the papyri and ostraca on the one hand and the *Hermeneumata* on the other, corresponds to the total amount of items from this particular source included in our study. The numbers within the grid refer to the number of correspondences between a particular papyrus or ostrakon and a single version of the *Hermeneumata* (e.g. *LDAB* 0416 and M have 23 items in common). The last column and the last row, then, contain the number of items a papyrus fragment has in common with any of the *Hermeneumata* versions and the number of items one version of the *Hermeneumata* shares with any of the papyri. Consequently the right corner gives the total number of overlaps between any papyrus and any *Hermeneumata* list.

	<u>LDAB</u> <u>1054</u> 11	<u>LDAB</u> <u>5062</u> 23	<u>LDA</u> <u>B</u> <u>5081/3</u>	<u>LDAB</u> <u>5416</u> 13	<u>LDAB</u> <u>0416</u> 42	<u>LDAB</u> <u>5219</u> 7	<u>LDAB</u> <u>5503</u> 5	<u>LDAB</u> <u>5538</u> 13	<u>Total</u> 87
<u>C</u> 188	8	18	0	9	23	1	3	5	47
<u>L</u> 86	9	15	1	9	20	3	4	3	39
<u>A</u> 49	8	11	1	7	17	3	4	2	30
<u>M</u> 87	10	16	2	7	22	2	3	5	43
<u>E</u> 104	10	16	2	8	17	2	3	2	35
<u>Mp</u> 138	11	19	2	10	20	3	4	3	44
<u>S</u> 37	10	11	1	9	14	2	3	3	28
<u>B</u> 37	10	11	1	9	14	2	3	3	28
<u>Total</u> 291	11	23	2	11	27	3	4	5	62

The most important information we can deduce from this second table is a remarkable general correspondence between the papyrological material and the material found in the versions of the *Hermeneumata*. In particular *LDAB* 1054, 5062, 5081, 5416 and 5503 stand out by their high correspondence rate, and *LDAB* 1054 and 5062 have the highest (100%) among the papyri. In the case of *LDAB* 1054, this is not surprising, as the list contains ten Olympic well-known divinities. But the 100% correspondence rate of *LDAB* 5062, the bilingual god-list, is more conspicuous and points to a close relationship with the medieval manuscripts.

The *Hermeneumata* C, M and Mp have the highest correspondence rate among the versions of the medieval schoolbooks. In proportion, however, to the total amount of items included C and Mp have the lowest correspondence rate, which is due to the large amount of adjectival epithets and personified abstracts in their god-list. Conversely, S and B which have preserved, like the papyri, no epithets and only the main figures of the Greek pantheon, have the highest proportional correspondence rate as 28 from the total of the 37 items correspond to at least one of the papyrus fragments.

The low number of correspondences in E is caused by the presence of an additional separate category of divinities residing in the Underworld, of which most are unparalleled in the papyri. But this may be accidental considering the short sequence of 3 Underworld gods in *LDAB* 0416 which correspond with the Einsiedeln list.

To conclude we would like to restate some modest, but important findings. In the first place this study confirms the statement of N.E. Priest and J. Kramer about the bilingual papyrus list *LDAB* 5062. The 100% correspondence rate of this fragment with the god-lists of the *Hermeneumata*, its resemblance in structure and even, although to a lesser degree, in the order of the names indicate its close relationship with the thematically organised lists of the *Hermeneumata* and the popularity of such lists in Greco-Roman society of ancient Egypt even before the 3rd century AD. Besides, this research shows that there was at least an undeniable general correspondence between the monolingual ancient god-lists and the medieval manuscripts⁴⁷. Even more than the merely quantitative analysis of our fragmentary data, the investigation of the connections between the individual lists is important here. For example, the 5 correspondences

⁴⁷ Another indication of the influence from monolingual on bilingual educational texts is the discovery of two bilingual papyrus fragments containing the fables of Aesop (*LDAB* 0138) and Babrius (*LDAB* 0434). These are presumably inspired by the short and moralizing texts used in monolingual education: cf. J. KRAMER 1996, p. 36.

between *P. Lund* VI 11 and the *Hermeneumata*, 4 of which are personified abstracts, illustrate the basic affinity of the papyrus list with a complex and entirely preserved list as in C, which presents the same incongruous mixing of well known god names, epithets, names of mythological figures and personified abstracts, some of which are known from ancient cults but others only attested in rare lexicographical sources.

This connection with lexicographical literature is another common characteristic of the monolingual and bilingual lists, ancient as well as medieval: to give but one example from the papyri, *κακοέπεια* (in *P. Lund* VI 11) is only attested in Byzantine lexis (Photius, Suda, Ps.-Zonaras)⁴⁸, and for the *Hermeneumata* *Βαιτύλος*, the name of the stone devoured by Kronos instead of his son, is only known from learned lexicographical sources and from the grammarian Herodianus (*De pros. cath.* 3,1 p. 163)⁴⁹. So the similarity which K. Worp recently detected between ancient school word lists and Hesychius⁵⁰ is apparently confirmed here. For our thematically organized lists the lexicographical sources should be traced into the tradition of the semantic onomastica. A concrete indication of the influence of scholarly monolingual onomastica on the bilingual *Hermeneumata* is the connection between the structure and organisation of the lexical fields in the great onomasticon of Pollux and the 'chapter division' of the *Hermeneumata*: both of them have the lists of gods on top⁵¹. In addition, K.-D. Fischer has pointed to correspondences between the technical terminology of medical equipment used in Pollux 4 and 10 and in the *Herm. Monacensia*⁵². Onomastic lexicography was still widespread in the two first centuries AD but had its origin and acme in Hellenistic scholarship⁵³. *LDAB* 1054, the so-called 'livre d'écolier'

⁴⁸ Cf. N. BAPLU 2006, p. 22.

⁴⁹ For the ancient lexigraphical origin of some of the lemmata in the *capitula*, see already G. GOETZ 1892, p. 122, K. KORHONEN 1996, p. 108.

⁵⁰ Cf. K.A. Worp, *P. Genova II 52: a Link with Hesychius?*, *ZPE* 156 (2006), p. 185-193; S. TORALLAS TOVAR - K.A. Worp, *To the Origins of Greek Stenography (P. Monts. Roca I)*, Abadía de Montserrat 2006, p.45-46, 213-265.

⁵¹ Cf. E. TAGLIAFERRO 2004, p. 59.

⁵² K.-D. FISCHER, *Die Listen medizinischer Gerätschaften im Onomastikon des Pollux und in den Hermeneumata Monacensia*, in: *From Epidaurus to Salerno*. Symposium held at the European University Centre for Cultural Heritage, Ravello, April 1990, ed. by A. Krug, Rixensart 1992, p. 139-146.

⁵³ On the onomastica in lexicographical tradition, see R. Tosi, *La lessicografia e la paremiografia in età alessandrina ed il loro sviluppo successivo*, in: F. Montanari (ed.), *La philologie grecque à l'époque hellénistique et romaine*, Genève 1994, p. 149-178; K. Alpers, *Lexikographie*, in: *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* V, 2001, col. 195-199.

from the 3rd century BC, is our oldest preserved specimen of a schoolbook clearly influenced in its structure by the learned onomastica, and at the same time it is our oldest papyrus with a list of gods.

Finally the dissimilarities within and between the two groups of texts, the papyri on the one hand and the medieval manuscripts on the other, even in this small section of the glossaries, seem to confirm the opinion of Dionisotti that we cannot speak of a traditional stemma or of an ‘archetype’ for the *Hermeneumata* schoolbooks in general nor for each of its sections. Items may have been added or removed according to the wishes of the individual student. But one should also consider the possibility that the *capitula* ultimately went back to learned and more extensive onomastic lists which were simplified or excerpted in view of their use for didactic purposes. The massive god-list copied by Celtis contains several hapax legomena which may have been derived from lexicographical scholarship: whereas Ὑλέτης might still be interpreted as a desperate translation of the Latin Silvanus by someone who no longer understood that the Greek pendant of Silvanus was the god Pan, the hapax Γαυρίασις and Προείδησις may well go back to lost lexicographical sources. If the rare abstract κακοέπεια found its way into a monolingual school word list, why would these two unattested abstracts not have been adopted from a learned model into an ancient bilingual schoolbook?

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